ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company v. Jigneshbhai Manilal Shah
2016-03-17
S.G.SHAH
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : S.G. Shah, J. 1. This appeal is preferred by the Insurance Company against claimant as well as driver, owner of the vehicle involved in accident. The challenge is against the judgment and award dated 30.12.2010 in Motor Accidents Claim Petition No. 75 of 2009 by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.) of Viramgam. Such claim petition was preferred by victim of the road accident claiming compensation of Rs. 2,50,000/- under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the accidental injuries received by him in a vehicular accident on 5.5.2009. 2. It is the case of the claimant that on 5.5.2009 when he was standing near Munsar Darwaja in Viramgam town, driver of Rickshaw No. GJ-13V-6353 has driven his Rickshaw in full speed and negligently and while committing the breach of traffic rules, he has driven the Rickshaw rashly and hit the victim, whereby, victim has been thrown away at a distance and received several injuries on different part of the body including fracture above elbow on left hand. Therefore, victim - claimant who is respondent No. 3 herein has filed claim petition against respondent Nos. 1, 2 and the appellant herein being driver, owner and insured respectively. 3. The Claim Tribunal has, after both the sides have submitted their evidence and after hearing them, allowed the claim petition and awarded an amount of Rs. 21,08,000/- with 9% interest from the date of claim petition till its realization from all the opponents i.e. driver, owner and insurer and fixed their liability joint and several. Rest of the directions regarding investment in the award are not much material at present. 4. Such award, has been challenged in the present appeal mainly on the ground that driver of the vehicle in question was not holding valid and effective driving licence to drive a transport vehicle like Rickshaw but he was holding driving licence to drive only non-transport light motor vehicle and, therefore, when vehicle involved in the accident was goods carrying vehicle and when insured has proved both such facts by adducing necessary evidence on record of the Tribunal, the Tribunal should not have made the Insurance Company liable because there is evidence regarding breach of policy condition on record. 5.
5. It is further contended that in addition to the breach regarding non-holding of valid licence to drive such vehicle, the owner has allowed un-authorized passenger in the vehicle though vehicle was goods carrying vehicle and, therefore, it is also a breach of policy condition which exonerated the Insurance Company to satisfy its liability of indemnifying the owner in case of its responsibility to pay any compensation to any such claimant. It is further contended that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate the FIR which is proved on record and which substantiates the evidence of the insured. Therefore, ultimately, it is submitted that the award needs to be modified so as to exonerate the Insurance Company from making the payment to the claimant since there is breach of policy condition. 6. As against that, learned advocate Mr. Mansuri for the original claimants has submitted that pursuant to the different decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, when Tribunal has saddled the liability on Insurance Company also, now, it would not be proper to exonerate them, more particularly, while admitting the appeal, this Court has also directed the appellant to deposit the awarded amount. It is further contended that pursuant to such order, the High Court has also allowed withdrawal of the amount as directed in the award itself and, therefore, now relying upon different decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which are referred by the Tribunal also, the liability of the Insurance Company cannot be set aside but, at the most, Insurance Company can recover such amount from the owner of the vehicle which they can even otherwise do. However, it is submitted that if at all, it is necessary and only if liability of Insurance Company is to be quashed and set aside, then, instead of directing the claimant to refund the amount already disbursed in his favour, the Insurance Company may be permitted and directed to recover the amount of compensation from the owner of the vehicle. 7. In light of above basic facts, if we scrutinize the available record, it transpires that there is no much dispute about the manner of accident, injuries and other factual details submitted by the claimant before the Tribunal and quantum of compensation discussed, determined and awarded by the Tribunal in favour of the claimant. Therefore, I do not want to discuss such factual details.
