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Uttarakhand High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 615 (UTT)

Heera Singh Bora v. State of Uttarakhand

2016-09-22

ALOK SINGH, K.M.JOSEPH

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.M. Joseph, J. There is a delay of 27 days in filing SPA Nos. 256, 257 & 258 of 2016. In the circumstances, the Applications for condonation of delay stand allowed and the delay stand condoned. 2. These five appeals raise common questions and, therefore, we dispose of the same by this common judgment. 3. Pursuant to an advertisement issued on 24.02.2014, calling for applications from eligible candidates for appointment as Assistant Teacher L.T. Grade, appellants, who are the writ petitioners, filed their applications. They, thereafter, sat in the written test, which was held on 29th March, 2015 and the result was declared on 13th January, 2016. It appears that they came out successful in the written test and, thereafter, they were called for counseling on two occasions. Thereafter, the appellants stood informed that they were not included in the final select list, for the reason that they did not possess TET as on the date of the advertisement. The case of the appellants, on the other hand, is that they came to possess the said qualification before declaration of the result of the written examination. They filed the writ petitions contending that though they did not possess TET as on the date of examination, they had the requisite qualification, by the time, the results were declared, and that was sufficient. The writ petitions were dismissed, and hence the appeals. 4. We heard Shri Rajendra Dobhal, learned Senior Counsel in Special Appeal No. 245 of 2016 and Shri Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in rest of the appeals. We also heard Shri Paresh Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the State. 5. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, Shri Rajendra Dobhal would only rely on Rule 8(2) of the Uttarakhand Subordinate Education (Trained Graduates Grade) Services Rules, 2014 and contend that Rule 8(2) of the said Rules provide only for possession of qualification of TET by the time of selection/appointment. He would submit that when the Rules were clear, then there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to reject the contention of the appellants. By the time, the selection process was underway, they had acquired the said qualification. Emphasis laid is on the use of the words “Recruitments/Appointment”. Therefore, it is contended that the Rules contemplate that it is sufficient that before appointment, the candidates possess the qualification of TET. By the time, the selection process was underway, they had acquired the said qualification. Emphasis laid is on the use of the words “Recruitments/Appointment”. Therefore, it is contended that the Rules contemplate that it is sufficient that before appointment, the candidates possess the qualification of TET. He also contended that it is not an academic qualification. 6. Shri Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, in the rest of the appeals, would also contend that the effect of Rule 8(2) has not been considered by the learned Single Judge in its proper perspective. It is pointed out that we are dealing with the category of Teachers called Assistant Teacher, L.T. Grade, who are expected to take classes for 9th and 10th. In order to give life to Article 21A, Parliament enacted the Right to Education Act. Under the same, NCTE was constituted as the authority competent to declare the qualifications. NCTE declared the qualifications by its Notification in August, 2010. NCTE has not declared the possession of qualification of TET as essentiality for appointment for the post of Assistant Teacher L.T. Grade. It is contended that a person, who is appointed as an Assistant Teacher, LT Grade, may have to take classes for the 6th to 8th standard. The Rules were made in the year 2014 TET was not an essential qualification for being appointed as an Assistant Teacher, LT Grade. It was not the requirement under the mandate of NCTE that a person to be appointed as an Assistant Teacher LT Grade should possess TET. In fact, it is submitted that in the State of U.P., TET is not insisted even now for being appointed as an Assistant Teacher, LT Grade. It is further submitted that this is a case, where the selection progressed on the basis of the applications submitted by the appellants, whereunder they were permitted to sit in the written examination in which they came out successful. They were called for two rounds of counseling. At this stage, it is not open for the State to resile from its earlier position and by their conduct, they are estopped from rejecting the candidature of the appellants, when the appellants have all along been led by the conduct of the State in treating them as qualified. They were called for two rounds of counseling. At this stage, it is not open for the State to resile from its earlier position and by their conduct, they are estopped from rejecting the candidature of the appellants, when the appellants have all along been led by the conduct of the State in treating them as qualified. It is their case that the respondents also understood that it is sufficient that the candidates possess the qualifications by the time they are appointed. There was scarcity of teachers with TET in the State. