Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation v. Bharat Ch. Sahoo
2016-08-10
SANJU PANDA, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. This writ petition is against the award dtd.27th December 1999 passed in Industrial Dispute Case No.32 of 1997. 2. The brief fact of the case of the petitioner as has been pleaded in the writ petition is that the opposite party – workman had been engaged in daily wage capacity as Supervisor in Yatri Nivas and cattle driving work from 24.11.1987 to 1.10.1992 and on 1.10.1992 the management has disengaged him without any prior notice or paying any notice pay or retrenchment compensation. The case of the Management is that the opposite party workmen has been engaged in daily rated capacity but on inspection it was found that he was not performing his duty with utmost satisfaction of his employer and as such he has been disengaged. 3. While on the other hand the case of opposite party workman is that before disengagement there is no compliance of section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. The opposite party – workman after being terminated has raised a dispute and the appropriate Government has made the following reference:- “Whether the action of the Executive Officer, Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation, Bhubaneswar in terminating services of Sri Bharat Chandra Sahoo by way of refusal of employment with effect from 1.10.1992 is legal and/or justified? If not, to what relief Sri Sahoo is entitled?” The Labour Court after instituting the reference as Industrial Dispute Case No.32 of 1997 has proceeded with the matter and after going through the various aspects of the matter regarding continuous service of the petitioner for period of more than 240 days under the management but there is no compliance of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 has answered the reference that since the mandatory provision as contained in Section 25-F has not been followed, hence the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement with full back wages. 4. The petitioner being aggrieved with the award is before this court by way of this writ petition on the ground that the Labour Court has not appreciated all aspects of the matter. It has been submitted that the opposite party – workman cannot be regularized or even cannot be taken back in service. 5.
4. The petitioner being aggrieved with the award is before this court by way of this writ petition on the ground that the Labour Court has not appreciated all aspects of the matter. It has been submitted that the opposite party – workman cannot be regularized or even cannot be taken back in service. 5. While on the other hand the case of opposite party – Workman is that before dispensing with the service the management ought to have taken recourse of the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 which is mandatorily to be followed by the employer. There is no dispute about the fact that Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 provides a condition that before terminating the services of a workman notice of one month in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. The continuous service has been defined U/s.25-B of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 which provides that a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman. 6. There is no dispute about the fact that if the workmen are being retrenched without following the provision as contained in Section 25(F) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 it will be illegal for the reason that before retrenchment the provision as provided U/s.25(F) is mandatorily to be followed. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bombay and Others Vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others, AIR 1960 SC 610 wherein at paragraph 6 their Lordships have been pleased to hold that on a plain reading of Section 25-F(b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by it is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of the workman. The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied………….
The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied…………. Having regard to the fact that the words used in plain and unambiguous it seems to us that the Court of Appeal was right in holding that section 25-Icovered cases of recovery of monies other than those specified in section 25-F(b)…… Therefore we see no substance in the argument that the Court of Appeal has misconstrued Section 25-F(b). That being so, failure to comply with the said provision renders the impugned orders invalid and inoperative. Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gammon India Limited Vs. Niranjan Das, (1984) 1 SCC 509 (para 2 to 4). 7. After going through the award it transpires that although it is an ex parte hearing for the reason that in spite of several opportunities given to the Management, the management chose not to appear after filing written statement refuting the claim of the workman, hence the Tribunal after taking into consideration the stand of opposite party – management taken in the written statement has adjudicated the issue. One of the stand of the Management is that it is an ex-parte Award so it may be quashed, but in our view when the Management appeared after due service of notice, filed written statement and thereafter not chosen to appear, as such the court after taking into consideration the attitude of the Management to delay the process and also considering the intent of the Industrial Dispute Act being a beneficial legislation has posted it for ex-parte hearing and considering the written statement of the Management has proceeded with the proceeding. Hence it is not a case of ex-parte proceeding, rather a case of ex-parte hearing and if t he plea of the Management will be accepted it would be unjust and improper for the workmen, since the reference is of the year 1997, so in our considered view the Management intentionally has not appeared and the reason was obvious to delay the proceeding. Hence no infirmity is said to have been committed by the Labour Court. Further the Management has also not come forward as to why they have not chosen to appear before the Labour Court. Taking all these aspects of the matter into consideration, we decline to accept the argument of the Management.
