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2016 DIGILAW 62 (GAU)

Sentong Phom v. State of Nagaland

2016-01-28

SUMAN SHYAM

body2016
JUDGMENT AND ORDER Suman Shyam, J.(CAV) - The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to pay a sum of Rs. 17,28,000/- as compensation to the petitioners together with interest calculated at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing the petition till payment on account of death of their father due to negligence on the part of the said respondents. 2. The petitioners are all children of one Lingpa Phom, a permanent resident of Yaongyimchen Village, district Longleng, Nagaland. Lingpa Phom had succumbed to his injuries received due to collapse of a wall constructed by the respondent No.4 on 03.12.2008 resulting into grievous injuries to the said person leading to his premature death. 3. The case of the petitioners is that their deceased father, viz. Late Lingpa Phom, who was a widower, was a skilled mason by occupation and was maintaining a family of five including his aforementioned children from the income generated from the aforesaid profession. The deceased father of the petitioners was engaged in constructing a residential building belonging to the proforma respondent over a plot of land situated adjacent to the office premises of the respondent No. 4. In course of execution of the aforesaid work the deceased father of the petitioners along with his co-workers were taking rest in the ground just outside the fencing guarding the office of the respondent No. 4, when a portion of the brick wall measuring about 25/30 ft. in length had collapsed and fell upon the father of the petitioners and another person, viz. Mr. T. Noktang. In the aforesaid incident the deceased father of the petitioners had received grievous injuries resulting into (a) dislocation of backbones D12 and LI leading to spinal injury and total physical paralysis; (b) multiple fractures of ribs and (c) multiple internal injuries in abdomen including traumatic perforation more than 1 cm contusion hepatic flexure with traumatic colon leading to blockade of urine and stool besides other injuries in his body. The father of the petitioners was immediately rushed to the hospital for medical treatment. However, despite intensive medical care and attention, the condition of Lingpa Phom did not show any improvement. The father of the petitioners was immediately rushed to the hospital for medical treatment. However, despite intensive medical care and attention, the condition of Lingpa Phom did not show any improvement. Due to the aforesaid injuries, the entire body of Lingpo Phom had suffered complete paralysis with no chance of recovery. Situated thus, the patient was discharged from the hospital on 01.06.2009 and he ultimately succumbed to his injuries on 8.7.2009. 4. It is the case of the petitioners that the aforesaid incident of wall collapse leading to the death of their father was solely on account of negligence on the part of the State respondents in failing to ensure the public safety by properly maintaining the boundary fencing. The petitioners have further stated that although the wall in question, being a single brick wall without any supporting pillars, was constructed way back in the year 1982, yet, no repair was ever carried out in the aforesaid 5-6 ft. high wall since the time of its construction. Although a number of proposals had been made for carrying out repair work in the aforesaid wall, yet, the authorities had neglected such advice given by the local officials as a result of which the wall had collapsed due to lack of maintenance. It has been stated that the deceased father of the petitioners along with his co-workers were taking rest by the side of the fencing outside the office premises of the respondent No.4. Such being the position the death of the petitioners' father had occurred solely due to negligence on the part of the authorities and hence, they are liable to suitably compensate the petitioners on account of death of their father. 5. The petitioners have also stated that their deceased father used to earn an amount of Rs. 250/- per day as daily wage in his capacity as a mason and that the average monthly income of Late Lingpa Phom was not less than Rs. 8000/-. The deceased father of the petitioners used to maintain the entire family with his income as aforesaid by means of which the expenses towards maintenance of the family members including the educational expenses of the four petitioners used to be borne. 6. On the basis of the aforementioned pleadings the petitioners have claimed an amount of Rs. 8000/-. The deceased father of the petitioners used to maintain the entire family with his income as aforesaid by means of which the expenses towards maintenance of the family members including the educational expenses of the four petitioners used to be borne. 6. On the basis of the aforementioned pleadings the petitioners have claimed an amount of Rs. 17,28,000/- as compensation on various heads which is indicated herein below :- "(a) Medical expenses including diet Rs. 2,00,000/-; (b) Expenses for three private attendants at Rs. 3000/- per month per head from the date of accident till the date of death Rs. 63,000/-; (c) Transportation expenses from Longleng to Mokokchung and back to Longleng Rs. 10,000/-; (d) Total loss of earning during the period of treatment Rs. 8,000/- per month multiplied by 6 months = Rs. 48,000/-; (e) Funeral expenses Rs. 25,000/-; (f) Loss of love, affection, paternal care and supervision Rs. 2,00,000/-; (g) For pain, suffering, inconveniences, loss of enjoyment and amenities of life suffered by the deceased person Rs. 1,00,000/-; (h) For loss of dependency suffered by the petitioners out of the income of the deceased person assessed at three-fourth or one fourth deduction as personal consumption of the deceased on his income of Rs. 8,000/- per month, it would be Rs. 6,000/- per month or Rs. 72,000/- per annum. On this amount, by considering the age of the deceased person, the relevant factor may be chosen 15 years. Therefore, the compensation assessed under this sub-head may be calculated and claimed at Rs. 10,80,000/-. The total amount of compensation thus assessed and claimed is Rs. 17,28,000/-." 7. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 have contested the writ petition by filing their counter affidavit Although the official respondent have not denied the occurrence of the incident leading to the death of Lingpa Phom, yet, an attempt has been made to shift the blame upon the proforma respondent i.e. Imkongnungba Phom. The stand of the official respondents is that the unfortunate incident had occurred due to encroachment of Government property during site levelling and dumping building materials such as sand, stone, chips etc. huge quantities in an area adjacent to the wall by the proforma respondent which had led to the collapse of the fencing. The stand of the official respondents is that the unfortunate incident had occurred due to encroachment of Government property during site levelling and dumping building materials such as sand, stone, chips etc. huge quantities in an area adjacent to the wall by the proforma respondent which had led to the collapse of the fencing. The official respondents have further stated that they had warned the proforma respondent on several occasions about the possible danger which was, however, not heeded to by the proforma respondent. According to the official respondents, the unfortunate incident occurred solely on account of encroachment of Government land by the proforma respondent and as such the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 cannot be made liable for payment of any compensation to the petitioners and compensation, if any, payable to the petitioners, should be realised from the proforma respondent The official respondents have also questioned the maintainability of the writ petition urging that the same involves several disputed questions of fact which requires to be determined by a civil court on the basis of evidence. 8. I have heard Mr. T. Ao, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. K. Wotsa, learned Senior Govt. Advocate, Nagaland, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 4. The proforma respondent did not appear in this case. 9. Mr. Ao, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that there is no dispute as regards the occurrence of the incident nor have the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 denied the fact that the collapse of the wall had resulted into grievous injuries to the deceased father of the petitioners which had ultimately led to his death. Mr. Ao further submits that the fencing had collapsed upon the deceased father of the petitioners at a time when he was taking rest in a public place outside the office premises of the respondent No. 4. The aforesaid incident would not have occurred had the official respondents taken proper care to maintain the wall. Such being the position, submits Mr. Ao, this is a clear case of negligence on the part of the State respondents who had led to the untimely death of the father of the petitioners making them orphan at an early age. He submits that this is a fit case where the doctrine of strict liability should be made applicable directing the official respondents to pay adequate compensation to the petitioners. 10. He submits that this is a fit case where the doctrine of strict liability should be made applicable directing the official respondents to pay adequate compensation to the petitioners. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners had further submitted that as has been specifically pleaded in the writ petition, the daily income of Late Lingpa Phom was Rs. 250/-. Leaving aside the Sundays the income comes to Rs. 6,500/- per month. Mr. Ao submits that as per the established principles of law recognised by a number of judicial pronouncements, 50% of the aforesaid amount is required to be added as future prospect. Since the age of the deceased person was 48 years at the time of his death, hence, by applying the multiplier of 15, adequate compensation can be awarded by this Court due to loss of life suffered by the father of the petitioners. In support of his aforesaid argument Mr. Ao has relied upon the following decisions :- 1. AIR 1993 SC 2979 [Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India & Ors.]. 2. 2012 ACJ 1428 [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.]. 3. 2013 ACJ 1746 [Santu Ram & Anr. v. State & Ors], 4. 2010 ACJ 1861 [ V. Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.]. 5. 2008 ACJ 1194 [G Gouri Sankara v. State of Orissa & Ors.]. 6. 2011 ACJ 63 (Madhya Pradesh) [Sushila Devi & Ors. v. Registrar, High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.]. 7. 2005 ACJ 342 [H.S.E.B. & Ors. v. Ram Nath & Ors.]. 8. 2014 ACJ 954 (New Delhi) [Varinder Prasad v. B.S.E.S. Rajdhani Power Ltd. & Ors.]. 9. 2001 ACJ 1719 [M.S.Grewal & Anr. v. Deep Chand Sood & Ors.]. 10. 1999 ACJ 1105 [Ashwani Kumar Mishra v. P. Muniam Baku & Ors.]. 11. 2001 ACJ 1735 [Lata Wadhwa & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.]. 12. 2012 ACJ 48 [Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy & Ors.]. 11. Mr. Wotsa, learned Additional Senior Govt. Advocate, Nagaland, questions the maintainability of the writ petition by contending that since the respondents have not admitted their negligence in the incident of wall collapse, hence, this writ petition is founded on several disputed questions of facts which cannot be determined in a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Wotsa, learned Additional Senior Govt. Advocate, Nagaland, questions the maintainability of the writ petition by contending that since the respondents have not admitted their negligence in the incident of wall collapse, hence, this writ petition is founded on several disputed questions of facts which cannot be determined in a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the writ petition itself is not maintainable on such count alone. 