Judgment 1. Appellants have come forward with Appeal on hand challenging their conviction and sentence passed by learned Special Judge Anti Corruption, Jammu, vide judgment and order dated 29th September 2003, whereby and whereunder appellants have been convicted for offences punishable under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 161 RPC, to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.3000/- in both the offences and sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. Aggrieved by the judgment and order propounded by learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Jammu, appellants impugn its correctness in this appeal. 2. The case abridged by prosecution is that appellants, while posted at Police Post Thatri, were deputed for patrolling duty on 23rd March 1994, with a complaint filed by one Paryog Singh son of Faquir Singh resident of Gagrani, Bhela, for enquiry against Parven Singh son of Dharam Singh, i.e. complainant and his mother Raj Dhai. Appellants took Parven Singh in custody. Appellants are alleged to have harassed Parven Singh to implicate him and arrest on the background of complaint and in the event he pays bribe of Rs.1000/- he would go scot free. The matter is stated to have been settled for Rs.500/-. The said amount, according to complainant was paid to appellants. The appellants are alleged to have, by abuse of their official position, received bribe of Rs.500/- from complainant which was followed by culmination of complaint into compromise. Senior Superintendent of Police, Doda, vide letter dated 25th June 1994 forwarded the complaint, addressed to him by District Magistrate Doda for action in the matter alongwith the report and allied papers, prepared in the course of enquiry, to Director General Vigilance, Srinagar, who in turn sent the same to Vigilance Organisation Jammu, vide No.JM/26/94-3124 dated 2nd September 1994 for registration of the case, and accordingly a case under Section 5(2) Prevention of Corruption Act, 2006, was registered against appellants and investigation started. On completion of investigation, sanction to prosecute appellants was obtained from the Government, whereafter a charge sheet for offences under Section 5(2) P.C. Act read with Section 161 RPC was filed against accused/appellants in the court of Special Judge, Anticorruption, Jammu, on 18th June 1996. Appellants denied the charge and claimed to be tried, and, prosecution was asked to produce evidence in support of its case. Appellants denied the charge and claimed to be tried, and, prosecution was asked to produce evidence in support of its case. Prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses out of a list of ten witnesses. The prosecution evidence by order dated 21.02.2001, was closed. The case was posted for. recording statements of accused as envisaged by Section 342 Cr.P.C. 3. Prosecution examined PW-Parveen Singh, PW-Dev Raj, PW-Jambail Singh, PW-Mohd. Afzal Mir, PW-Nazir Hussain, PW-Mohd. Yunis Parvez, Dy. SP, PW-Hari Chand, PW-K.K. Gupta, SP, VOJ and PW-Gulzar Ahmed. It would be advantageous to give summary of evidence led by parties. 4. PW-Parveen Singh (Complainant) In his deposition stated that on 23.03.1994, he had been to Chuna Bhati for check-up of 33 KV Electric Transmission Line and at that time, accused along with one Paryog Singh son of Faquir Singh, reached there and entered into a conversation with him, whereafter they caught hold of him under the pretext that he along with his mother are involved in a case, to which he pleaded his ignorance. The accused subjected him to beating. He divulged his identity to them but they did not set him at large. Thereafter they took him to village Bhabi Gagrani, where they called his mother as well and told him that they would parade him handcuffed up to Thatri in case he did not pay them an amount of Rs.1000/-. The matter was settled at Rs.500/- as he did not have an amount of Rs.1000/-. He further stated that he paid the bribe money of Rs.500/- to accused in presence of Dev Raj, Jambail Singh and Ram Lal, whereafter accused prepared two documents which were signed by him and his mother affixed her thumb impression on them. He further stated that he reported this occurrence to Deputy Commissioner on next day, that is, on 24.03.1994.0n 28.03.1994 an enquiry was conducted by Dy. S.P. Headquarter, who recorded the statements of witnesses in the course of enquiry. He further stated that he reported this occurrence to Deputy Commissioner on next day, that is, on 24.03.1994.0n 28.03.1994 an enquiry was conducted by Dy. S.P. Headquarter, who recorded the statements of witnesses in the course of enquiry. In his cross-examination, he stated that he had been verbally ordered to check the power transmission line and the place, where he was doing so, was surrounded by some houses; that he sustained injuries when he was thrashed by accused; that Paryog Singh is his co-sharer; that when he reached at house of Faquir Singh, three to four persons, consisting of Hem Raj, Soami Raj, Faquir Singh, Paryog Singh, Dev Raj, Jambail Singh and Sham Lal, had assembled there; that his statement was recorded by Enquiry Officer after a period of one month from the date of lodging the report, which subsequently stretched to two months and thereafter reduced by him to 7 to 8 days; that he does not know whether or not the names of the witnesses, namely, Dev Raj, Ram Lal and Jambail Singh were narrated by him to the Scribe of the complaint; that when he was subjected to beating by authorities of Police Post Thatri, there in the police post none except accused were present at that moment of time; that he had stated it before the scribe of complaint that accused demanded an amount of Rs.1000/-, but that he paid an amount of Rs.500/- only to them; that accused asked him to pull his ears and he was made to sign one or two papers and that Faquir Singh and Paryog Singh had entered into a scuffle with his mother. 