Therefore, I do not want to discuss such factual details. Therefore, the only issue which requires consideration in this appeal is issue No. 3 framed by the Tribunal and its determination in affirmative against all the opponents fixing their liability jointly and severally. The issue No. 3 in the award reads as under:-- "In case the findings of issue No. 2 is in affirmative, who is liable to pay compensation." 8. Discussion for its determination as aforesaid is found in Paragraph 17 to 20 in the impugned judgment and award. Perusal of such paragraphs makes it clear that Insurance Company has examined one Bhikhabhai Kanjibhai Gadhavi, a Senior Clerk of R.T.O., Surendranagar at Exh. 37. The Tribunal has noted that the witness has deposed before it that the opponent No. 1 - Jignesh Shah, who was driving the vehicle in question is holding licence to drive motor cycle - LMV non-transport, Auto Rickshaw non transport and tractor. Therefore, it is his say that he cannot drive Chhakdo Rickshaw being a goods vehicle which is involved in the accident, because he was not holding authorization for driving transport vehicle. It is further contended that the licence held by the opponent No. 1 is valid for 20 years i.e. till the age of 50 years of the driver, whereas, validity of authorization of driving transport vehicle is only for 3 years. The witness has, thereafter, produced a copy of driving licence of driver Jignesh Shah at Exh. 38 reconfirming that its validity is not for 3 years. The witness has further deposed that the Auto Rickshaw in question is a special vehicle and that licence of Jignesh Shah is valid from 4.2.2009 till 3.12.2029 and that there is no any endorsement or authorization by any other R.T.O. so as to permit him to drive transport vehicle. Therefore, the appellant - Insurance Company has pleaded before the Tribunal as well as before this Court that when registration book of the Auto Rickshaw which is at Exh. 27 confirms that it is a delivery van, which is to be considered as a commercial vehicle, whereas, Insurance policy produced at Exh. 42 is for goods carrying vehicle and, therefore, Insurance Company cannot be held responsible to indemnify the owner by making payment of compensation to the claimants. 9.
27 confirms that it is a delivery van, which is to be considered as a commercial vehicle, whereas, Insurance policy produced at Exh. 42 is for goods carrying vehicle and, therefore, Insurance Company cannot be held responsible to indemnify the owner by making payment of compensation to the claimants. 9. The Insurance Company has relied upon several decisions both, before the trial Court as well as before this Court which are discussed hereinafter. 10. As against that, the claimant has submitted that claimant - applicant has nothing to do with the driving licence of the driver who has committed an accident since he is third party and vehicle in question has dashed with him and injured him. Moreover, the driver was holding licence for driving the Rickshaw and when Rickshaw was not loaded with the goods and, thereby, when Rickshaw had dashed with third party - claimant, the provisions of Section 149 of the Act would attract which confirms that in such cases, even if, driver of the vehicle is not holding effective driving licence, initially, the Insurance Company has to satisfy the award and, thereafter, it may recover the amount of compensation from the insured since it is their inter-se dispute regarding breach of policy condition. The claimant has also relied upon several decisions which are discussed by the Tribunal and which would be taken care of hereinafter. However, ultimately, it is observed by the Tribunal after relying upon few judgments and provisions of Section 149of the M.V. Act, 1988 that the Insurance Company can be exonerated from its liability to satisfy the award only if it proves that the driver was not holding licence at all and that in the present case, Insurance Company has failed to prove it and, therefore, when Rickshaw has dashed the pedestrian and then fled away, the Insurance Company cannot rescue itself from its liability to satisfy the award. Therefore, it is contended that even if it is held that the driver was not holding valid licence, then, at the most, Court may permit the Insurance Company to recover the amount of compensation from the owner.
Therefore, it is contended that even if it is held that the driver was not holding valid licence, then, at the most, Court may permit the Insurance Company to recover the amount of compensation from the owner. In reply to such last submission, it is contended by the appellant that such direction and observation can be only passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under its inherent jurisdiction under article 142 of the Constitution but some directions cannot be passed either by the Tribunal or even by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction. 11. I have perused rival submissions and available record. I do not find any substance in the appeal so as to interfere with it except for modifying the award only to the effect that appellant would be entitled to recover the amount of compensation from the owner of the vehicle i.e. insured since this High Court has already directed it to deposit the amount and disburse the same in favour of the claimant and, more particularly, as discussed hereinafter the liability of the Insurance Company cannot come to an end in given facts and circumstances as well as statute and decisions applicable in such cases. 12. If we start with the evidence on record, it is unfortunate fact that driver and owner has not appeared before the Tribunal and, therefore, it is to be believed that whatever is stated in the petition against them is to be considered as truth unless it is rebutted, whereas, issue regarding validity of licence is raised by opponent No. 3 only but it is in absence of the litigant against whom such issue is raised i.e. opponent No. 1 and 2 and that too without putting them on notice that this is the stand taken by opponent No. 3 insurer against its own insured. It is basic principle of civil jurisprudence that no order can be passed against the person without putting him on notice i.e. without issuance of notice upon him that what is the case of other litigants against him and what relief could have been claimed against him.
