JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice. (Oral) Subject matter of this appeal is judgment and award, dated 23rd April, 2010, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P. (for short "the Tribunal") in MAC Petition No. 104 MAC/2 of 2006, titled as Surto Devi versus Rattan Singh and others, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.2,21,000/with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of the petition till its realization came to be awarded in favour of the claimant and the owner-insured and the driver of the offending vehicle were saddled with liability (for short “the impugned award”). 2. The claimant and the insurer of the offending vehicle have not questioned the impugned award on any count, thus, has attained finality so far it relates to them. 3. The only question to be determined in this appeal is – whether the Tribunal has rightly discharged the insurer from its liability and saddled the owner-insured and driver of the offending vehicle with liability? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons: 4. The claimant in para 11 of the claim petition has specifically pleaded that the deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle offending vehicle with goods. It is apt to reproduce para 11 of the claim petition herein: “11. Yes. The deceased was travelling in the Pickup with his goods.” 5. The owner-insured and the driver of the offending vehicle have filed joint reply and have admitted para 11 of the claim petition. It is apt to reproduce para 9 of the reply filed to the claim petition by the owner-insured and the driver of the offending vehicle herein: “9. That the paras No. 9 to 11 of the petition under reply are correct hence admitted.” 6. Thus, there is no dispute viz-a-viz the said fact. 7. It is beaten law of land that in terms of the mandate of Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “CPC”) issues are to be framed when a material proposition of fact or law is raised by one party and denied by the other. That can be made basis for framing issues for trial. When there is no denial, no issue can be framed. 8. It was for the insurer to take the said plea. That can be made basis for framing issues for trial. When there is no denial, no issue can be framed. 8. It was for the insurer to take the said plea. Though, it has taken a specific plea in the preliminary objections that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger, but has not been able to prove the same for the following reasons: 9. The admission on the part of the owner-insured and the driver of the offending vehicle is a proof in favour of the claimant and the claimant was not supposed to lead evidence, though, she has led evidence and proved that the deceased was travelling in the offending vehicle with goods. 10. The offending vehicle was a goods vehicle and was duly insured at the relevant point of time. In terms of the insurance policy, Ext. RW2/C, the risk of 2+1' was covered. Thus, the liability was also covered. 11. Learned counsel for the insurer argued that the Investigating Officer has appeared in the witness box and stated that no goods were found on the spot. It appears that the learned counsel for the insurer is trying to project a case as if he is arguing a civil case. 12. The Apex Court in a case titled as Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in (2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 646, has laid down the principle and held that strict proof and strict links are not required. 13. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 14. A Single Judge of this Court in FAO No. 127 of 1999, titled as Bimla Devi and others versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, decided on 22.08.2005, held that the claimants have to prove the case by leading cogent evidence and applied the mandate of CPC read with the Evidence Act, was questioned before the Apex Court by the medium of Civil Appeal No. 2538 of 2009, titled as Bimla Devi & Ors. versus Himcahal Road Transport Corpn. & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 4298, and the Apex Court set aside the said judgment and held that strict proof is not required. It is apt to reproduce paras 2 and 12 to 15 of the judgment herein: "2. versus Himcahal Road Transport Corpn. & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 4298, and the Apex Court set aside the said judgment and held that strict proof is not required. It is apt to reproduce paras 2 and 12 to 15 of the judgment herein: "2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in FAO No. 127 of 1999 whereby and whereunder an appeal preferred against a judgment and award dated 28.10.1998 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II [MACT (I), Nahan] in MAC Petition No. 21NL/ 2 of 1997, was set aside. xxx xxx xxx 12. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimants predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post mortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 13. The deceased was a Constable. Death took place near a police station. The post mortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of a constable has taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus stand and near a police station. In such an event, the court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 14. In such an event, the court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 14. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the First Information Report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the claimant s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties." 15. Applying the test to the case in hand, there is no need to prove the fact that the deceased was travelling with the goods at the relevant point of time as it has been admitted by the owner-insured and the driver of the offending vehicle. 16. It was the duty of the insurer to plead and prove the said factum to avoid its liability, has failed to do so. 17. The Apex Court in the case titled as National Insurance Co. 16. It was the duty of the insurer to plead and prove the said factum to avoid its liability, has failed to do so. 17. The Apex Court in the case titled as National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Swaran Singh and others, reported in AIR 2004 Court 1531, has laid down principles, how can insurer avoid its liability. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 105 of the judgment herein: “105. ..................... (i) ......................... (ii) ........................ (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in subsection (2) (a) (ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability, must not only the available defence(s) raised in the said but must also establish 'breach' on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be on them. (v)......................... (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insured under Section 149 (2) of the Act.” 18. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insured under Section 149 (2) of the Act.” 18. It would also be profitable to reproduce para 10 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Pepsu Road Transport Corporation versus National Insurance Company, reported in (2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 217, herein: “10. In a claim for compensation, it is certainly open to the insurer under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) to take a defence that the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident was not duly licensed. Once such a defence is taken, the onus is on the insurer. But even after it is proved that the licence possessed by the driver was a fake one, whether there is liability on the insurer is the moot question. As far as the owner of the vehicle is concerned, when he hires a driver, he has to check whether the driver has a valid driving licence. Thereafter he has to satisfy himself as to the competence of the driver. If satisfied in that regard also, it can be said that the owner had taken reasonable care in employing a person who is qualified and competent to drive the vehicle. The owner cannot be expected to go beyond that, to the extent of verifying the genuineness of the driving licence with the licensing authority before hiring the services of the driver. However, the situation would be different if at the time of insurance of the vehicle or thereafter the insurance company requires the owner of the vehicle to have the licence duly verified from the licensing authority or if the attention of the owner of the vehicle is otherwise invited to the allegation that the licence issued to the driver employed by him is a fake one and yet the owner does not take appropriate action for verification of the matter regarding the genuineness of the licence from the licensing authority. That is what is explained in Swaran Singh case. If despite such information with the owner that the licence possessed by his driver is fake, no action is taken by the insured for appropriate verification, then the insured will be at fault and, in such circumstances, the Insurance Company is not liable for the compensation.” 19. That is what is explained in Swaran Singh case. If despite such information with the owner that the licence possessed by his driver is fake, no action is taken by the insured for appropriate verification, then the insured will be at fault and, in such circumstances, the Insurance Company is not liable for the compensation.” 19. The Tribunal has also held that the driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the offending vehicle, which is not factually and legally correct. 20. Admittedly, the driver was driving the offending vehicle, i.e. Pickup Van, bearing registration No. HP640135, at the relevant point of time, the gross vehicle weight of which is 2750 kilograms, as per the Certificate of Registration, Ext. RW2/ B, is a light motor vehicle. 21. I deem it proper to reproduce the definitions of “driving licence”, “light motor vehicle”, “private service vehicle” and “transport vehicle” as contained in Sections 2 (10), 2 (21), 2(35) and 2 (47), respectively, of the MV Act herein: “2. ….............. (10) “driving licence” means the licence issued by a competent authority under Chapter II authorising the person specified therein to drive, otherwise than a learner, a motor vehicle or a motor vehicle of any specified class or description. xxx xxx xxx (21) “light motor vehicle” means a transport vehicle or omnibus the gross vehicle weight of either of which or a motor car or tractor or roadroller the unladen weight of any of which, does not exceed 7,500 kilograms. xxx xxx xxx (35) “public service vehicle” means any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a maxicab, a motorcab, contract carriage, and stage carriage. xxx xxx xxx (47) “transport vehicle” means a public service vehicle, a goods carriage , an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle.” 22. Section 2 (21) of the MV Act provides that a “light motor vehicle” means a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of either of which or a motor car or tractor or road roller the unladen weight of any of which, does not exceed 7500 kilograms. Section 2 (21) of the MV Act provides that a “light motor vehicle” means a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of either of which or a motor car or tractor or road roller the unladen weight of any of which, does not exceed 7500 kilograms. Section 2 (35) of the MV Act gives the definition of a “public service vehicle”, which means any vehicle, which is used or allowed to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward and includes a maxicab, a motorcab, contract carriage and stage carriage. It does not include light motor vehicle (LMV). Section 2 (47) of the MV Act defines a “transport vehicle”. It means a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle. 23. At the cost of repetition, definition of “light motor vehicle” includes the words “transport vehicle” also. Thus, the definition, as given, mandates the “light motor vehicle” is itself a “transport vehicle”, whereas the definitions of other vehicles are contained in Sections 2(14), 2 (16), 2 (17), 2 (18), 2 (22), 2 (23) 2 (24), 2 (25), 2 (26), 2 (27), 2 (28) and 2 (29) of the MV Act. In these definitions, the words “transport vehicle” are neither used nor included and that is the reason, the definition of “transport vehicle” is given in Section 2 (47) of the MV Act. 24. In