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Allahabad High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 65 (ALL)

SATISH CHANDRA GUPTA v. STATE OF U. P.

2016-01-07

MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, V.K.SHUKLA

body2016
JUDGMENT By the Court.—Satish Chandra Gupta, son of Shri Anant Bihari Lal Gupta is before this Court for quashing the award dated 22.9.1986 passed by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Nagar Nigam, Allahabad-respondent No. 3. He has further prayed for direction commanding the respondents to release the land in dispute i.e. Survey Plot No. 101/1M area 0.0800 hec. situated in village Harwara, Tehsil Sadar, District Allahabad and not to interfere in his peaceful possession and occupation over the land in dispute. 2. The factual situation that is accepted before us is that the dispute relates to Survey Plot No. 102/1M area 0.0800 hec. situated in village Harwara, Pargana and Tehsil Sadar, District Allahabad. The land in dispute initially belonged to Anant Bihari Lal Gupta-the father of the petitioner and he was the recorded tenure holder and in possession of the land in dispute. He executed a will deed dated 23.4.1978 by which the land in dispute was bequeathed in favour of the petitioner. 3. It appears from the record that the Allahabad Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “ADA”) had sent a detailed proposal to the State Government that the land in dispute alongwith large tract of adjoining land was urgently required for planned development of Allahabad. Consequently, a notification under Section 4 (1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the 1894 Act) alongwith Section 17 (1) of the 1894 Act was issued on 28.4.1979. The same was published in official Gazette on 9.6.1979. Anant Bihari Lal Gupta died on 28.12.1980. Subsequently the State Government issued notification under Section 6 (1) of the 1894 Act on 26.5.1981, which was published in the official Gazette on 27.5.1981. Finally the award in question was also made on 22.9.1986. The award has been brought on record as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. As per the award it is reflected that the possession of the land in question had been taken by the Competent Authority way back on 1.9.1981/2.1.1984. It is claimed that upon the death of Anant Bihari Lal Gupta-father of the petitioner, the name of the petitioner was recorded in the revenue record on 2.7.1994. 4. Shri Rajiv Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the possession of the land in dispute was never taken by respondent No. 3 i.e. ADA and the petitioner continued in possession of the land in dispute. 4. Shri Rajiv Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the possession of the land in dispute was never taken by respondent No. 3 i.e. ADA and the petitioner continued in possession of the land in dispute. He submits that the 1894 Act was repealed and under the Act No. 30 of 2013 i.e. the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short, 2013 Act), now it covers the field of land acquisition, which also provides the methods and methodology to be followed in respect of acquisition under the Act of 1894. He has placed reliance upon Section 24 of the 2013 Act and submits that in view of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act the entire acquisition initiated by the ADA has lapsed and further alternatively prayed that the respondents are obliged to determine the compensation to be fixed as per provisions of the 2013 Act. Shri Rajiv Misra has placed reliance on judgments of Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Sonanki and others, 2014 (3) SCC 183 . Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced hereinafter : “6. It is argued on behalf of the landowners that by virtue of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, the subject acquisition shall be deemed to have been lapsed because the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act is made more than five years prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and no compensation has been paid to the owners nor the amount of compensation has been deposited in the Court by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. 7. On the other hand, on behalf of the Corporation and so also for the Collector, it is argued that the award was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 31.1.2008 strictly in terms of 1894 Act and on the very day the landowners were informed regarding the quantum of compensation for their respective lands. Notices were also issued to the landowners to reach the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer and receive the amount of compensation and since they neither received the compensation nor any request came from them to make reference to the District Court under Section 18, the compensation amounting to Rs. 27 crores was deposited in the Government treasury. Notices were also issued to the landowners to reach the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer and receive the amount of compensation and since they neither received the compensation nor any request came from them to make reference to the District Court under Section 18, the compensation amounting to Rs. 27 crores was deposited in the Government treasury. It is, thus, submitted that there was no default on the part of the Special Land Acquisition Officer or the Government and, hence, the acquisition proceedings have not lapsed. Moreover, reliance is also placed on Section 114 of the 2013 Act and it is argued that the concluded land acquisition proceedings are not at all affected by Section 24 (2) and the only right that survives to the landowners is to receive compensation. 8. 2013 Act puts in place entirely new regime for compulsory acquisition of land and provides for new scheme for compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or affected by such acquisition. 9. To turn, now, to the meaning of the expression “compensation has not been paid” in Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act and its effect on the subject acquisition, it is necessary to refer to Section 24 which reads as follows : “24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,— (a) Where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) Where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act : Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holding has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 10. Insofar as sub-section (1) of Section 24 is concerned, it begins with non obstante clause. By this, Parliament has given overriding effect to this provision over all other provisions of 2013 Act. It is provided in clause (a) that where the land acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award under Section 11 is made, then the provisions of 2013 Act shall apply relating to the determination of compensation. Clause (b) of Section 24 (1) makes provision that where land acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the 1894 Act and award has been made under Section 11, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if that Act has not been repealed.” 