JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. This writ petition having been preferred by the workmen assailing the award passed in Industrial Dispute Case No.3 of 1997 dtd.17.9.1978 whereby and where under the reference has been answered against the workmen. 2. The brief fact of the case of the petitioners as has been pleaded by them in the writ petition is that they have been appointed as Khalasi (Mulia) on N.M.R. basis with consolidated pay of Rs.240/- per month with effect from 2.3.1986, 1.2.1986, 11.6.1985 and 20.3.1986 respectively. As per the resolution of the Orissa State Electricity Board, the petitioners were given appointment with the approval of Superintending Engineer, Balimela Hydro Electric Project and were directed to work in the protection and control division of the project at Podia Scheme. After completion of more than 3 to 4 years of successful and continuous service the petitioners all of a sudden were terminated w.e.f. 01.11.1988 on the plea that the work of paid scheme has been completed. It is the case of the petitioners that while issuing individual notices for termination, the authorities completely ignored the resolution of the Board that N.M.R. employees completed 400 days as on 1.8.1991 and as such they ought to have been regularized, but they have not been regularized and one K. C. Sahoo, opposite party no.6 who was appointed much after the appointment of the petitioners and was working in protection and control division was also retrenched w.e.f.01.11.1988 along with the petitioners, but very surprisingly opposite party no.6 was re-appointed w.e.f.01.11.1988 in the said project and was allowed to work in the maintenance division. Thereafter an industrial dispute was raised before the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour Officer, Malkanagiri and on failure of conciliation, the appropriate Government accepted the failure report and made a reference and referred it before the Labour Court for its adjudication vide reference dtd.26.5.1997 which was registered as Industrial Case No.3 of 1997. 3. The Labour Court has framed as many as four issues such as:- (i) Is the reference maintainable? (ii) Whether the employment of K.C. Sahu under first party No.2 amounts to his re-employment U/s.25-H of the I.D. Act? (iii) Whether refusal of re-employment to the second party – workman ignoring their seniority vis-à-vis Sri K.C. Sahu is illegal and unjust? (iv) What relief? (ii) Whether the employment of K.C. Sahu under first party No.2 amounts to his re-employment U/s.25-H of the I.D. Act? (iii) Whether refusal of re-employment to the second party – workman ignoring their seniority vis-à-vis Sri K.C. Sahu is illegal and unjust? (iv) What relief? The Labour Court vide award dtd.17.9.1998 has decided issue no.(i) in favour of the workmen but answered issue nos.(ii) and (iii) against them holding that opposite party nos.3 and 4 are two different units so the appointment of opposite party no.6 by opposite party no.3 after being retrenched by opposite party no.2 is not re-employment U/s.25-H of Industrial Dispute Act. The petitioner being aggrieved with the award is before this court by way of this writ petition. 4. The opposite parties have appeared. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite party no.4 defending the award. It has been stated therein that there is no infirmity in the same since the evidences do not show that the Superintending Engineer was the appointing authority in respect of N.M.Rs. rather the document produced, clearly proves beyond doubt that the Executive Engineer in the respective divisions are the appointing authority in respect of N.M.Rs. and that the documents marked exhibits are only relating to the N.M.Rs./work charged persons engaged in operation and maintenance work of the erstwhile Orissa State Electricity Board and on such finding the Presiding Officer has came to conclusion that the circulars are not applicable to the petitioners. It has been stated that from bare reading of the circulars, it would be clear that each division is independent unit in respect of employment and retrenchment of the N.M.Rs. and the Executive Engineer of the divisions are the appointing authority and as such the allegation of non-compliance of Section 25-H of the I.D. Act is not attracted. 5. Learned counsels for the parties have been heard at length. After going through the pleadings made in the writ petition as well as in the counter affidavit including the award which is impugned in this writ petition it is evident that the issue raised by the workmen, the petitioners herein is with respect to non consideration of their cases for re-employment while re-employing one K.C. Sahoo who admittedly has come in service after the workmen and on failure of conciliation the appropriate Government has made reference to the effect that:- “Whether re-employment of Sri Kishore Ch. Sahu by the Executive Engineer, protection and control division, Balimela Hydro Electrical Circle, power House, Balimela, Malkangiri ignoring the seniors S/S Bhagaban Khemudu, Rama Krushna Baghm, Kamala Nag, Kamala Lochan Harijan and Gangadhar Bhuyan, N.M.Rs. are legal and/or justified? If not, what relief the seniors are entitled to?” 6. After hearing the rival submissions of the learned counsels for the parties the fact emerges for consideration is that if the opposite party nos.2 and 3 will be held to be two separate units having been different identity, the reference will be in favour of the management but if the opposite party nos.2 and 3 will be said to be part and parcel of the industrial establishment i.e. the Odisha Hydro Power Corporation or the Office of the Superintending Engineer the reference will be answered in favour of the workmen. 7. Before going into the finding of the Labour Court it would be necessary to refer the provision of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is being reproduced herein below:- “25H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.-Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re-employment, and such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for re-employment shall have preference over other persons.” The provision as contained in Section 25-H stipulates a provision for re-employment if the retrenched workmen offer themselves for re-employment, the employer is bound to give preference to them over and above other persons and if this is not done and the appointments are given in violation of this provision, the retrenched workmen can raise an industrial dispute. However, it is pertinent to note that this section only gives the right to a retrenched employee to be re-employed in the event a vacancy arises in the establishment and in case of such re-employment the question of back wages would not arise. It is also clear from the said provision that it is only the retrenched workmen who have the right of re-employment under this section. If the services of the workmen have been terminated for any other reason, then retrenchment, he would not be entitled to re-employment under this section. This section prescribes certain conditions for the workmen to be entitled to claim the benefit under it. If the services of the workmen have been terminated for any other reason, then retrenchment, he would not be entitled to re-employment under this section. This section prescribes certain conditions for the workmen to be entitled to claim the benefit under it. In order to claim preference in employment, the following conditions should be satisfied:- (i) He should be a citizen of India; (ii) The workmen should have been “retrenched” prior to re-employment. This right is not available to a dismissed, discharged or superannuated workman; (iii) He should have been retrenched from the same category of service in the industrial establishment in which the re-employment is proposed; and (iv) He should have offered himself for re-employment in response to the notice by employer under Rule 76 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, or under any rules framed by a state. Failure so offer himself for re-employment as aforesaid, will disentitle a workman to the benefit of this section. Thus after going through the provision of Section 25-H it is also important to look into the definition of Industrial Establishment which has got bearing for coming to a rightful conclusion to assess the finding of the Labour Court. The definition of “Industry” as also “Industrial Establishment” has been provided in sections 2-J and 2-(Ka) which are being reproduced here under as:- “2(j) “Industry” means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. The definition of “Industry” as also “Industrial Establishment” has been provided in sections 2-J and 2-(Ka) which are being reproduced here under as:- “2(j) “Industry” means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. 2(ka) “Industrial establishment or undertaking” means an establishment or undertaking in which any industry is carried on: Provided that where several activities are carried on in an establishment or undertaking and only one or some of such activities is or are an industry or industries, then,- (a) If any unit of such establishment or undertaking carrying on any activity, being an industry, is severable from the other unit or units of such establishment or undertaking, such unit shall be deemed to be a separate industrial establishment or undertaking; (b) If the predominant activity or each of the predominant activities carried on in such establishment or undertaking or any unit thereof is an industry and the other activity or each of the other activities carried on in such establishment or undertaking or unit thereof is not severable from and is, for the purpose of carrying on, or aiding the carrying on of, such predominant activity or activities, the entire establishment or undertaking or, as the case may be, unit thereof shall be deemed to be an industrial establishment or undertaking;” From perusal of the definition of “industry” as provided under section 2(j) it is evident that it is in two parts, the first part says that it means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employees and then goes on to say that it includes any calling, service, employment handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. Thus, one part defines it from the standpoint of the employer; the other from the standpoint of the employees. The first part of the definition gives the statutory meaning of industry, whereas the second part deliberately refers to several other items of industry and bringing them in the definition in an inclusive way. The first part of the definition determines an industry by reference to the occupation of the employers in respect of certain activities. The activities are specified by five words, namely, business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling, these words determine the scope of the word “industry” and they describe what the cognate expression “industrial” is intended to convey. The first part of the definition determines an industry by reference to the occupation of the employers in respect of certain activities. The activities are specified by five words, namely, business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling, these words determine the scope of the word “industry” and they describe what the cognate expression “industrial” is intended to convey. Reference with respect to the definition of “industry” may be made to the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mgmt of FICCI Vs. R.K. Mittal, (1971) 2 LLJ 630 , State of Bombay Vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, (1960) 1 LLJ 251 and Magmt of Safdarjung Hospital Vs. Kuldip S. Sethi, (1970) 2 LLJ 266. Thus the “industry” is to be looked into in its broader sense. Likewise as per the definition of “industrial establishment”. After going through the provision of Sections 25FF, 25FFA, 25FFF, 25-O and 25R it is evident that the expression “industrial establishment” has been synonymously used at various places in the Act. Section 25 uses the