Hence no infirmity is said to have been committed by the Labour Court. Further the Management has also not come forward as to why they have not chosen to appear before the Labour Court. Taking all these aspects of the matter into consideration, we decline to accept the argument of the Management. 8. It transpires from the award that opposite party – workman has worked as supervisor in Yatri Niwas and cattle driving work under the management from 24.11.1987 to 1.10.1992 and on 1.10.1992 the management had disengaged him without any prior notice. The opposite party – workman has filed copy of the note sheet under Exhibit-1, copy of the note-sheet dtd.28.8.1998 under Exhibit-2, the orders of Executive Officer dtd.21.6.1989 under Exhibit-3, the certificate issued by the Manager, Yatri Nivas dtd.1.9.1990 under Ext.4 and the applications of the employees under Exhibits-5 to 5/e and after going through these exhibits the Labour Court has came to finding that the workman was working under the management as D.L.R. The management has not led any evidence defending their claim and thereafter the Labour Court has came to finding that the opposite party – workman had worked for more than the stipulated period of 240 days under the Management but the Management disengaged him which would come under the purview of Section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the management has not followed the provision as contained in Section 25-F, hence the reference has been answered in favour of the opposite party – workman. As has been stated herein above the provision as contained in Section 25 is mandatorily to be followed and if it has not been followed, it will be said that before dispensing with the services the management has taken decision contrary to the statute and it is settled that if anything has been done contrary to the statute, it will not stand in the eye of law and after taking into consideration this aspect of the matter the Labour Court has answered the reference in favour of the workman. 9.
9. Learned counsel representing the petitioner – management has submitted that since it was an ex-parte hearing, as such the matter may be remanded for fresh hearing, but when this court has asked a specific query that whether Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act has been complied with, learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly submitted that it has not been complied with and in that pretext even if the matter would be remitted before the Labour Court for adjudication afresh, it will yield nothing but a futile exercise. In this regard reference may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. & Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 281 and M/s. Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise Gauhati, (2005) 4 SCC 337 wherein it has been held that it would be of no use if it amounts to completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits and in such situation remitting the matter would be an empty formality and as such we are of the firm opinion that the case stands covered by „useless formality theory since admittedly there is no compliance of the provision of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Applying the said ratio and taking into consideration the fact that the dispute is of the year 1997 and admittedly the provision of Section 25-F has not been complied with, as such it would not be proper for this court to remit the matter again. 10. It will also be relevant to deal with the finding given by the Tribunal with regard to back wages. Since the tribunal has came to a conscious finding that retrenchment of the workmen is contrary to the provision as contained in Section 25(F) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, as such the award for reinstatement along with back wages has been passed. In this regard reference may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs.
In this regard reference may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and Others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 wherein their lordships have been pleased to hold that we are of the considered view that awarding back wages by the finding of Tribunal cannot be said to be improper and accordingly it is held to be proper. The proposition laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) has also been followed in the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tapash Kumar Paul Vs. Bsnl & Another, (2014) 4 SCR 875 wherein their Lordships after taking into consideration the proposition laid down in the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Surendra Kumar Verma & Others Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Lavour Court, New Delhi & Another, (1980) 4 SCC 443 and Deepali Gundu’s case (supra) have been pleased to confirm the award of the Labour Court of reinstatement with full back wages, since in the absence of full back wages, the employee will be distressed and will suffer punishment for no fault of his own. Applying this proposition in the instant case, in our considered view there is no error in the award directing the workman for his reinstatement with back wages. Taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, in our considered view there is no error in the award passed by the Labour Court, accordingly, there is no merit in this writ petition, hence dismissed.