ORDER : Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J. The petitioners have called into question the order dated 14-6-2016 passed by the Court of the City Civil Judge (CCH-3) on I.A. No. 7 in O.S. No. 8192 of 2011. The matter pertains to the formation and constitution of the Association of Apartment Owners. By the impugned order, the Trial Court turned down the petitioners' request for the review of the order dated 16-6-2014 made on the clarification sought by the Receiver. 2. Sri Mento Issac, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that there can be no formation of the owners' interim association as per the Karnataka Apartment Ownership Act, 1972 and the Rules framed thereunder, namely, Karnataka Apartment Ownership Rules, 1975. 3. He submits that the tenants cannot be given the voting rights, unless the owners give their consent. He submits that the preparation of the defaulters' list is unilateral. The respondents are not even sharing the books of accounts with the owners of the apartments. Hence, on the alleged ground of default, the owners cannot be deprived of the voting rights. He submits that the Karnataka Apartment Ownership Rules, 1975 do not deal with the defaulters' issue at all. 4. He submits that the points raised in I. A. No. 7 are not at all discussed in the impugned order. The order dated 16-6-2014 suffers from the error apparent on the face of the record. 5. He submits that the Trial Court has erred in holding that there is no need to pass any fresh order on I.A. No. 7 in view of the order passed by this Court in W.P. No. 48621 of 2015. In support of his submissions, he relied on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another, (2000) 6 SCC 359 . The portions of the said decision as read out by him are as follows: "44............. (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a Court, Tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising is appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter." 6. He also relies on the Apex Court's decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi v. Pearl Drinks Limited, (2010) 11 SCC 153 . Paragraphs 11 and 12 relied upon y him, are extracted herein below: "11. The doctrine of merger has its origin in common law. It has its application not only in the realm of judicial orders but also in the realm of estates. In its application two orders passed by the judicial and the quasi-judicial Courts and authorities it implies that the order passed by a lower authority would lose its finality and efficacy in favour of an order passed by a higher authority before whom correctness of such an order may have been assailed in appeal or revision. The doctrine applies regardless of whether the higher Court or authority affirms or modifies the order passed by the lower Court or authority........... 12. In State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Company Limited, AIR 1967 SC 681 , this Court had another occasion to examine the true scope and purport of the doctrine of merger. The Court declared that the doctrine of merger was not a doctrine of rigid and universal application nor could it be said that where there are two orders, one by the inferior authority and the other by a superior authority, they must necessarily merge irrespective of the subject-matter of the appeal or the revision or the scope of the proceedings in which such orders are passed " 7. Sri G.L. Vishwanath, the learned Counsel for the respondent no.1 submit that the delay in the formation of the owners' association is not in the interest of the owners. Because the respondent-developer is under the lega obligation to collect huge service tax from the owners of the apartments and remit the same to the Government. If the owners' association is formed and the maintenance-amounts are collected by it, then there is no need to collect and remit any amount to the Government. 8. He submits that the formation of the owners' association has to be as per recital No. 5 of the sale deeds executed by the respondent in favour of the purchasers. Recital No. 5 reads as follows: "5. The purchasers along with the other apartment owners of the Elita Promenade shall form only one Association of Apartment Owners for the Elita Promenade, only after expiry of 6 months from the date of the Occupancy Certificate with respect to the last block/wing of the Elita Promenade. For clarity, the Association of Apartment Owners under the Karnataka Apartment Ownership Act of 1972 and Rules 1974 shall be formed by the vendor along with all the apartment owners including the purchasers after 67 months but within 12 months from obtaining the Occupancy Certificate with respect to the last block/wing of the Elita Promenade." 9. He submits that the Occupancy Certificates are obtained between 2008 and 2010. Therefore the owners' association ought to have been formed within 2011. 10. He submits that the Trial Court's order, the review of which was sought by the petitioners by filing I. A. No. 7 has merged in this Court's order dated 20-1-2016 passed in W.P. No. 48621 of 2015. Further, the petitioner: moved the memo for 'being spoken to' in the disposed off matter. This Court by its order dated 15-2-2016, rejected the said memo. The learned Counsel further submits that no leave or liberty is reserved to the petitioners in the said writ proceedings to seek review of the Trial Court's order, which was upheld by this Court. 11. In support of his submissions, he read out paragraph 12 of the Apex Court's decision in the case of Kunhayammed (supra), which is extracted herein below: "12. 