JUDGMENT : Vivek Rusia, J. Learned Government Advocate raised a preliminary objection about maintainability of the writ petition. He submits that in view of the case of Sudhir Bhaksar Rao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage & Ors., reported in (2016) 6 SCC 277 . He submits that the writ petition should not be entertained in criminal matters and the petitioner should be directed to approach the concerned magistrate concerned under Section 156(3). 2. In reply to the objection raised about the maintainability of the writ petition, Shri Rishi Tiwari learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the present writ petition is maintainable in light of the judgment given by the Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 . 3. The facts of the case are as under: 4. The present petition is filed by Surendra Kumar through his sister Ms. Sushma Chandra alleging that despite written complaint given by the petitioner through her sister, the police is not taking any action by registering FIR. As per the averments made in the petition, petitioner Surendra Kumar purchased a portion of House no.27, Chain Singh Ka Bagicha, New Palasia, Indore from Smt. Easterbai, mother of Smt. Premlata Sodhi, Smt. Nalini Mehra and Smt. Indresh Sachdeva. A registered sale deed was executed on 18.07.2001 which is filed as Annexure P/2. It is alleged that on 26.05.2014, Smt. Indresh Sachdeva has executed sale deed and Smt. Nalini Mehra executed sale deed on 09.05.2014 and Smt. Romila Sodhi also executed sale deed in favour of one Anil Kumar Jain. It is the case of petitioner that despite selling the rights and title to the petitioner Smt. Premlata Sodhi, Smt. Nalini Mehra and Smt. Indresh Sachdeva cannot sale the property to Anil Kumar Jain, therefore, by executing subsequent sale deeds, they committed an offence under Section 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC and Section 22-A of the Registration Act. 5. The petitioner lodged a written complaint on 29.09.2016 at Police Station, Sanyogitaganj, Indore and complained to DIG on 17.03.2016 and despite that FIR has not been registered against them. It is submitted that in case of Lalita Kumari (Supra), the Supreme Court has held that once the information disclosing commission of cognisable offence brought to the knowledge of Police, registration of FIR is mandatory, hence the present petition. It is submitted that in case of Lalita Kumari (Supra), the Supreme Court has held that once the information disclosing commission of cognisable offence brought to the knowledge of Police, registration of FIR is mandatory, hence the present petition. 6. Shri Rishi Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the Police authorities are not taking any action, therefore, the writ petition has been preferred for giving direction to the Police authorities to take appropriate action. This Court in W.P.No.6398/2015 and W.P. No.1728/2015 has given direction to the Police Authority to take appropriate action in accordance with law, therefore, the same direction can be given in this petition also. 7. Per contra, Shri Yogesh Mittal submits that the allegations made in the writ petition does not construe any offence whereas the dispute is a purely civil in nature and further submits that if the Police Authority is not taking any action, the petitioner is having remedy under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. to file a complaint before the Magistrate. In support of his contention he has placed reliance the judgment Sudhir Bhaksar Rao Tambe (Supra). 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 9. The petitioner has alleged in the writ petition that he purchased the property by way of registered sale-deed. Thereafter, the seller has no right to sale the same to one Anil Kumar Jain in the year 2014 and by executing the sale deeds, offence has been committed by them. From face of it, it is purely a civil dispute between the parties. 10. The petitioner is seeking a direction from this Court to register a criminal case against Smt. Premlata Sodhi, Smt. Nalini Mehra, Smt. Indresh Sachdeva and Anil Kumar Jain but the petitioner has not impleaded them as respondents in this writ petition. The petitioner wanted a direction from this Court against them without impleading them as parties. The cases in which the petitioner cited that the W.P. No. 1728 and W.P.No.6398/2015 in which those were impleaded as a respondents against which reliefs of registration of a criminal case was sought, therefore, the present petition is liable to be dismissed only on this ground alone. 11. The cases in which the petitioner cited that the W.P. No. 1728 and W.P.No.6398/2015 in which those were impleaded as a respondents against which reliefs of registration of a criminal case was sought, therefore, the present petition is liable to be dismissed only on this ground alone. 11. It is not disputed that in case of Lalita Kumari (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the registration of FIR is mandatory if the information discloses the commission of a cognisable offence and in some commission when does not disclosed, commission of cases then preliminary enquiry may be conducted. If the Police Authorities is not taking any action then whether writ would be an appropriate remedy to seek direction against the Police Authority?. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sudhir Bhaksar Rao Tambe (Supra) has considered this aspect. 12. The entire order is reproduced as under: "1. Leave granted. These two appeals have been filed against the common impugned judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated 08-09-2009. The facts in detail have been set out in the impugned judgment and hence we are not repeating the same here. By the impugned order, the Bombay High Court has, in para 9 of its order, changed the investigation officer and appointed a special Investigation Officer to investigate into the alleged offence. 2. This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. that if a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or having been registered, proper investigation is not being done, then the remedy of the aggrieved person is not to go to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but to approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. If such an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is made and the Magistrate is, prima facie, satisfied, he can direct the FIR to be registered, or if it has already been registered, he can direct proper investigation to be done which includes in his discretion, if he deems it necessary, recommending change of the investigation officer, so that a proper investigation is done in the matter. We have said this in Sakiri Vasu Case because what we have found in this county is that the High Courts have been flooded with writ petitions praying for registration of first information report or paying for a proper investigation. 3. We have said this in Sakiri Vasu Case because what we have found in this county is that the High Courts have been flooded with writ petitions praying for registration of first information report or paying for a proper investigation. 3. We are of the opinion that if the High Courts entertain such writ petitions, then they will be flooded with such writ petitions. Hence, we have held that the complainant must avail of his alternate remedy to approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and if he does so, the Magistrate will ensure, if prima facie he is satisfied, registration of the first information report and also ensure a proper investigation in the matter, and he can also monitor the investigation. 4. In view of the settled position in Sakiri Vasu Case, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. The Magistrate concerned is directed to ensure proper investigation into the alleged offence under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C and if he deem sit necessary, he can also recommend to the SSP/SP concerned a change of the investigation officer, so that a proper investigation is done. The Magistrate can also monitor the investigation, though he cannot himself investigate (as investigation is the job of the police). Parties may produce any material they wish before the Magistrate concerned. The learned Magistrate shall be uninfluenced by any observation in the impugned order of the High Court. 