JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. 1. These appeals are directed against the judgment, dated 30th June, 2014, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP No.4854 of 2013, titled Bharat Bhushan vs. H.P. State Electricity Board and another, whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner was partly allowed and the writ respondents were directed to release the salary for the period the writ petitioner remained under suspension, and other retiral service benefits to the writ petitioner. 2. Feeling aggrieved, the writ respondents preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.133 of 2015, whereas, the writ petitioner filed Letters Patent Appeal No.153 of 2014, are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. Brief facts of the case, as pleaded in the writ petition, necessary to settle the present controversy, are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Junior Engineer (Electrical) in the Electricity Board in the year 1977 and was thereafter, promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer in the year 1995 and was posted at Rongtong Power House, Sub Division, Rangrik, Lahaul and Spiti. During his posting, a complaint was lodged against the petitioner and he was reverted to the post of Junior Engineer, vide order dated 14th September, 1999. Thereafter, vide order dated 15th September, 1999, the services of the petitioner were placed under suspension. It has further been averred that, after a lapse of one year, an FIR was lodged against the petitioner. 4. The writ respondents promoted the persons junior to the writ petitioner to the post of Assistant Engineers and also to the next promotional post. The petitioner represented on numerous occasions for revoking his suspension and promoting him to the next higher post, which representations, as per the petitioner, remained unheard. 5. The writ petitioner has also pleaded that the writ respondents, without holding any departmental inquiry against the petitioner, have kept him under suspension for a sufficient long time i.e. for about 13 years. Even, in the FIR lodged against the petitioner, no challan was presented before the competent court of law. 6. The petitioner had prayed for quashing of the suspension order dated 15th September, 1999 as also for directing the respondents to release all service benefits to the petitioner w.e.f. March, 2000 alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per annum. Even, in the FIR lodged against the petitioner, no challan was presented before the competent court of law. 6. The petitioner had prayed for quashing of the suspension order dated 15th September, 1999 as also for directing the respondents to release all service benefits to the petitioner w.e.f. March, 2000 alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per annum. Directions were also sought to the writ respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the next promotional post w.e.f. 4th November, 2006, on which date his juniors were promoted. 7. Respondents filed reply to the writ petition, wherein it has been pleaded that FIR No.33/2000, dated 28th September, 2000, was registered against the petitioner under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the petitioner was arrested on 1st October, 2001 and was in custody till 16th November, 2001. 8. Thus, the services of the petitioner were rightly placed under suspension. It was further pleaded that departmental inquiry could not be conducted against the petitioner for the reason that the original record of the case was taken into custody by the Enforcement Department. The criminal case was stated to have been pending before the Special Judge, Kinnaur at Rampur. Just before the filing of the writ petition, the suspension of the petitioner was revoked. It was also pleaded that the petitioner has retired from service, on attaining the age of superannuation, on 30th June, 2013. The respondents also pleaded that since criminal case was pending against the petitioner, his case for promotion to the next higher post was not considered. Thus, the respondents prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. 9. Feeling aggrieved, the writ petitioner/employee filed LPA No.153 of 2014 on the ground that the learned Single Judge has fell into an error in not granting the promotional benefits to the petitioner from the date his juniors were promoted to the next higher post. 10. On the other hand, the writ respondents/employer filed LPA No.133 of 2015 challenging the impugned judgment on the ground that the learned Single Judge has fell into an error in allowing the writ petition partly and directing them to pay to the petitioner entire monetary benefits for the period he remained under suspension as also the other retiral benefits. 11. On the other hand, the writ respondents/employer filed LPA No.133 of 2015 challenging the impugned judgment on the ground that the learned Single Judge has fell into an error in allowing the writ petition partly and directing them to pay to the petitioner entire monetary benefits for the period he remained under suspension as also the other retiral benefits. 11. The moot question is whether the Writ Court has rightly ordered to release the entire salary, pension and gratuity to the writ petitioner or otherwise. 12. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner argued that the suspension of the writ petitioner was revoked prior to the date of his superannuation i.e. on 27th June, 2013. Since on the date of superannuation, the writ petitioner was not facing any departmental inquiry, therefore, he was entitled to entire salary for the period he remained under suspension, as has been rightly granted by the learned Single Judge. It was further submitted that the writ respondents, for the reasons best known to them, had never ventured into conducting a departmental inquiry against the writ petitioner. Thus, it was submitted that the writ petitioner was entitled to promotion to the higher posts from the date his juniors were promoted and that, on superannuation, was entitled to all retiral benefits, as has been ordered by the learned Single Judge. 13. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ respondents (appellants in LPA No.133 of 2015) has argued that the learned Single Judge has erred in directing the writ respondents to release the retiral benefits in favour of the writ petitioner. He has submitted that Rule 9, Sub Rule (4) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 1972’) clearly lays down that an employee against whom any departmental or judicial proceedings are instituted prior to his retirement, he is entitled only to provisional pension. It is apt to reproduce Rule 9(4) of the Rules of 1972 hereunder: “(4) In the case of Government servant who has retired on attaining the age of superannuation or otherwise and against whom any departmental or judicial proceedings are instituted or where departmental proceedings are continued under sub-rule (2), a provisional pension as provided in Rule 69 shall be sanctioned.” 14. We may also make a reference to Rule 69(1)(c) of the Rules of 1972 as under: “69. We may also make a reference to Rule 69(1)(c) of the Rules of 1972 as under: “69. Provisional pension where departmental or judicial proceedings may be pending: (1)(a). xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx (1)(b). xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx (1)(c). No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders thereon: Provided that where departmental proceedings have been instituted under Rule 16 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, for imposing any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i)(ii) and (iv) of Rule 11 of the said rules, the payment of gratuity shall be authorized to be paid to the Government servant.” 15. Our attention was also drawn to Rule 4 of the Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981, which provides that in case departmental or judicial proceedings, as referred to in Rule 9 of the Rules of 1972, are instituted against a government servant prior to his retirement, he would only be entitled to commute his provisional pension authorized under Rule 69 of the Rules of 1972. Rule 4 of the Rules of 1981 reads thus: “4. Restriction on commutation of pension - No Government servant against whom departmental or judicial proceedings as referred to in Rule 9 of the Pension Rules, have been instituted before the date of his retirement, or the pensioner against whom such proceedings are instituted after the date of his retirement, shall be eligible to commute a percentage of his provisional pension authorized under Rule 69 of the Pension Rules or the pension, as the case may be, during the pendency of such proceedings.” 16. Having glance of the above quoted Rules, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that, in case, an employee retires on attaining the age of superannuation, during the pendency of the departmental inquiry or criminal proceedings/trial, in that eventuality the said employee is entitled to only provisional pension and other benefits are subject to the outcome of the departmental inquiry/judicial proceedings. Even Rule 4 of the 1981 Rules also places an embargo on allowing commutation of pension, as discussed hereinabove. 17. Thus, keeping in view all these Rules, at the best, provisional pension was to be granted to the petitioner and other benefits would depend upon the outcome of the judicial proceedings instituted against the petitioner in the year 2001. 18. Even Rule 4 of the 1981 Rules also places an embargo on allowing commutation of pension, as discussed hereinabove. 17. Thus, keeping in view all these Rules, at the best, provisional pension was to be granted to the petitioner and other benefits would depend upon the outcome of the judicial proceedings instituted against the petitioner in the year 2001. 18. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner was not in a position to point out any provision or law whereby it is provided that in the event of an employee facing departmental or judicial proceedings, gratuity or other retiral benefits cannot be withheld. However, in the case in hand, as discussed hereinabove, the Rules occupying the field, puts complete restriction for releasing the retiral benefits. 19. The rationale behind withholding the retiral and other benefits of an employee facing departmental or judicial proceedings appears to be that in case the judicial proceedings culminate into conviction order, then it would be difficult for the Department concerned to effect recovery from the employee concerned. Also, granting all service benefits would, prima facie, amount to holding that the employee was not involved in any such charge. 20. In the instant case, it is the admitted case of the parties that the writ petitioner has been facing criminal trial before the court of the Special Judge, Kinnaur Division at Rampur and the said proceedings were instituted during the period when the writ petitioner was in service. Thus, the action of the writ respondents in allowing only provisional pension and withholding other benefits can be said to be justified and in accordance with the Rules occupying the field. 21. Coming to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the suspension of the writ petitioner for a prolonged period was illegal since the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1965, stipulates that the suspension order has to be reviewed within 90 days of its issuance, which, in the present case, has never been done by the writ respondents. 22. In support of his above submission, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and others vs. Dipak Mali, (2010) 2 Supreme Court Cases 222, wherein it was held that suspension order would not survive after a period of 90 days unless extended after review. 22. In support of his above submission, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and others vs. Dipak Mali, (2010) 2 Supreme Court Cases 222, wherein it was held that suspension order would not survive after a period of 90 days unless extended after review. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 11 of the said decision hereunder: “11. The case sought to be made out on behalf of the petitioner, Union of India as to the cause of delay in reviewing the Respondent's case, is not very convincing. Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, speaks of abatement of proceedings once an original application under the said Act was admitted. In this case, what is important is that by operation of sub rule (6) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules, the order of suspension would not survive after the period of 90 days unless it was extended after review. Since admittedly the review had not been conducted within 90 days from the date of suspension, it became invalid after 90 days, since neither was there any review nor extension within the said period of 90 days. Subsequent review and extension, in our view, could not revive the order which had already become invalid after the expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension.” 23. This is well settled proposition of law and there is no quarrel about the same. However, this Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that the writ petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 15th September, 1999, remained contended with the same till 29th June, 2013, the day when the writ petition was filed i.e. one day prior to his retirement. There is no explanation on the file as to why the writ petitioner remained silent and did not knock the doors of the Court for such a long period. Interestingly, the suspension of the writ petitioner stood revoked on 27th June, 2013, just after the drafting of the writ petition (24th June, 2013) and before filing of the same in this Court on 29th June, 2013. During the period of his suspension, the writ petitioner enjoyed the subsistence allowance granted to him by his employer. Interestingly, the suspension of the writ petitioner stood revoked on 27th June, 2013, just after the drafting of the writ petition (24th June, 2013) and before filing of the same in this Court on 29th June, 2013. During the period of his suspension, the writ petitioner enjoyed the subsistence allowance granted to him by his employer. Thus, the conduct of the writ petitioner assumes great significance and the facts of the case have to be viewed from that angle too. 24. Having said so, the impugned judgment is set aside so far as it relates to the release of gratuity and other retiral benefits. As far as release of salary for the period during which the writ petitioner remained under suspension is concerned, the writ respondents are directed to release the salary to the writ petitioner, as admissible, for the said period after adjusting the amount already paid to him towards subsistence allowance. Except provisional pension, promotional benefit and other retiral service benefits including gratuity etc. shall be subject to the outcome of the criminal trial. 25. In view of the above discussion, the appeal filed by the writ respondents i.e. LPA No.133 of 2015 is partly allowed and the appeal filed by the writ petitioner being LPA No.153 of 2014 is dismissed. 26. Since the FIR was registered in the year 2001, therefore, the trial Court is directed to conclude the trial as early as possible, preferably within three months from today. The Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the learned Sessions Judge, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushahr forthwith.