JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This Regular Second Appeal has been instituted against judgment and decree dated 29.10.2004 rendered by the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh in Civil Appeal No. 27 of 2000. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are that the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants namely Shri Krishan Singh, filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of injunction against predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents (defendant No. 1, Dayal Singh) (hereinafter referred to as 'defendant No. 1' for convenience sake). According to the averments made in the plaint, suit land was under joint tenancy of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 under proforma defendant No. 2 namely Purshotam. Plaintiff and defendant No. 1 were cultivating the suit land as non-occupancy tenants since long and they were having this status as on 3.10.1975 and as such under the provisions of Section 104(3) of the HP Tenancy & Land Reforms Act, 1972, and Rule 27 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy & Land Reforms Rules, 1975, the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 became cosharers in joint possession over the suit land. However, in the month of July, 1994, defendant tried to throw the plaintiff out of the joint possession over the suit land and asked the plaintiff not to enter the suit land as he had no right, title or interest over the suit land. The plaintiff, therefore, visited the Patwari on 22.7.1994 to verify the revenue record qua the suit land and the plaintiff was astonished to know that the defendant No. 1 somehow managed to get himself recorded in the revenue record as the person in exclusive ownership and possession of the suit land. He also came to know that the name of plaintiff from the non-occupancy tenant was deleted from the revenue record on the basis of order passed by Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar on 25.3.1985. Defendant No. 1 Dayal Singh moved an application for the correction of Girdavari on 14.11.1983 in the Court of Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar, who without summoning the plaintiff and without any legal evidence on record ordered the deletion of the name of the plaintiff as non-occupancy tenant from the revenue record and thereafter proprietary rights qua the suit land were conferred upon defendant No. 1, exclusively, under Section 104(3) of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy & Land Reforms Act. Mutation was attested on 25.4.1986. The Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar had no jurisdiction to effect change in the revenue record. The proceedings had been conducted at the back of the plaintiff. 3. Suit was contested by the defendant. According to the averments made on merits, entry showing plaintiff to be a co-tenant with defendant No. 1 were incorrect and contrary to the facts, as the plaintiff never cultivated the suit land. Defendant No. 1 was cultivating the suit land for the last 45 years and as such there was no question of joint possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. It was denied that order passed by Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar was null and void but the same was valid one and plaintiff was duly served in the correction proceedings and Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar passed order after making necessary enquiries. Now, defendant No.1 was absolute owner-in-possession of the suit land. It was denied that the plaintiff was a co-sharer in the in the joint possession over the suit land. It was also averred that if the Court came to a conclusion that the plaintiff was having any right, title or interest over the suit land, then same had extinguished as the defendant has become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession and same was open, peaceful, continuous and hostile to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The learned trial Court framed issues on 26.11.1996 and 29.6.1999. Suit was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 9.11.1999. Plaintiff filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Mandi, who dismissed the same vide judgment and decree dated 29.10.2004. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. 4. The appeal was admired on 29.12.2004 on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the findings of the trial Court and the first appellate Court are based on in-admissible evidence, which if excluded, not lead to opposite conclusion?” 5. Mr. G.R. Palsra, Advocate, on the basis of substantial question of law framed, has vehemently argued that the learned Courts below have misread the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. He then contended that the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar had no jurisdiction to confer proprietary rights on defendant No. 1 vide order dated 25.3.1985 and mutation dated 25.4.1986 was also illegal. 6. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, Advocate, has supported the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. 7. He then contended that the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar had no jurisdiction to confer proprietary rights on defendant No. 1 vide order dated 25.3.1985 and mutation dated 25.4.1986 was also illegal. 6. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, Advocate, has supported the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 8. PW-1 Tek Chand, the Power of Attorney of the plaintiff, has testified on oath that the suit land was jointly owned and possessed by the plaintiff alongwith defendant No. 1 and previously the suit land was owned by Purshotam, proforma defendant No. 2. The plaintiff and proforma defendant No. 2 were tenants over the suit land to the extent of ½ share each but despite this fact, proprietary rights were conferred exclusively upon the defendant No. 1 due to change in Girdavari in favour of the defendant No. 1 and that no notice was issued to the plaintiff in proceedings initiated for correction of the Girdavari and his father was also not called at the time of attestation of mutation in favour of the defendant No. 1 qua the suit land. He denied, in the cross-examination, that revenue entry in favour of the plaintiff showing him as a joint owner was incorrect and it was also denied that the plaintiff never remained in possession of the suit land as a tenant. 9. Plaintiff examined PW-3 Nanak Chand and PW-4 Sher Singh to prove that the plaintiff was suffering from leprosy for many years and as per PW-3 Nanak Chand, the plaintiff remained patient of leprosy from May, 1977 to July, 1994. 10. DW-1 Dayal Singh deposed that the suit land was owned and possessed by him and previously Purshotam was owner of the suit land and he has taken the suit land on tenancy from Purshotam about 50 years back and the plaintiff never remained in possession of the suit land and the revenue entry qua the suit land made in favour of the plaintiff was wrongly made which was later on corrected in an application moved by him for correction of the revenue entry. He denied in his cross-examination that he alongwith plaintiff used to cultivate the suit land as a tenant in equal share and it was also denied that at relevant time, the plaintiff was cultivating the suit land jointly alongwith him as well as that the plaintiff was co-sharer in the suit land to the extent of ½ share. 11. DW-2 Dhani Ram testified that the suit land was owned and possessed by defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 was in cultivating possession of the suit land for the last 50 years. 12. According to the Jamabandi for the year 1974-75, Ext. P6 and copy of Misal Hakiyat Bandobast Jadid, Ext. P7, the plaintiff alongwith the defendant No. 1 is recorded in joint possession of the suit land as tenant in equal share except the land comprising of Khasra No. 309. In the Jamabandi for the year 1979-80, Ext. P4, suit land except land in Khasra No. 309 was recorded to be in the ownership of proforma defendant No. 2 but the same was recorded to be in possession of the plaintiff alongwith defendant No. 1 as a tenant in equal share. However, as per Jamabandi for the year 1989-90, Ext. P3, the land comprised in Khasra No. 273 is shown to be in possession of defendant No. 1 exclusively. Entry in the Jamabandi for the year 1989-90 Ext. P-1 has been altered on the basis of order passed by Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar on 25.3.1985. Defendant No.1 made an application for correction on 14.11.1983. Order was passed by Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar on 25.3.1985. Mutation was attested on 25.4.1986. 13. Case of the plaintiff, precisely, is that Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar had no jurisdiction to confer proprietary rights upon defendant No. 1. Plaintiff was not heard at the time of passing of order dated 25.3.1985. 14. It is evident from Ext. P5 dated 25.3.1985 that no notice on application moved by defendant No. 1 was issued to the plaintiff. The Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar has recorded the statement of a few inhabitants of the locality without associating the plaintiff. Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar has relied upon affidavit Ext. DW-3/A. This affidavit was sworn by the plaintiff on 14.11.1983. P5 dated 25.3.1985 that no notice on application moved by defendant No. 1 was issued to the plaintiff. The Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar has recorded the statement of a few inhabitants of the locality without associating the plaintiff. Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar has relied upon affidavit Ext. DW-3/A. This affidavit was sworn by the plaintiff on 14.11.1983. According to the averments made in the affidavit, plaintiff has admitted that he was not a tenant with defendant No. 1 over the suit land and the revenue entry showing him as tenant over the suit land was incorrect. DW-4 B.R. Mughlana Advocate has testified on oath that he was practising at Jogindernagar since 1976 and he knew the plaintiff personally and he had got scribed the affidavit Ext. DW-3/A as per the instruction of the plaintiff. Thereafter, he identified the plaintiff before the Executive Magistrate at the time of attestation of the affidavit. DW-3 Ram Dass was the then Executive Magistrate, Jogindernagar. He also stated that affidavit Ext. DW-3/A has been attested by him and deponent was identified before him by B.R. Mughlana Advocate. He read over the content of the affidavit to the deponent who admitted before him the same to be true. 15. Plaintiff has been shown to be in possession with defendant No. 1 as per previous entries recorded in Jamabandi as well as Misal Hakiyat for the year 1974-75 and 1979-80, Jamabandi for the year 1989-90 showing defendant No. 1 to be in exclusive possession of the suit land was based on an illegal order passed by Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar on 25.3.1985. The Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar has no authority to confer proprietary rights under the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy & Land Reforms Act. It is the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, who can confer proprietary rights upon a tenant in accordance with law. It is settled law that though presumption of truth is attached to latest Jamabandi but the same is rebuttable and plaintiff has rebutted the latest Jamabandi whereby defendant No. 1 had been shown in exclusive possession of the suit property. Courts below have not taken into consideration the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, whereby affidavits do not constitute evidence under the Evidence Act. Courts below have not taken into consideration the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, whereby affidavits do not constitute evidence under the Evidence Act. Learned trial Court has misdirected itself by observing that since the plaintiff has not stepped into witness box to rebut the contents of affidavit dated 14.11.1983, the contents would be deemed to have been admitted. According to the statements of PW-3 Nanak Chand and PW-4 Sher Singh, plaintiff was suffering from leprosy. 16. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Smt. Sudha Devi vs. M.P. Narayanan and others reported in (1988) 3 SCC 366 , have held that affidavits are not ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872, they can be used as evidence only if for sufficient reason court passes order under Rule 1 or 2 of Order 19. Their Lordships have held as under: 4. The fact that the plaintiff obtained an ex-parte decree in the earlier suit against the defendant No. 1 and 2 is established by the copy of the decree exhibited in the case. The allegation in the plaint so far as the third defendant is concerned, is in paragraph 7 in the following words: "7. Subsequent to the said Decree on a date or dates which the plaintiff is unable to specify until after disclosure by the defendants, the first and/or second defendants wrongfully permitted and allowed the third defendant to occupy the said demised flat. The first and/or second defendants by themselves and/or by the third defendant are still in wrongful possession of the said demised flat." The only evidence relevant to this part of the case is to be found in the oral evidence of the plaintiff's sole witness Nand Kumar Tibrewal. The High Court (in appeal) has declined to rely on his evidence mainly on the ground that the witness has not disclosed his concern with the suit property or his relationship with the plaintiff. He has been rejected as incompetent. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the witness (now deceased) was the husband of the plaintiff-appellant and thus he was fully conversant with the relevant facts. He has been rejected as incompetent. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the witness (now deceased) was the husband of the plaintiff-appellant and thus he was fully conversant with the relevant facts. The criticism by the High Court that the witness did not state anything in his evidence which could connect him with the plaintiff or the property and thus make him competent was attempted to be met before us by relying on an affidavit filed in this Court. We are afraid, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to fill up the lacuna in the evidence belatedly at the Supreme Court stage. Besides, affidavits are not included in the definition of 'evidence' in s. 3 of the Evidence Act and can be used as evidence only if for sufficient reason court passes an order under Order XIX, Rules 1 or 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This part of the argument of Mr. Tapas Ray must, therefore, be rejected. 17. A learned Single Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Gopikabai v. Narayan reported in AIR 1953 Nag 135, has held that Sections 1 and 3 Evidence Act, read together make it clear that affidavit is not regarded as evidence under the Act. The learned Single Judge has held as under: [3] It is contended for the legal representatives that the lower appellate Court acted with material irregularity and illegally in assuming the affidavit as evidence. It is not disputed that if the affidavit evidence is excluded there is no evidence to support the allegations of the Appellant. It is no doubt true, it is the practice of the civil Courts in this State to require an affidavit to support the allegations in applications under Order 22, Rule 9 or Order 22, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure. The Rules and Orders (Civil) do not make provision for it. So far as the High Court is concerned, there is an express rule which requires such applications to be supported by affidavits. If affidavit is not evidence under law, the question is whether the practice of requiring such affidavits makes it an evidence. Section 1, Evidence Act excludes the application of the Act to affidavits presented to any Court or officer. What ''evidence'' means and includes is described in Section 3 of the Act but affidavit is not within that description. If affidavit is not evidence under law, the question is whether the practice of requiring such affidavits makes it an evidence. Section 1, Evidence Act excludes the application of the Act to affidavits presented to any Court or officer. What ''evidence'' means and includes is described in Section 3 of the Act but affidavit is not within that description. Under Section 30, Code of Civil Procedure subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, at