It is basic principle of civil jurisprudence that no order can be passed against the person without putting him on notice i.e. without issuance of notice upon him that what is the case of other litigants against him and what relief could have been claimed against him. In absence of such notice, defendant No. 1 and 2 being driver and owner would generally be under the impression that once they have insured themselves, the Insurance Company would defend their rights, since they have nothing to pay to the claimants because of their contract with the Insurance Company to indemnify in such a situation. Therefore, irrespective of all other decisions and evidence adduced in this case, it becomes clear that there is no evidence on record by the insurer/Insurance Company to show that even after receipt of an intimation of accident, either by the owner or even after service of summons/notices regarding claim petition by the Insurance Company, that whether they have at any point of time, either through the pending proceedings or directly, conveyed the owner of the vehicle that they are not responsible to satisfy the award because of breach of a particular condition of the policy of the owner and, thereby, owner should defend such claim on his own. Though, it can be argued, against above observation, that once litigant is served with the notice of the pending proceedings, even if, he remained absent, it is to be believed that he is aware about the proceedings and, thereafter, he has no right to blame or to resist any judicial order against him. However, such principle would be applicable qua the opposite party and not to the same party i.e. between co-opponent's or defendant's. In that case, at-least Insurance Company should have served a copy of Written Statement where such defence is pleaded if any has been filed by them on record to such driver and owner, amongst which practically owner has a written contract with the Insurance Company that in case of liability of the owner of the vehicle, the Insurance Company will satisfy the award in favour of the claimant.
Therefore, though it seems to be concept and logic of such issue, the fact remains that the appellant - Insurance Company has before filing such appeal, at no point of time, conveyed its insured that they would like to rescue themselves from their liability to satisfy the award or calling upon the insured regarding proof of driver's licence or any other evidence or information and, thereby, there is breach of policy conditions and, therefore, it is not liable to satisfy the award. 13. Now so far as available evidence on record is concerned, it is in the form of a deposition by a Senior Clerk of R.T.O. claiming that a licence in the name of one Jignesh Shah does not have endorsement which confirms that holder of the licence is authorized to drive transport vehicle. Otherwise, there is positive evidence that such licence is for 20 years. Now, the crucial issue which arises is that how to confirm that this is the only licence or this is the licence only for concerned and connected with opponent No. 1 alone and not for any other person with similar name i.e. Jignesh Shah. In that case, Insurance Company should have called for the information from the police investigation or chargesheet or even in the prescribed form No. 54 under the concerned Act to prove that the information and evidence produced by it is relating to none but the opponent No. 1. Therefore, in absence of such clinching evidence, it would be difficult to hold that opponent No. 1 was not holding valid licence, more particularly, in his absence because what is served upon respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is the copy of claim petition alone and wherein there is no disclosure about inability of the driver to drive a particular vehicle or that there is breach of policy condition by the opponent No. 2 and, thereby, opponent No. 3 may not be held liable to satisfy the award. 14. The Insurance Company has also not examined any of his Officers or person to prove that they have called upon the owner to disclose the information of valid licence but owner has failed to do so and, therefore, there should be presumption against him.
14. The Insurance Company has also not examined any of his Officers or person to prove that they have called upon the owner to disclose the information of valid licence but owner has failed to do so and, therefore, there should be presumption against him. Similarly, Insurance Company has not bothered to call upon the driver and owner to produce relevant evidence on the issue either by issuing witness summons to them or by issuance of a notice on any application by them under Order XI of Code of Civil Procedure which provides that how better information can be collected either from the litigant or from anybody else. Therefore, in absence of opponent Nos. 1 and 2 and more particularly, in absence of any notices upon them regarding their disability and breach of policy condition as claimed by the appellant, prima-facie, it seems that appellant has no case in its favour to avoid to satisfy the award as per impugned judgment only because they have preferred such appeal. 15. As against that, if we consider the legal issue then also, the applicability of law is certainly in favour of the claimants. The duty of the insurance is confirmed in such cases of legal provisions in the form of Section 149 of the M.V. Act, 1988. The bare perusal of Section 147(3) makes it clear that once certificate of insurance has been issued as provided under Section 147(3) of the Act in favour of the person by whom the policy has been affected, judgment and award in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under Section 147(1)(b) being liability covered by the terms of policy or under the provisions of Section 163(A) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall subject to the provisions of this Section, pay to the persons entitled to the benefit of the decree in sum not exceeding the sum insured payable therein as if even the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability together with any amount payable in respect of cost and sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. 16.
