JUDGMENT : Dipankar Datta, J. Over the years this Bench while hearing writ petitions alleging 'police inaction' has had the occasion to deal with diverse grievances of complainants arising out of non-registration of First Information Report (hereafter F.I.R.) by the officers-in-charge of police stations despite receipt of written complaint disclosing cognisable offence; non-receipt of intimation from the officers-in-charge of police stations that there is no reason to embark upon an investigation despite registration of F.I.R. for cognisable offences; non-receipt of intimation regarding the fate of investigation despite lapse of sufficient time since registration of an F.I.R.; tardy and inept investigation to somehow save the accused; registration of F.I.R. under soft sections to dilute the offences alleged to have been committed, etc. 2. This writ petition dated May 11, 2016 alleging police inaction is an addition to such series of litigation, containing bits and pieces of all types of grievances noted above that often give rise to writ petitions alleging 'police inaction'. The initial grievance was that no action has been taken on the several complaints lodged by the second petitioner. In course of hearing, the aggrieved petitioners complained that though an F.I.R. has been registered, the accused have not been booked under appropriate provisions of the Indian Penal Code (hereafter the I.P.C.). 3. The second petitioner had lodged a written complaint before the Officer-in-Charge, Madhyamgram Police Station on April 5, 2016. For better appreciation of the issue involved in the writ petition, it would be profitable to reproduce the complaint in its entirety. It reads: "I, Raja Karmakar, son of Sri Gopal Krishna Karmakar, residing at 8/B, Dum Dum Road, Kolkata - 700030 do hereby beg to seek your kind attention to the fact that I am the Secretary of Dum Dum Ramakrishna and Vivekananda Seva Pratishthan registered under the West Bengal Society Registration Act, 1961. The above-mentioned society runs a self funded school under the name and style 'Ramakrishna Missionary Institution' of which also I am the Secretary of the governing body. On 05.04.2016 around 10.00 A.M., I, and Sri Nabakumar Karmakar who is also a member of the governing body of the school, went to the school as per daily schedule and daily course of business; at around 11.30 on the same morning, around 20 to 25 anti-social men under the leadership of the local Councilor (Ward No. 4 of Madhyamgram Municipality) Mrs. Mamata Roy Sen came to the school and started showering kicks on the main entrance of the school. The said anti-social who I can recognize on seeing forced entered into the school premises and attempted to snatch the keys of the cash-box of the school, almirah and attendance registers. When I try to protest, the Councilor grabbed me by the collar of my shirt and the anti-socials namely Vinod Singh @ Rinku, Abdul Majid, Haru and others started bearing me mercilessly. The local councilor, in the meantime told Vinod Singh to shoot me, upon receiving such instruction, the said Vinod Singh pulled out a gun from his wrist-belt and held it against my belly cursing me in filthiest of languages and started hit by a gun over my right shoulder and threatened me to comply with the Councilor's instructions or he would kill me then and there. While the said Vinod Singh was abusing me, the Councilor, Mrs. Mamata Roy Sen shoved me onto a chair and started chocking me by pressing my neck, she then picked up a cushion from another chair and put it on my face almost chocked me to death. It is of utmost pertinence to mention here that ours being a self-funded school, the said Councilor Mrs. Mamata Roy Sen demanded Rs. 10 lacs from us for smooth running of the school which we refused; it was since then that the said Councilor took to threatening us by various means and even threatened to kill us. This act of threats reached its height today in the form of all the above-mentioned atrocious and over-audacious acts committed by the Councilor and her men. They also threatened us not to go to the police or they will slap false cases against us with the help of police. Subsequent to the injuries caused upon my person by the Councilor and her men, I got myself treated at the R.G. Kar Medical College and Hospital. A medical certificate to that effect has been issued by medical officer on 05.04.2016 of the said hospital. While leaving, the Councilor and her men at gunpoint looted Rs. 70,500/- from the school's cash-box and a 17 gram gold chain from my neck and planted a few men to restrain us from entering the school. A medical certificate to that effect has been issued by medical officer on 05.04.2016 of the said hospital. While leaving, the Councilor and her men at gunpoint looted Rs. 70,500/- from the school's cash-box and a 17 gram gold chain from my neck and planted a few men to restrain us from entering the school. The Councilor's acts of threatening us by various means was brought to the office of the Superintendent of Police, North 24-Parganaas by a letter dated 31.03.2016. This being the situation faced by us; our life and property being in danger, I do please before you esteemed self to treat this letter as First Information and initiate proper legal procedure against the Councilor Mrs. Mamata Roy Sen and her men." 4. Registration of an F.I.R. was not informed resulting in presentation of this writ petition on May 11, 2016 and consequently, it was prayed as follows: "(a) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent police authorities to initiate an appropriate proceeding against the private respondents herein for the illegal activities carried on by them as specifically stated in the complaints made by your petitioners vide letters dated 25.03.2016, 31.03.2016, 05.04.2016 and 18.04.2016. (b) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent authorities to render necessary assistance to your petitioners for protection of life and property of your petitioner." 