JUDGMENT : Akil Abdul Hamid Kureshi, J. 1. These appeals arise out of the common judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 7.8.2015 passed in Special Civil Applications No. 4213/2015 and No. 3563/2015. 2. Brief facts are as under:-- 3. The original petitioners (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the petitioners') of the said Special Civil Applications are Associate Professors working with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Institute of Technology (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the institute'). According to the institute, several complaints of sexual harassment were received against the petitioners from the girl students and other women. The institute therefore constituted Internal Complaints Committee (hereinafter referred as 'ICC' for short) in terms of the provisions containing Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'Act of 2013') to examine the complaints of such girl students and other women employees. The committee asked the petitioners to remain present on 6.2.2015. According to the institute, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioners the ICC submitted its report on 13.2.2015 in which the ICC recommended to the institute to award penalty upon the petitioners and for their termination from service with the stipulation that they cannot be employed as a teaching staff elsewhere also. 4. Pursuant to such report of the ICC two separate show cause notices, both dated 17.2.2015, came to be issued by the institute on the petitioners as to why suitable action should not be taken as per report of the ICC. In such notices it was pointed out that the ICC in its report had held the petitioners guilty of sexual harassment by way of "(a) physical contact and advances (b) other unwelcome physical, verbal and nonverbal conduct of sexual nature (c) threatening to the victims during the investigation process of ICC. The petitioners were called upon to show cause for such misconduct. Alongwith such notice the petitioners were also supplied relevant portion of the report of the ICC. It was, therefore, conveyed that "in light of the above mentioned alleged misconduct by Dr. Ranjit Roy, Associate Professor in Electrical Engineering Department, Dr. Ranjit Roy is given an opportunity to explain as to why suitable action should not be taken against him." Similar proposal was made against the other petitioner also. 5. Dr. It was, therefore, conveyed that "in light of the above mentioned alleged misconduct by Dr. Ranjit Roy, Associate Professor in Electrical Engineering Department, Dr. Ranjit Roy is given an opportunity to explain as to why suitable action should not be taken against him." Similar proposal was made against the other petitioner also. 5. Dr. Ranjit Roy replied to such notice under communication dated 26.2.2015 pointing out that he is working as Professor since 2007. Earlier he was teaching at West Bengal. In the past he had never been involved in any such incident. He requested that his detailed representation which was annexed to such letter be taken into account before taking final decision in which he had pointed out why according to him none of the allegations were established. 6. Dr. Ranjit Roy filed further reply dated 3.3.2015 and contended, inter alia, that the inquiry should have been conducted in terms of the Central Civil Service (Classification Control & Appeals) Rules 1965 (hereafter after to be referred to as 'CCS (CCA) Rules' for short). He contended that his service cannot be terminated without following the procedure envisaged under Articles 311 of the Constitution. He also questioned the procedure followed by the ICC contending that such procedure was neither fair nor reasonable and was thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 7. Ignoring such pleas the Director of the institute passed order dated 6.2.2015. In such order it was noted that as per the committee there were three serious charges of sexual harassment against the petitioner. As per the report of the Committee Dr. Ranjit Roy had misused his position as a teacher and harassed the complainants. He had indulged in physical sexual overtones and had created hostile work environment for complainants. He had also threatened M. Tech and Ph.D. students during the investigation. It was recorded that after due deliberation the Board had come to a conclusion that Dr. Ranjit Roy had committed misconduct in terms of Rule 3C of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. In the conclusion under such order it was conveyed that looking to the gravity of the charges the competent authority under the National Institute of Technology Act, 2007 had resolved to dismiss Dr. Ranjit Roy from service immediately. 8. Against the other petitioner, namely, Prof. Vivekanand Mishra also similar procedure was followed. In the conclusion under such order it was conveyed that looking to the gravity of the charges the competent authority under the National Institute of Technology Act, 2007 had resolved to dismiss Dr. Ranjit Roy from service immediately. 8. Against the other petitioner, namely, Prof. Vivekanand Mishra also similar procedure was followed. After considering his replies the Board of Directors of the respondent institute passed the order of penalty dated 4.3.2015 which decision was conveyed to him by the Director under his letter dated 6.3.2015. It is not necessary to record details in the second case. 9. Both these orders were challenged by the petitioners before the learned Single Judge taking up multiple contentions. It was contended that the procedure as required under the CCS (CCA) Rules was not followed. In any case reasonable opportunity was not made available to the delinquents before passing the final order of punishment. It was contended that the charges leveled against the petitioners were not established. On the other hand, on behalf of the institute it was argued that CCS (CCA) Rules would not apply, since detailed procedure is provided under the National Institute of Technology Act, 2007 and the Statutes framed under the said Act. It was also contended that principles of natural justice are not rigid rules of procedure. When the question of dealing with complaints of sexual harassment on campus arises, the fulfillment of requirement of principles of natural justice must be seen in light of peculiar facts and circumstances. Majority of the complainants were girl students of tender age. It was not possible to reveal the identity of such complainants whose complaint was against the behaviour of a senior professor. It was, therefore, also not possible to offer such witnesses for cross-examination. 