16. Therefore, the provisions of Section 149(2)(a)(i) of the M.V. Act, 1988 practically confirms the logic discussed in previous paragraphs that notwithstanding the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, its liability to satisfy the award and, therefore, there is logic that if at all the Insurance Company wants to avoid or cancel its liability, they have to do it with a positive act of such disclosure well-in-advance but not by an attempt to prove the breach of policy condition before the Court only, even if, they are entitled to avoid or cancel the policy. However, the provisions of law is otherwise that even if it is avoided or cancelled, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of the Section, has to pay the person entitled to the benefit of decree. Whereas, the condition precedent for enforcing liability of the Insurance Company, sub section (2) of the Section provides that the Insurance Company must have noticed through the Court before the commencement of the proceeding in which judgment or award is given.
Whereas, the condition precedent for enforcing liability of the Insurance Company, sub section (2) of the Section provides that the Insurance Company must have noticed through the Court before the commencement of the proceeding in which judgment or award is given. It is further made clear that in such sub section that even after notice of the proceedings though Insurance Company is entitled to be a party to such proceedings, it is entitled to defend the action on any of the grounds enumerated in it which are material to be recollected here and hence, reproduced as under:-- "Section 149(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1): xxxx (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely:-- (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle- (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of Insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organized racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the nondisclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular." 17. Therefore, the bare reading of the above defence makes it clear that available defence includes limited issues only and in all the issues wherein so far as driving licence is concerned, Section 149(2)(a)(ii) provides that there should be breach of condition excluding driving by named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licenced or of any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification.
Now, therefore, what is required is a breach of condition if any imposed in the policy to drive the vehicle by any particular class of people. Therefore, in absence of any specific condition in the policy that vehicle should not be driven by a person who is not holding an authorization to drive driving vehicle "duly licence" may alone would not be enough to exonerate the Insurance Company from its liability to indemnify the owner in case of injuries to the third party by such a vehicle, more particularly, because the basic principle of the concept of such litigation is relating to the right of a person to get compensation because of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. 18. The appellants-claimants are relying upon following judgments and submitted when the deceased and the injured were third party with respect to offending vehicle being Rickshaw, the Insurance Company cannot be exonerated from its liability. "[1] National Inc. Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh reported in 2004 (3) SCC 297 wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless the breach(es) regarding the condition of driving licence is/are not so fundamental and found to have contributed to the cause of the accident, the Insurance Company is liable; and the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party. In the present case, the claimants are third party, the driver of Rickshaw was having licence of Motor Cycle and Tractor since 21.12.96 and from 16.7.97 further endorsement of Auto Rickshaw; the accident took place on 20.5.07, the R.T.O. officer has deposed that having licence of this type can drive transport vehicle. In this case, the driver was having licence of Auto Rickshaw and was driving Rickshaw (delivery van) having same mechanism. It is not the case that Rickshaw being delivery van is having different mechanism than the Auto Rickshaw. In the present case, the Insurance Company has failed to prove that the breach was so fundamental. Therefore the Insurance Company is liable.
It is not the case that Rickshaw being delivery van is having different mechanism than the Auto Rickshaw. In the present case, the Insurance Company has failed to prove that the breach was so fundamental. Therefore the Insurance Company is liable. The finding of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are as under:-- Summary of Findings: "The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions are as follows: (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory Insurance of vehicles against third party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory Insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) Insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petitions filed under Section 163A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 inter alia in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-Section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) The Insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish 'breach' on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof whereof would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case.
(v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the concept of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insured under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver, (a fake one or otherwise), does (not) fulfill the requirements of law or not, will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner's licence, the Insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants.