11. In support of his submissions, he read out paragraph 12 of the Apex Court's decision in the case of Kunhayammed (supra), which is extracted herein below: "12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior Court, Tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the Superior Court has disposed of the lis before it either way - whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the Superior Court, Tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the Court, Tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view." 12. He also sought to draw support from the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of Amba Bai and Others v. Gopal and Others, (2001) 5 SCC 570 . Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said decision are extracted herein below: "10. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the impugned order held that the order passed in the first appellate decree merged into the order passed in the second appeal and hence there is no executable decree. "The doctrine of merger arise only when there are two independent things and the greater one would swallow up or may extinct the lesser one by the process of absorption". (Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyer, page 1224, 2nd Edition) 11. If the judgment or order of an inferior Court is subjected to an appeal or revision by the Superior Court and in such proceedings the order of judgment is passed by the Superior Court determining the rights of parties, it would supersede the order or judgment passed by the inferior Court. If the judgment or order of an inferior Court is subjected to an appeal or revision by the Superior Court and in such proceedings the order of judgment is passed by the Superior Court determining the rights of parties, it would supersede the order or judgment passed by the inferior Court. The juristic justification for such doctrine of merger is based on the common law principle that there cannot be, at one and the same time, more than one operative order governing the subject-matter and the judgment of the inferior Court is deemed to lose its identity and merges with the judgment of the Superior Court. In the course of time, this concept which was originally restricted to appellate decrees on the ground that an appeal is continuation of the suit, came to be gradually extended to other proceedings like revisions and even the proceedings before quasi-judicial and executive authorities." 13. He has also relied on this Court's decision in the case of A.A Enterprises, Bangalore v. Tektronix (India) Private Limited, Bangalore, ILR 2011 kar. 3594 Paragraphs 16 and 19 of the said decision read out by him are as follows: "16. For yet another reason too, I am disinclined to entertain this review petition. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has filed SLP No. 29872 of 2009 challenging the very same order dated 15-9-2009. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has dismissed the said SLP by its order dated 4-12-2009. My order, dated 15-9-2009 stands merged in the Apex Court's order dated 4-12-2009. This Court's order is sunk in the Hon'ble Supreme Court's order by the operation of the doctrine of merger. If the order dated 15-9-2009 is reviewed, it amounts to reviewing the Apex Court's order, which is not permissible. When the superior Court has been approached for the self-same relief, the review application has to be rejected at the threshold itself. 19. Similarly, in the case of State of Maharashtra and Another v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, (1996)3 SCC 463 , it is held that when the self-same order was confirmed by the Supreme Court, the exercise of power of review by the Tribunal would be deleterious to the judicial discipline. Once the Supreme Court has confirmed the order of the Tribunal, that becomes final. Once the Supreme Court has confirmed the order of the Tribunal, that becomes final. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot have any power to review the previous order, which stands merged with the order passed by the Supreme Court." 14. His last submission is that having participated in the process of getting the Receiver appointed, the petitioners cannot turn around and put the clock back. 15. The question that falls for my consideration is whether the Trial Court is justified in dismissing the petitioners' I.A. No. 7 for the review of its order: dated 16-6-2014? Admittedly, the order dated 16-6-2014, on the clarification sought by the Receiver was also sought to be reviewed by the respondents. It that regard, the respondents filed I.A. No. 6, which was rejected by the Trial Court by its order dated 25-8-2015. The said order was challenged by the respondents by filing W.P. No. 48621 of 2015. This Court, by its order dated 20-1-2016 dismissed the writ petition. The petitioners filed the memo in the disposed off matter stating that certain observations made by this Court in its order dated 20-1-2016 carry negative remarks to petitioners' case. On the matter being posted for 'being spoken to', this Court dismissed the memo. Thereafter, no party has challenged the said orders. Thus, the matter appears to have attained the finality. 16. It is also worthwhile to notice that while rejecting the writ petition or rejecting the memo, no liberty was reserved to any party to seek the review of the order dated 16-6-2014. By the operation of the doctrine of merger, the, order dated 16-6-2014 passed by the Trial Court has merged in the order passed in W.P. No. 48621 of 2015. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Kunhayammed (supra), 'to merge' means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished. When a decree or order passed by an Inferior Court, Tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum and once the superior forum disposed it of, whether its order is one of reversal or modification or dismissal or confirmation, it becomes a decree or order of the superior forum. When a decree or order passed by an Inferior Court, Tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum and once the superior forum disposed it of, whether its order is one of reversal or modification or dismissal or confirmation, it becomes a decree or order of the superior forum. This position is reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Amba Bai (supra) by holding that the decree or order of the inferior Court would merge with that of the appellate or revisional Court. If the Trial Court were to review its earlier order, it would have amounted to reviewing this Court's order, which is not permissible. 