ORDER : 1. The petitioner, Mr. Surendra Nayak, has challenged the legality of the order dated 27.06.2011, passed by the III Additional District Judge, D.K., Mangalore, whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the petitioner’s revision petition filed under Section 46 (2) of the Karnataka Rent Act (‘the Act’, for short), wherein the petitioner had challenged the order dated 28.01.2011, passed by the Principal Civil Judge, Mangaluru, in HRC No. 11/2009, whereby the learned Civil Judge had dismissed the petitioner’s application under Section 43 of the Act. 2. Briefly the facts of the case are that the petitioner is a tenant in a suit property bearing Door No. 143240, admeasuring 120 Sq.Ft., situated in Manar Complex, Balmatta New Road, Mangaluru. The Manar complex was constructed by M/s. Manar Builders, a partnership firm. The partners of the firm were the family members of one Mr. A.M. Moosa Haji. In the year 2006, the wife of A.M. Moosa Haji, namely Mrs. Aysha Moosa Haji, instituted an eviction suit against one Mr. Subhash Chandra Kini, and Mr. Surendra Nayak, the petitioner before this court. In the said suit, the petitioner took a categorical stand that in fact, he had obtained the schedule property from Mr. A.M. Mohammed Shafi, the plaintiff’s son, as per the agreement dated 27.05.2003, on a monthly rent of Rs.1,000/-. He had further claimed that he had paid a sum of Rs.25,000/- as caution deposit by cheque dated 27.05.2003. He further claimed that ever since 2003, he is a tenant of Mr. A.M. Mohammad Shafi, and not of the plaintiff, Mrs. Aysha Moosa Haji. 3. Meanwhile, due to certain disputes that arose within the family members of Mr. A.M. Moosa Haji after his death, Mr. A.M. Mohammed Shafi, (the respondent before this court) instituted a civil suit for declaration, namely HRC No. 40/2006. In the said civil suit, he sought a declaration that he is the absolute owner of the schedule premises, and also sought the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction against the other members of his family. 4. Meanwhile, Mr. Mohammad Shafi also instituted a civil suit for eviction against the petitioner, namely HRC No. 11/2009. It is in this proceedings that the petitioner filed an application under Section 43 of the Act, wherein, he questioned the relationship between him and Mr. Mohammad Shafi, the plaintiff therein, as Landlord and tenant. The petitioner took a categorical stand that Mr. Mohammad Shafi also instituted a civil suit for eviction against the petitioner, namely HRC No. 11/2009. It is in this proceedings that the petitioner filed an application under Section 43 of the Act, wherein, he questioned the relationship between him and Mr. Mohammad Shafi, the plaintiff therein, as Landlord and tenant. The petitioner took a categorical stand that Mr. Mohammad Shafi is not his landlord. He further claimed that his Landlady is Mrs. Aysha Moosa Haji, the plaintiff’s mother. Therefore, he prayed that further proceedings in the suit should be stayed till Mr. Mohammad Shafi proves his title in the declaratory civil suit filed by him. However, by order dated 28.01.2011, the learned Civil Judge dismissed the said application filed by the petitioner. 5. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the order dated 28.01.2011, he filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. However, by order dated 27.06.2016, the learned Judge has also dismissed the revision petition. Hence, the present petition before this court. 6. Mr. Sachin B. S., the learned Counsel for petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, the learned Judge was not justified in concluding that the petitioner had made "an admission", in the first suit, filed by Mrs. Aysha Moosa Haji, that “his landlord was Mr. Mohammad Shafi”. Further, the Judge was unjustified in reading the said admission against the petitioner in the second suit. According to the learned counsel, the previous admission cannot be read against a party in a subsequent case. In order to buttress this plea, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Suma Gouda @ Anitha @ Vasanti v. M.K. Poovaiah, AIR 2010 Kar 577. Secondly, in the present suit, the petitioner had clarified his position in his written statement. In his counter, he had clearly stated that Mr. Mohammad Shafi had held himself out to be Mrs. Aysha Moosa Haji's son. He had asked the petitioner to enter into a separate lease agreement with him, on behalf of his mother. Therefore, he had entered into the lease agreement with Mr. Mohammad Shafi on 27.05.2003; he had paid him the rent from 2003 to 2006. However, after receiving the notice in the present suit, the petition realized that Mr. Mohammad Shafi had hoodwinked him into entering into the lease agreement. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the petitioner was justified in denying the fact that Mr. Mohammad Shafi on 27.05.2003; he had paid him the rent from 2003 to 2006. However, after receiving the notice in the present suit, the petition realized that Mr. Mohammad Shafi had hoodwinked him into entering into the lease agreement. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the petitioner was justified in denying the fact that Mr. Mohammad Shafi is his landlord. Thirdly, once the petitioner had filed the application, denying the relationship between him and the plaintiff as that of tenant and landlord, under Section 43 of the Act, the learned trial court should have stopped further proceedings in the case. The learned trial court should, in fact, have waited for Mr. Mohammad Shafi to prove his title of the property in the civil suit filed by him. Hence, neither the learned court was justified in rejecting the petitioner's application under Section 43 of the Act, nor the learned Judge was justified in rejecting the revision petition under Section 46 (2) of the Act. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned order. 