5. 5. PW-Dev Raj stated that the accused are known to him; that in the month of March 1994, Paryog Singh, complainant, was checking 33 KV Transmission Line in his capacity as a Lineman and at that moment, accused caught hold of him and brought him to his native village, where they threatened him and his mother with dire consequences and told them that they will carry them to Thatri under custody unless an amount of Rs.1000/- was paid to them; whereafter the matter was settled at Rs.500/-, which he paid to accused after its receipt from them; that Jambail Singh and Ram Lal also were there and, thereafter; the accused reduced a deed of compromise into writing which was signed by him also and that on 29.03.1994, he was summoned by Dy. S.P. who recorded his statement. In his cross examination, the witness stated that Faquir Singh brought complainant from Chuna Thatri, and thereafter, he has stated that he was brought from there by the accused; that Faquir Singh had lodged a report against complainant and his mother in police post, Thatri, whereafter he has stated that he does not know whether or not any report had been lodged there; that a dispute had arisen between Faquir Singh and the complainant, which was settled in the house of Faquir Singh; that• the compromise deed placed on record, does contain his signature; that his statement was recorded by a Dy. S.P. and he signed that statement; that the complainant resides at Gagrani, which is a part of village Bela, that is, the place of his residence; that an amount of Rs.500/- was paid to the accused outside the house of Faquir Singh, and that the accused were not personally known to him, prior to the occurrence, but they were frequent visitors to their village and, therefore, he could identify them but he came to know them by their name later on. 6. 6. PW-Jambail Singh states that .before a period of 4 to 5 years, the accused who were posted at Police Post Thatri visited their village at the instance of Paryog Singh son of Faquir Singh, because a scuffle had ensued between his mother and mother of the complainant; that the accused called complainant in the house of Paryag Singh, where they threatened to parade him handcuffed to Thatri; that Dev Raj, Ram Lal and some boys assembled there, who tried to resolve the dispute between complainant and Faquir Singh amicably; that accused demanded an amount of Rs.1000/- for setting the complainant at large and the matter was settled at Rs.500/- which were paid to the accused present in the court; that Parven Singh paid Rs.500/- to Dev Raj and Dev Raj in turn paid the same to the accused, namely, Ramesh Kumar In presence of other accused. Whereafter the accused got a document written, in which it was averred that in case any mishap took place in the house of Faquir Singh, its liability will be fastened upon Parven Singh, and that, thereafter the complainant and his mother were set at large by the accused. In his cross-examination witness stated that Gagrani and Bhela are situated adjacent to each other; that he is a resident of Gagrani; that the complainant is related to him as his grandson; that Prayog Singh called the complainant from Chuna Bhati; that he was called by complainant with whom he went to the house of Paryog Singh that those who had assembled there paved way for the compromise but the bribe money was not paid to the accused in their presence; that the accused were not known to him, prior to the occurrence; that he accompanied the complainant up to Doda; that Dev Raj and Ram Lal had also been to Doda; that Dev Raj belongs to his caste and Ram Lal has lost his eyesight before two years; that he has been operated in his right eye before 7 to 8 years and wears spectacles and that complainant had not paid Rs.500/- to the accused persons. 7. 7. PW-Mohd Afzal Mir states that in the month of March, 1994 he was posted as Dy.SP Headquarter Doda, where an inquiry in a complaint filed by complainant was entrusted to him; that he recorded statements of Dev Raj, Ram Lal and Jambail Singh, and submitted his report to SP, and as per the statements of the witnesses that were recorded by him he found that the accused had committed the offence imputed to them. In his cross examination witness stated that during enquiry, he did not record statements of witnesses, with whom complainant had a dispute; that since he was not present at the spot, therefore, he cannot say whether or not any compromise had been effected in the village, and that the accused committed offence, is based on statements of the afore-named witnesses and he did not enquire from Incharge Police Post, Thatri, as to whether or not the accused had been deputed by him for conducting an enquiry nor was any identification parade of the accused got conducted by him. 8. PW-Nazir Hussain stated that on 26.12.1999, he was posted as Inspector In the office of VOJ, and on that day a Rozenamcha of Police Post Thatri and a letter consisting of three pages were produced before the I/O namely Guizar Ahmed, who in turn seized the same. In his cross-examination, witness stated that he does not know as to how many pages did the Roznamacha consist of. 9. PW-Mohd Younus Parvez, Dy. S.P. stated that on 26.12.1994, he was posted as Inspector VOJ, and on the said day a constable produced a Roznamacha and some papers before him which were seized by the Investigating Officer. In his cross-examination, witness stated that he was orally directed by the then S.P., to take the custody of the Roznamacha as also the papers, from the Constable and that he did not count their pages. 