JUDGMENT : 1. Though these appeals are listed for admission, with the consent of the learned Counsel on both sides, they are heard finally. 2. These appeals arise out of the judgment and decree passed by the XL Additional City Civil Judge at Bangalore in O.S.No.9681/2005 dated 16.07.2010. These appeals are preferred by defendant Nos.3 and 4 in the said suit. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to, in terms of their status before the trial Court. 4. The first respondent / plaintiff filed the suit seeking a decree of recovery of a sum of Rs.1,43,405/- with interest and costs towards arrears for usage of telephone bearing No.5722331. It is the case of the plaintiff that the Department of Telephones was coming under the Ministry of Communication, Government of India and subsequently, the plaintiff Bharath Sanchar Nigam Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘BSNL’ for brevity) was incorporated which is a successor. The plaintiff is a Central Government Company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, and is a successor to the Department of the Telephones, Government of India. The first defendant is a Limited Company which is also registered under the Companies Act, 1956, and defendant Nos.2 to 4 are its directors. The first defendant Company was allotted the telephone connection bearing No.5722331. The defendants initially were regular in payment of telephone charges but later on, stopped paying the charges. In spite of repeated requests and reminders made by the plaintiff, the defendant defaulted in paying the telephone charges. The arrears amounted to Rs.1,43,405/-. The plaintiff, having no other alternative, issued departmental notices and demanded arrears of telephone charges. Despite repeated requests and reminders, defendants did not pay the dues. The plaintiff got legal notices issued on 07.08.2004 and 10.08.2004 but there was no response from the defendants to the said notices. Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking recovery of arrears of telephone charges with interest and costs. 5. In response to the suit summons and Court notices, defendant Nos.2 and 4 entered appearance and filed separate written statement denying the plaint averments and also their liability to pay the amount sought by the plaintiff. They contended that the suit was not maintainable as it was barred by limitation. 5. In response to the suit summons and Court notices, defendant Nos.2 and 4 entered appearance and filed separate written statement denying the plaint averments and also their liability to pay the amount sought by the plaintiff. They contended that the suit was not maintainable as it was barred by limitation. They further contended that the plaintiff was attempting to armtwist the defendants in paying the suit claim which they were not liable to pay. Second defendant contended that she was not a director of the first defendant company as alleged in the plaint and the plaintiff has not produced any documents to demonstrate that she was indeed the director of the first defendant company. Further, she was a shareholder or member of the first defendant company holding 100 shares in the company and annual return of the company has been submitted. She was unaware of the present status of the company and hence, in any event, her liability was only to the extent of her shares in the company and she was not liable to pay any amount that was foisted on her. That the liability of the shareholder is to the extent of shares held in the company and not any further. 6. She also contended that she was not aware that the first defendant company was allotted the telephone connection in question and alleged dues in respect of that connection. Contending that there was no cause of action against her, she sought dismissal of the suit. 7. Fourth defendant in her written statement contended that the suit was frivolous, vexatious and unsustainable both in law as well as on facts, apart from being barred by limitation. She also contended that she was unaware that a telephone connection was allotted to the first defendant and for what period there was stoppage of payment of telephone charges of the said phone. She further contended that she was a director of the first defendant upto 16.04.1999, on which date she submitted her resignation and thereafter, she has nothing to do with the first defendant company. That her resignation was accepted on 20.04.1999 and necessary steps had been taken intimating the Registrar of Companies about her resignation in accordance with the Company’s law. She, therefore, submitted that no liability regarding the first defendant could be fastened on her as she had ceased to be a director. That her resignation was accepted on 20.04.1999 and necessary steps had been taken intimating the Registrar of Companies about her resignation in accordance with the Company’s law. She, therefore, submitted that no liability regarding the first defendant could be fastened on her as she had ceased to be a director. Contending that the suit filed by the plaintiff was belated and barred by time, she sought for dismissal of the suit. 8. Defendant Nos.1 and 3 were placed exparte by the trial Court. 9. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: “1. Whether the plaintiff proves that defendants are due in a sum of Rs.1,43,405/- being the arrears of telephone bill amount? 2. Whether the plaintiff further proves that defendants are liable to pay interest on arrears at 18% per annum? 3. Whether the suit claim is barred by time? 4. What Decree or order? 10. In order to substantiate its case, plaintiff examined one witness as PW.1 and produced 18 documents which were marked as Exs.P.1 to P.18. Defendant Nos.2 and 4 examined themselves as DWs.1 and 2 and got marked 6 documents as Exs.D.1 to D.6. 11. On the basis of the evidence on record, the trial Court answered issue No.1 in the affirmative, issue No.2 partly in the affirmative and partly in the negative, issue No.3 in the negative and decreed the suit directing defendant Nos.1, 3 and 4 to pay the sum of Rs.1,43,405/jointly and severally. The suit was decreed with costs to the plaintiff. The suit was dismissed as against defendant No.2. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 16.07.2010, defendant Nos.3 and 4 have preferred these appeals. 12. I have heard learned Counsel for the appellants and learned Counsel for the first respondent / plaintiff and perused the material on record. 