17. Therefore, the Trial Court is justified in rejecting the review petition in the wake of this Court's order passed in W.P. No. 48621 of 2015. Even when the Trial Court's order is fully justifiable, as the doctrine of merger is applicable to the case on hand, let me still examine whether the reviewing of the order dated 16-6-2014 is permissible. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Others v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tiruymale, AIR 1960 SC 137 an error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. 18. It is also profitable to refer to the Apex Court's judgment in the case of S. Bagirathi Animal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission, (2009) 10 SCC 464 wherein it is held that an error contemplated under Rule 1 Order 47 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for the permissibility of review must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. In other words, it must be an error of inadvertence. It should be something more than a mere error and it must be the one, which must be manifest on the face of the record. If the error is so apparent that without further investigation or enquiry only one conclusion can be drawn in favour of the applicant, the review will lie. Under the guise of review, the parties are not entitled to the rehearing of the same issue. 19. If the error is so apparent that without further investigation or enquiry only one conclusion can be drawn in favour of the applicant, the review will lie. Under the guise of review, the parties are not entitled to the rehearing of the same issue. 19. It is also helpful to refer to the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Haridas Das v. Smt. Usha Rani Banik and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1634 wherein it is held that neither Section 114 of CPC nor Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC postulate the rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcibly and/or cited the binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. 20. It is also profitable to refer to the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2014) 5 SCC 75 wherein it is held that even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the Court to undertake the review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment or order cannot be disturbed. 21. I do not see any error apparent on the face of the record in insisting for the payment of at least 50% of the maintenance amount. The Trial Court has referred to Rule 8 of the Karnataka Apartment Ownership Rules, 1975. The submission urged on behalf of the petitioners is that Rule 8 does not deal with the defaulters' rights and liabilities, but Bye-law No. 8 of Chapter I of the said Rules, which could perhaps be termed as Model Bye-laws, does. It reads as follows: "8. Disqualifications. - No apartment owner shall be entitled to vote on the questions of the election of members of the Board or the President, Secretary, Treasurer or any other office-bearer or be entitled to stand for election to such office if he is in arrears on the last day of the year in respect of his contributions for common expenses to the Association for more than 60 days." 22. The incorrect or the wrong mentioning of the provision of law does not in any way vitiate the order or put any party to any prejudice. 23. Thus viewed from any angle, I find it hard to give acceptability to the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioners. This petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 24. The owners of eight apartments have filed I.A. No. 1 of 2016 for impleadment. Their learned Counsel Sri Y. Hariprasad submits that about 300 such owners have filed the impleading applications in the suit proceedings. The Trial Court is yet to pass any orders on the said application. He asserts that they are proper and necessary parties for the adjudication of the issues falling for consideration in this case. 25. Sri Mento Issac, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that as the impleading applicants have not approached this Court aggrieved by the Trial Court's not passing any order on their applications, they are not entitled to maintain this application. 26. Now that I am dismissing the petition itself, I do not find any need to pass any orders on the impleading application. It is open to the impleading applicants to press their impleading applications in the suit proceedings. It is also open to the petitioners to resist the same taking such defences as are permissible in law. No opinion whatsoever is expressed on the impleading applications pending before the Trial Court. 27. At this juncture, Sri Vishwanath, the learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 submits that the respondent has already collected and remitted huge amounts towards the service tax to the Government. He would therefore pray for a direction to the Trial Court to expedite the steps towards the formation of the owners' association. 28. No such direction is required to be given to the Trial Court. It is open to the respondents to impress on the Trial Court the imperative need to complete the process of the forming the owners' association. It is for the Trial Court to take a decision in expediting the process after hearing all the parties.