5. The appeals are allowed in the above terms. In view of the aforesaid order, no orders need be passed on the application for intervention and it is disposed of accordingly." 13. That in case of Priyanka Shrivastava and Another v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and the duty to approach the Magistrate while exercising power under Section 156(3), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also considered the misuse of process of law an its provision in para 27 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court has said that if it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations made and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. 14. 14. In para 29, it is further held that a Court of law is involved and it is not the Police taking step at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. The Supreme Court has also noted that such granting of applications are being filed not a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons, therefore, a direction was given to the Magistrate to entertain the application under Section 156(3), supported with an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant so that they can make the applicant more responsible. 15. Para 27, 29, 30 and 31 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under: "27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to justice and then he may pass the requisite order. The present is a case where the accused persons are serving in high positions in the bank. We are absolutely conscious that the position does not matter, for nobody is above law. But, the learned Magistrate should take note of the allegations in entirety, the date of incident and whether any cognisable case is remotely made out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower of the financial institution covered under the SARFAESI Act, invokes the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and also there is a separate procedure under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993, an attitude of more care, caution and circumspection has to be adhered to. 29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same. 30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. 31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR." 16. In view of the above 2 Judgments, it is clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted that now a days litigants are invoking the provision of Cr.P.C. and the writ petitions are being filed in a routine manner to harass certain persons. 17. In case of Priyanka Shrivastava and Another (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has given direction to the learned Magistrate while exercising the power under Section 156, therefore, instead of giving the direction in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner can be directed to approach the concerned Magistrate under the provisions of Cr.P.C., who is competent to entertain the complaint and if he finds it appropriate, he can direct Police Authorities for investigation. The complete procedure has been given in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. The petitioner may resort remedy available under the law. Accordingly, the preliminary objections taken by the State Government is upheld. 18. In case of Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 627 , the apex Court has considered the scope of Section 156 and said that the steps are required to be taken by the Police. 19. Para 5 to 11 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under: "In order to appreciate rival submissions Section 156 of the Code needs to be quoted; the same reads as follows: "156. Police officer's power to investigate cognisable cases. - (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognisable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Police officer's power to investigate cognisable cases. - (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognisable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned." 6. Section 156 falling within Chapter XI, deals with powers of police officers to investigate cognisable offences. Investigation envisaged in Section 202 contained in Chapter XV is different from the investigation contemplated under Section 156 of the Code. 7. Chapter XII of the Code contains provisions relating to "information to the police and their powers to investigate", whereas Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e. complaint filed by a person. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognisable offences. True, Section 202, which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to "direct an investigation by a police officer". But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in Section 156 of the Code. 8. The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of the Code have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognisable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence. 9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Code makes the position clear that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1) i.e. "or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding". 10. This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him. 11. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognisable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an F I R should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognisable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter. 20. The case of Sudhir Bhaksar Rao Tambe (Supra), again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Hemant Yashwant Dhage v. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 273 in second round of litigation again the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 156(3) and 154 of the Cr.P.C. in which, it was held that the learned Magistrate can direct Police Authority to register the FIR. The direction given in the case of Mohd Yusuf (Supra) has been followed. Para 8 of the judgment is reproduced as under: "In view of the aforesaid broad consensus amongst the counsel for the various parties, it is not necessary for us to go deeper into the relevant issue of law as to whether the earlier order of this Court dated April 12, 2010 warranted registering of F.I.R. by the police be fore commencing investigation. But we would like to only indicate in brief the law on this subject expressly stated by this Court in the case of Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan (Smt.) and another, (2006) 1 SCC 627 . This Court explained that registration of an F.I.R. involves only the process of recording the substance of information relating to commission of any cognisable offence in a book kept by the officer in-charge of the concerned police station. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan (Smt.) and another, (2006) 1 SCC 627 . This Court explained that registration of an F.I.R. involves only the process of recording the substance of information relating to commission of any cognisable offence in a book kept by the officer in-charge of the concerned police station. In paragraph 11 of the aforementioned case, the law was further elucidated by pointing out that to enable the police to start investigation, it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an F.I.R. and even where a Magistrate does not do so in explicit words but directs for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, the police should register an F.I.R. Because Section 156 falls within chapter XII of the Code which deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognisable offences, the police officer concerned would always be in a better position to take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII once F.I.R. Is registered in respect of the concerned cognisable offence" 21. In view of the above law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the present facts of the case, the writ is not maintainable. The petitioner is having remedy to approach Magistrate or to resort the remedy available under the civil law. 22. Hence the present writ petition fails and dismissed.