8. The moot question before this court is whether the previous statement made by the petitioner that Mrs. Aysha Moosa Haji was not his landlady, but, in fact, Mr. Mohammad Shafi was his landlord, can be read against the petitioner in the present case where he has denied Mr. Mohammad Shafi as being his landlord or not ? 9. In the case of Suma Gouda @ Anitha @ Vasanti (supra) this court had observed as under: “Admission made by a party in pleadings is conclusive but admission made in the evidence is only a piece of evidence unless it operates as estoppel as stated above. Even otherwise, admission in a pleading is binding only in the proceedings in which it is made and it may be shown to be wrong in subsequent proceedings.” 10. The said observation cannot be questioned. But the question still remains whether a party to a litigation can be permitted to change his stand and to take a contradictory stand especially on a question of fact, or not? 11. Estoppel is a collective name given to a group of legal doctrines whereby a person is prevented from making assertions that are contradictory to their prior position on certain matters before the court; thereby, the person is said to be "estopped". 11. Estoppel is a collective name given to a group of legal doctrines whereby a person is prevented from making assertions that are contradictory to their prior position on certain matters before the court; thereby, the person is said to be "estopped". Estoppel may operate by way of preventing someone from asserting a particular fact in court, or in exercising a right, or in bringing a claim. Black's Law Dictionary defines "estoppel" as “a bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally established as true.” [Ref. to Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, 2009] 12. Judicial estoppel is said to be parcel of doctrine of equitable estoppel. Judicial estoppel binds a party to his/ her previous judicial declaration, such as allegations contained in a lawsuit, complaint, written statement, or testimony given under oath. The object of judicial estoppel is to preserve the integrity of the courts, and to uphold the sanctity of the oath. Under judicial estoppel a party to a litigation cannot be permitted to take contradictory stand and to change its position from the previous litigation to the subsequent one. For, a litigant cannot be permitted to take a court out for a ride by his shifting stand. 13. According to the Supreme Court of United States, the doctrine of judicial estoppel can be applied if three conditions are satisfied: i) the party's later position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position; ii) whether the first court had accepted the earlier position; iii) whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. [Ref. to New Hampshire v. Maine] 532 U.S. 742. However, the two crucial conditions are the first and the third. If they are met, even if the second condition is unsatisfied, even then the doctrine of Judicial estoppel would apply. 14. Section 43 of the Act entitles the tenant to ask that further proceedings be stayed, if he were to question the relationship of the landlord and tenant and were to deny the title of the landlord to the suit property. But precisely because a party is granted this right, the party cannot be permitted to abuse the law by changing its position on the issue as to who is the landlord? But precisely because a party is granted this right, the party cannot be permitted to abuse the law by changing its position on the issue as to who is the landlord? To permit the tenant to do so, is to encourage the people to abuse the process of the court, and of the law in order to escape the judgment day. Thus, a strict view should be taken if a litigant hoodwinks the court by changing his stand from the stand taken by him/ her in a previous suit. 15. Admittedly, in the present case the petitioner has changed his position from the previous suit vis-a-vis the issue as to who is the landlord? In the previous suit, the petitioner claimed that Mr. Mohammad Shafi is his landlord; in the subsequent suit, filed by Mr. Mohammad Shafi, the petitioner claims that Mr. Shafi is not his landlord. Obviously, the petitioner cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold simultaneously. He cannot change his position under the doctrine of Judicial Estoppel. Litigants, like the petitioner, cannot be allowed to pull the wool over the eyes of the court. 16. Although the learned counsel has argued that the petitioner has given an explanation for changing his position, but the explanation cannot be accepted at the initial stage as it is subject to proof. Therefore, the learned courts below are justified in not considering the petitioner's alleged explanation at this juncture of the trial. 17. Even otherwise, the petitioner's stand that Mr. Mohammad Shafi is not his landlord is against the tenor of law. For, Section 3 (e) of the Act defines the word "landlord" as meaning "a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or to be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant." According to the petitioner, he was under the belief that Mr. Shafi was acting on behalf of the true landlord. Hence, he paid to rent amount to him. Thus, considering the definition of "landlord" the petitioner cannot claim that Mr. Shafi is not his landlord. Shafi was acting on behalf of the true landlord. Hence, he paid to rent amount to him. Thus, considering the definition of "landlord" the petitioner cannot claim that Mr. Shafi is not his landlord. Since the rent has been paid to Mr. Shafi, he is deemed to be the landlord under the Act. 18. Moreover, even if there were a dispute between Mr. Shafi and his family members with regard to the title of the property, even then it would not prevent Mr. Shafi from filing an eviction suit against the petitioner. For, under Section 3 (e) of the Act, Mr. Shafi is deemed to be the landlord. 19. Thus, for the reasons stated above, this court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. This petition, being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed.