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2016 DIGILAW 640 (KER)

NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. P. CHANDRAN

2016-07-25

BABU MATHEW P.JOSEPH, C.T.RAVIKUMAR

body2016
JUDGMENT : Ravikumar, J. What is the impact of the amendment brought to Explanation-II to section 4(1)(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 by Amendment Act 46 of 2000 as relates the deemed monthly wages of a workman who met with an accident prior to its coming into force, in the matter of computation of the amount of compensation? The said question crops up for consideration in this appeal at the instance of the second opposite party in W.C.C.No.190/2000 on the files of the Court of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation in the light of the following factual matrix:- The applicant (first respondent herein) was working under the first party before the Commissioner as driver in lorry bearing Reg.No.KL/11/A/675. On 18.5.2000, during midnight, he was driving the said vehicle towards Bangalore and at about 2 a.m on 19.5.2000, when the lorry reached at Mandya, it went off the road from the highway and dashed against a tree standing on the road side, due to mechanical defect. He sustained severe injuries in the said accident. Ext.A1 would reveal that he sustained fracture Ulna (Rt.), Inferior Radius Ulna joint dislocation (Rt.) and extensive raw area involving whole fore arm. He was initially treated at Sanjay Gandhi Hospital, Bangalore and from there, he was referred to Medical College Hospital, Kozhikode. He had been an inpatient there, from 2.6.2000 to 21.6.2000. It was in the said circumstances that he filed an application under section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short 'the Act') claiming Rs.1,50,000/-as compensation for the personal injuries sustained by him. 2. After following the procedural formalities, the application was admitted and notices were issued to the opposite parties. The first and second opposite parties who are respectively the owner and insurer of the aforesaid lorry entered appearance and filed separate written statements. The first opposite party, the owner of the vehicle admitted the ownership of the vehicle and the employment of the applicant/first respondent herein as also the accident. He would further state therein that the vehicle in question was covered by a valid insurance policy issued by the second opposite party and therefore, the second opposite party got liability to indemnify him. In fact, the second opposite party was not originally a party to the said lis. He would further state therein that the vehicle in question was covered by a valid insurance policy issued by the second opposite party and therefore, the second opposite party got liability to indemnify him. In fact, the second opposite party was not originally a party to the said lis. The applicant-the first respondent herein filed an application for impleadment of the insurer of the vehicle and the same was allowed and the insurer was, accordingly, impleaded as the second opposite party. On appearance, the insurer/appellant, too, admitted the insurance coverage, but denied all other averments in the application. On the side of the applicant/first respondent, he got himself examined as AW1 and Exts.A1 to A3 were got marked. No evidence, either oral or documentary, was tendered by the opposite parties. It was on an analysis of the evidence on record and appreciation of the arguments advanced by both sides that the impugned order was passed by the Commissioner whereby and whereunder an amount of Rs.2,38,846/- was granted as compensation with simple interest @ 12% per annum from the date of the accident. As per the impugned order, the second opposite party/appellant was directed to deposit the said amount within 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order and in default of payment of the said amount within the stipulated time, it was ordered that the amount would be realised with a penalty of 30%. It is in the said circumstances that the second opposite party, the insurer of the offending vehicle, filed the captioned appeal. 3. We have heard learned counsel on both sides. 4. It is evident from the rival contentions and pleadings that the only substantial question of law that arises for consideration in this appeal is the one mentioned in the opening paragraph. In other words, whether the amendment brought to Explanation-II to section 4(1)(b) of the Act by Amendment Act 46 of 2000 is retrospective or prospective, in operation in the wake of the indisputable factual position that the amendments to that section and Explanation II thereunder were brought into force only with effect from 8.12.2000 and the accident in which the first respondent sustained injuries occurred on 19.5.2000 and the case was adjudicated only on 27.2.2010. In the appeal, the appellant framed the following as the question of law:- Whether in the absence of retrospective operation to the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act No.46/00, the learned Commissioner is entitled to assess the monthly wages as Rs.3,500/-, in respect of accident occurred on 8.5.2000 and assess compensation on that basis? 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the amendment to Explanation II to section 4(1)(b) of the Act by Amendment Act 46 of 2000 got no retrospective effect and therefore, the compensation ought to have been determined fixing the monthly wages of the first respondent/applicant only as Rs.2,000/- going by the then existing provision of law viz., in terms of the unamended Explanation-II to section 4(1)(b) of the Act. Based on the contention, it is submitted that the Commissioner went wrong in taking the monthly wages as Rs.3,500/- in assessing the compensation treating that amendment to section 4 and Explanation II of the Act are having retrospective operation. To buttress the said contention, the learned counsel relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court in United India Insurance Company v. Alavi, 1998 (1) KLT 951 . 6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent contended that the Commissioner cannot be said to have committed an error or illegality in assessing the amount of compensation by looking into the provision of law which was available on the date of adjudication and therefore, no appellate interference is warranted. To drive home the said point, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 dated 6.11.1996. It is further submitted that the said decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court was relied on by a Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Asokan ( 1997 (1) KLT 608 ). It was held therein that the benefits flowing from the amendments brought to sections 4 and 4A of the Act available on the date of final adjudication should be extended to the injured workman/the claimant where permanent disablement or death resulted from the accident, whether it occurred prior to or subsequent to 15.9.1995. The submission is that the dictum laid down therein would squarely apply in the case on hand and therefore, the order of the Commissioner calls for no interference. 7. The submission is that the dictum laid down therein would squarely apply in the case on hand and therefore, the order of the Commissioner calls for no interference. 7. For a proper disposal of this appeal, on consideration of such rival contentions, it is relevant to refer to the position of law under section 4 of the Act as it stood originally and subsequent to the amendments as relates the 'deeming monthly wages of a workman', for the purpose of calculating the amount of compensation payable under section 4(1)(b) of the Act for permanent total disablement resulting from an injury sustained by a workman in the course of his employment. It is mentioned in Explanation II under section 4(1)(b) of the Act and obviously the said provision relating deemed monthly wages is applicable for assessment of compensation under section 4 (1)(a) of the Act for death resulting from an injury. Section 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) of the Act and Explanation II thereunder after coming into force of the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act No.46 of 2000, read as hereunder:- "4.Amount of compensation-Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:- (a) where death results from the injury. an amount equal to fifty percent of the monthly wages of the deceased workman multiplied by the factor; or an amount of eighty thousand rupees, whichever is more; (b) where permanent total disablement results from the injury an amount equal to sixty percent of the monthly wages of the injured workman multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of ninety thousand rupees, whichever is more ........................... ........................... Explanation II-Where the monthly wages of a workman exceed four thousand rupees, his monthly wages for the purposes of clause (a) and clause (b) shall be deemed to be four thousand rupees only;" 8. We are concerned only with Section 4(1)(b) and Explanation II thereunder and hence, the position of those provisions and the position of law in relation to those provisions, prior to and subsequent to the coming into force of Act 30 of 1995 and in terms of Act 46 of 2000 alone need be looked into. The words 'sixty percent' and the words 'sixty thousand rupees' were substituted in clause (b) of Section 4(1) by Act 30 of 1995 respectively for the words 'fifty percent' and 'twenty-four thousand rupees', with effect from 15.9.1995. The words 'sixty percent' and the words 'sixty thousand rupees' were substituted in clause (b) of Section 4(1) by Act 30 of 1995 respectively for the words 'fifty percent' and 'twenty-four thousand rupees', with effect from 15.9.1995. After clause (b) mentioned above in Explanation II the words 'two thousand rupees' was also substituted by Act 30 of 1995 for the words 'one thousand rupees', with effect from 15.9.1995. It was thereafter that Act 46 of 2000 came into force and brought certain amendments to some of such words, with effect from 8.12.2000, as can be seen from the above extracted provisions of Section 4(1)(b) and Explanation II. 9. Thus, obviously, as per Act 46 of 2000 the words 'ninety thousand rupees' was brought into clause (b) of Section 4(1) for the words 'sixty thousand rupees' and in Explanation II the words 'four thousand rupees' was brought into for the words 'two thousand rupees' and in all other respects the provisions under Section 4(1)(b) and Explanation II remained as such, with effect from 8.12.2000. It is also relevant to note that later, by a subsequent amendment the pecuniary ceiling limit in clause (b) viz., ninety thousand rupees was enhanced to One lakh and forty thousand rupees and Explanation II was deleted. 10. Now, we will consider the merits of the rival contentions. In that regard, firstly, the contentions of the appellant founded on the decision in Alavi's case have to be considered. In Alavi's case (supra), the Full Bench had considered the question whether the amendment brought to section 4 and 4A by Act 30 of 1995 would operate retrospectively or only prospectively. The opening paragraph in Alavi's case reads thus:- "The question that is posed for consideration before the Full Bench is as to whether Sections 4 and 4A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, as amended by Act 30 of 1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest would be applicable to claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from accident which occurred prior to 15.9.1995, the date on which the amendment provisions came into force." 11. Evidently, the Full Bench in Alavi's case relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pratap Narain Singh v. Srinivas, AIR 1976 SC 222 . Evidently, the Full Bench in Alavi's case relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pratap Narain Singh v. Srinivas, AIR 1976 SC 222 . The following portion from Pratap Narain Singh's case dealing with the relevant provisions in the Act was quoted in paragraph 11 in Alavi's case (supra). "Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if "personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." It was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under sub-s. (5) of S.3 because of the institution of a suit in a civil Court for damages, in respect of the injury, against the employer or any other person. The employer, therefore, became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is therefore, futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioner's order dated May 7, 1969 under S.19.What the Section provides is that if any question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the amount or duration of the compensation it shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is, therefore nothing to justify the argument that the employer's liability to pay compensation under Section 3 in respect of the injury, was suspended until after the settlement contemplated by S.19. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the appellant and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary. The Full Bench held thus :- "A combined reading of Ss. 3(1), 4(1) and 4-A indicates that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by those provisions. The right of the injured employee or his heirs to receive compensation gets crystallised the moment the personal injury takes place. The Full Bench held thus :- "A combined reading of Ss. 3(1), 4(1) and 4-A indicates that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by those provisions. The right of the injured employee or his heirs to receive compensation gets crystallised the moment the personal injury takes place. The corresponding liability of the employer to make good this claim also springs forth simultaneously and the liability has to be computed as per the relevant provisions of the Act. These legal positions have been clearly laid down by 5 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Pratap Narain Singh v. Srinivas, AIR 1976 SC 222 = 1976 ACJ 141." Thus, the Full Bench relied on the aforesaid extracted portion from Pratap Narain Singh's case to hold that the said view gets fortified by what is laid down in Pratap Narain Singh's case. In Alavi's case, the Full Bench virtually relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh (1997 ACJ 517) and referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 which was relied on by a Division Bench of this Court in Asokan's case (supra). The decision in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 was, in fact, distinguished by the Full Bench. Paragraph 12 of the decision in Alavi's case is very much relevant in view of the conflicting rival contentions and also for the purpose of deciding the question involved in this case. While dealing with all the aforesaid cases, the Full Bench held as follows:- "12. A three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh, 1997 ACJ 517 was dealing with the claim of a workman who lost both his hands in the course of employment. The accident occurred on 26.7.1984 resulting in permanent disability with 100% functional loss. When the case was decided by the Supreme Court on 24.9.1996 the relevant provisions of Act 30 of 1995 were in force. However, the Supreme Court did not apply the amended provisions, but applied only unamended provisions of S.4(1)(b) and held that he would be entitled to get compensation at 50 per cent of the monthly wages multiplied by the relevant factor in Schedule IV to the Act. However, the Supreme Court did not apply the amended provisions, but applied only unamended provisions of S.4(1)(b) and held that he would be entitled to get compensation at 50 per cent of the monthly wages multiplied by the relevant factor in Schedule IV to the Act. Supreme Court did not award compensation or interest or penalty as per the Amending Act, but only applied the law which was in force as on 26.7.1984. Going by the principle laid down by the 5 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Pratap Narain Singh's case as well as the decision of the three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in Maghar Singh's case, we are inclined to take the view that when the two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court decided the case, in the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. V.K.Neelakandan, Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16906 of 1996, their Lordships never intended the same to be of general application." (emphasis added) Thus, evidently, the Full Bench took note of the three Judges Bench decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Maghar Singh's case (supra) dealing with the claim of the workman who lost both his hands in the course of his employment. The accident thereunder occurred on 26.7.1994 and it resulted in permanent disability with 100% functional loss. The Hon'ble Apex Court decided the question on 24.9.1996. Despite the fact that the relevant provisions of Act 30 of 1995 were then in force, the Full Bench found that the Apex Court had not applied the amended provisions, but, applied only the unamended provisions of section 4(1)(b) of the Act to arrive at the compensation payable to the said workman. The Full Bench found that the Apex Court did not award the compensation or interest or penalty in terms of the amended provisions whereas the Apex Court applied only the law which was in force as on 26.7.1994, i.e., the date on which the accident in question took place. 12. Virtually, the apparent conflict in two Division Bench decisions, viz., in Asokan's case (supra) and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Majeed ( 1996 (2) KLT 1022 ) was also considered by the Full Bench in Alavi's case. 12. Virtually, the apparent conflict in two Division Bench decisions, viz., in Asokan's case (supra) and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Majeed ( 1996 (2) KLT 1022 ) was also considered by the Full Bench in Alavi's case. It is to be noted that in Majeed's case, a Division Bench of this Court held that the benefits of sections 4 and 4A as amended would be extended only in respect of claims occurred on or after 15.9.1995. The same Division Bench took the same view in the decision in Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd v. Abdul Nazar ((1997) 1 ILR 496) as well. In Asokan's case, another Division Bench relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex court in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 dated 6.11.1996 and held that the benefits of the amended provisions of sections 4 and 4A would be available when the claim is finally adjudicated irrespective of the fact whether the death or permanent disablement resulted from the accident occurred prior to 15.9.1995 or subsequent to that date. The fact that the decision in Majeed's case was impliedly overruled by the decision in the aforesaid Civil Appeals dated 6.11.1996 was also taken into consideration by the Full Bench. Taking note of the fact that the decision in Pratap Narain Singh's case was rendered by a 5 Judges Bench of the Apex Court and the decision in Maghar Singh's case was rendered by 3 Judges Bench of the Apex Court and that the judgment rendered in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 was rendered by a Bench of 2 Judges of the Apex Court, it was held that the decisions rendered by a Bench consisting of larger number of Judges would prevail over the decision rendered by lesser number of Judges. The Full Bench overruled the decision in Asokan's case and affirmed the decision in Majeed's case (supra). 13. Evidently, the question whether the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 could be a binding precedent so as to have a general application was also considered by the Full Bench in Alavi's case (supra). The Full Bench overruled the decision in Asokan's case and affirmed the decision in Majeed's case (supra). 13. Evidently, the question whether the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 could be a binding precedent so as to have a general application was also considered by the Full Bench in Alavi's case (supra). Paragraphs 20 to 23 of the decision in Alavi's case (supra) would reveal the manner in which the Full Bench analysed the position of law relating the binding effect of decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, to answer that question with reference to various decisions such as Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, (1991) Supp. SCC 600, State of U.P.v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139 and M/s.Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 672 , 680. Paragraphs 20 to 23 read thus :- "20. Supreme Court under Art.141 is enjoined to declare law. As held by the Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, (1991) Supp. SCC 600, the expression 'declared' is wider than the words 'found' or 'made'. To declare is to announce opinion. Indeed latter involves a process, while the former expresses result. Interpretation, ascertainment and evolution are parts of process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as law. Law declared by the Supreme Court is a law of the land. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Art. 141 of the Constitution of India. In State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139 , the Supreme Court held : "Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or proceeded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. Law declared is not that can be culled out, but that which is stated as law to be accepted and applied. A conclusion without reference to relevant provisions of law is weaker than even casual observation." 21. Law declared is not that can be culled out, but that which is stated as law to be accepted and applied. A conclusion without reference to relevant provisions of law is weaker than even casual observation." 21. In the above mentioned decision, in a concurring judgment, Sahai, J. has dealt with in detail the scope of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India. The dispute centred round the levy of purchase tax on industrial alcohol. The High Court held that the State Legislature was competent to enact a law imposing purchase tax on it, in exercise of power under Entry 54 of List II. However, it struck down the levy as it would disturb price structure regulated by Central Government. It was held that control of alcohol industry having been taken over by the Parliament, for purpose of regulation and development, the State stood denuded of its taxing power under Entry 54 of List II to the extent the filed of price fixation was covered by the price control order issued by the Government. And the purchase price being component of price fixation, which squarely fell within the power of Central Government, the imposition of purchase tax amounted to intrusion into the forbidden area of price fixation by Central Government. Support for this was drawn from the two Constitution Bench decisions in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1990)1 SCC 12 , and Synthetic and Chemicals v. State of UP., (1990)1 SCC 109 . 22. Supreme Court noted that the problem has arisen due to the conclusion in the case of Synthetic and Chemicals. Question that arose in that case was as to whether State Legislature could levy vend fee or excise duty on industrial alcohol. The Bench answered the question in the negative as industrial alcohol being unfit for human consumption, the State Legislation was incompetent to levy any duty of excise either under Entry 51 or Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. While doing so, it was not preceded by any discussion. No reason or rationale could be found in the order. This gave rise to an important question, if the conclusion is law declared under Art. 141 of the Constitution, or it is per incuriam and is liable to be ignored. Supreme Court explained the meaning of the words 'per incuriam' and dealt with the rule of sub-silentio. No reason or rationale could be found in the order. This gave rise to an important question, if the conclusion is law declared under Art. 141 of the Constitution, or it is per incuriam and is liable to be ignored. Supreme Court explained the meaning of the words 'per incuriam' and dealt with the rule of sub-silentio. Supreme Court in the above mentioned decision held : "incuria" literally means 'carelessness'. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority': Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 1 KB 718. Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Art. 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law". After examining various principles, the Supreme Court concluded : "The Bench further was not apprised of earlier Constitution Bench decisions in Hoechst Chemicals v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1019 , and Ganga Sugar Mill v. State of U.P., (1980)1 SCC 223 , which specifically dealt with the legislative competence of levying sales tax in respect of any industry which had been declared to be of public importance. Therefore, the conclusion of law by the Constitution Bench that no sales or purchase tax could be levied on industrial alcohol with utmost respect fell in both the exceptions, namely, rule of subsilentio and being in per incuriam, to the binding authority of the precedents." 23. It is therefore well settled that what is the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation, nor what logically follows from various observations made in it. It is therefore well settled that what is the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation, nor what logically follows from various observations made in it. In this connection it is profitable to refer to the dictum laid down by Lord Halsbury, L.C. In Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) AC 495, 506 : "..........there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make and one is to repeat what I have every often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what is actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." The above dictum was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in M/s. Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 672 , 680. As held by the Supreme Court any conclusion without any reference to the relevant provisions of law is weaker than even casual observation. It is also held by the Supreme Court that any declaration made or conclusion arrived at without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be a declaration of law, or authority, as a binding precedent." 14. It is after elaborately discussing the binding nature of the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in terms of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India in the aforesaid manner that the Full Bench considered the binding nature of the decision in the aforementioned civil appeals. Evidently, the Full Bench held that it could only be considered that the Apex Court in the decision in those civil appeals rendered only justice between the parties in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art. 142 of the Constitution and consequently held that the said decision was never intended to be of general application. Evidently, the Full Bench held that it could only be considered that the Apex Court in the decision in those civil appeals rendered only justice between the parties in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art. 142 of the Constitution and consequently held that the said decision was never intended to be of general application. Evidently, such a view was taken by the Full Bench based on the settled position of law that a decision rendered by more Judges would prevail over the decision rendered by the lesser number of Judges. It was after applying the said principle in the light of the Pratap Narain Singh's case and Maghar Singh's case that the Full Bench held that the decision rendered in the aforesaid civil appeals could not be said to have laid down a dictum which could be followed as a binding precedent ignoring the position obtained from Pratap Narain Singh's case and Maghar Singh's case. As per Pratap Narain Singh's case, an injured workman would become entitled to compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions under the Act and the right of the injured employee or his heirs to receive compensation gets crystallised the moment such cause of action takes place and the corresponding liability of the employer would also spring forth simultaneously. In the light of the said decision in Maghar Singh's case, even if the benefits flowing from the amendments are available at the time of final adjudication compensation payable under Section 4 (1)(b) of the Act has to be assessed in the light of the provisions which were existing on the date of the accident. The ratio of the said decisions are followed by the Full Bench in Alavi's case to hold that Amendment Act 30 of 1995 enhancing the amount of compensation would not apply to an accident which occurred prior to 15.9.95, the date on which Act 30 of 1995 came into force. Paragraphs 27 and 29 of Alavi's case read as hereunder:- "27. In this connection, it is also pertinent to note that the decision in Pratap Narain Singh's case was rendered by a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. So also the decision in Maghar Singh's case was rendered by the three- Judge bench of the Supreme Court. Paragraphs 27 and 29 of Alavi's case read as hereunder:- "27. In this connection, it is also pertinent to note that the decision in Pratap Narain Singh's case was rendered by a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. So also the decision in Maghar Singh's case was rendered by the three- Judge bench of the Supreme Court. We have already mentioned that those decisions of the Supreme Court laid down the principle while considering the claims of the workmen under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 is by a Bench of two Judges. Supreme Court time and again held that decision rendered by more Judges will prevail over the decision rendered by lesser number of Judges. Applying the said principle also, we are of the view that the decision rendered in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 was never intended to be of general application. 29. In the light of the above findings, we hold that the claimants in all these appeals are not entitled to get the benefit of Amendment Act 30 of 1995, since accidents occurred prior to 15.9.1995." 15.In the light of the fact that the Full Bench in Alavi's case distinguished the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996 and held it as one rendered to do justice between the parties in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and overruled the decision in Asokan's case (supra), it can only be held that the contentions raised on behalf of the first respondent (applicant), based on the said decisions to counter the position obtained from Pratap Narain Singh's case, Maghar Singh's case and Alavi's case are devoid of merit. It is to be noted that the decision in Alavi's case relying on Pratap Narain Singh's case and Maghar Singh's case was rendered by the Full Bench on 6.4.1998 and the Amendments to Section 4(1) and Explanation II were brought about by Act 46 of 2000 only much later. It is to be noted that the decision in Alavi's case relying on Pratap Narain Singh's case and Maghar Singh's case was rendered by the Full Bench on 6.4.1998 and the Amendments to Section 4(1) and Explanation II were brought about by Act 46 of 2000 only much later. If the legislative intention was misinterpreted in Alavi's case, based on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pratap Narain Singh's case and Maghar Singh's case, in the opinion of the legislature and if the legislature wanted to have the amended provisions of the Act to operate retrospectively the same would have been and could have been easily provided in the Amendment Act itself. It is pertinent to note that despite those decisions the legislature did not by express terms or by necessary implication made the amended provisions to be operative with retrospective effect. Indisputably, Amendment Act 46 of 2000 was brought into force only on 8.12.2000. As held by the Full Bench in Alavi's case (supra) the general presumption is that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Aplethora of decisions fortify the said view : See Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1951 SC 128 ), Mahadeolal v. Administrator General of W.B. (AIR 1960 SC 939), State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra ( AIR 1961 SC 307 ), Mithilesh Kumari & Anr. v. Prem Behari Kharu ( AIR 1989 SC 1247 ), State of M.P. and Ors. v. Rameshwar Rathod ( AIR 1990 SC 1849 ) and K.S.Paripoornan v. State of Kerala & Ors. ( (1994) 5 SCC 593 ). In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which really forms the foundation for the said general presumption, which reads thus :- "5. Coming into operation of enactments.