10. PW-Hari Chand stated that after the registration of the case against accused, he entrusted its investigation to Sh. Guizar Ahmed, Inspector by virtue of an entrustment slip which contains his signature. In his cross-examination, witness stated that he did not record the statement of any witness. 11. PW-K.K. Gupta, S.P., VOJ stated that charge sheet appended to the file was reduced into writing by him, after obtaining necessary sanction to prosecute the accused from the competent authority. Guizar Ahmed, Inspector by virtue of an entrustment slip which contains his signature. In his cross-examination, witness stated that he did not record the statement of any witness. 11. PW-K.K. Gupta, S.P., VOJ stated that charge sheet appended to the file was reduced into writing by him, after obtaining necessary sanction to prosecute the accused from the competent authority. In his cross-examination witness stated that he did not visit the place of occurrence and the sanction to prosecute the accused was issued by the Government after due application of mind. He further stated that Faquir Singh had stated before him that Parveen Singh did not bribe the accused in his view and presence. 12. PW-Gulzar Ahmed stated that on 22.09.1994 he was posted as Inspector in the Department of VOJ and the investigation of the instant case was entrusted to him. During investigation, he recorded statements of witnesses conversant with facts of the case, effected seizure of Roznamacha and as per his investigation offences under Sections 5(2) Prevention of Corruption Act and 161 RPC were made out against accused. He has proceeded to state that the posting orders of the accused were also collected by him. In his cross-examination witness stated that he had been to Thatri in connection with investigation of the case; that he does not know who reduced complaint marked as EXPW-BS into writing; that complainant, namely, Parven Singh had not presented himself before him in Police Post Thatri; that compromise deed dated 23.03.1994 had been reduced into writing at Thatri; that he did not record the statement of Incharge Police Post Thatri;• that documents marked as MARK-GA and Mark-GA/1 were collected by him from the office of SSP, Doda; that during course of investigation it did not come to surface that complainant had lodged any complaint against accused in PIP Thatri; that he did not effect seizure of any record in the office of Electricity; and that the statements of the witnesses were reduced into writing at Thatri. 13. 13. The case set up by ‘appellants in the Appeal on hand against the conviction and sentence is that the impugned judgment by Special Judge Anti Corruption, Jammu, is quite contrary to the law and facts of the case as the alleged occurrence is stated to have taken place on 23.03.1994, whereas the complaint was lodged before the Deputy Commissioner, Doda, on 27.03.1994, who referred it to SSP, Doda, for enquiry and the SSP further referred the application/complaint for enquiry to Dy. S.P. Doda. The Dy. S.P. Doda is stated to have after having conducted enquiry at the back of appellants, referred the matter directly to Vigilance Organisation, Jammu, and did not bother to send it to Deputy Commissioner, Doda or S.S.P. for finalization of the matter In controversy. The then Deputy Commissioner, Doda and S.S.P., Doda, are said to have neither been produced as witnesses nor has any report on their behalf been made part of enquiry and challan. The enquiry officer, according to appellants, has acted without participation of appellants and no questionnaire given to appellant, and as such, the basic enquiry is totally against the provisions of law and principles of natural justice. It is vehemently stated that there are clear contradiction in the statement of witnesses, which fact has not been considered by the Special Judge, Anti Corruption and that the complaint is itself contradictory with the statement of witnesses; that the enquiry officer has not conducted enquiry in the case on spot according to his own statement and that as per the prosecution case, there are two Vigilance Officers, who investigated the case and in terms of their statements, they have conducted no enquiry of their own and merely relied upon the alleged documents produced before them. Appellants further aver that what sort of material the two vigilance officers have relied upon In connecting the appellants with the alleged commission of offence, is absent in their statement and investigation and that all the witnesses are interested and planted witnesses, therefore, no reliance under law can be placed on their statements. The witnesses and their statements have not been appreciated in true perspective. The witnesses and their statements have not been appreciated