The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act, the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in sub-section (4) with proviso thereunder and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover amount paid under the contract of Insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse of by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of insurer against insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims." [2] S. Iyyapan v. United India Ins. Co. Ltd. 2013 (7) SCC 62 (Supreme Court) wherein also Insurer was held liable. Relevant Para 17 and 18 reads as under:-- "17.
Co. Ltd. 2013 (7) SCC 62 (Supreme Court) wherein also Insurer was held liable. Relevant Para 17 and 18 reads as under:-- "17. The heading "Insurance of Motor Vehicles against Third Party Risks" given in Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Chapter VIII of 1939 Act) itself shows the intention of the legislature to make third party Insurance compulsory and to ensure that the victims of accident arising out of use of motor vehicles would be able to get compensation for the death or injuries suffered. The provision has been inserted in order to protect the persons travelling in vehicles or using the road from the risk attendant upon the user of the motor vehicles on the road. To overcome this ugly situation, the legislature has made it obligatory that no motor vehicle shall be used unless a third party Insurance is in force. 18. Reading the provisions of Sections 146 and 147of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is evidently clear that in certain circumstances the insurer's right is safeguarded but in any event the insurer has to pay compensation when a valid certificate of Insurance is issued notwithstanding the fact that the insurer may proceed against the insured for recovery of the amount. Under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurer can defend the action inter alia on the grounds, namely, (i) the vehicle was not driven by a named person, (ii) it was being driven by a person who was not having a duly granted licence, and (iii) person driving the vehicle was disqualified to hold and obtain a driving licence. Hence, in our considered opinion, the insurer cannot disown its liability on the ground that although the driver was holding a licence to drive a light motor vehicle but before driving light motor vehicle used as commercial vehicle, no endorsement to drive commercial vehicle was obtained in the driving licence. In any case, it is the statutory right of a third party to recover the amount of compensation so awarded from the insurer.
In any case, it is the statutory right of a third party to recover the amount of compensation so awarded from the insurer. It is for the insurer to proceed against the insured for recovery of the amount in the event there has been violation of any condition of the Insurance policy." [3] First Appeal No. 2584 of 2013 decided on 8.10.13 by Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court, wherein, the accident took place on 9.2.2012 (after 2001) and the Division Bench has relied upon the decision of S. Iyyapan V. United reported in 2013 (7) SCC 62 has held that the question of liability for breach of condition of licence is already concluded by the judgment of the Apex Court and no different view can be taken. Ultimately held the Insurance Company liable. [4] First Appeal No. 1657 of 2013 decided on 5.2.14 by Division Bench of this High Court, wherein, the accident took place on 23.9.2007 (after 2001). Similar contention of amendment after 2001 was negatived and relying upon the decision of S. Iyyapan, ultimately the Insurance Company was held liable. [5] Kulwant Singh v. Oriental Ins. Co. reported in 2015 (2) SCC 186 - Supreme Court, wherein, the accident took place on 8.10.2005 (after 2001). Similar issue had come up and the order of tribunal was restored holding Insurance Company liable. [6] National Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Jisha K.P. and Ors. (Full Bench Kerala HC) reported in 2015 STPL (web) 2046 KER decided on 16.12.14, wherein, the accident took place on 3.12.2005 (after 2001). Considering all the judgments including the judgments relied by the other side, the Full Bench of Hon'ble Kerala High Court has held that Badge is a minor technical breach and not sufficient to exonerate Insurance Company from liability. It is further held that in absence of any evidence to show that the breach was so fundamental in causing accident, there can't be any automatic direction in allowing Insurance Company to recover the amount from owner also. [7] Bhailalbhai Garbabhai Vasava v. Munikhan Ismailkhan Sayed reported in 2003 (1) GLR 605 (Gujarat High Court), wherein, this Court held that if it is found that the driver is holding a valid licence to drive a particular category of vehicle, namely, light motor vehicle or heavy motor vehicle, then, the Insurance Company can't be exonerated of its liability to reimburse the damage.
[8] Jawahar Singh v. Bala Jain & Ors. reported in 2011 (6) SCC 425 paragraph 14, wherein, the Injured and the deceased were third parties, the Insurance Company has to pay and recover the amount as per the following decisions. The Tribunal has power to pass an order to pay and/or to Recover it from owner." 19. Under the above circumstance, the appeal stands dismissed. 20. In view of disposal of main matter, Civil Application does not survive and hence the same stands disposed of accordingly.