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. Manoj Tiwari would contend that the appellants have a fundamental right to be considered for appointment, and this right has been observed in its breach by the State by rejecting the candidature of the appellants. It is further contended that the qualification of TET is not an academic qualification. In this regard, he would submit that the academic qualifications are those qualifications, which must be possessed as on the date of the advertisement, or on the last date fixed under the advertisement for submitting the applications. This becomes evident according to him, on a perusal of the manner in which Rules has been framed. That is to say, Rule 8(1) deals with the essential educational qualification, which must be possessed by the candidates. TET figures in Rule 8(2) and in Rule 8(2) there is reference to the requirement that it should be possessed by the time of the selection/appointment. Therefore, the Rule-makers considered TET as an additional requirement and not as an essential academic qualification. Therefore, he would submit that the principle of law that the qualification must be possessed by a candidate at least by the last date fixed under the advertisement, would not be applicable in the case of TET, which can be acquired upto the time the candidate is considered for appointment. He would submit that the Court may bear in mind the cardinal principle, which is applicable in the field of interpretation of statutes, which is the golden Rule of interpretation that when the words are clear whatever may be the harsh consequences which may flow from the same, full effect must be given to the words as they stand and there is no scope for diluting the effect of those words. Shri Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that in regard to the candidates falling under category III, i.e. departmental candidates, for whom, 10 per cent vacancies are reserved, this requirement of TET is not being insisted upon and it has been diluted and the candidates are being treated with discrimination, i.e. whereas, in the case of the appellants, who fall under the direct recruitment quota, their candidature have been rejected on the ground that they did not possess TET qualification as on the date of advertisement; in regard to the candidates, who were the departmental candidates and working as teachers, for whom only 10 per cent quota is reserved, TET is not being insisted. He sought to draw support from the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Justice Chandrashekaraiah Vs. Janekere C. Krishna and others, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 117 , Shankar Raju Vs. Union of India reported in (2011) 2 SCC 132 and as also B.P.L. Limited Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Cochin reported in (2015) 13 SCC 220. 7. Per contra, learned Chief Standing Counsel Shri Paresh Tripathi would address the following contentions before us. 8. He would draw our attention to the language used in Rule 8(1) and 8(2). He would submit that Rule 8(1), in fact, contemplates possession of various qualifications of various posts coming thereunder, and he would submit that, in fact, words used in Rule 8(1) are that a candidate must possess the qualifications for his appointment; whereas in regard to the qualification mentioned in Rule 8(2), it is submitted that Rule 8(2) refers to certain categories, in which qualification of TET is not required. In Rule 8(2), the words used are “the requirement is that candidates must possess the qualification mentioned at the time of selection/appointment”, which, in fact, is even more stringent. The result of acceptance of the appellants’ arguments that in regard to the qualifications mentioned in Rule 8(1), the qualification may be possessed only by the time of the appointment, would certainly produce a most anomalous result which is, in fact, not even the case of the appellants. 9. Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel would contend that as far as the candidates falling under Rule 5 (3) are concerned, they fall in a separate category. 9. Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel would contend that as far as the candidates falling under Rule 5 (3) are concerned, they fall in a separate category. In regard to the said category, the Rules were amended on 13.05.2014, relaxing the requirement and making it not mandatory that they should possess the qualification of TET. In fact, according to the learned Chief Standing Counsel, even under the regulations issued by NCTE, TET was not required for the teachers, who are already working, and he further posed the question as to how the appellants can get the advantage of the argument based on differential treatment accorded to the departmental candidates. In this regard, he would point out that appellants have not challenged the Rules, making it mandatory that the candidates in the direct recruitment quota should possess the qualification of TET. The advertisement, which has been framed in accordance with the Rules, also remains unchallenged. Therefore, no prejudice is caused to the appellants and no grievance can be raised by the appellants on the basis of the differential treatment accorded to the departmental candidates, who fall under the different category altogether under the Rules. In fact, he would submit that NCTE issued clarification in 2013 that in Uttarakhand where persons are appointed as Assistant Teacher L.T. Grade in schools, in view of the fact that the Assistant Teacher L.T. Grade are often appointed in schools, where though they are ordinarily expected to take classes for 9th and 10th standard, they would also have to cater to the requirement of classes 6th to 8th, the qualification mentioned in Rule 8(2) was provided for. As regards the plea of estoppel, it is submitted that it is not a case where in the first place, the final selection had taken place. He would point out that the complaint of the appellants is that though they underwent the process of selection; but, in the final select list, their names do not figure. 