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2016 DIGILAW 631 (JHR)

Hemraj Yadav, Son of Bhagwat Yadav v. State of Jharkhand

2016-04-18

RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY

body2016
JUDGMENT : R. Mukhopadhyay, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28.02.2014, passed by Shri Chandresh Kumar, learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Giridih in S.T. No. 531 of 2007, whereby and whereunder the appellant has been convicted for the offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for seven years and also to pay a fine of Rs.3000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo S.I. for a period of one month. 2. The prosecution case is that on 16.08.2002 at about 8 A.M. in the morning, the informant Reeta Devi had gone to the forest Dumarwaghati for cutting wood. It is alleged that the appellant suddenly came near her and snatched the axe from her hand and thereafter pulled her down and committed rape upon her. On hearing the cry of alarm, the mother of Phusan Mian had come running but by that time, the appellant had fled away. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid allegation, Gawan P.S. Case No. 34 of 2002 was instituted. Upon investigation, finding the allegation to be true, chargesheet was submitted under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code on 30.09.2003 and after taking of cognizance by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Giridih, case was committed to the court of Sessions. Charge was framed under section 376 IPC, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. In course of trial, ten witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. P.W-1-Ram Kishun Yadav had deposed that when he was going towards jungle, he had heard the cry of alarm. He had seen the appellant fleeing away. This witness has stated that the informant had subsequently told him about the commission of rape upon her. P.W-2-Hari Yadav has stated that on alarm he and P.W-1 had rushed to the place of occurrence. The informant had disclosed about the commission of rape upon her. It has been deposed that by the time they reached the place of occurrence, the appellant had already fled away. P.W-3-Sona Mahto is the father of the informant and he has disclosed that the informant told him about the rape committed by the son of Bhagwat Mahto. The informant had disclosed about the commission of rape upon her. It has been deposed that by the time they reached the place of occurrence, the appellant had already fled away. P.W-3-Sona Mahto is the father of the informant and he has disclosed that the informant told him about the rape committed by the son of Bhagwat Mahto. P.W-4 –Mohan Yadav is the husband of the informant and he has stated that the informant had disclosed to him about the commission of rape upon her by the appellant. P.W-5-Reeta Devi is the informant in the present case. She had disclosed about how the appellant had committed rape upon her and when on hearing the cry of alarm, the mother of Phusan had come, the appellant had fled away. P.W-6-Md. Mumtaz and P.W-7-Md. Allauddin are both hearsay witnesses. P.W-8-Satya Narain Pandey has deposed that at the time when the medical examination of the informant was done he was posted as a Male Ward Attendant. This witness had identified the signature of one of the doctors in the report of Medical Board, which was marked as Ext-1. P.W-9-Harihar Mahto is an Advocate Clerk, who had proved the formal FIR and the written report and which were marked as Exts-2 and 3 respectively. P.W-10-Dr.-Bibha Singh had examined the informant and has opined that possibility of rape cannot be doubted. She has further stated that as per the pathological examination, dead spermatozoa was found. 5. After examination of the prosecution witnesses, the appellant was examined under section 313 Cr.P.C, in which he denied the allegation made against him. 6. After considering the evidence of the witnesses, the learned trial court vide judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28.02.2014 had convicted the appellant for the offence under section 376 IPC and had sentenced him to undergo R.I. for seven years. 7. Heard Mr. Mahadeo Thakur, learned counsel for the appellant and learned A.P.P. for the State. 8. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned trial court had not considered the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution as several discrepancies appeared in the said examination. It has further been submitted that evidence of P.W-5 cannot be relied upon in absence of any corroborative evidence. 8. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned trial court had not considered the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution as several discrepancies appeared in the said examination. It has further been submitted that evidence of P.W-5 cannot be relied upon in absence of any corroborative evidence. It has also been submitted that there is no eye witness to the occurrence and the place of occurrence has also not been established in view of non examination of I.O. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that as per the FIR, on hearing the cry of alarm, the mother of Phusan Mian had come, at which the appellant had fled away but the said witness who was vital to the prosecution, has never been examined by the prosecution. He further submits that Dr. Dolly Rani Dhar, who was also a part of the medical board has also not been examined. It has, thus, been submitted that in view of the fact that several material witnesses have not been examined and the evidence of P.W-5, being the sole witness as well as the victim, unsupported by any evidence on the point of rape, the appellant deserves to be acquitted from the charges levelled against him. 9. Learned A.P.P., on the other hand, has submitted that the conviction under section 376 IPC can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and since there is no material difference in the incident narrated by her at the time of institution of FIR and her subsequent deposition in course of trial, the prosecution has been able to establish its case and therefore the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 10. P.W-5 is the informant of the case, who has stuck to her fardbeyan and has given a consistent evidence with respect to commission of rape by the appellant upon her. The evidence of P.W-1 suggests that the appellant was seen fleeing away from the place of occurrence and the fact that this witness had rushed to the place of occurrence has been corroborated by the statement of P.W-2, who had also accompanied him. The evidence of P.W-1 suggests that the appellant was seen fleeing away from the place of occurrence and the fact that this witness had rushed to the place of occurrence has been corroborated by the statement of P.W-2, who had also accompanied him. Consistent evidence is also on record with respect to the factum of occurrence and perpetrator of rape as P.W-1, 2, 3 and 4 have clearly and consistently deposed about the disclosure made by the informant with respect to the appellant having committed rape upon her. The evidence of the prosecution further gets fortified by the fact that as per the pathological examination, dead spermatozoa was detected and the possibility of rape committed upon the informant was not ruled out. The conviction based on the sole testimony of a witness is permissible if the version of the said witness is consistent and does not suffer from any material infirmity or discrepancy. Such evidence however has to be tested in the anvil of the other witness so as to corroborate such statement. The evidence of P.W-5 being the victim inspires confidence as it is not adulterated and the surrounding circumstances in the nature of corroborative evidence by P.W-1, 2, 3 and 4 does suggest that the prosecution had been able to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The learned trial court has properly appreciated the evidence on record and thereafter has come to a finding with respect to culpability of the appellant in commission of the offence and accordingly there being no cause to interfere in the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, this appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. Since the appellant has already served out his sentence, no further order need be passed. Appeal dismissed.