5. Shri Rajiv Misra has also relied upon judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana and others, 2014 (6) SCC 586 , in which it was held in paras 6 to 10 as follows : “6. To appreciate the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, the said Section is required to be extracted. Section 24 of the 2013 Act is under : Section 24. To appreciate the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, the said Section is required to be extracted. Section 24 of the 2013 Act is under : Section 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894— (a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) Where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act : Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 24 commences with a non obstante clause. It is a beneficial provision. In view of this provision, if the physical possession of the land has not been taken by the acquiring authority though the award is passed and if the compensation has not been paid to the landowners or has not been deposited before the appropriate forum, the proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act is deemed to have been lapsed. 7. Keeping the aforesaid provisions in view, we have specifically looked into the assertions made by the appellant and the way it is countered by the respondents. 7. Keeping the aforesaid provisions in view, we have specifically looked into the assertions made by the appellant and the way it is countered by the respondents. In our opinion though the award has been passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, they have not taken the physical possession of the land and have not paid the compensation to the appellant or had deposited the said compensation before an appropriate forum. 8. In that view of the matter, in our considered opinion, sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act squarely applies to the appellant’s case and the appellant is entitled to relief sought for in their petition. 9. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court qua the appellant only. We declare that the acquisition proceedings insofar as the appellant is concerned are deemed to have lapsed. 10. We permit the respondents, if they so desire, to initiate appropriate proceedings for acquisition of the land in question afresh in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. Ordered accordingly.” 6. Shri Rajiv Misra has also relied upon judgments in Bimla Devi and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2014 (6) SCC 583 ; Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2015 (3) SCC 353 ; Sharma Agro Industries v. State of Haryana and others, 2015 (3) SCC 341 ; Sita Ram v. State of Haryana and another, 2015 (3) SCC 597 ; Ram Kishan and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2015 (4) SCC 347 and Rajiv Chawdhrie Huf v. Union of India and others, 2015 (3) SCC 541 , in support of his submission. He submits that the ratio of the aforesaid judgments squarely applies to the present case in hand. Thus the acquisition proceedings qua the land of the petitioner has to be declared as lapsed by applying the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. 7. Dr.Y.K. Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that compensation had been deposited to the competent Court. The acquisition has not been lapsed and present case is not covered by Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. Each and every objections have been dealt with while finalisaing the award in the year 1986. He has also indicated that the possession of the land in question was taken way back on 1.9.1981/2.1.1984. The acquisition has not been lapsed and present case is not covered by Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. Each and every objections have been dealt with while finalisaing the award in the year 1986. He has also indicated that the possession of the land in question was taken way back on 1.9.1981/2.1.1984. Even certain land belonged to the father of the petitioner was released under Section 48 of the 1894 Act. He submits that the petitioner was conscious and well aware with the fact that the acquisition proceedings were under full swing but had never objected upon. He has also drawn attention on Page-56-L, which is marked as Anukrimrika - 15 (Gha) whereby even after taking possession the ADA had proceeded to release certain land. He has further made submission that no documentary evidence has been filed alongwith the writ petition to indicate that at any point of time the petitioner’s name has been mutated over the property in dispute and as such at this belated stage the writ petition is liable to be dismissed only on the ground of laches. 8. Dr. Y.K. Srivastava has also placed his reliance on the urgency clause under Section 17 (1) of 1894 Act. He submitted that payment of 80 percent compensation as contemplated under Section 17 (3) is a condition precedent for taking possession under Section 17 (1). Therefore, at this belated stage the petitioner cannot agitate to the extent that he has not received the compensation and as such, his case would fall under Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act. So far as urgency part is concerned, the same has been considered by Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in Gajraj and others v. State of UP and others, 2011(11) ADJ 1 (FB). The relevant paras are quoted below : “372. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that after publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act, in none of the cases award has been made under Section 11 within two years from the date of publication, hence, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land has lapsed. Section 11 A of the Act is as follows : 11A. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that after publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act, in none of the cases award has been made under Section 11 within two years from the date of publication, hence, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land has lapsed. Section 11 A of the Act is as follows : 11A. Period within which an award shall be made.—(1) The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse : Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. 374. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Section 11 A applies in the cases where Section 17 has not been invoked and in cases where Section 17 has been invoked, there is no applicability of Section 11-A. 376. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties. In Satendra Prasad Jain’s case the issue was considered and it was held by the Apex Court that when Section 17 sub-section (1) is applied by reason of urgency, the Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government as laid down in paragraph 15. The said view was reiterated by the Apex Court in Awadh Bihari Yadav and others v. State of Bihar and others, 1995(6) SCC 31 . The recent judgment of Banda Development Authority (supra) has also occasion to consider the said issue, relying on the decision of Satendra Prasad Jain. The argument on the basis of Section 11-A was repelled. In the present bunch of cases the State Government has invoked urgency clause under Section 17(1) and possession has been taken in all the cases exercising urgency power. The ratio laid down by Satendra Prasad Jain’s case is fully attracted and the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the basis of Section 11-A cannot be accepted. 377. The ratio laid down by Satendra Prasad Jain’s case is fully attracted and the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the basis of Section 11-A cannot be accepted. 377. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners were not made payment of 80% of the compensation as required by Section 17(3-A) and as alleged the possession has been taken without payment of 80% compensation which violates Section 17(3A). It is contended that Section 17(3A) uses the word ‘shall’ which has to be interpreted as a mandatory provision. It is submitted that when possession is to be taken under Section 17 sub-section 1, invoking urgency clause the award is not prepared and in preparation of the award several years are taken due to which Section 17(3-A) mandates that 80% of the compensation is to be paid. Non payment of 80% compensation is arbitrary, unjust and in view of the fact that without payment of compensation possession is claimed to have been taken. The entire acquisition deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The above submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners has been refuted by learned counsel appearing for the respondents. It is contended that the provision of Section 17(3-A) is directory. It is submitted that even if 80% compensation is not tendered/paid to the land holder, acquisition shall not be vitiated, reliance has again been placed on judgment of Sateyendra Prasad Jain (supra) as well as the judgment of the Apex Court in Banda Development Authority (supra) and Awadh Bihari Yadav (supra). 378. The provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act were considered by three Judge Bench in Satendra Prasad’s Jain case, following was laid down by Apex Court in paragraph 17 : “In the instant case, even that 80 per cent of the estimated compensation was not paid to the appellants although Section 17(3-A) required that it should have been paid before possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the first respondent. It is, at any rate, not open to the third respondent, who, as the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 27th June, 1990 shows, failed to make the necessary monies available and who has been in occupation of the said land ever since its possession was taken, to urge that the possession was taken illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not vested in the first respondent and the first respondent is under no obligation to make an award.” 379. Again in Awadh Bihari Yadav (supra) case the same proposition was laid down in paragraph 8 which is quoted below : “8. The sheet-anchor of the appellants plea is that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Act. In order to understand the scope of the plea it will be useful to extract the relevant provisions of the Acts. [Section 6, Section 11, Section 11- A, Section 17 and Section 18(1)]. “6. The sheet-anchor of the appellants plea is that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Act. In order to understand the scope of the plea it will be useful to extract the relevant provisions of the Acts. [Section 6, Section 11, Section 11- A, Section 17 and Section 18(1)]. “6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.— (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section 5-A, sub-section (2) : Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1),— (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification : Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.” “11. Enquiry and award by Collector.—(1) on the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under Section 9 to the measurements made under Section 8, and into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notifications under Section 4, sub-section (1), and into the respective interests of the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of— (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him : Provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf : (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if at any stage of the proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government, he may without making further enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement. (3) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-section (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act. (3) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-section (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act,1908, (16 of 1908), no agreement made under sub-section (2) shall be liable to registration under that Act.” “11-A. Period within which an award shall be made.—The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse : Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation.—In computing the period of two years referred to in this Section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.” “17. Special powers in cases of urgency.—(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. XXX XXX XXX (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not be apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1).” “48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed.— (1) Expect in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the Acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.” It was contended that in view of Section 11-A of the Act the entire land acquisition proceedings lapsed as no award under Section 11 had been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984. We are of the view that the above plea has no force. In this case, the Government had taken possession of the land in question under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition (Section 48 of the Act). In such a case, Section 11-A of the Act is not attracted and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse, even if it is assumed that no award was made within the period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act. Delivering the Judgment of a Three Member Bench of this Court, in Stander Prasad Jain and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1993 (4) SC 369, S.P. Bharucha, J., at page 374, paragraph 15, stated the law thus : “Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession, the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not wasted in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending, and by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not wasted in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending, and by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11- A can have no application to cases of acquisition under Section 17, because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.” (Emphasis supplied) We, therefore, hold that the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case did not lapse.” 380. Recent judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Delhi Airtech Service Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State of U.P. and others, JT 2011(9) SC 440 needs to be noted in this context. The provisions of Section 17(3A) as well as 11 A of the Act came for consideration before the Apex Court. Submission was made that payment of 80% compensation as contemplated under Section 17(3A) is a condition precedent for taking possession under Section 17(1). It was contended that unless the provision is interpreted as mandatory the whole purpose and object shall be frustrated. The two judge Bench which heard the matters in M/s Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. deferred on the interpretation of Section 17(3-A). Hon. Justice Ashok Kumar Ganguli held the provisions of Section 17(3A) mandatory. Following was laid down in paragraphs 72 and 74 : “72. On the above premise, taking over a possession of land without complying with the requirement of Section 17(3A) is clearly illegal and in clear violation of the statutory provision which automatically violates the constitutional guarantee under Article 300A. A passing observation to the contrary in S.P. Jain (supra) must pass sub-silentio being unnecessary in the facts of the case as otherwise such a finding is per incuriam, being in violation of the statute. A fortiorari the said finding cannot be sustained as a binding precedent. 74. A passing observation to the contrary in S.P. Jain (supra) must pass sub-silentio being unnecessary in the facts of the case as otherwise such a finding is per incuriam, being in violation of the statute. A fortiorari the said finding cannot be sustained as a binding precedent. 74. This Court further holds that in all cases of emergency acquisition under Section 17, the requirement of payment under Section 17(3A) must be complied with. As the provision of Section 17(1) and Section 17(2) cannot be worked out without complying with requirement of payment under Section 17(3A) which is in the nature of condition precedent. If Section 17(3A) is not complied with, the vesting under Section 17(1) and Section 17(2) cannot take place. Therefore, emergency acquisition without complying with Section 17(3 A) is illegal. This is the plain intention of the statute which must be strictly construed. Any other construction, in my opinion, would lead to diluting the Rule of Law.” 381. Hon. Justice Swatanter Kumar took a different opinion and relying on various judgment of this Court following the line of Satyendra Prasad Jain it was opined that Section 17(3-A) is not mandatory. Justice Swatanter Kumar further held that Section 11-A has no application to the acquisition proceedings under Section 17 of the Act. Following observation were made by Hon. Justice Swatanter Kumar in paragraph 117 : “Consistent with the view expressed by this Court in the cases referred (supra), I am of the considered view that the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act are not mandatory. Such a conclusion can safely be arrived at, even for the reason that the Court would have to read into the provisions of Section 17(3A) consequences and a strict period of limitation within which amount should be deposited, which has not been provided by the Legislature itself in that Section. The consequences and contingencies arising from non-compliance of the said provisions have not been stated in the Act. Once the land has vested in the Government, non-compliance with the obligation of payment of 80 per cent of estimated compensation would not render the possession taken under Section 17(1) as illegal. The land cannot be re-vested or reverted back to the claimants as no provisions under the Act so prescribe. Once the land has vested in the Government, non-compliance with the obligation of payment of 80 per cent of estimated compensation would not render the possession taken under Section 17(1) as illegal. The land cannot be re-vested or reverted back to the claimants as no provisions under the Act so prescribe. Furthermore, if the interpretation put forward by the appellants is accepted, it would completely frustrate the objects and purpose of the Act, rather than advancing the same. The expression `shall’ used in Section 17(3A) has to be understood in its correct perspective and is not to be construed as suggestive of the provisions being absolutely mandatory in its application. Inter alia for these reasons and as per the above discussions, I hold that the provisions of Section 17(3A) are not mandatory. They are directive provisions, though their compliance is necessary in terms of the Act.” 382. There being difference of opinion the matter was directed to be placed before Hon. Chief Justice for reference to larger bench to resolve the divergent views expressed in both the judgments and to answer the questions of law framed. From the above, it is clear that the issue is yet to be considered by larger Bench of the Apex Court on Section 17(3A). However, we are bound to follow the law as it exists today which is a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The judgment in Sateyendra Prasad Jain will hold the field hence the submission of the petitioner at present that Section 17(3) A is mandatory, non compliance of which vitiate the acquisition cannot be accepted.” 9. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. The Stamp Reporter has reported that this writ petition has been filed after delay of 26 years and 345 days. 11. In the present case, the notification under Section 4 (1) alongwith Section 17 (1) of 1894 Act was issued on 18.4.1979; thereafter the notification under Section 6 of the 1894 Act was issued on 26.5.1981 and the award was made on 22.9.1986. Thus according to Section 24 (1) (a) of the 2013 Act, where no award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply. 12. Thus according to Section 24 (1) (a) of the 2013 Act, where no award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply. 12. Now we come to the petitioners’ submission that by virtue of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, the subject acquisition shall be deemed to have been lapsed because the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act is made more than five years prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and no compensation has been paid to the owners nor the amount of compensation has been deposited in the Court by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The 2013 Act has been enacted to ensure in consultation with institutions of local self-Government and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution of India, a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families; to provide just and fair compensation to the affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such acquisition and to make adequate provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement; to ensure that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development leading to an improvement in their post acquisition social and economic status and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It delineate a completely new scheme for undertaking acquisition of the land. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, on which reliance has been placed, contains a heading “Land acquisition process under Act No 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases”. Section 24 of the 2013 Act is quoted below : “24. It delineate a completely new scheme for undertaking acquisition of the land. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, on which reliance has been placed, contains a heading “Land acquisition process under Act No 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases”. Section 24 of the 2013 Act is quoted below : “24. Land acquisition process under Act No 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,— (a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act : Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 13. Now we come to sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. There are pre-conditions, as mentioned in the said sub-section. They are, (i) where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act; (ii) the physical possession of the land has not been taken; (iii) or the compensation has not been paid. There are pre-conditions, as mentioned in the said sub-section. They are, (i) where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act; (ii) the physical possession of the land has not been taken; (iii) or the compensation has not been paid. Thus for applicability of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, first condition is that award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made five years or more prior to commencement of the 2013 Act. The 2013 Act has commenced with effect from 1.1.2013 by virtue of notification issued by the Central Government under Section 1 sub-section (3) of the 2013 Act. The judgment of the Apex Court in Pune Municipal Corporation’s case (supra) relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners was a case where award under the Land Acquisition Act was made on 31.1.2008 which date is mentioned in paragraph 7of the judgment. In the said case the compensation was not received by the land holders and was deposited in the Government Treasury. 14. Therefore, at this stage, we have now proceeded to examine the issue regarding the compensation. In the present case, nothing has been brought to indicate that at any relevant point of time the father of the petitioner or the petitioner himself had proceeded for exemption of the disputed land in question or to ask for compensation, entire pleadings are missing in the matter. While examining the records in question, we find that the petitioner in most cursory manner has proceeded to make mention in paragraph 10 of the writ petition that upon the death of his father, the name of the petitioner came to be recorded in the revenue records regarding the land in dispute vide order dated 2.7.1994 passed in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act. The said averment has been made without substantiating the relevant record. Contrary to it, what we find from the record is that the land in dispute was recorded in favour of the ADA in the Fasli Year 1420-1425. 15. The said averment has been made without substantiating the relevant record. Contrary to it, what we find from the record is that the land in dispute was recorded in favour of the ADA in the Fasli Year 1420-1425. 15. This much is also reflected from the award itself that the possession of the acquired land was taken way back on 1.9.1981/2.1.1984 and further nothing concrete material has been brought on record to indicate that at any point of time the names of heirs of late Anant Bihari Lal Gupta had been recorded specially the petitioner. It is not disputed that the Survey Plot No. 101 was the subject-matter of acquisition and an area of 2 bigha 13 biswa in Harwara, Dhumanganj, Allahabad, which came to be recorded in favour of the father of the petitioner, was also included in the notification under Section 4 (1) and 6 (1) of the 1894 Act. Subsequently certain land was exempted by the State Government under Section 48 of the 1894 Act. 16. Once this is the factual situation that certain portion of the land of the petitioner’s father had been released by the State Government and further for the disputed property nothing concrete has been brought on record before this Court to indicate that at any point of time petitioner himself has proceeded to the State Government either for exemption of the said land under Section 48 of the 1894 Act or asked for compensation. Even no material has been brought on record to substantiate that the petitioner had proceeded to the authority concerned for release of any compensation in this regard. All of sudden the petitioner has waked up from deep slumber after 35 years of acquisition and now in the garb of Section 24 of the 2013 Act he has proceeded to challenge the acquisition proceedings by virtue of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, the subject acquisition shall be deemed to have been lapsed. 