in true perspective. The appellants assail the impugned conviction and sentence on the ground that according to prosecution, sanction was granted vide order no.13 dated 8.3.1996, but what material has been seen or perused by the sanctioning authority is neither disclosed nor perused by the sanctioning authority and that there is no mention of any such thing in the sanction letter. It is pleaded that alleged complaint, if any, has not been mentioned nor considered on its merits while granting the alleged sanction; that there is no evidence stated or discussed whatsoever while granting the alleged sanction in the alleged sanction, it has not been mentioned that a demand of Rs.1000/- was made by the appellants and further that who gave the money and before whom is also missing; that there is no seizure of any amount allegedly involved or even asked or investigated, as such, the sanction granted for prosecution is illegal; that the alleged sanction order has been passed mechanically and such an authority who grants sanction for prosecution is required under law to act fairly and its actions must be consistent with public interest and interest of law; that sanctioning authority has relied upon merely on presumptions and assumptions but not in accordance with law. Appellants also submit that the court below has failed to consider that a Constable has no power to investigate a complaint and there is no such order on record, which empowers appellants/constables to investigate the complaint as alleged by the prosecution; that the compromise In. Appellants also submit that the court below has failed to consider that a Constable has no power to investigate a complaint and there is no such order on record, which empowers appellants/constables to investigate the complaint as alleged by the prosecution; that the compromise In. between the parties i.e. the complainant and other person was arrived at in the Police Station and by SHO concerned of the time; that the Vigilance Organisation has not recorded the statement of the said SHO P/S Thatri, nor has he been cited as witness in the challan; that there was neither any order of arrest nor were appellants assigned the duty of investigation, arrest or even informing the complainant party; that the appellants never called nor has any alleged evidence been recorded in their presence and that there is no evidence/witness recorded in respect of any seizure of documents; that there are major difference in the complaint and statements and that complainant’s mother has not been cited as a witness nor has she been produced as a witness before the court below and that she is a material witness, and one Ram Lal, who is also an important and material witness, has not been produced in the court below; that the challan lacks with material illegality and the same has been ignored by the court below; that no show cause notice was issued upon appellants and no identification parade was conducted during alleged investigation by any of such investigating officers; that the appellant Romesh Kumar was transferred from District Police Line Doda to Police Post Thatri on 12.04.1993 whereas the date of alleged occurrence is 23.03.1994, as such, the involvement of the appellants is based on mere assumptions and presumptions; that there is absolute no evidence to prove that any of the two appellants has conducted any inquiry or accepted any illegal gratification, the alleged commission of offence as attributed to the names of appellants, is without any basis and reliance on interested and planted witnesses are totally illegal; that neither the demand nor has acceptance been proved and it is obligatory on the part of court below to inspire confidence in the statement of complainant and other witnesses and that the statement of prosecution witnesses have not been scanned with care and caution; that there are not attending circumstances against the appellants, which could be considered for even prosecution of the appellants in the Prevention of Corruption Act and that the court below has failed to safeguard the interest of law in favour of appellants but relied upon frivolous prosecution case as under the circumstances it does not fall within the parameters of Prevention of Corruption Act. 14. I have heard learned counsel appearing for parties in extenso and a minute examination of facts on file has also been made meticulously. 15. The prosecution case, In a nutshell, is that accused persons, while posted at Police Post Thatri, and deputed for patrolling duty on 23.03.1994 were approached by one Prayog Singh, who had a complaint about a fight between his mother and Praveen Singh’s mother. The accused along with Prayog Singh went to the place, called Chuna Bhati, where complainant-Praveen Singh was checking a 33KV Line, being a Lineman. The accused persons along with Prayog Singh took complainant at village Gagrani to Prayog Singh’s father’s house and told him that he would be arrested in connection with above complaint and threatened him to settle the matter and demanded Rs.1000/- for settling the matter. The complainant paid Rs.500/- to the accused persons. 16. There are four factors that provide for the trap: (1) demand of money, which can be categorized into two aspects i.e. his initial demand; and demand at the time of trap; (2) the acceptance of the money in pursuance of the aforesaid demand; (3) recovery of money and (4) consideration for demanding such money. 