word “industry” while Section 25G uses the word “industrial establishment”. Since these two sections are cognate, the word industrial establishment, as used in Section.25-G has to be understood to mean an “industry” as used in Section 25-F. The term “industry” as defined in Sec.2(j) of the Act includes an “undertaking”. Thus undertaking is a narrow concept than “industry”, in other words “industry” is a whole of which an “undertaking” may be a part. Hence, the present definition brings on the ambit of an “industrial establishment” or “undertaking” any establishment or undertaking in which any “industry” as defined in Sec.2(j) is carried on. Thus it is the character of an activity as an “industry” which brings any establishment or undertaking within the ambit of the definition. Hence in the light of the definition of “industry” and industrial establishment the finding given by the Tribunal is to be assessed. 8. Thus it is the character of an activity as an “industry” which brings any establishment or undertaking within the ambit of the definition. Hence in the light of the definition of “industry” and industrial establishment the finding given by the Tribunal is to be assessed. 8. Under section 25-H it is the duty of the employer to propose to take into his employ any persons on retrenchment, the “employer” has been defined under section 2(g) which speaks as follow:- “2(g) “employer” means- (i) In relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department; (ii) In relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of that authority;” From perusal of the definition of the “employer” it is evident that in the context of the present case the workmen are working under the Odisha Hydropower Corporation limited, a functionary of the State Government and as such the head of the division i.e. office of the Executive Engineer can be said to be the employer of the opposite party- workmen or the Odisha Hydropower Corporation limited. 9. After close examination of the finding given by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court while answering the reference, we find that the Presiding Officer has not dealt with the fact with respect to the “industrial establishment”/“employer” as to whether the opposite party nos.2 and 3 will come under an establishment/employer or the opposite party no.1 or the Orissa Hydro Power Corporation will be said to be employer or industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 25(H) of the Act which according to our conscious view is the core issue to answer the reference. We find that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has answered the reference treating opposite party nos.2 and 3 who are the head of the office of the division under the circle i.e. opposite party nos.2 & 3 and treated the office of opposite party nos.2 and 3 as two different units while the case of the workmen all along is that Mr. K.C. Sahoo who has come in service after their engagement under the opposite party no.2 but he has been re-employed and to that effect petitioners-workmen have raised dispute against the action of the management that the same is contrary to the provisions of section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. After going through the provisions of section 25-H it is evident that the said provision will be applicable to the establishment where any workmen under retrenchment and the employer proposes to take into his employ, he shall in such manner as may be prescribed given opportunity to the retrenched workmen for re-employment who offers themselves for re-employment the employer is bound to give them preference over other persons. 10. The case of the petitioner in this writ petition is that they deserve for re-employment but ignoring their cases, one Sri K.C. Sahoo has been re-employed, hence dispute has been raised and accordingly reference has been made before the Labour Court for its adjudication. After close scrutiny of the award it is evident that four issued have been framed such as (i) Is the reference maintainable? (ii) Whether the employment of K.C. Sahu under first party No.2 amounts to his re-employment U/s.25-H of the I.D. Act? (iii) whether refusal of re-employment to the second party – workman ignoring their seniority vis-à-vis Sri K.C. Sahu is illegal and unjust? and (iv) what relief? The Tribunal has examined the workmen as well as the management. The issue no.(i) although has been answered in favour of the petitioner – workmen, but while discussing issue nos.(ii) and (iii) the Tribunal has came to finding that opposite party nos.2 & 3 are two different employers and hence the relief prayed for by the second party – workmen has been refused. The petitioner workmen has exhibited documents and in support of their claim Exhibits-3 to 5 which are some circulars/letters of the Orissa State Electricity Board. These circulars/letters show that power has been vested upon the Superintending Engineers to approve engagement of N.M.Rs. working in all the division under him. The Exhibit nos.3 to 5 confers power upon the Superintending Engineer by delegation of power by the Board to the Superintending Engineer to approve engagement of N.M.Rs. and their prior approvals in the matters of engagement of N.M.Rs. working in all the division under him. The Exhibit nos.3 to 5 confers power upon the Superintending Engineer by delegation of power by the Board to the Superintending Engineer to approve engagement of N.M.Rs. and their prior approvals in the matters of engagement of N.M.Rs. But according to the Labour Court these exhibits does not show that the Superintending Engineers are the appointing authorities in respect of N.M.Rs. It has been observed in the award that the petitioner –workmen have failed to produce any material to see that they were engaged in control and maintenance side of the Boards work, hence it is not possible to say that these circulars are applicable to workmen of this case. The labour court thereafter without going into the nature of employment of Mr. K.C. Sahu as to by