- (1) Where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent,- (a) in the case of a Central Act made before the commencement of the Constitution, of the Governor- General, and (b) in the case of an Act of Parliament, of the President. (3) Unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement." 16. Evidently, in the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2000, Act 46 of 2000, it is stated that it shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette appoint. The notification was published on 8.12.2000 and therefore, the Act has come into force with effect from 8.12.2000. It is to be noted that the changes brought about by Act 30 of 1995 and subsequently by Act 46 of 2000 to Section 4 and Explanation II of the Act are with respect to the percentage of monthly wages/or the ceiling limit of the maximum amount payable either under Section 4(1)(a) or Section 4(1)(b) and also with respect to the deemed monthly wages of a workman. In all other respects, virtually no change was effected by the said amendments. In such circumstances, the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Pratap Narain Singh's case and Maghar Singh's case, which were relied on by the Full Bench in Alavi's case while interpreting the question whether the amendments brought about by Act 30 of 1995 are prospective or retrospective in effect are to be followed in this case while deciding the question whether the amendments referred above brought in by Amendment Act 46 of 2000 are prospective or retrospective in effect. Applying the position thus obtained it can only be held that the said amended provisions are only prospective in operation. In such circumstances, the benefits flowing from such amendments would be applicable only with effect from 8.12.2000 and in respect of accident or death occurred prior to the said date, the question of compensation has to be determined either under Section 4(1)(a) or Section 4(1)(b), in terms of the unamended provisions. In other words, the upshot of the discussion is that since the accident in question occurred prior to 8.12.2000, the date of coming into force of Amendment Act 46 of 2000, the Tribunal clearly erred in law in holding that the first respondent/applicant is entitled to compensation reckoning his monthly wages as Rs.3,500/-. In other words, the upshot of the discussion is that since the accident in question occurred prior to 8.12.2000, the date of coming into force of Amendment Act 46 of 2000, the Tribunal clearly erred in law in holding that the first respondent/applicant is entitled to compensation reckoning his monthly wages as Rs.3,500/-. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the fact that as on 19.5.2000, the provisions holding the field were the one obtained subsequent to the amendment brought by the Act 30 of 1995 and prior to the coming into force of Act 46 of 2000. In such circumstances, even if it is found that the applicant/first respondent was getting the monthly wages of Rs.3,500/-, by virtue of Explanation II to clause (b) of Section 4(1) of the Act, for the purpose of computing the compensation payable under Section 4(1)(b) of the Act, the monthly wages of the first respondent could only be taken as Rs.2,000/- despite the fact that it was enhanced subsequent to the accident, as Rs.4,000/- by Act 46 of 2000. In short, the applicant/first respondent is entitled to compensation only based on the unamended provisions available in terms of Amendment Act 30 of 1995, that is; the position obtained prior to the amendments brought in as per Act 46 of 2000. 17. In the said circumstances, while upholding the findings of the Commissioner as per the impugned order that the applicant is eligible to get compensation under Section 4(1)(b) of the Workman Compensation Act, the award in terms of the quantum of compensation has to be interfered with and modified. 18. In this case, with respect to the relevant factor to be applied, there is no dispute and it is 189.56. In Ext.A2 disability certificate, the Medical Board certified that the occupational disability of the first respondent/applicant is 60%. Since those facts are not at all disputed, the compensation payable to the applicant/first respondent has to be reassessed following the same formula, but with the modified deemed monthly wages. In the light of the discussion above, the first respondent/applicant is entitled to compensation only to the following extent :- 2000 x 60/100 x 189.56 x 60/100 = Rs.1,36,483.20, which is rounded off to Rs.1,36,500/-. 19. We are maintaining the rate of interest fixed by the Commissioner, viz., 12% per annum from the date of the accident, on the amount of compensation now reassessed. 19. We are maintaining the rate of interest fixed by the Commissioner, viz., 12% per annum from the date of the accident, on the amount of compensation now reassessed. The 2nd respondent, who is the opposite party before the Commissioner is liable to pay compensation and interest to the applicant and since the appellant is the insurer of the vehicle at the time of the accident, the appellant is liable to indemnify the 2nd respondent/opposite party No.1. In the result, the modified amount of compensation, which is Rs.1,36,483.20, which is rounded off to Rs.1,36,500/-, shall be deposited by the appellant with Simple Interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the accident. Needless to say that if any amount has already been deposited by the appellant for the purpose of satisfying the impugned order, the appellant shall deposit only the balance amount payable in the light of this judgment. This appeal is allowed as above. There will be no order as to costs.