17. While considering the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, it is suffice to indicate that the judgments cited before this Court would not be attracted under the present facts and circumstances of the case. 17. While considering the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, it is suffice to indicate that the judgments cited before this Court would not be attracted under the present facts and circumstances of the case. In Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Sonanki and others (supra) Hon’ble Apex Court has proceeded to consider Section 24 (1) and (2) of the 2013 Act whereas the acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act; compensation has not been paid to the land owners and the award was made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and held that the deposit of compensation of amount in Government treasury is not enough. In Ram Kishan and others v. State of Haryana and others (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the limitation as well as interpretation of five years’ period and held in paras-11 and 12 as follows : “11. Further in the case of Shiv Raj and others (supra), this Court discussed the circular issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Urban Development, Delhi Division wherein the legal opinion of the Solicitor General of India clarified the statutory provisions of the Act of 2013 with respect to lapsing of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. The relevant para 25 is extracted hereunder : “25..... 3.Interpretation of five years’ period “With regard to this issue viz. interpretation of five years’ period, two situations have been envisaged in cases where the acquisition has been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 viz. (1) parties whose lands have been acquired have refused to accept the compensation and (2) parties whose lands have been acquired having just parted with physical possession of the land. However, in both the above situations, as on 1-1-2014, the period of 5 years would not have ended and in such cases, the advisory seeks to clarify that the new law shall apply only if the situation of pendency continues unchanged for a period that equals to or exceeds five years. However, in both the above situations, as on 1-1-2014, the period of 5 years would not have ended and in such cases, the advisory seeks to clarify that the new law shall apply only if the situation of pendency continues unchanged for a period that equals to or exceeds five years. In my view, it should be further clarified that in none of the cases the period of five years would have elapsed pursuant to an award made under Section 11 from the date of commencement of the Act and that the benefit of Section 24 (2) will be available to those cases which are pending and where during pendency, the situation has remained unchanged with physical possession not being handed over or compensation not having been accepted and the period equals to or exceeds five years. 4. Limitation As regards this item relating to the period spent during litigation would also be accounted for the purpose of determining whether the period of five years has to be counted or not, it should be clarified that it will apply only to cases where awards were passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, 5 years or more prior to 1-1-2014 as specified in Section 24 (2) of the Act, to avoid any ambiguity. Since this legislation has been passed with the objective of benefiting the land-losers, this interpretation is consistent with that objective and also [pic]added as a matter of abundant caution that the period spent in litigation challenging an award cannot be excluded for the purpose of determining whether the period of five years has elapsed or not. If the possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid due to the challenge to the land acquisition proceedings, the pendente lite period will be included to determine the five year period and including such period if the award was made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, then the said acquisition proceedings will be deemed to have elapsed and fresh proceedings, if so desired, will have to be initiated in accordance with the new Act. The Objects and Reasons of the 2013 Act and particularly Clause 18 thereof fortify the view taken by this Court in the judgments referred to hereinabove. Clause 18 thereof reads as under : “18. The Objects and Reasons of the 2013 Act and particularly Clause 18 thereof fortify the view taken by this Court in the judgments referred to hereinabove. Clause 18 thereof reads as under : “18. The benefits under the new law would be available in all the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where award has not been made or possession of land has not been taken.” 12. By considering the aforesaid decisions of this Court and the facts and circumstances of the present case on hand, we are of the view that physical possession of the land belonging to the appellants has not been taken by the respondents and more than five years have elapsed since the making of the award on 14.1.2006 when the Resettlement Act, 2013 came into force on 1.1.2014. Therefore, the conditions stated in Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 are fulfilled for allowing the plea of the appellants that the land acquisition proceedings be deemed to have elapsed. The said legal principle laid down by this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and other cases referred to supra with regard to interpretation of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 are applicable with all fours to the fact situation on hand with respect to the land covered in this appeal and for granting relief as prayed by the appellants in this application.” 18. We have also proceeded to make a mention that Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act provides that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. In the present matter, the huge chunk of land has been acquired for planned development of Allahabad and at present the petitioner is claiming benefit of Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act. In the present matter, the huge chunk of land has been acquired for planned development of Allahabad and at present the petitioner is claiming benefit of Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act. The petitioner is claiming that the possession of the subject land has not been taken over and compensation has not been deposited in the account of beneficiaries but as indicated above, nothing has been brought on record to indicate that at any point the name of the petitioner had been mutated in the revenue record to substantiate the claim of the petitioner over the property in dispute, but contrarily the name of ADA had been mutated long back in the revenue record, which was never subjected to any challenge. 