13. By order dated 18.10.2010, service of notice to the other defendants namely defendant Nos.2 to 4 has been dispensed with in both the appeals. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellants, at the outset would submit that the trial Court could not have decreed the suit when the suit itself was not maintainable having been barred by limitation. 13. By order dated 18.10.2010, service of notice to the other defendants namely defendant Nos.2 to 4 has been dispensed with in both the appeals. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellants, at the outset would submit that the trial Court could not have decreed the suit when the suit itself was not maintainable having been barred by limitation. He contended that the trial Court ought to have raised the issue of maintainability of suit, i.e., the question of limitation as a preliminary issue and on answering the same, further proceedings could have been considered by the trial Court. He submitted that the dues / charges of telephone connection sought by the first respondent / plaintiff was for the period from 16.03.1997 to 29.12.1997 but the suit was instituted on 06.12.2005, which was highly belated and therefore, the cause of action was time barred. He submitted that respondent No.1 – BSNL was not a department of the Central Government as on the date of filing of the suit. Respondent No.1 – plaintiff is a Government Company incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and therefore, by taking the colour of being a Central Government department as it was earlier part of Department of Telephones, Ministry of Communications, the suit could not have been filed in the year 2005. That from 01.10.2000 with the incorporation of the first respondent – company, it was no longer a part of the Central Government and was a separate body altogether. Therefore, Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity), which prescribes a limitation period of thirty years for central government was not applicable as has been observed by the trial Court. On the other hand, as per Article 113 of the Act, which prescribes a limitation period of three years was applicable and the suit had to be filed prior to 23.12.2000. In the instant case, the suit has been filed on 06.12.2005, the suit was extremely barred by limitation and hence, the trial Court ought to have dismissed the suit without going into the merits of the matter. He contended that this Court may examine on this aspect of the matter at the first instance and thereafter, consider the appeals on merits in case of necessity. 15. He contended that this Court may examine on this aspect of the matter at the first instance and thereafter, consider the appeals on merits in case of necessity. 15. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Pawan Kumar Gupta reported in (2016) 1 SCC 363 , to contend that the precise question that arises in these appeals i.e., applicability of Article 112 of the Act to BSNL has been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court against BSNL and in favour of the respondent in that case. He submitted that the said case is squarely applicable to the present case. 16. Per contra, learned Counsel for respondent No.1, supporting the judgment and decree of the trial Court contended that BSNL is nothing but an extension of the Department of Telephones which was earlier part of the Ministry of Communications. He submitted that being successor to the Ministry of Communications, it was nothing but an adjunct to the Central Government Department. Therefore, Article 112 of the Act would continue to apply to the plaintiff and the trial Court was therefore, justified in holding that the limitation period insofar as the respondent No.1 – plaintiff is concerned, was 30 years and thereby, holding that the suit filed by the plaintiff in the year 2005 was maintainable and not barred by limitation and thereby rightly decreeing the suit in favour of respondent No.1. He submitted that on the issue of limitation, this Court may consider the matter under Article 112 of the Act and not under Article 113 as contended by the appellants’ Counsel and thereby, sought for dismissing the appeals even on merits. 17. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material on record, the preliminary issue which would arise for consideration is, as to whether, the suit filed by respondent No.1 – BSNL was barred by limitation and therefore, was not maintainable. In this regard, it is noted that the trial Court had intact raised such an issue. While answering issue No.3, the trial Court applied Article 112 of the Act and not Article 113 thereof. 18. Before going into the applicability of any Articles of the Act to the case on hand, the undisputed facts of the matter could be noted. In this regard, it is noted that the trial Court had intact raised such an issue. While answering issue No.3, the trial Court applied Article 112 of the Act and not Article 113 thereof. 18. Before going into the applicability of any Articles of the Act to the case on hand, the undisputed facts of the matter could be noted. The suit has been filed by respondent No.1 on 06.12.2005. The arrears of telephone charges claimed are in respect of the period from 16.03.1997 to 29.12.1997. On a reading of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, it is noted from paragraph No.7 onwards that Department of Telephones which was part of Central Government with effect from 30.09.2000, that is, the date of the execution of the Office Memorandum transferred its assets and liabilities from 01.10.2010 to BSNL on its incorporation. It is no doubt true that BSNL is the successor of Department of Telephones. The precise question that arose in the aforesaid case was whether the benefit of Article 112 of the Act should also accrue in favour of BSNL. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the said issue held that the benefit could not accrue to BSNL, that the period of 30 years prescribed under Article 112 of the Act is only applicable to Central and State Government Departments including the State of Jammu and Kashmir. For all other entities, such as BSNL, Article 113 of the Act would apply. Articles 112 and 113 of the Act read as under: Description of the suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 112. Any suit (except a suit before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person. PART X – SUITS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO PRESCRIBED PERIOD 113. Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years When the right to sue accrues. “7. Further, the learned Senior Counsel by placing strong reliance upon the definition of the “Central Government”, which is an inclusive definition, submits that the Central Government also includes such authorities as are indicated therein. Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years When the right to sue accrues. “7. Further, the learned Senior Counsel by placing strong reliance upon the definition of the “Central Government”, which is an inclusive definition, submits that the Central Government also includes such authorities as are indicated therein. Since the appellant Company is incorporated under the Companies Act and it has acquired the assets and liabilities of the DoT, as an instrumentality of the Central Government, the appellant being a company having a separate and distinct entity from the Central Government, its functioning is controlled by the Central Government and, therefore, it is entitled to avail the benefit under Article 112 of the Limitation Act. Alternatively, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the suit claim is not barred by limitation if its cause of action arose for the appellant Company either on 30.09.2000 i.e. the date of execution of the Office Memorandum transferring the assets and liabilities or on 01.10.2010, the date of its incorporation, as the case may be. Taking either of the said dates into consideration, the suit claim is within three years and maintainable and, therefore, the courts below were not right in dismissing the suit claim made in the original suit proceedings before the various courts, which is contrary to law. He, therefore, requested this Court to set aside the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal/civil revision petition. 8. The query that falls for our scrutiny in that, though, in respect of the claim against the respondent-subscriber, the amount due from the installation of the telephone connection i.e. 29.01.1992 till its disconnection on 16.03.1998 is Rs.25,296/, the DoT of the Central Government is entitled to file a suit within thirty years under the period of limitation provided under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, whether this benefit will accrue in favour of the appellant Company either from the date of the execution of the Office Memorandum, referred to supra, transferring the assets and liabilities and remedies, or the date of its incorporation. This aspect of the matter is examined by us very carefully in the light of the provisions of Section 3 and Section 130 of the TP Act and in the backdrop of the Office Memorandum vis-a-vis the Office Memorandum dated 30.09.2000 executed in favour of the appellant Company transferring its assets and liabilities and also remedies available for the transferor in favour of the appellant Company, the legal contention urged is that by virtue of the said transfer an actionable claim, i.e. a claim to any debt from the subscriber should be recoverable debt from the subscriber by the Company. Reliance is placed upon Accounting Standards and Corporate Accounting Practices, referred to supra, and the clarification given in the said extracts, to contend that the actionable claim/current assets includes the inventories and trade receivables and the said principle is applicable to the appellant Company, being a registered company under the provisions of the Companies Act. Section 133 of the Companies Act, 2013 which provides that the Central Government would prescribe accounting standards and Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, which relevant provision is extracted hereinabove, have been relied upon to substantiate the contention that the appellant Company is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government as it is being financed and controlled by the Central Government, and therefore, the benefit accrued in favour of DoT of the Central Government under Article 112 of the Limitation Act would stand extended to the Appellant Company, it being an instrumentality of the Central Government for the reason that 100% share capital of the company is owned in the name of the President of India, and therefore, it partakes the character of Central Government. It is urged that this aspect of the matter has not been properly examined and considered by the courts below while rendering the impugned judgments and decrees. 9. These contentions cannot be accepted by this Court for the following reasons: 10. No doubt, the assets and liabilities are transferred by the erstwhile DoT in favour of the appellant Company, including the debts due from the subscribers, the respondents herein, an asset which is registered with the Company pursuant to the transfer of assets and liabilities as provided under Section 130 of the TP Act upon which reliance is placed by the learned Senior Counsel. What requires to be carefully examined is that the actionable claim, a claim to any debt from a subscriber debtor after the assets and liabilities are transferred by an instrument, the Office Memorandum, referred to supra, in favour of the appellant Company, is a legally recoverable debt to avail the remedy which is transferred in favour of the appellant Company. 