any time, either of its own 'motion or on the application of any party order any fact to be proved by affidavit. The conditions and limitations are to be found in Order 19 of the Code. Rule 1 of that Order provides that any Court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the Court thinks reasonable. It, therefore, follows that there must be an order in each case stating the particular fact or facts which are to be proved by an affidavit. The Evidence Act is not a fragmentary enactment but a consolidatory one, repealing all previous rules of evidence other than those saved by the last part of Section 2; and if affidavit is not evidence under the Act it cannot be taken as evidence unless it is permitted by Order 19, Code of Civil Procedure. The practice which is obviously not warranted by law will not override these provisions. 18. A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Firm S. Rajkumar v. Bharat Oil Mills reported in AIR 1964 Bombay 38, has held that affidavits are not included in the definition of evidence in S. 3, Evidence Act but on the contrary they are expressly excluded by S. 1 of that Act. That means that affidavits cannot be used as evidence under any of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Affidavits can however, be used as evidence, only under Order 19 of the Civil Procedure Code. Under O. 19, R. 1, affidavit evidence cannot be entertained unless the Court passes an order, for sufficient reasons, that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavits. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 11. Affidavits can however, be used as evidence, only under Order 19 of the Civil Procedure Code. Under O. 19, R. 1, affidavit evidence cannot be entertained unless the Court passes an order, for sufficient reasons, that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavits. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 11. What evidence means and includes, is described in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, but affidavits are not included within that description. On the contrary, affidavits have been expressly excluded by section 1 of the Indian Evidence Act from the applicability of that Act that means that affidavits cannot be used as evidence under any of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Affidavits can however, be used as evidence, only under Order 19, of the Civil Procedure Code. In accordance with Order 19, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court has, for sufficient reasons, to pass an order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit. That would mean that affidavit evidence: cannot be entertained unless the Court passes an order, for sufficient reasons, that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavits. While passing an order under Order 19, Rule 1, to call for evidence on affidavits, it is necessary to consider compliance with the proviso to Rule 1 and with the requirements of Rule 2, under Order 19, as the circumstances of each case may require. I would also like to point out the decision in Kanhaiyalal v. Meghraj, ILR (1954) Nag 603 : (AIR 1954 Nag 260) wherein it was held that in cases where affidavits are filed in support of applications and are received by the Court, the order receiving the affidavit is' tantamount to passing an order under Order 19, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code and complies with the law. When an affidavit is filed, the Court official receiving it ought to see that it is properly drawn up and verified as per Order 19, Rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code and the instructions in Chapter XXIII, Civil Manual, Volume I. If it is not properly drawn up or verified, it ought not to be received and the parties should be required to file a proper affidavit. A judge ought not to act upon an affidavit which is not properly drawn up and verified in accordance with the requirements explained in the rulings cited supra. 19. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in M/s Parekh Brothers v. Kartick Chandra Saha and others reported in AIR 1968 Cal 532 , have held that affidavits per se do not become evidence in the suits but it can become evidence only by consent of the party or where it is specially authorized by a particular provision of law. This is because by virtue of S 1 of the Evidence Act, the Act applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any court “but not to affidavit presented to any court or officer”. The Division bench have held as under: 14. Mr. Banerjee contended that the appellant should not be allowed to take the plea that the appellant had only one land lord in view of the fact that in its application under Section 17(1) of the said Act the defendant had asked for the permission of the Court to pay rent in favour of all the three plaintiffs This application which had been made before the Rent Controller upon an affidavit was not tendered as evidence in the trial Court. Mr. Ghosh argued that the application in question was not a part of the records of this case and cannot, therefore, be relied upon He contended that if the respondents had sought to rely on this document his client could have easily explained the document. It would be uniust, according to him, to rely on a document which was never produced as evidence at the time of the trial and which the appellant had no opportunity to explain. Mr. Banerjee strenuously argued that since this was an affidavit and since the affidavit had been made in