17. Learned counsel for appellants argues that prosecution case and statement of complainant are contrary to the F.I.R. lodged by complainant. He stoutly states that there are material contradictions found in the prosecution story, initially given by complainant, in that first version in terms of F.I.R./initial complaint, does not mention that the demand of Rs.1000/- was made by accused persons. It also does not mention about the persons in whose presence demand was allegedly made. He further states that when complainant was confronted/asked about whether he had mentioned about the demand of Rs.1000/- or the name of the persons in whose presence the demand was made, the complainant, at first, says that he does not know and then says he had mentioned it, which throws serious doubts on credibility of such witness. Learned counsel relies on a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Mal vs. State, reported in 1979 AIR (SC) 1408 to contend that where witness makes two inconsistent statements at different stages, the witness is highly unreliable and unworthy of credence. To buttress his submissions for assailing impugned conviction and sentence, learned counsel for appellants places reliance on law laid down in Bhajan Singh Vs. To buttress his submissions for assailing impugned conviction and sentence, learned counsel for appellants places reliance on law laid down in Bhajan Singh Vs. State of Punjab [1977 AIR (SC) 674]; Pana Lal Damodar Rathi Vs. State of Maharashtra [1979 AIR (SC) 1191]; State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Parakash Chand Bhadwaj [2013 Latest HLJ (H.P) 1381]; Saroop Nath Vs. State of J&K [ 2005 (2) JKJ 393 ]; Sita Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan [ AIR 1975 (SC) 1432 ]; Pandharinath Shelke Vs. State of Maharashtra [2005(2) Bom. C.R(Cri.) 940]: Paresh Kumar Rasiklal Darji Vs. State of Gujara [2015(Cr.L.J.) 4808]: Selvaraj Vs. State of Karnataka [2015 (4) RCR (Criminal); P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. Dist. Inspector of Police and Another [2015 (4) RCR (Cri.) 350]; Satpal Singh Vs. State of Delhi [2016 (2) RCR (Cri) 969]; Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra [2015 All MR (Cri) 2673]; Bhagwan Mahadev Sathe Vs. State [2011 (1) AIR Bom. R 479]; V. Venkata Subbarao Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police [2007(1) RCR (Cri) 519 : (2006) 13 SCC 305]; Mohd Iqbal Ahmed Vs. State of A.P. [ AIR 1979 (SC) 677 ]; Madan Mohan Singh vs. State of UP [ AIR 1954 (SC) 637 ]; Vinod son of Saralarem Vs. State of Maharashtra [2016 (3) PCR (Cri) 744]. 18. Where FIR, based on complainant, does not disclose the name of witnesses in whose presence accused demanded and accepted bribe money, it makes evidence of complainant unconvincing and unreliable as has been held by this Court in Saroop Nath’s case (supra). 19. The testimony of complainant, in the present case, when compared with testimony of other witnesses, like Dev Raj and Jambail Singh, major and material contradictions as regards acceptance of money and alleged passing of money to the accused persons are surfaced. Complainant has deposed that he himself paid the money in presence of villagers/witnesses, present at Prayog Singh’s father’s house whereas one of the witnesses, namely, Jambail Singh, deposes that the money was not given by the complainant but by Dev Raj. PW Jambail Singh’s father states that money was not given in presence of persons present at Paryog Singh’s father’s house. PW Dev Raj, however, deposes that he took the money from complainant and gave it to accused persons. PW Jambail Singh’s father states that money was not given in presence of persons present at Paryog Singh’s father’s house. PW Dev Raj, however, deposes that he took the money from complainant and gave it to accused persons. Thus, two different versions of complainant and witnesses about acceptance and passing of money, i.e. the theory of payment of money, cannot be said to have been established. Therefore, acceptance has not been proved. Even this has not come in the evidence of complainant or any other witnesses as to who demanded Rs.1000/-. The proposition of law is that where the witnesses made inconsistent statements in their evidence either at one stage or at different stages, the testimony of such witnesses becomes unreliable and unworthy of credence. Reference may be made to law laid down In Suraj Mal’s case (supra). 20. Even independent corroboration in the present case is lacking as one of the witnesses, namely, Jambail Singh, is grandfather of complainant and other Dev Raj, belong to the same stratum. It appears that both witnesses, Jambail Singh and Dev Raj had become convenient witnesses and, as such, their statements were required to be scrutinized with care, caution and circumspection. The possibility of these witnesses in making statements in a manner the complainant desired cannot be ruled out. It is clearly exacted from their statements, as discussed above. Thus, their statements cast serious speck of doubt on the veracity of these witnesses and renders their evidence incredible and untrustworthy. Despite important and independent witnesses being available, like Ram Lal and Others, they have not been produced in the court, making prosecution story a doubtful affair. It may not be out of place to mention here that while appreciating the evidence, the probabilities of a case are a material-test in judging credibility of a witness and that when the witness held the position of sponsored, interested, convenient witness favouring a party producing him, it is incumbent upon the court to exercise appropriate caution when appraising of the evidence and to examine its probative value with reference to the entire mixture of facts appearing from the record. Reference in this regard may be made to law laid down in State of J&K Vs. Prem Parkash and Anr. [ 2003(2) JKJ 334 (HC/J&K)]. 