10. We are concerned in this batch of cases with the post of Assistant Teacher L.T. Grade. The qualification in regard to the same has been fixed in the statutory rules which were made in the year 2014. It is after a few days of enactment of the Rules that the advertisement was issued on 24.2.2014. The appellants applied pursuant to the said advertisement. The qualification in regard to the same has been fixed in the statutory rules which were made in the year 2014. It is after a few days of enactment of the Rules that the advertisement was issued on 24.2.2014. The appellants applied pursuant to the said advertisement. At the outset, we must notice the most salient feature in these cases, namely, not only they had applied pursuant to the advertisement; but, they participated in the process, accepting the terms of advertisement. There is no challenge to the statutory rules or to the advertisement. Therefore, we have to take the statutory rules and the advertisement, as they stand. In the advertisement, as noticed by the learned Single Judge, it is relevant to notice two Clauses, English translation of which, reads as follows:- “Uttarakhand Technical Education Board does not advice any candidate as to his qualifications. As such a candidate must carefully study the terms and conditions of the entire advertisement and only if he is satisfied that he fulfills the eligibility requirement should he apply. A brief description of the syllabus for the written examination has been given at column no. II. Only such candidates should apply for the post who fulfill the minimum eligibility conditions for the post prior to the date of advertisement.” “All candidates who apply for the post must ensure that they fulfill all the eligibility conditions for the post. The permission to appear in the examination is purely provisional in nature which is subject to the verification of the eligibility conditions. In case it is discovered, at any stage, that a candidate does not fulfill the minimum eligibility requirement, his/her application form shall be rejected. If it is discovered, at any stage, that his application form was liable to be rejected or was not liable to be considered at the admission stage itself, his candidature shall be rejected summarily and even if he is finally selected by the Board, the name shall be taken away from the select list.” 11. Therefore, it was made unambiguously clear that only such candidates should apply for the post, who fulfill the minimum eligibility conditions for the post prior to the date of the advertisement. The condition no. Therefore, it was made unambiguously clear that only such candidates should apply for the post, who fulfill the minimum eligibility conditions for the post prior to the date of the advertisement. The condition no. 5, which we have extracted, also leaves us in no doubt that the authorities have conveyed, unambiguously, the idea that the minimum eligibility conditions are to be possessed and it is for the candidates to ensure that they possess such eligibility conditions. The permission to appear in the examination would be purely provisional and even if the matter progresses further and their applications are not rejected earlier, even the final selection will not stand in the way of the candidates’ name being taken out from the select list if it is found that they do not possess the eligibility conditions. We noticed conditions at the outset only to deal with the argument of estoppel raised before us. Estoppel is a principle in equity. It has various forms. Promissory estoppel is one of them. It is founded on the principle that a public authority, if by words or conduct for which he has a competence holds out to anyone that a certain course will be followed and some person has acted on the strength of the same, then it cannot be open for the public authority to resile from the same and to deprive the person. Being an equitable principle, it must yield to the considerations of equity. Secondly, it has no scope for operation, when it is sought to be invoked against a statute. Thirdly, it ordinarily must be subordinate to public interest. Before we finally pronounce on this issue, we must, however, consider the effect of the Rule, which is much emphasized upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants as also the law relating to the matter. 12. Rule 8(1), as we noticed, provides that the candidates for various posts, which includes the post in question, must possess the qualifications for appointment. This is followed by Rule 8(2), which in the relevant portion with which we are concerned, mandates that for being selected/appointed a candidate must have qualified TET. We must, at once, notice the decision which, in our view, would suffice for the purpose of dealing with the law which has been laid down by the Apex Court. In Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. We must, at once, notice the decision which, in our view, would suffice for the purpose of dealing with the law which has been laid down by the Apex Court. In Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2007) 4 SCC 54 , wherein the Apex Court was dealing with the question as to the time at which the candidate must possess the requisite adequate qualification, the Apex Court, in fact, referred to the earlier judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma vs. Chandrashekhar, 1993 Suppl 2 SCC 611 wherein two Hon’ble Judges of a three Judge Bench took the view that it would not be illegal if candidates who did not possess the qualifications at the time of the advertisement or last date fixed for filling the application; but, who became subsequently qualified, were allowed to participate in the interview. The majority view was that it would be in public interest that the appellants therein were also considered for the interview, as in public interest better candidates who are fully qualified on the date of selection being considered would advance the cause of merit. Justice Sahai, however, took a dissenting view. There was a review filed and that came to be considered by the Apex Court in the judgment reported in (1997) 4 SCC 18 . It is appropriate, in our view to deal with the issues raised to refer to the following paragraph from the said judgment :- “14. A review application was filed which was admitted. The matter was again placed before a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma and Others Vs. Chander Shekhar and Another, (1997) 4 SCC 18 . One of the issues which fell for consideration of the Bench being Issue No. 1 reads as under :- "(1) Whether the view taken by the majority (Honble Dr Thommen and V. Ramaswami, JJ.) that it is enough for a candidate to be qualified by the date of interview even if he was not qualified by the last date prescribed for receiving the applications, is correct in law and whether the majority was right in extending the principle of Rule 37 of the Public Service Commission Rules to the present case by analogy? 