5. As adverted to above, in course of hearing it transpired that Madhyamgram P.S. FIR No. 227 dated April 12, 2016 under sections 447/323/379/506/34 I.P.C. had duly been registered on the petitioners' complaint. 6. It is also been ascertained that in course of investigation the investigating officer had formed an opinion that the accused should also be booked under Section 307, I.P.C. and accordingly, a prayer was made before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barasat (hereafter the ACJM) on June 5, 2016 in that regard. The ACJM duly considered the prayer and allowed the same, as a result whereof the investigation is also proceeding, inter alia, to nail the accused under Section 307, I.P.C. 7. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned advocate for the petitioners, however, invited the attention of the Bench to the written complaint extracted supra and contended that the accused were not booked under Section 386, I.P.C. as well as Section 25 of the Arms Act. He further contended that none of the accused has been arrested. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned advocate for the petitioners, however, invited the attention of the Bench to the written complaint extracted supra and contended that the accused were not booked under Section 386, I.P.C. as well as Section 25 of the Arms Act. He further contended that none of the accused has been arrested. It was also contended that the accused have been booked under soft sections to extend the opportunity to enable them easily obtain orders for release on anticipatory bail. 8. Mr. Bhattacharya relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 , to contend that it is the mandatory duty of a police officer to register an F.I.R. if cognisable offence is disclosed in the complaint and that appropriate action ought to be directed to be taken against the concerned officer found to be remiss in discharging such statutory duty. 9. Mr. Dutta, learned junior government advocate representing the State, contended that the accused were not booked under Section 386, I.P.C. and section 25 Arms Act because a preliminary enquiry that was conducted did not reveal the allegations of the second petitioner, as levelled in the written complaint, to be of any worth. The complainant, it was contended, could not furnish any medical report of any gun-shot injury having been suffered by him. 10. Mr. Dutta relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Police, CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 175 , to contend that law does not require mentioning of all the ingredients of the offence in the F.I.R. and that only after a complete investigation it may be possible to say whether any offence is made out on the basis of evidence collected by the investigating agency. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Dutta on the decision in Tapas Paul v. Biplab Kumar Chowdhury, reported in 2014 (4) CHN (CAL) 668, in support of the proposition that the sections under which the F.I.R. is required to be registered must not be indicated by the Court and ought to be left for the police to decide under which provisions of law an accused should be booked. That the police has the power to conduct a preliminary enquiry before registering an F.I.R. was also emphasized by referring to the decision in Lalita Kumari (supra). That the police has the power to conduct a preliminary enquiry before registering an F.I.R. was also emphasized by referring to the decision in Lalita Kumari (supra). He, accordingly, submitted that the writ petition does not merit interference and the police ought to be left free to conduct investigation in accordance with law. 11. Appearing for the sixth and seventh respondents (Binod Singh and Abdul Majid respectively), Mr. Saha, learned advocate contended that the allegations levelled against them by the second petitioner in the written complaint are absolutely false and concocted and that the complaint is the fallout of a civil dispute between the petitioners and the eighth respondent, in respect whereof a civil suit is pending. It was also submitted that notices under section 41A, Criminal Procedure Code (hereafter the Cr.P.C.) having been issued, the sixth and seventh respondents have been cooperating with the investigating officer and that this writ petition ought to be dismissed in limine. 12. Ms. Ranjana Har Chowdhury, appearing for the eighth respondent (Tanuja Dutta Chowdhury), contended that although several allegations have been levelled against her in the writ petition, no such allegation appears in the written complaint dated April 18, 2016. She too prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 13. The parties have been heard and the written complaint perused. 14. Before examining the merit of the petitioners' grievance, it is considered necessary to make a few preliminary observations. 