19. At this stage it is relevant to go through the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (Supra), which is holding the field of the present controversy, paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of which are reproduced for ready reference : “17. While enacting Section 24(2), Parliament definitely had in its view Section 31 of the 1894 Act. From that one thing is clear that it did not intend to equate the word “paid” to “offered” or “tendered”. But at the same time, we do not think that by use of the word “paid”, Parliament intended receipt of compensation by the landowners/persons interested. In our view, it is not appropriate to give a literal construction to the expression “paid” used in this sub-section (sub-section (2) of Section 24). If a literal construction were to be given, then it would amount to ignoring procedure, mode and manner of deposit provided in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act in the event of happening of any of the contingencies contemplated therein which may prevent the Collector from making actual payment of compensation. We are of the view, therefore, that for the purposes of Section 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as “paid” if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the Court where reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been “paid” within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in Court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33. 18. 1894 Act being an expropriatory legislation has to be strictly followed. The procedure, mode and manner for payment of compensation are prescribed in Part V (Sections 31-34) of the 1894 Act. The Collector, with regard to the payment of compensation, can only act in the manner so provided. It is settled proposition of law (classic statement of Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad[1]) that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. 19. Now, this is admitted position that award was made on 31.1.2008. Notices were issued to the landowners to receive the compensation and since they did not receive the compensation, the amount (Rs.27 crores) was deposited in the Government treasury. Can it be said that deposit of the amount of compensation in the Government treasury is equivalent to the amount of compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested? We do not think so. In a comparatively recent decision, this Court in Agnelo Santimano Fernandes[2], relying upon the earlier decision in 9, has held that the deposit of the amount of the compensation in the state’s revenue account is of no avail and the liability of the state to pay interest subsists till the amount has not been deposited in Court.” 20. As per award and this has also been pleaded by Dr. Y.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents that in the present matter Section 17 (1) of the 1894 Act had been invoked, which provides the special powers in case of urgency and it was incumbent upon the Collector, though no such award has been made, that he may on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of notice mentioned in Section 9 sub-section (1) take possession of the land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. He further made submission that as per Section 17 (3-A) before taking possession of the land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), (a) tender payment of eighty percent of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31, sub-section (2). As in the present matter Section 17 (1) of the 1894 Act has been invoked and Section 17 provides special powers in cases of urgency, the relevant provisions for our purposes read thus : “17. Special powers in cases of urgency.—(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (3-A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31, sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of Section 31, sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that Section, (3-B) The amount paid or deposited under sub-section (3-A) shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation required to be tendered under Section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of the Collector’s award, be recovered as an arrears of land revenue.” 21. Just to appreciate the present controversy regarding payment of compensation, whereas urgency had been invoked, it would be relevant to consider the judgment of Three-Judges Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., 1993 SC 2517. Just to appreciate the present controversy regarding payment of compensation, whereas urgency had been invoked, it would be relevant to consider the judgment of Three-Judges Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., 1993 SC 2517. Relevant paras are reproduced hereinafter : “10. Learned Counsel for the third respondent supported the reasoning of the judgment under appeal. He also submitted that the requirements of Section 17 (3A), namely, the tender of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation for the said land not having been complied with, the taking of possession of the said land from the appellants was illegal and there was, therefore, no vesting thereof in the first respondent. He submitted that for being kept out of possession of the said land the payment of compensation to the appellants under Section 5 would adequately recompense them. 11. Section 4 of the said Act requires the publication of a notification that it appears to the appropriate Government that certain land is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose. Thereupon an officer authorised by the Government may enter upon the land to survey it and do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is suitable for the public purpose. Section 5 requires the payment of estimated compensation to the owner for damage done in entering upon the land and doing such acts as are necessary to ascertain whether it can be used for the public purpose. Under the provisions of Section 5-A any person interested in the land may raise objections to the proposed acquisition. Upon considering the report of the Collector who hears such objections, if the Government is satisfied that the land is needed for the public purpose, a declaration to that effect shall be made under the provisions of Section 6. Section 9 (1) contemplates the issue of a notice that the Government intends to take possession of the land and it must invite claims for compensation for all interests in the land. The Collector must inquire into the claims under the provisions of Section 11 and make an award of compensation in favour of the persons found interested in the land. The Collector must inquire into the claims under the provisions of Section 11 and make an award of compensation in favour of the persons found interested in the land. Section 16 states that the Collector may, after he has made an award under Section 11, “take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free form all encumbrances.” Section 11-A was inserted in the said Act by Act 68 of 1984 and it reads thus : 11-A. Period within which an award shall be made. The Collector shall made an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the dale of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse : Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. The provisions of Section 48 (1) may also be noted. It states that “the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. 