12. The learned Govt. counsel has steadfastly argued that the incident had occurred purely on account of encroachment of Government land by the proforma respondent who alone is responsible for the collapse of the fencing. As such, it is the proforma respondent who is liable to pay compensation to the petitioners if at all the same is found to be due and payable. The learned Government Advocate further submits that since the element of negligence has not been established in the instant proceeding, hence, the doctrine of strict liability would have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. On the basis of such submission, Mr. Wotsa has further contended that the decisions cited by the petitioners in support of their case are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. I have considered the submissions made by and on behalf of the parties and have also perused the materials on record. 14. A careful scrutiny of the pleadings goes to show that there is no denial of the incidence by the contesting respondents. It is also not in denial that the cause of death of the deceased father of the petitioners is on account of the grievous injuries suffered due to collapse of the brick fencing constructed by the respondent No. 4. Since the wall was constructed by the respondent No. 4, hence, the duty to maintain the said wall so as to ensure that the same does not pose any threat or danger to the public in general was upon the said respondent. A perusal of the pleadings contained in the counter affidavit, more particularly those in paragraph 4 of the affidavit goes to show that even the respondent No. 4 was aware of the danger involving the possibility of the wall collapse and accordingly they had also allegedly warned the proforma respondent. A perusal of the pleadings contained in the counter affidavit, more particularly those in paragraph 4 of the affidavit goes to show that even the respondent No. 4 was aware of the danger involving the possibility of the wall collapse and accordingly they had also allegedly warned the proforma respondent. However, save and except warning the proforma respondent, the official respondents did not take any step to prevent the wall from collapsing. From the stand taken by the respondents it is apparent that the official respondents have made an attempt to shift the blame upon the proforma respondent by alleging that he had encroached upon the Government land and dumped heavy quantity of sand, stone and other building materials adjacent to the wall which had led to the collapse of the brick wall. Even assuming that the said allegation is true, even then it was the duty of the respondent no. 4 to maintain the boundary wall so as to prevent it from posing any danger to the public, which duty they have failed to discharge. 15. From the scrutiny of the pleadings it further appears that the wall had collapsed on the exterior side of the premises wherein the deceased father of the petitioners was taking rest. It is also not in dispute that the respondent authorities had never put up any caution or warning sign in the wall advising the members of the public not to sit by the side of the wall. There is nothing on record to indicate that the collapse of the wall was triggered by any natural phenomenon which was beyond the control of the respondents. In view of the above, I am of the unhesitant opinion that the present is a case of utter negligence on the part of the respondent No. 4 which had led to the unfortunate incident where the father of the petitioners had to die an untimely death. From the records of the case it is established that there has been a breach of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India due to the negligence on the part of the official respondents. 16. From the records of the case it is established that there has been a breach of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India due to the negligence on the part of the official respondents. 16. In the case of Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa reported in (1993) 2 SCC 746 , the Apex court, while laying down the principles regarding payment of compensation by the State on account of breach of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution has observed as follows:- "34. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting "compensation" in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making 'monetary amends' under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law. 35. 35. This Court and the High Courts, being the protectors of the civil liberties of the citizen, have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir of the victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are established to have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights of the citizen, notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the remedy by way of a civil suit or criminal proceedings. The State, of course has the right to be indemnified by and take such action as may be available to it against the wrongdoer in accordance with law - through appropriate proceedings. Of course, relief in exercise of the power under Article 32 or 226 would be granted only once it is established that there has been an infringement of the fundamental rights of the citizen and no other form of appropriate redressal by the court in the facts and circumstances of the case, is possible. The decisions of this Court in the line of cases starting with Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar granted monetary relief to the victims for deprivation of their fundamental rights in proceedings through petitions filed under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the rights available under the civil law to the aggrieved party where the courts found that grant of such relief was warranted. It is a sound policy to punish the wrongdoer and it is in that spirit that the courts have moulded the relief by granting compensation to the victims in exercise of their writ jurisdiction. In doing so the courts take into account not only the interest of the applicant and the respondent but also the interests of the public as a whole with a view to ensure that public bodies or officials do not act unlawfully and do perform their public duties properly particularly where the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 is concerned. Law is in the process of development and the process necessitates developing separate public law procedures as also public law principles. Law is in the process of development and the process necessitates developing separate public law procedures as also public law principles. It may be necessary to identify the situations to which separate proceedings and principles apply and the courts have to act firmly but with certain amount of circumspection and self-restraint, lest proceedings under Article 32 or 226 are misused as a disguised substitute for civil action in private law. Some of those situations have been identified by this Court in the cases referred to by Brother Verma, J". 17. Again, in the case of D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 416 , the supreme Court has made the following observations:- "44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. 45. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim - civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family." 18. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy reported in 2012 ACJ 48 (Uphaar Tragedy case) the following observations have been made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 60, 61, 62 and 63 :- "60. But, in a case where life and personal liberty have been violated, the absence of any statutory provision for compensation in the statute is of no consequence. Right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the most sacred right preserved and protected under the Constitution, violation of which is always actionable and there is no necessity of statutory-provision as such for preserving that right. Article 21 of the Constitution of India has to be read into all public safety statutes, since the prime object of public safety legislation is to protect the individual and to compensate him for the loss suffered. Duty of care expected from State or its officials functioning under the public safety legislation is, therefore, very high, compared to statutory powers and supervision expected from officers functioning under the statutes like the Companies Act, Cooperative Societies Act and such similar legislations. When we look at the various provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and the Rules made thereunder, the Delhi Building Regulations and the Electricity Laws the duty of care on officials was high and liabilities strict. Constitutional Torts - Measure of Damages: 61. When we look at the various provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and the Rules made thereunder, the Delhi Building Regulations and the Electricity Laws the duty of care on officials was high and liabilities strict. Constitutional Torts - Measure of Damages: 61. Law is well settled that a Constitutional court can award monetary compensation against State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. Quite often the courts have a difficult task in determining the damages in various fact situations. The yardsticks normally adopted for determining compensation payable in a private tort claim are not as such applicable when a Constitutional court determines the compensation in cases where there is violation of fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens. In D.K. Basu v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 416 , a Constitutional Bench of this court held that there is no straitjacket formula for computation of damages and we find that there is no uniformity or yardstick followed in awarding damages for violation of fundamental rights. In Rudul Sah's case, (1993) 4 SCC 141, this court used the terminology 'palliative' for measuring the damages and the formula of 'ad hoc' was applied in Sebastian M. Hongray's case, AIR 1984 SC 1026 , the expression used by this court for determining the monetary compensation was 'exemplary' cost and the formula adopted was 'punitive'. In Bhim Singh's case, 1986 ACJ 867 (SC), the expression used by the court was 'compensation' and method adopted was 'tortuous formula'. In D.K. Basu v. Union of India (supra) the expression used by this court for determining the compensation was 'monetary compensation'. The formula adopted was 'cost to cost' method. Courts have not, therefore, adopted a uniform criteria since no statutory formula has been laid down. 62. Constitutional courts all over the world have to overcome these hurdles. Failure to precisely articulate and carefully evaluate a uniform policy as against State and its officials would at times tend the court to adopt rules which are applicable in private law remedy for which courts and statutes have evolved various methods, such as loss of earnings, impairment or future earning capacity, medical expenses, mental and physical suffering, property damage, etc. Adoption of those methods as such in computing damages for violation of Constitutional torts may not be proper. Adoption of those methods as such in computing damages for violation of Constitutional