this backdrop, we have to go through Section 3 and Section 10 of the MV Act. It is apt to reproduce Section 3 of the Act herein: “3. Necessity for driving licence. (1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds an effective driving licence issued to him authorising him to drive the vehicle; and no person shall so drive a transport vehicle [other than a motor cab or motor cycle hired for his own use or rented under any scheme made under subsection (2) of section 75] unless his driving licence specifically entitles him so to do. (2) The conditions subject to which subsection (1) shall not apply to a person receiving instructions in driving a motor vehicle shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” 25. It mandates that the driver should have the licence to drive a particular kind of vehicle and it must contain endorsement for driving a transport vehicle. (2) The conditions subject to which subsection (1) shall not apply to a person receiving instructions in driving a motor vehicle shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” 25. It mandates that the driver should have the licence to drive a particular kind of vehicle and it must contain endorsement for driving a transport vehicle. In this section, the words “light motor vehicle” are not recorded. Meaning thereby, this section is to be read with the definition of other vehicles including the definition given in Section 2 (47) of the MV Act except the definition given in Section 2 (21) of the MV Act for the reason that Section 2 (21) of the MV Act provides, as discussed hereinabove, that it includes transport vehicle also. 26. My this view is supported by Section 10 of the MV Act, which reads as under: “10. Form and contents of licences to drive. (1) Every learner's licence and driving licence, except a driving licence issued under section 18, shall be in such form and shall contain such information as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (2) A learner's licence or, as the case may be, driving licence shall also be expressed as entitling the holder to drive a motor vehicle of one or more of the following cases, namely: (a) motor cycle without gear; (b) motor cycle with gear; (c) invalid carriage; (d) light motor vehicle; (e) transport vehicle; (i) roadroller; (j) motor vehicle of a specified description.” 27. Section 10 (2) (d) of the MV Act contains “light motor vehicle” and Section 10 (2) (e) of the MV Act, was substituted in terms of amendment of 1994, class of the vehicles specified in clauses (e) to (h) before amendment stands deleted and the definition of the “transport vehicle” stands inserted. So, the words “transport vehicle” used in Section 3 of the MV Act are to be read viz-a-viz other vehicles, definitions of which are given and discussed hereinabove. 28. A Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Srinagar, of which I (Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice) was a member, in a case titled as National Insurance Co. 28. A Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Srinagar, of which I (Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice) was a member, in a case titled as National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Muhammad Sidiq Kuchey & ors., being LPA No. 180 of 2002, decided on 27th September, 2007, has discussed this issue and held that a driver having licence to drive “LMV” requires no “PSV” endorsement. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment herein: “The question now arises as to whether the driver who possessed driving licence for driving abovementioned vehicles, could he drive a passenger vehicle? The answer, I find, in the judgment passed by this court in case titled National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Irfan Sidiq Bhat, 2004 (II) SLJ 623, wherein it is held that Light Motor Vehicle includes transport vehicle and transport vehicle includes public service vehicle and public service vehicle includes any motor vehicle used or deemed to be used for carriage of passengers. Further held, that the authorization of having PSV endorsement in terms of Rule 41 (a) of the Rules is not required in the given circumstances. It is profitable to reproduce paras 13 and 17 of the judgment hereunder: “13. A combined reading of the above provisions leaves no room for doubt that by virtue of licence, about which there is no dispute, both Showkat Ahamd and Zahoor Ahmad were competent in terms of section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act to drive a public service vehicle without any PSV endorsement and express authorization in terms of rule 4(1)(a) of the State Rules. In other words, the requirement of the State Rules stood satisfied. …....................... 17. In the case of Mohammad Aslam Khan (CIMA no. 87 of 2002) Peerzada Noorud Din appearing as witness on behalf of Regional Transport Officer did say on recall for further examination that PSV endorsement on the licence of Zahoor Ahmad was fake. In our opinion, the fact that the PSV endorsement on the licence was fake is not at all material, for, even if the claim is considered on the premise that there was no PSV endorsement on the licence, for the reasons stated above, it would not materially affect the claim. By virtue of “C to E” licence Showkat Ahmad was competent to drive a passenger vehicle. By virtue of “C to E” licence Showkat Ahmad was competent to drive a passenger vehicle. In fact, there is no separate definition of passenger vehicle or passenger service vehicle in the Motor Vehicles Act. They come within the ambit of public service vehicle under section 2(35). A holder of driving licence with respect to “light Motor Vehicle” is thus competent to drive any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for carriage of passengers i.e. a public service vehicle.” In the given circumstances of the case PSV endorsement was not required at all.” 29. The mandate of Sections 2 and 3 of the MV Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court in a case titled as Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & ors. versus Smt. Santosh & Ors., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 2791, and after examining the various provisions of the MV Act held that Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on the driver to hold an effective driving licence for the type of vehicle, which he intends to drive. It is apt to reproduce paras 19 and 23 of the judgment herein: “19. Section 2(2) of the Act defines articulated vehicle which means a motor vehicle to which a semi-trailer is attached; Section 2(34) defines public place; Section 2(44) defines 'tractor' as a motor vehicle which is not itself constructed to carry any load; Section 2(46) defines `trailer' which means any vehicle, other than a semi-trailer and a sidecar, drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle. Section 3 of the Act provides for necessity for driving license; Section 5 provides for responsibility of owners of the vehicle for contravention of Sections 3 and 4; Section 6 provides for restrictions on the holding of driving license; Section 56 provides for compulsion for having certificate of fitness for transport vehicles; Section 59 empowers the State to fix the age limit of the vehicles; Section 66 provides for necessity for permits to ply any vehicle for any commercial purpose; Section 67 empowers the State to control road transport; Section 112 provides for limits of speed; Sections 133 and 134 imposes a duty on the owners and the drivers of the vehicles in case of accident and injury to a person; Section 146 provides that no person shall use any vehicle at a public place unless the vehicle is insured. In addition thereto, the Motor Vehicle Taxation Act provides for imposition of passenger tax and road tax etc. 20. …....................... 21. …...................... 22. …..................... 23. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold an effective driving license for the type of vehicle which he intends to drive. Section 10 of the Act enables the Central Government to prescribe forms of driving licenses for various categories of vehicles mentioned in subsection (2) of the said Section. The definition clause in Section 2 of the Act defines various categories of vehicles which are covered in broad types mentioned in subsection (2) of Section 10. They are 'goods carriage', 'heavy goods vehicle', 'heavy passenger motor vehicle', 'invalid carriage', 'light motor vehicle', 'maxicab', 'medium goods vehicle', 'medium passenger motor vehicle', 'motorcab', 'motorcycle', 'omnibus', 'private service vehicle', 'semitrailer', 'tourist vehicle', 'tractor', 'trailer' and 'transport vehicle'.” 30. The Apex Court in another case titled as National Insurance Company Ltd. versus Annappa Irappa Nesaria & Ors., reported in 2008 AIR SCW 906, has also discussed the purpose of amendments, which were made in the year 1994 and the definitions of 'light motor vehicle', 'medium goods vehicle' and the necessity of having a driving licence. It is apt to reproduce paras 8, 14 and 16 of the judgment herein: “8. Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the contention raised herein by the appellant has neither been raised before the Tribunal nor before the High Court. In any event, it was urged, that keeping in view the definition of the 'light motor vehicle' as contained in Section 2(21) of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 ('Act' for short), a light goods carriage would come within the purview thereof. A 'light goods carriage' having not been defined in the Act, the definition of the 'light motor vehicle' clearly indicates that it takes within its umbrage, both a transport vehicle and a non-transport vehicle. Strong reliance has been placed in this behalf by the learned counsel in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., [ 1999 (6) SCC 620 ]. 9. ….................. 10. …............... 11. …............... 12. ….............. 13. ….............. 14. Rule 14 prescribes for filing of an application in Form 4, for a licence to drive a motor vehicle, categorizing the same in nine types of vehicles. 9. ….................. 10. …............... 11. …............... 12. ….............. 13. ….............. 14. Rule 14 prescribes for filing of an application in Form 4, for a licence to drive a motor vehicle, categorizing the same in nine types of vehicles. Clause (e) provides for 'Transport vehicle' which has been substituted by G.S.R. 221(E) with effect from 28.3.2001. Before the amendment in 2001, the entries medium goods vehicle and heavy goods vehicle existed which have been substituted by transport vehicle. As noticed hereinbefore, Light Motor Vehicles also found place therein. 15. ….......................... 16. From what has been noticed hereinbefore, it is evident that 'transport vehicle' has now been substituted for 'medium goods vehicle' and 'heavy goods vehicle'. The light motor vehicle continued, at the relevant point of time, to cover both, 'light passenger carriage vehicle' and 'light goods carriage vehicle'. A driver who had a valid licence to drive a light motor vehicle, therefore, was authorised to drive a light goods vehicle as well.” 31. The Apex Court in the latest judgment in the case titled as Kulwant Singh & Ors. versus Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., reported in JT 2014 (12) SC 110, held that PSV endorsement is not required. 32. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 33. The driver was having a driving licence to drive 'LMV' (Ext. RW1/A), thus, was having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the offending vehicle. 34. Having said so, the Tribunal has fallen in an error in saddling the appellants with liability and discharging the insurer from its liability. Accordingly, it is held that the insurer has to satisfy the impugned award. 35. Viewed thus, the impugned award is modified, as indicated hereinabove, and the appeal is disposed of. 36. The statutory amount deposited by the appellants is awarded as costs in favour of the claimant. 37. The insurer is directed to deposit the awarded amount before the Registry of this Court within eight weeks. On deposition, the same alongwith costs be released in favour of the claimant strictly as per the terms and conditions contained in the impugned award through payee's account cheque or by depositing the same in her bank account. 37. Send down the record after placing copy of the judgment on Tribunal's file.