12. Section 17 provides from cases where there is urgency. The relevant provisions for our purposes read thus : 17. Special powers in cases of urgency.—(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (3-A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3). Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (3-A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3). (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31, sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of Section 31, sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that Section, (3-B) The amount paid or deposited under sub-section (3-A) shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation required to be tendered under Section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of the Collector’s award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1). 13. There are two judgments of this Court which we must note. In Rajasthan Housing Board and others v. Shri Kishan and others, it was held that Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 once it had taken possession of the land. In Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh v. Avinash Sharma, it was held that “after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17 (1) the land is vested in the Government and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17 (1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification.” 14. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17 (1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17 (1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisition under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. 15. Further, Section 17(3-A) postulates that the owner will be offered an amount equivalent to 80 per cent of the estimated compensation for the land before the Government takes possession of it under Section 17 (1). Section 11-A cannot be so construed as to leave the Government holding title to the land without the obligation to determine compensation, make an award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the amount of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation. 16. Section 11-A cannot be so construed as to leave the Government holding title to the land without the obligation to determine compensation, make an award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the amount of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation. 16. In the instant case, even that 80 per cent of the estimated compensation was not paid to the appellants although Section 17 (3-A) required that it should have been paid before possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the Ist respondent. It is, at any rate, not open to the third respondent, who, as the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 27th June, 1990 shows, failed to make the necessary monies available and who has been in occupation of the said land ever since its possession was taken, to urge that the possession was taken illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not vested in the first respondent and the first respondent is under no obligation to make an award.” 22. After examining the record in question and respective arguments of the parries, we find that the land acquisition proceedings have been concluded in all respects under the 1894 Act and they are not affected at all in view of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. The land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act are deemed to have been lapsed, where the award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and possession of the land in question had not been taken or compensation has not been paid. In the present matter, the award was made and at no point of time the name of the petitioner had ever been mutated in the revenue record. Contrarily it is reflected from the record that name of ADA had been mutated. 23. In the present matter, the precise submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act, once the possession has been taken and compensation has been paid, then the provision of Section 24 of 1894 Act would be attracted. In the present matter, admittedly Section 17 (1) of 1894 Act had been invoked. In the present matter, admittedly Section 17 (1) of 1894 Act had been invoked. Therefore, we are of the view that once Section 17 (1) has been invoked, possession has been taken, compensation has been deposited, then at least three and half decades of the acquisition, we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. 24. In view of above, we are of the view that in the present matter the possession of the land in question had been taken by the respondents way back in the year 1981. The compensation has been paid to the tenure holders. Nothing has been brought on record to indicate that at any point of time the petitioner had either approached to the Special Land Acquisition Officer for compensation or had moved an application before the State Government for release of the said land under Section 48 of the 1894 Act. Therefore, in view of the law settled by Hon’ble Apex Court in Satendra Prasad Jain’s case (supra) the objections after three decades cannot be sustained and accordingly rejected. 25. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances we must note that in Rajasthan Housing Board and others v. Shri Kishan and others, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48. Once it had taken possession of the land. In the present matter, admittedly Section 17 (1) of the 1894 Act has been invoked. In such a situation where urgency had been invoked, the Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 17 of 1894 Act and thereupon the ownership is divested of the title of the land, which is vested in the Government. It is further relevant to indicate that Section 17 (3-A) clearly postulates that the owner will be offered an amount equivalent to 80 per cent of the estimated compensation for the land before the Government takes possession of it under Section 17 (1). 26. In Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh v. Avinash Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1576 , Hon’ble Apex Court had further noted that after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17 (1) the land is vested in the Government and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision in relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17 (1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reversed to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification. 27. Therefore, in view of above facts and circumstances, at this belated stage we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 28. The writ petition sans merit and is accordingly dismissed.