21. Reference in this regard may be made to law laid down in State of J&K Vs. Prem Parkash and Anr. [ 2003(2) JKJ 334 (HC/J&K)]. 21. The evidence led by the prosecution falls short of quality and decisiveness of proof of demand and acceptance and where there are two possible views, one is in favour of prosecution and another In favour of accused, the latter should prevail. It IS pertinent to mention here that generally the golden thread that runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases, is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriaqe of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. 22. Apart from the above, the sanctioning order has been passed mechanically. Paragraph Nos.2 & 3 of sanctioning order are reproduction of F.I.R only and initial complaint referring the demand of Rs.500/- whereas prosecution case pertains to demand of Rs.1000/- being made. The sanctioning authority was not aware of the facts constituting the offence and is a result of non-application of mind. Even the sanctioning order has not been proved in the Court as required under law. To this effect reference may be made to law laid down in Bombay High Court Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra 2015 (supra); Vinod Vs. State of Maharastra (supra),’ and Bhagan Mahader Sathe Vs. State [2011 (1) AIR Bom. R 479]. 23. In order to understand the controversy, it is important to understand the purport of Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Svt. 2006. For facility of reference, Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006, is reproduced hereunder:— “4. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration. 1. R 479]. 23. In order to understand the controversy, it is important to understand the purport of Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Svt. 2006. For facility of reference, Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006, is reproduced hereunder:— “4. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration. 1. Where in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 165 of the Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 or an offence referred to in clause (a) (or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of this Act punishable under sub-section (2) thereof) it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he accepted to obtain, that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said section 161, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. 2. Where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 165-A of the Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII) (or under clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 5 of this Act) it is proved that any gratification other than legal remuneration or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 161 of the Ranbir Penal Code, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. 3. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the Court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn.” 24. Section 4(1) of the Act raises presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration. Section 4(1) of the Act raises presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration. When the expression “shall be presumed” is employed in Section 4 (1) of the Act, it has the import of compulsion in it. It envisages that the presumption has to be raised once ingredients of Section 4 are complied with. The prosecution, under these circumstances, is required to prove, by reliable and consistent version of the witnesses, that there has been a demand and acceptance of money by the accused. It is mandatory to prove by reliable and consistent version of the witnesses that the money has been accepted by the accused. If this condition is satisfied, it can be presumed that the accused has received the illegal gratification. However, the Court can draw a line to decline the presumption referred in Section 4(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006, if the gratification or the thing as aforesaid is, in the opinion of the Court, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn. 25. I am fortified by the view taken in case laws reported in AIR 2004 SC 961, AIR 1979 SC 1191 and 2006 Cri.L.J. 1029 as also the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. Appeal No.06/1994 titled Charan Dass Vs. State through Vigilance Organization, Jammu. 