15. 15. It was held:- "So far as the first issue referred to in our order dated 1-9-1995 is concerned, we are of the respectful opinion that majority judgment (rendered by Dr T.K. Thommen and V. Ramaswami, JJ.) is unsustainable in law. The proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority judgment. This is also the proposition affirmed in Rekha Chaturvedi Vs. University of Rajasthan (1993) Supp (3) SCC 168. The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to appear for the interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J. (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 respondents could not have been allowed to appear for the interview." The said decision is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that in absence of any cut-off date specified in the advertisement or in the rules, the last date for filing of an application shall be considered as such.” 13. Thereafter, the Apex Court has referred to further case law, which included the judgment of the Apex Court in (2003) 9 SCC 519 , where the position was set out as follows:- “18. Yet again in Shankar K. Mandal and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2003) 9 SCC 519 this Court held that the following principles could be culled out from the aforementioned decisions :- "(1) The cut-off date by reference to which the eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed by the relevant service rules. (2) If there is no cut-off date appointed by the rules then such date shall be as appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications. (3) If there is no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications were to be received by the competent authority.” “20. Possession of requisite educational qualification is mandatory. The same should not be uncertain. If an uncertainty is allowed to prevail, the employer would be flooded with applications of ineligible candidates. A cut-off date for the purpose of determining the eligibility of the candidates concerned must, therefore, be fixed. In absence of any rule or any specific date having been fixed in the advertisement, the law, therefore, as held by this Court would be the last date for filing the application.” 14. Undoubtedly, it is true that the Court was dealing with the Educational qualifications and the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, Shri Manoj Tiwari, seeks to draw the distinction between qualifications set out under Rule 8(1) and the qualifications mentioned in Rule 8(2). He would buttress his argument also by referring to the following finding given by the learned Single Judge : “27. The argument of the learned Senior Counsels Mr. Manoj Tiwari and Mr. Rajendra Dobhal that TET is not a mandatory educational qualification is wholly misconceived. It is definitely not an educational qualification or even a minimum educational qualification, but it has been made a mandatory qualification after the notification of the NCTE dated 23.08.2010, which is in compliance with the mandate of Section 23 of the Act of 2009, which is a Parliamentary Legislation. It is definitely not an educational qualification or even a minimum educational qualification, but it has been made a mandatory qualification after the notification of the NCTE dated 23.08.2010, which is in compliance with the mandate of Section 23 of the Act of 2009, which is a Parliamentary Legislation. Therefore, technically speaking even though it is not a minimum educational qualification, it is definitely a mandatory qualification and for the purposes of appointment in elementary school it is now mandatory for a teacher to have qualified the examination called TET.” 15. He would, therefore, contend that the said principle, with which he has no quarrel, is inapplicable in the context of the qualification mentioned in Rule 8(2). It is merely an additional requirement runs the argument and it may be possessed at a later point of time and not necessarily on the date of advertisement or the last date mentioned for making the application. We are of the view that there is no merit at all in such an argument. In the conditions, which we have adverted to, what is referred to is that candidate must possess the eligibility conditions prior to the date of advertisement. We are of the view that the words “eligibility conditions” would take in it not merely the educational qualifications but it would cover all essential requirements. In this context, we may bear in mind distinction between essential qualification and preferential qualification. In the case of selection, a candidate must possess the essential qualifications. He may not possess the preferential qualification. In regard to the exemption from possessing essential qualification, it is permissible only if there is power of relaxation and the power is exercised as provided therein. Here, there is no power of relaxation with the authority to exempt the candidate from possessing the qualifications mentioned in Rule 8(2). Rule 8(2), in other words, is an essential qualification, as held by the learned Single Judge. It is a mandatory qualification. Therefore, we need not be detained by the contention that it is not an academic qualification. It matters little whether it is treated as academic qualification or a qualification which Mr. Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel would liken to NET. We are afraid that if we have to accept the argument of Mr. It is a mandatory qualification. Therefore, we need not be detained by the contention that it is not an academic qualification. It matters little whether it is treated as academic qualification or a qualification which Mr. Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel would liken to NET. We are afraid that if we have to accept the argument of Mr. Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel, we would be disabled from dealing with a case, where the candidate is not possessed of NET, as on the date of the advertisement, and he can also pass muster by contending that he possessed NET at the stage of interview or appointment. We would think that this would be completely anomalous and uncontemplated and contrary to the law, which has been laid down by the Apex Court. We have already noticed the effect of the Rules. As held by the Apex Court, selection must be conducted in terms of the advertisement and the Rules. As regards the question as to when a candidate must possess the qualification or the essential conditions, it may be that the Rules may provide for the point of time at which a candidate must possess the qualification. In such a case, the matter would be governed by the Rules and, if the Rules are silent, the matter could be governed by the advertisement. If the advertisement is also silent, it is established beyond doubt that the qualifications must be possessed as on the last date fixed for applying. These principles are salutary principles, which have been evolved by the Courts, as a guarantee against arbitrariness, as public employment would otherwise be reduced to a fraud on the public. If the argument of the appellants is accepted, we cannot be oblivious to the clearly pernicious effects that can follow. If the argument is accepted, the selection procedure can be delayed and the persons, who do not possess the qualification of TET, can be allowed to acquire the same and the selection procedure can be delayed to suit the requirements of candidates. If the argument is accepted, the selection procedure can be delayed and the persons, who do not possess the qualification of TET, can be allowed to acquire the same and the selection procedure can be delayed to suit the requirements of candidates. It has to be first viewed from the stand point of members of the public, namely, candidates, who did not possess TET and who were under the impression that the possession of TET, prior to the advertisement, is required, as was the condition in the advertisement; their fundamental right to be considered, about which right, much ado is made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, would also be scuttled. This is the foundation for the principles, which have been evolved by the Court, that in a case of public selection, principle of equality mandates that every person, who is eligible, must be given the right to apply and be considered. The parameters must be well known and the rules of the game cannot be changed and what is set as the criteria in the beginning must continue till the game ends. This will completely eliminate the possibility of arbitrariness in the matter of public employment. We would, therefore, emphatically reject the contentions of the appellants that they need only possess TET as on the date of appointment. Requirement of TET, under the Rules, can be met only if the candidate possesses TET prior to the advertisement, as the advertisement, in this case, specifically provides for the said procedure. Rule 8(2), in our view, cannot be understood as a provision, which mandates the point of time at which TET must be possessed. We have already noticed the manner in which Rule 8(1) is carved and the anomaly, which would ensue if the contentions of the appellants are accepted viz-a-viz Rule 8(2). Therefore, we cannot consider Rule 8(2) as indicating the point of time when TET must be possessed. It was a matter, which was left to be decided in the advertisement. In the advertisement under the head of eligible conditions, TET must be possessed prior to the date of advertisement. Even assuming for a moment that it does not come under that, certainly a candidate must possess the essential qualification at least by the last date of making the applications. In the advertisement under the head of eligible conditions, TET must be possessed prior to the date of advertisement. Even assuming for a moment that it does not come under that, certainly a candidate must possess the essential qualification at least by the last date of making the applications. It is the admitted case that none of the appellants had the qualification of TET either on the date of the advertisement or even by the last date mentioned for making the applications. 16. The fact that the State has brought an amendment to the Rules, by which the departmental candidates, who applied for selection under the 10 per cent quota have been exempted from pursuing TET cannot advance the case of the appellants. Appellants have applied under the direct recruitment quota. They are not claiming under the 10 per cent quota. They are claiming as candidates under the direct recruitment quota. The rules, which require possession of TET, in regard to the appellants’ category of candidates, in which appellants figure, have not been amended. The rules, as they stood at the time of advertisement, were not challenged by the appellants, as we noticed. In the advertisement, in fact, the contents of Rule 8(2) are incorporated. Even though, the rules were framed a few days prior to the advertisement, there is no case for the appellants that the appellants were not even aware of the rules. In fact, they were required to carefully read the terms of the advertisement and they have no case otherwise. Therefore, the fact that as far as the departmental candidates are concerned, they stand exempted cannot give rise to a cause of action founded on the plea of discrimination. The plea of discrimination is available only to equals. The appellants and the departmental candidates cannot be treated as forming one class. May be, it is true that the amendment was brought out after the recruitment process was set in motion. May be, it may amount to changing the rules of the games as regards the candidates falling in that category; but, we are not in this case dealing with a challenge to the same at the hands of candidates falling in that category and, therefore, we would think that we need not be detained by the said contention as far as the appellants are concerned. The requirements under the rules have been apparently enforced across the Board in regard to all candidates falling in that category and, therefore, the case of discrimination cannot be invoked by the appellants. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant Mr. Manoj Tiwari, in the case of Central Airmen Selection Board and another Vs. Surender Kumar Das reported in (2003) 1 SCC 152 , in our view, cannot assist the appellants. That was a case where, no doubt, candidate was selected and, however, the court noted that there was misrepresentation on the part of the candidate and candidate could not laystore by the principle of promissory estoppel. 17. In this case, in the first place, there is no scope at all for the promissory estoppel by the mere reason that the appellants have been permitted to participate in the selection process till the point at which they were dropped from further consideration. This is for the reason that in the advertisement itself, it was made clear to them that they must possess the essential eligibility conditions prior to the date of the advertisement. It is further provided, as already noticed, that in case the candidature is not rejected and matter continues further and, at any stage, once it is discovered that he did not possess the eligibility conditions, even after final selection, the candidature is liable to be rejected. They must be treated as having accepted conditions with eyes wide open. We do not see how the principle of estoppel can apply at all when it is common case that they did not possess the eligibility conditions in so far as the conditions mentioned in Rule 8(2) are concerned at the time when the advertisement was issued. Also, we notice that the contention of the appellants is contrary to the terms of the advertisement that they must possess the eligibility condition, which would include the qualification mentioned under Rule 8(2), prior to the date of advertisement. It is not also a case where appellants have been appointed and it is after appointment or after long period that they are sought to be ousted. The vice which affected their applications, have been detected before they were finally selected and, therefore, we would see no merit in this contention. 18. It is not also a case where appellants have been appointed and it is after appointment or after long period that they are sought to be ousted. The vice which affected their applications, have been detected before they were finally selected and, therefore, we would see no merit in this contention. 18. We must notice that the learned Single Judge has entered a finding, which reads as follows:- “18. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that it is not uncommon for a Senior Elementary/Junior High School to be attached to a high secondary or sometimes even intermediate school. Therefore, teachers who are imparting education in a higher secondary school in particular, are also expected to take classes of VI to VIII, apart from his normal duties of taking Classes of IX and X. Since such teachers by implication have to impart education in an elementary school at senior elementary level (Classes VI to VIII). The conditions laid down by the NCTE vide its notification dated 23.08.2010 (subsequently clarified or elaborated by subsequent notifications) will also be applicable, ipso facto, to these teachers, as they also impart education at elementary level. The minimum qualification hence which all such teachers have to meet, inter alia the qualification known as TET-II.” “24. TET-I and TET-II have been made compulsory for appointment as teachers at elementary level. It is now a mandatory qualification and a candidate and one who is not having such a qualification is not qualified to be considered for appointment on the post of teacher in elementary school. On this, there can be no doubt.” 19. There is no challenge to the correctness of the said findings. In fact, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would admit that even though they are expected ordinarily to take classes for 9th and 10th, they may also be called upon to take classes from time to time as per the requirement for classes 6 to 8 also for which even under the NCTE, they are required to possess the qualification of TET. 20. As far as judgments relied on for the principle that golden rule of interpretation is that full effect must be given to the words as they are used, we have already indicated the true purport of Rule 8(2) and also the result of interpretation of Rule 8(1) and Rule 8(2). 20. As far as judgments relied on for the principle that golden rule of interpretation is that full effect must be given to the words as they are used, we have already indicated the true purport of Rule 8(2) and also the result of interpretation of Rule 8(1) and Rule 8(2). In fact, Rule 8(2) requires that candidates must possess the qualification of TET for selection/appointment and it is a case where the Rule-makers only intended that he must have qualification for being selected, besides of course being appointed. If at all there is any ambiguity in the rules, even assuming the arguments of the appellants and having regard to the terms of the advertisement and the principle of law, which has been laid down by the Apex Court by a catena of decisions, we would think that there is absolutely no scope for relying on rule 8(2) to contend that the candidates need possess TET only at the time when they are appointed. 21. The upshot of the above discussion is that the appellants have failed to make out any case for interference with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The appeals fail and are dismissed. No order as to costs.