15. That registration of an F.I.R. involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the alleged commission of cognisable offences in a book kept by the officer-in-charge of a police station, is settled law. It is considered to be the duty of the officer-in-charge to register an F.I.R. recording the cognisable offence disclosed by the complainant, because the police officer can take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. only thereafter. If any authority is required to support this proposition, one may usefully refer to the decision in Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 627 . 16. The object of an F.I.R. from the point of view of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion and from the point of view of the investigating authority, to obtain information about alleged criminal activity to enable suitable steps being taken to trace out and to bring to book the guilty. 16. The object of an F.I.R. from the point of view of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion and from the point of view of the investigating authority, to obtain information about alleged criminal activity to enable suitable steps being taken to trace out and to bring to book the guilty. The pertinence of an F.I.R. in the criminal law procedure is of immense worth. The historical background of Section 154, Cr.P.C. has been traced in Lalita Kumari (supra) and the decision authoritatively lays down that recording of the F.I.R. should be the starting point of any investigation by the police. 17. Since at the stage of registering an F.I.R. the contents thereof are regarded as correct, situations are not rare where such registration has been used as a tool to unnecessarily harass an individual by showing him as an accused in the F.I.R. although ultimately the accusation may be found to be entirely wrong. Overenthusiastic police officers registering an F.I.R. without the complaint disclosing cognisable offence and vice versa have also caught the attention of the Bench many a times. 18. Though elementary, it is to be re-stated that the duty envisaged by section 154 is a mandatory duty and the mandate of sub-section (1) thereof does not confer any discretion on an officer-in-charge of the police station to conduct a preliminary enquiry prior to registration of an F.I.R., except in certain situations mentioned in paragraph 120.6 of the decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) and other situations too, not mentioned therein. It is, however, axiomatic that if an F.I.R. is not registered despite the complaint disclosing cognisable offence, in appropriate cases, such action must pass judicial scrutiny if the matter is brought to court. 19. Registration of an F.I.R. is an executive act and, therefore, liable to be questioned both by the accused and the complainant but on vastly varying grounds. This writ petition not being at the instance of an accused, the right that an accused has need not be discussed here. Although an officer-in-charge is conferred power by Section 157, Cr.P.C. not to embark on an investigation in a given case, there must be sufficient ground therefor and in such eventuality, he is inter alia under obligation to inform the complainant that he shall not investigate the F.I.R. or cause it to be investigated. Although an officer-in-charge is conferred power by Section 157, Cr.P.C. not to embark on an investigation in a given case, there must be sufficient ground therefor and in such eventuality, he is inter alia under obligation to inform the complainant that he shall not investigate the F.I.R. or cause it to be investigated. However, such power cannot be exercised arbitrarily, whimsically or in a high-handed manner. The magistrate before whom a report is required to be submitted may interdict, if the facts and circumstances so warrant. So can the court of writ, if it is satisfied that non-interference would lead to palpable injustice. 20. If a written complaint discloses commission of several offences by the accused, the action of the officer-in-charge in booking the accused under certain sections and not booking him under the other sections, if brought to the notice of the court of writ, must be appropriately dealt with or else investigation from the inception may become flawed and could bring about farcical results. This observation is made drawing from experience and keeping in mind that all officers-in-charge are not honest in discharging their statutory duty. 21. Be that as it may, even if an F.I.R. may have been registered and the accused booked under provisions that are attracted on bare perusal of the written complaint, it is well-settled that nothing prevents the investigating officer to file a police report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. mentioning additional sections if materials collected during investigation authorize such action. However, this Bench is unable to be ad idem with Mr. Dutta that after registration of an F.I.R., a preliminary inquiry could be embarked upon to find out as to whether part of the allegations disclosing cognisable offence is trustworthy or not. It is no part of the duty of the officer-in-charge to doubt the truth or otherwise of the allegations levelled in a written complaint immediately after the same is received; he must proceed on the basis that the allegations are prima facie correct and hence, action is called for. It is only in such situations mentioned in paragraph 120.6 of the decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) or in other exceptional