11. It could be seen from the undisputed facts, which are adverted to in the impugned judgment that undisputedly the suit claims against the debtors/subscribers are beyond the period of three years of limitation which is available. Therefore, contention of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant Company that the benefit accrued in favour of the Central Government under Article 112 of the Limitation Act is attracted to the fact situation, has a far-reaching consequences for the reason that, though the Company is a statutory authority, it is not synonymous with the Central Government. The expression 'Central Government' under the General Clauses Act is clearly defined, which relevant provision is extracted in the aforestated portion of this judgment. By a reading of the aforestated definition, by no stretch of imagination it can be construed that the appellant Company which is registered under the Companies Act, though the share capital of the Company owned in the name of the President is 100%, it cannot be construed as the Central Government for the reason that the appellant Company by registration under the Companies Act, no doubt it is under the control of the Central Government as it is financed and its administration is under the absolute control of the Central Government, nonetheless, it shall not be construed as the Central Government for the reason that the appellant Company is a separate legal entity. It also cannot claim that it is entitled to the benefit under Article 112 of the Limitation Act on the ground that a debt recoverable from the subscriber is an actionable claim in terms of Section 3 of the TP Act, even if the same has been transferred under Section 130 of the TP Act by execution of the Office Memorandum, referred to supra, thereby vesting in it the rights and the remedies vis-à-vis the same. No doubt, by execution of the said instrument it has got the actionable claim transferred, the assets that must be recoverable debts from the debtors and subscribers. No doubt, by execution of the said instrument it has got the actionable claim transferred, the assets that must be recoverable debts from the debtors and subscribers. As could be seen from the claim, the undisputed facts of these appeals are that on the date of the transfer, some of the claims were time barred, therefore, the Company cannot construe that the time barred debts are also an actionable claim by way of transfer in its favour, which entitles it to avail the benefit of Article 112 of the Limitation Act i.e. the period of thirty years to institute suits for recovery of the same. Such an interpretation is contrary to Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 12. A careful reading of Article 112 of the Limitation Act clearly reveals that in any suit (except a suit before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the period of limitation would be thirty years. The period of limitation time from which the period begins to run is mentioned under Column 3 of the above Article of the Limitation in the Schedule, which reads as follows. "When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person." By a careful reading of the aforesaid Article, it makes abundantly clear, that a suit can be instituted by or on behalf of the Central Government. It is not the case of the appellant herein that it has filed the suit on behalf of the Central Government. This is for the reason that the appellant Company has instituted the suit on the basis of the instrument of Office Memorandum wherein the DoT has transferred its assets and actionable claims. It cannot be said that it has filed the suit on behalf of the Central Government because the appellant-plaintiff is a Company, a distinctly independent and separate entity. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the aforesaid Article 112 of the Limitation Act to claim that there would be thirty years of limitation period as the asset transferred is an actionable claim due to the DoT is wholly misconceived in law. 13. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the aforesaid Article 112 of the Limitation Act to claim that there would be thirty years of limitation period as the asset transferred is an actionable claim due to the DoT is wholly misconceived in law. 13. The other argument advanced by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant-company that it is an agency or instrumentality under the Central Government which falls within the inclusive definition as defined under Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act is wholly misconceived for the reason that Article 112 of the Limitation Act speaks of the Central Government or the State Government. Its agencies or instrumentalities are not incorporated under Article 112 of the Limitation Act. Such an argument is contrary to the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. vs. State of T.N. and Ors. reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533 . In paragraph 14 of the said judgment it is categorically stated that the legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process and the Court cannot do the legislative functions. Para 14 of the said judgment reads thus: "14. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 515 . The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case, (1996) 3 SCC 88 . In Nanjudaiah case, (1996) 10 SCC 619 , the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent." (Emphasis supplied) 14. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent." (Emphasis supplied) 14. In the connected matter i.e. Civil Appeal No. 2409/2009, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in A.K. Bindal vs. U.O.I. (2003) 5 SCC 163 paras 5, 14 and 17 and Food Corporation of India vs. Municipal Committee, Jalalabad (1999) 6 SCC 74 , in support of the contention that the expressions 'Central Government' or 'State Government' in terms of Section 3(8) and Section 3(60) of the General Clauses Act do not include in their purview or definition their agencies or instrumentalities. 15. In view of the aforesaid judgments of this Court, the legal contention urged by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the appellant being the agency or instrumentality of the Central Government is entitled to maintain the suit claims within thirty years as provided under Article 112 of the Schedule in the Limitation Act or alternatively, whatever the limitation period which was available for the Central Government, within three years from the date of execution of the agreement are wholly unsustainable in law. 20. In view of the aforesaid judgment, it becomes clear that Article 112 of the Act is not applicable instead Article 113 of the Act is applicable. The suit ought to have been filed by the BSNL on or before 23.12.2000 instead it was filed belatedly on 06.12.2005. Therefore, the suit filed was time barred and not maintainable. The trial Court was not right in applying Article 112 whereas Article 113 applies. On this short ground alone, the appeals are to be allowed. 21. In view of the answer given to the aforesaid preliminary issue regarding the maintainability of the suit, it would not be necessary to consider further, on the merits of the matter. 22. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial Court is set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.