26. In AIR 2004 SC 960 , it is held:— “When the sub-section deals with legal presumption, it is to be understood as in terrorem i.e. in tone of a command that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing for forbearing to do any official act etc., if the condition envisaged in the former party of the section is satisfied. The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption under section 4 is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. The section does not say that the said condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its only requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fact can be proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged in the Evidence Act.” 27. Its only requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fact can be proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged in the Evidence Act.” 27. In AIR 1979 SC 1191 , it has been held that the evidence of the complainant is in no better position than accomplice after introduction of Section 165-A RPC. This statement requires corroboration of material facts from the independent witness. If there is no corroboration of testimony of the complainant regarding the demand for money by accused, the evidence of the complainant on that aspect cannot be accepted. On this crucial aspect, it has to be found that the version of the complainant is not corroborated, therefore, the evidence of the complainant on this aspect cannot be relied upon. 28. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove its case indubitably. As discussed above, there is no independent witness qua ‘demand’, of money. Same is true about ‘acceptance’ of money by accused from complainant. It would be unsafe to place reliance on the statement of complainant alone. The condition for drawing legal presumption under Section 4 of the Act during trial is that it should prove that accused has accepted any gratification by reliable and independent witness. In the present case, there is no independent witness as regards the ‘demand’ of money by accused. From the bare reading of section 4(1) of the Act, it is manifest that no presumption under this Section is available in respect of the offence defined under Section 5(1) (d) P.C. Act, which is one of the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused. As regards the offence under Section 161 RPC is concerned, it can be drawn only when the prosecution is found to have proved “that an accused person has accepted or obtained any gratification. 29. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 342 RPC have stated that they have not demanded the money. The only witness, who has shown some consistency in respect of the prosecution story, is complainant. Whether reliance can be placed on the sole statement of complainant to hold accused guilty is worth to be seen. 29. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 342 RPC have stated that they have not demanded the money. The only witness, who has shown some consistency in respect of the prosecution story, is complainant. Whether reliance can be placed on the sole statement of complainant to hold accused guilty is worth to be seen. In this regard it is a well settled proposition of law that evidence of the complainant is in no better position than accomplice after introduction of Section 165-A RPC. This statement requires corroboration of material facts from the independent witness. If there IS no corroboration of testimony of complainant regarding demand for money by accused, the evidence of complainant on that aspect cannot be accepted. On this crucial aspect, it has to be found that the version of the complainant is not corroborated, therefore, the evidence of the complainant on this aspect cannot be relied upon. 30. A criminal trial is not a fairy tale in which one is free to give flight to one’s imagination and fantasy. Crime is an event in real life and is product of an interplay between different human emotions. In arriving at a conclusion about the guilt of accused, charged with commission of a Crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case, in the final analysis, would have to depend upon its own facts. The court must bear in mind that “human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions” Though an offence may be gruesome and revolt the human conscience, an accused can be convicted only on legal evidence and not on surmises and conjectures. The law does not permit the court to punish accused on the basis of a moral conviction or suspicion alone. “The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it is always the burden of prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence.” In fact, it is a settled principle of Criminal Jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused. The fact that the offence was committed in a very cruel and revolting manner may in itself be a reason for scrutinizing the evidence more closely, lest the shocking nature of the crime induce an instinctive reaction against dispassionate judicial scrutiny of the facts and law. Reference in this regard may be made to law laid down in Kashmira Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [ AIR 1952 SC 159 ]; State of Punjab Vs. Jagir Singh Baljit Singh and Anr., [ AIR 1973 SC 2407 ]; Shankar/a/ Gyarasilal Dixit Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765 ; Mousam Singha Roy and Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal, [ (2003) 12 SCC 377 ]; and Aloke Nath Dutta and Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal, [ (2007) 12 SCC 230 )]. 31. From the above discussion, there is no sufficient material to hold the appellants guilty. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellants is set aside. As a consequence whereof, the judgment of the Special Judge Anticorruption, Jammu shall stand quashed and the accused are acquitted of the charges. Their bail bonds are discharged. 32. Disposed of. 33. Record be remitted back to the court below.