situations (for instance, when an allegation is levelled against a constitutional functionary that prima facie seems to be improbable) prior to registration of an F.I.R., a preliminary inquiry may be conducted. It is only in such situations mentioned in paragraph 120.6 of the decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) or in other exceptional situations (for instance, when an allegation is levelled against a constitutional functionary that prima facie seems to be improbable) prior to registration of an F.I.R., a preliminary inquiry may be conducted. Investigation of an F.I.R. registered under certain sections and proceeding to conduct preliminary inquiry in respect of other allegations contained in the self-same written complaint, is not permissible. The arguments of Mr. Dutta in support of the action of the officer-in-charge cannot thus be accepted. 22. It is now time to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Dutta. 23. In Tapan Kumar Singh (supra), a decision of this Court in exercise of criminal revisional jurisdiction quashing a General Diary entry and an F.I.R. registered on the basis thereof was under challenge. This Court recorded the finding that the facts stated in the GD entry did not disclose the commission of a cognisable offence, and consequently the police had no power or jurisdiction to investigate the allegations made therein; thus, the investigation undertaken, and the search and seizures made were illegal and without jurisdiction and deserved to be quashed. The correctness of such finding was assailed before the Supreme Court. While allowing the civil appeal and setting aside the impugned decision, it was observed: "20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognisable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognisable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognisable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognisable offence has been committed. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognisable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognisable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a cognisable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognisable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the police officer concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the commission of a cognisable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can." This Bench has been unable to comprehend as to how the above passage advances the submission of Mr. Dutta; on the contrary, it renders the impugned action of the officer-in-charge indefensible. 24. The single sentence from paragraph 24 of the decision in Tapas Paul (supra) on which reliance has been placed cannot be read in isolation. Dutta; on the contrary, it renders the impugned action of the officer-in-charge indefensible. 24. The single sentence from paragraph 24 of the decision in Tapas Paul (supra) on which reliance has been placed cannot be read in isolation. The next sentence from the said paragraph reading "(I)t is evident from the impugned order that the learned Single Judge was compelled to give a prima facie view of the Sections which could be attracted as the State insisted that the complaint did not disclose any cognisable offence.", is really the clincher. It is of some significance that ultimately, the learned judge (the 3rd judge to whom the appeal was assigned on a difference of opinion arising between the learned judges of the Division Bench) did not interfere with the course of action directed in the order under appeal except that part directing monitoring of investigation. 25. Since the officer-in-charge here failed to register the F.I.R. mentioning appropriate sections, this Bench is left with no other option but to guide such officer to discharge his statutory duty in the manner the statute requires him to discharge. 26. It ought to be placed on record that in his usual fairness, Mr. Dutta has submitted that the F.I.R. should have been registered under section 25, Arms Act and to this extent the officer-in-charge has failed to perform his duty in the manner mandated by the statute. 27. The written complaint does disclose ingredients of offence punishable under Section 386, I.P.C. The so called reason for not registering the F.I.R. under such section has not impressed this Bench at all. 28. Accordingly, the officer-in-charge is directed to register the F.I.R. (bearing No. 227) also under Section 386, I.P.C. and Section 25 of the Arms Act immediately but not later than 48 hours from date of service of a copy of this order. The investigating officer shall proceed to take the investigation to its logical conclusion bearing in mind the added sections and submit appropriate police report under section 173(2), Cr. P.C. before the relevant magistrate at an early date. Needless to observe, any party aggrieved by such police report shall be entitled to work out his remedy in accordance with law. 29. With this direction, the writ petition stands disposed of. There shall not be any order as to costs. P.C. before the relevant magistrate at an early date. Needless to observe, any party aggrieved by such police report shall be entitled to work out his remedy in accordance with law. 29. With this direction, the writ petition stands disposed of. There shall not be any order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, shall be furnished to the applicant at an early date. Writ petition disposed of.