torts may not be proper. In the case of Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 14 , the Apex Court has laid down parameters in assisting the victims of rape including the liability of the State to provide compensation to the victims and held as follows: "It is necessary, having regard to the directive principles contained under Article 38(1) of the Constitution of India, to set up the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. The rape victims frequently incurred substantial financial lows. Some, for example, were too traumatized to continue in employment. Compensation for victims shall be awarded by the court on conviction of the offender and by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board whether or not a conviction has taken place. The Board will take into account the pain, suffering and shock as well as loss of earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of the child but if it is occurred as a result of rape." 63. Legal liability in damages exists solely as a remedy out of private law action in tort which is generally time consuming and expensive and hence when fundamental rights are violated, claimants prefer to approach Constitutional courts for speedy remedy. Constitutional courts, of course, shall invoke its jurisdiction only in extraordinary circumstances when serious injury has been caused due to violation of fundamental rights especially under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances the court can invoke its own methods depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case." 19. It is thus settled law that for established breach of fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, award of appropriate compensation against the State is effective remedy and such compensation can be granted under public law by the High Court in addition to the private law remedy that may be available for tortuous action against the wrong doer. I, therefore, hold that the doctrine of strict liability would be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 would be liable to pay suitable compensation to the petitioners on account of the death of their father. 20. I, therefore, hold that the doctrine of strict liability would be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 would be liable to pay suitable compensation to the petitioners on account of the death of their father. 20. Coming to the question of compensation that may be awarded by this court, what may be noted from the pleadings is that the petitioners have not only mentioned the monthly income of their deceased father but have also stated the age of the deceased person at the time of his death although no documentary proof in support of such claim has been submitted. The petitioners have also annexed the medical prescriptions, bills and vouchers showing the expenditure incurred by them in connection with the medical treatment of their father due to the injuries suffered by him in the aforementioned incident. There is no specific denial of any of those averments in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. The respondents have not made any attempt to question the authenticity of the medical bills and vouchers produced by the petitioners. Save and except stating that the petition involves several disputed question of facts which are not admitted, the respondents have failed to traverse the pleadings contained in the writ petition on the aforesaid aspects. 21. Even assuming that the figures pertaining to income of the petitioners' deceased father as mentioned in the writ petition are unreal, even in that case, It is not in dispute that the deceased Linga Phom was maintaining a family of five persons including two minor children with the income generated from his profession. There is also nothing on record to show that the claim of the petitioners of being dependants upon the deceased Linga Phom at the time of his death is untrue. The death of Linga Phom had rendered the petitioners, including school going children, as orphans. Therefore, there can hardly be any doubt that the pre-mature death of their father had resulted into tremendous sufferings to the petitioners effecting their upbringing besides depriving them of parental love, care and affection. The premature death of their father in the above incident has resulted in grave pain and mental agony of the petitioner putting a question mark on their future. 22. The premature death of their father in the above incident has resulted in grave pain and mental agony of the petitioner putting a question mark on their future. 22. In view of what has been discussed herein before, and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would be met if an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs) be directed to be paid by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to the petitioners by way of compensation on account of death caused to their father due to the negligence of the said respondents. The compensation amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs), as directed by this court, shall be paid by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioners within a period of 90 (Ninety) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order failing which the amount would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum calculated from the date of expiry of 90 days till realisation, besides inviting other legal consequences. 23. The compensation amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- as directed by this court, be paid to the petitioners by way of account payee cheque after verifying their true identity and also after adjusting the ex-gratia amount already paid by the State on the above account. 24. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition stands allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to cost.