whom he has been appointed, has came to the conclusion that this court can decide only the question as to whether non-compliance of Section 25-H of the Act gives rise any right in favour of the workmen and hence exhibits 3 to 5 have not been relied upon in order to answer the reference. The labour court has came to finding that Sri K.C. Sahoo and the petitioners – workmen have been engaged in two different units and as such the petitioner cannot claim equity and parity with Sri K.C. Sahoo for the reason that Sri K.C. Sahoo has been re-employed under opposite party no.2 while the petitioners – workmen had been working under opposite party no.2 and since opposite party nos.2 and 3 are two different employers, the relief sought for by the second party has been refused. The labour court has gone into the fact that before seeking any aid of Section 25-H of the Act it is the utmost duty of the workmen to show that they are seeking re-employment under the same employer from where they have been retrenched. We also find that the labour court has observed that these workmen – second party members and Mr. We also find that the labour court has observed that these workmen – second party members and Mr. K.C. Sahoo were employed by opposite party no.3 to execute a project work and on completion of the work they were retrenched and thereafter after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court reported at page 137 Vol.30 of A.I.R. Mannual Fifth Edition were there is a note from a decision of Hon’ble Patna High Court (1991 Pat LJR 567) that casual workers employed for some specified work or period, on completion of that work or period, would automatically stand terminated from service, but it is termination simpliciter and they cannot be treated as retrenched workmen for the purpose of Section 25-F or 25-H of the Act. However, he has not bothered to go into the full reported decision of the Hon’ble Patna High Court and applying the said principle he came to opinion that termination of service of the workmen cannot be treated as retrenchment even though the management has paid them retrenchment benefit U/s.25-F of the Act. We further found that the labour court has given its award basing upon the fact that the petitioners- workmen since have been engaged under a scheme and the moment the scheme has been closed after closure of the project work, the workmen will be terminated, the services of the workmen will stand terminated and the said termination will be simplicitor and basing upon this fact the reference has been answered against the petitioners – workmen while answering issue nos.(ii) and (iii) and accordingly issue no.(iv) has also been answered against the petitioners – workmen. It is settled that if the appropriate Government is referring a dispute by making a reference, the reference is to be answered by the Industrial Tribunal or the labour court. The appropriate Government has made a specific reference that whether the re-employment of Sri K.C. Sahoo by the Executive Engineer, Protection and Control Division, Balimela Hydro Electrical Circle, Power House, Balimela, Malkanagiri ignoring the seniors, i.e. the workmen – petitioners herein are legal and/or justified. In the pretext of this reference the labour court ought to have considered the re-employment of K. C. Sahoo vis-à-vis non-consideration of the case of the petitioners-workmen, thus the entire reference revolves around towards violation of provision of section 25-H of the Industrial Dispute Act. In the pretext of this reference the labour court ought to have considered the re-employment of K. C. Sahoo vis-à-vis non-consideration of the case of the petitioners-workmen, thus the entire reference revolves around towards violation of provision of section 25-H of the Industrial Dispute Act. Thus from appreciation of the entire aspect of the matter and after going through the Award it transpires to us that the Labour Court has not dealt with the issue regarding the fact (i) as to whether the opposite party no.2 and 3 will come under “industry” or “industrial establishment” or “employer”; (ii) or the opposite party no.1 will be said to be an “industry” or “industrial establishment” or “employer”. These issues are of paramount consideration for deciding the dispute as has been referred by the appropriate Government before the Labour Court. But the Labour Court without touching this issue has answered the reference by answering issue nos.2 and 3 against the opposite party – workmen treating the services of opposite party – workmen and Sri K. C. Sahoo on different units since they were working under opposite party nos.2 & 3 respectively. 11. This Court is conscious of the fact that the Writ Court should not interfere in the matter of finding given by the Tribunal but it is not that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot interfere, rather the interference can be shown on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. In this regard reference may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” Applying the principle laid down therein in our considered view the Tribunal has passed order within the limits of its authority, but since there is mistake apparent on the face of the record as discussed above, as such we in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are inclined to interfere with the fact finding given in the award and accordingly we hold that the award is not sustainable and accordingly set aside. The issue which has been discussed by us depends upon determination of factual aspect for which the evidence is to be laid, hence we thought it proper to remand the matter before the Labour Court for its fresh adjudication in order to answer the reference. Accordingly the matter is remitted before the Labour Court to adjudicate the issue afresh in connection with Industrial Dispute Case No.3 of 1997 in the light of the discussion made above. It is made clear that the Labour Court will take its own decision independently without being prejudiced by the finding of this Court.