connection with the proceedings in this suit, it was not necessary to formally tender this affidavit as evidence and that we should treat the affidavit as evidence. This contention of Mr. Banerjee is not correct. Section 1 of the Evidence Act provides that the Act applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any court but not to affidavit presented to any court or officer'. Affidavits are not even included in the definition of evidence in Section 4 of the Evidence Act. This contention of Mr. Banerjee is not correct. Section 1 of the Evidence Act provides that the Act applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any court but not to affidavit presented to any court or officer'. Affidavits are not even included in the definition of evidence in Section 4 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, affidavits cannot be used as evidence under any of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act Affidavits can be used as evidence only under Order 19 of the Civil Procedure Code- See Firm Shamsunder Raikumar v. Bharat Oil Mills Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that subject to certain conditions and limitations the court may at any time order any fact to be proved by affidavit. The conditions and limitations to this power are to be found in Order 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Dominion of India v. Rupchand, AIR 1953 Nag 169 in a suit against the railways for damages, the plaintiff sought to rely on affidavit of the District Commercial Inspector, G.I.P. Railway made by him in answer to the interrogatories. This was, however, disallowed; it was held that the affidavit did not ipso facto become evidence unless tendered. See also Marneedi Satyam v. Venkataswami AIR 1949 Mad 689 at p. 690 and Kamakshya Prosad Dalai v Emperor. In all these cases, it is clearly established that an affidavit per se does not become evidence in the suits but that it could become evidence only by consent of the party or where it is specially authorised by a particular provision of law. In the present case therefore the statements contained in the affidavit made by the appellant under Section 17 of the said Act cannot be looked into. Such statements cannot become evidence automatically because the affidavit has neither been proved nor tendered. 20. In the case of Besru vrs. Shibu, reported in 1999(1) Shim.L.C. 343 , this Court has held that it was evident from Rule 29 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Rules, 1975 that only Assistant Collector (Ist Grade) was competent Land Reforms Officer to hold enquiry under Section 104 of the Act. It has been held as follows: “9. In the case of Besru vrs. Shibu, reported in 1999(1) Shim.L.C. 343 , this Court has held that it was evident from Rule 29 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Rules, 1975 that only Assistant Collector (Ist Grade) was competent Land Reforms Officer to hold enquiry under Section 104 of the Act. It has been held as follows: “9. Rule 28 of the Rules provides that mutation is to be attested in the presence of the parties and Rule 29 provides that a dispute under subsection (4) of Section 104 of the Act shall be decided by the Land Reforms Officer in his capacity as an Assistant Collector 1st Grade in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act or the H.P. Land Revenue Act, as the case may be, though the inquiry held by him would be summary inquiry. In the H.P. Land Revenue Act, which applies to the present case. Sections 20 to 23 provide for summoning persons for the purpose of any business before a Revenue Officer and the mode of service of summons. Under Section 21 thereof, it is stated that summons issued by a Revenue Officer shall, if practicable, be served personally upon the person to whom it is addressed or failing him, his recognized agent, or in case it is refused by affixation on the last known address or by sending the same by registered post of proclamation, etc. etc. 10. Admittedly, in the present case no attempt was made by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade to serve the plaintiff in accordance with law. As such, the mutation is void ab initio being violative of the principles of natural justice. It can be held so for another reason that it was not passed by the competent authority. From Rule 29 of the Rules, it is clear that only Assistant Collector of the 1st Grade was the competent Land Reforms Officer to hold inquiry under Section 104 of the Act. It is further fortified by the Notifications dated 27th/29th September, 1995 whereby all the Tehsildars in Himachal Pradesh were conferred with powers of Assistant Collector of 1st Grade for purposes of Chapter X of the Act under which Section 104, pertaining to acquisition of proprietary rights by the tenants, fails. It is further fortified by the Notifications dated 27th/29th September, 1995 whereby all the Tehsildars in Himachal Pradesh were conferred with powers of Assistant Collector of 1st Grade for purposes of Chapter X of the Act under which Section 104, pertaining to acquisition of proprietary rights by the tenants, fails. By another Notification of the same date, Tehsildars conferred with the powers of Assistant Collector 1st Grade were appointed Land Reforms Officers for carrying out the purposes of Chapter X of the Act within their respective jurisdiction with immediate effect. So far the present case is concerned, from the perusal of mutation, it is clear that it was attested by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade who had no jurisdiction to do so. Had the plaintiff been served in accordance with law and the competent authority held proper inquiry, the mutation conferring proprietary rights on the defendants would not have been passed in view of the Bar under sub-section (8)(a) of Section 104 of the Act.” 21. In the case of Krishan Chand and ors. vrs. Jeet Ram and another, reported in Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 978, this Court has held that the proceedings for conferment of proprietary rights conducted by A.C. 2nd Grade, would be void ab initio. This Court has further held that since the very purpose of the tenancy had been challenged, the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to decide the matter. It has been held as follows: 6. Learned counsel has urged that proprietary rights were conferred on the appellants herein in accordance with law and has emphasized that Ex.DX-1 to DX-3 which are the basis and foundation for claiming ownership under Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act'). 8. By Notification No.1-8/68-Rev.1 issued by the competent Authority under Section 86 of the Act, it is only the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, who is empowered to take-up proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights. 8. By Notification No.1-8/68-Rev.1 issued by the competent Authority under Section 86 of the Act, it is only the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, who is empowered to take-up proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights. Notification reads:- "No.1-8/68-Rev.1- In exercise of the powers vested in him under sub-section (1) of section 86 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (Act No.8 of 1974) and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to confer on all the Tehsildars in Himachal Pradesh, all the powers exercisable by an Assistant Collector of First Grade, for the purposes of Chapter IX of the aforesaid Act, within their respective jurisdiction, with immediate effect." It is undisputed that the provision of conferment of proprietary rights by tenants is contained in Chapter-IX of the Act as aforesaid. These proceedings are, therefore, void ab initio, having been conducted by an officer who is not empowered to exercise power to grant proprietary rights or to perform any other ancialling act. The very basis set up by the defendants for claiming ownership is, therefore, without any basis. This question would have concluded the entire controversy, however, since the appeal has been admitted on other questions, I am taking them up for consideration. Question No.5: 9. This question is answered against the appellants. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted as pleaded. The decisions in Pritam Singh vs. Krishan Kumar, 1997(1) Sim.L.C. 255, Birbal vs. Udhami 1992(1) Sim.L.C. and Shankar vs. Rukmani, 2003(1) Sim.L.C. 300 are clear and unequivocal that where the proceedings have been conducted without jurisdiction, where the question of tenancy is disputed, independent of the proceedings under the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, there is no finality to the adjudication of the revenue officials and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred. In Rukmani's case supra this Court held:- "After analyzing the judgment in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram's case (supra), we have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under the Act if the dispute pertaining to the relationship of landlord and tenant arises during the proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights upon the tenant and resumption of land by the land owner and the order in respect thereof has been passed by the authorities under the Act except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by that Act had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with. But if the dispute of landlord and tenant arises independent of the proceedings under the Act, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction." In the present case the very basis and foundation of conferment of proprietary rights has been questioned. The case pleaded by the plaintiffs is one of suppression of facts, exercise of powers by an officer not competent to do so and the very basis of tenancy has been challenged. This question is, therefore, answered against the appellants.” 22. It is also settled law that mutation does not confer any right. The revenue entries are used only for the fiscal purpose. Though presumption of truth is attached to the revenue entries, but these are rebuttable. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 23. Accordingly, in view of the discussions and analysis made hereinabove, the present appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree dated 29.10.2004 rendered by the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh in Civil Appeal No. 27 of 2000 and judgment and decree dated 9.11.1999 rendered by the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Jogindernagar, District Mandi, HP in Case No. 142/94, are set aside. The suit of the plaintiff is decreed. The order dated 25.3.1985 conferring proprietary rights upon defendant No. 1 by Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Jogindernagar is declared null and void having no force of law. Consequential orders i.e. mutation dated 25.3.1986 and revenue entries made in the Jamabandi for the year 1989-90, Ext. P1 and P3 are also set aside. 24. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. No costs.