10. The learned Single Judge substantially allowed both the petitions. Impugned orders of dismissal of both the petitions were set aside. The institute is, however, permitted to initiate fresh proceeding against the petitioners by deciding whether to invoke powers under the proviso to clause (b) of Articles 311(2) of the Constitution or to conduct a departmental inquiry treating the report of the ICC as report of preliminary inquiry. It was observed that if such an inquiry is to be undertaken, the same would be completed within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. It was observed that if such an inquiry is to be undertaken, the same would be completed within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. It was also provided that such inquiry would be conducted as far as practicable following Rules 14 and 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. It is this judgment which the institute has challenged by filing Letters Patent Appeals No. 1349 and 1350 of 2015. 11. During the pendency of the writ petitions the institute had filed Civil Application before the learned Single Judge for vacating the interim relief against protection to the petitioners allowing them to retain the staff quarters at the institute campus site. The learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petitions directed the petitioners to vacate the quarters and vacated the interim relief for such purpose. This order of the learned Single Judge has given rise to Letters Patent Appeals No. 1328 and 1329 of 2015 filed by the employees. 12. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment noted that in several communications and orders which the institute had passed, there was a clear reference to the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules. She was of the opinion that the procedure contained in the CCS (CCA) Rules as far as practicable in such proceedings was required to be followed. If no rules are provided then the procedure to be followed is as provided under Sexual Harassment Rules particularly Rules 7 and 8 thereof. In the present case, the learned Judge was of the opinion that the procedure under CCS (CCA) Rules though required, was not followed. Having said so the learned Judge also held that the procedure laid down in Rule 7 of Sexual Harassment Rules had also not been followed by the ICC. The last alternative contention of the institute that what was required to be followed was the principles of natural justice which should be flexible in such cases, was also examined. It was also held that even such requirements were not satisfied. The learned Judge therefore concluded that the procedure under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules was not followed. Procedure under Rule 7 of the Sexual Harassment Rules was also not followed and even if assuming that these rules did not apply even principles of natural justice were also not followed. The learned Judge therefore concluded that the procedure under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules was not followed. Procedure under Rule 7 of the Sexual Harassment Rules was also not followed and even if assuming that these rules did not apply even principles of natural justice were also not followed. The learned Judge also recorded that there was no conscious decision recorded for dispensing with the departmental inquiry in terms of second proviso to clause (b) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 13. Appearing for the institute learned counsel Shri Sanjanwala submitted that, "(i) The learned Judge committed an error in holding that CCS (CCA) Rules apply. He submitted that when the National Institute of Technology Act, 2007 and Statutes made thereunder provide for a detailed procedure, reference to CCS (CCA) Rules would not be permissible. Merely because the institute referred to such rules in the order of suspension or in the correspondence with the petitioners would not establish its applicability. (ii) Counsel submitted that the ICC had followed all the necessary procedure by providing gist of complaints to the petitioners and giving reasonable opportunity of making representations. The report of the Committee was also supplied to the petitioners, their representations considered before the Board of Directors took the final decision. (iii) The allegations established against the petitioners were very serious. The nature of inquiry and the establishment of charges must be seen in light of the sensitivity of the subject, particularly looking to the fact that the petitioners were the senior professor of the institute and majority of the complainants were the girl students studying in the same college." 14. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hira Nath Mishra & Ors. v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, reported in (1973) 1 SCC 805 in which in the context of complaint made by the girl students in a college it was observed that strict principles of natural justice would not apply. It was, however, a case where the girl students had made a serious complaint of male students having behaved vulgarly and the action initiated by the college was of rusticating such male students. It was observed that administration could not have called the police, because if the investigation had started the female students of sheer fright and harm to their reputation would not have cooperated. It was observed that administration could not have called the police, because if the investigation had started the female students of sheer fright and harm to their reputation would not have cooperated. It was observed that under such circumstances the authorities had to device a just and reasonable plan of inquiry which, on one hand, would not expose individuals to harassment and on the other hand secure reasonable opportunity to the students to state their cases. 15. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of Medha Kotwal Lele & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 311 in which in continuation of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 241 further directions were issued for carrying out amendments in the service rules of educational institutions to treat the report of the Complaints Committee as an inquiry report. 16. In the context of the petitioners retaining staff quarters it was contended that their presence at the campus would not be desirable, particularly looking to the sensitive nature of the case as they could exert influence over the complainants and witnesses. Therefore, in order to conduct a fair inquiry their presence should be removed from the campus. It was contended that both the professors have their own residential accommodation at Surat, where the college in question is situated. 17. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel Shri Yatin Oza opposed the Letters Patent Appeals filed by the institute contending that the learned Judge has given cogent reasons. Procedure under the CCS (CCA) Rules was not followed. Even otherwise, the principles of natural justice were breached. No charge-sheet was issued. Copy of inquiry report was not supplied. Statements of witnesses were not supplied or even cited. 18. Regarding the direction of the learned Judge regarding the quarters, counsel submitted that no untoward incidents have been reported against either of the petitioners. Pending further inquiry they are ordered to be continued under suspension. During suspension an employee does not cease to be in employment. He, therefore, cannot be asked to vacate the staff quarter. 19. Before dealing with the rival contentions, we may briefly record the procedure followed by the institute before passing the punishment orders of dismissal. As noted, upon receipt of several complaints an ICC was constituted. During suspension an employee does not cease to be in employment. He, therefore, cannot be asked to vacate the staff quarter. 19. Before dealing with the rival contentions, we may briefly record the procedure followed by the institute before passing the punishment orders of dismissal. As noted, upon receipt of several complaints an ICC was constituted. The ICC called the petitioners orally to remain present during the hearing on 6.2.2015. It is undisputed that on such date the petitioners were asked to explain the conduct. Their oral representations and denials were noted and the proceedings were thereafter adjourned. It appears that on that day the petitioners were supplied copies of two complaints signed by several students of the college, of course without revealing the identity of the signatories. It seems that in addition to the said two complaints made in writing by bunch of students, several other oral complaints were also made by individual or group of the students to the committee. After the proceedings of 6.2.2015 several of such statements or complaints were reduced in writing and duly signed by the complainant students and in some cases further supported by other students or the staff members. Admitted position is that copies of such complaints were not supplied to the petitioners. There was no further bi-parte hearing before the ICC. The ICC submitted its report on 13.2.2015 which formed the basis for the institute to first issue show cause notice and after eliciting replies from the petitioners pass orders of dismissal. 20. We may first examine whether either procedure laid down in the CCS (CCA) Rules or under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013 was required to be followed. As is well known that CCS (CCA) Rules apply to all employees of the Central Government. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that these rules shall apply to every Government servant including Civil Government servant in the defence services, but would not apply to five categories of Government servants specified in clause (a) to (e) thereof. Essentially therefore CCS (CCA) Rules apply to every Government servants other than those mentioned in the exclusion clauses. Admittedly the petitioners are not Government servants. They are in the employment of an educational institution. It is not even their case that being Government servants they were covered under CCS (CCA) Rules. Essentially therefore CCS (CCA) Rules apply to every Government servants other than those mentioned in the exclusion clauses. Admittedly the petitioners are not Government servants. They are in the employment of an educational institution. It is not even their case that being Government servants they were covered under CCS (CCA) Rules. Merely because the institute referred to such rules in some of the correspondence would not by itself make the applicability of rule binding to the institute. It is well known that as long as there is power to take certain action mere reference to a wrong statutory provision would not invalidate exercise of such powers. In the present case, in fact, neither the order of suspension nor that of dismissal is in challenge on such ground of reference to a wrong provision. The conclusion of the learned Single Judge therefore that procedure under Rules 14 and 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules was required to be followed and having not so done the institute in the fresh inquiry would do so, therefore cannot be upheld. 21. Coming to the question of applicability of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013 we may first refer to some of the provisions contained in the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013. Term 'work place' has been defined under Section2(o) of the Act, 2013, perusal of which would show that the same includes not only department, organization, undertaking of the Government, local authority or a Government company but also private sector, organization, private venture undertaking etc. Term 'sexual harassment' is defined under Section 2(n) in a widest possible manner. Provisions of Act, 2013 would thus demonstrate that detailed provisions have been made for protection of women at work place which need not necessarily be the Government organizations. In this context, Section 11 needs to be seen which pertains to inquiry into complaints. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 11 it is provided that subject to the provision of Section 10 pertaining to conciliation, internal committee or the local committee, as the case may, shall where the respondent is employee, proceed to make inquiry into complaint in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent and where no such rules exist in such manner as may be prescribed. Such procedure is prescribed under the Rules of 2013 and particularly under Rule 7 thereof which pertains to manner of inquiry into complaint. This rule sets out the provisions for conducting the inquiry by the complaints committee and the manner in which such inquiry would be conducted. However, if there are service rules governing the employee, in view of Section 11 of the Act of 2013 the procedure prescribed under the Rules of 2013 would not apply. 22. In this context we may notice that the National Institute of Technology Act, 2007 contains in the Schedule-1 the list of central institutes incorporated into the Act, one of them being the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Institute of Technology. In term of Section 1 of Section 13 of the National Institute of Technology Act, 2007 the board of every institute would be responsible for general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of the institute and would exercise all powers of the institute not otherwise provided in the Act, Statute or Ordinances. Section 25 of the Act pertains to the power for framing Statutes and provides that subject to the provisions of the Act the Statute may provide for all or any of the following matters which in clause (g) includes the classification, the method of appointment and the determination of the terms and conditions of service of teachers and other staff of the institute. 23. In exercise of such powers the Central Government has framed the First Statute of National Institute of Technology (hereinafter referred to as the 'First Statute'). Statute 24 of the First Statute pertains to the general terms and conditions of service of permanent employees. It provides that permanent employee of the institute would be governed by the following terms and conditions which in clause (5) provides that the employee of the institute shall be governed by the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules 1964. Statute 26 pertains to suspension, penalties and disciplinary proceedings. It provides that permanent employee of the institute would be governed by the following terms and conditions which in clause (5) provides that the employee of the institute shall be governed by the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules 1964. Statute 26 pertains to suspension, penalties and disciplinary proceedings. Relevant portion of which reads as under:-- "(1) The Director may place a member of the staff appointed at the institute under suspension:-- (i) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (ii) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial: Provided that where a member of the staff is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, such member of the staff shall be deemed to have been placed by an order of the competent authority under suspension with effect from the date on which he was so detained. (2) During the period of suspension, the member of the staff shall be entitled to the following payments, namely:-- (a) a subsistence allowance at an amount equal to the Leave Salary, which the staff member would have drawn had he been on leave on half pay and Dearness Allowance, if admissible on the basis of such leave salary : Provided that where the period of suspension exceeds six months, the Subsistence Allowance shall be as follows : (i) the amount of subsistence allowance may be increased by a suitable amount not exceeding fifty percent of the subsistence allowance admissible during the period of the first six months, if, in the opinion of the Competent Authority the period of suspension has been prolonged for reasons to be recorded in writing, not directly attributable to the employee concerned; (ii) the amount of subsistence allowance may be reduced by a suitable amount, not exceeding fifty percent of the subsistence allowance admissible during the period of the first six months, if, in the opinion of the Competent Authority, the period of suspension has been prolonged due to reasons, to be recorded in writing, directly attributable to the employee. (b) The rate of dearness allowance will be based on the increased or as the case may be the decreased amount of subsistence allowance admissible under sub-statute 2. (b) The rate of dearness allowance will be based on the increased or as the case may be the decreased amount of subsistence allowance admissible under sub-statute 2. (c) Any other compensatory allowance admissible from time to time on the basis of pay of which the staff member was in receipt of on the date of suspension subject to the fulfillment of other conditions laid down for the drawl of such allowances. (5) The following penalties may be imposed on any employee:-- (i) censure; (ii) withholding of increments or pay; (iii) withholding of promotion; (iv) recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the institute by negligence or breach of orders; (v) reduction to lower grade or post or to a lower time-scale of pay, or to a lower stage in a time-scale for a period of three years without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting his pension (where ever applicable): (vi) compulsory retirement; (vii) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the institute; (viii) dismissal from service, which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the institute. (6) No order imposing on any member of the staff any of the penalties specified at (v) to (viii) above shall be passed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and except after an enquiry has been held the member of the staff has been given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in this regard. (7) No order imposing on any member of the staff any of the penalties specified at (i) to (iv) above shall be passed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and unless the member of the staff concerned has been given an opportunity to make a representation to the appointing authority: provided that the provisions of sub-statute (5) and (6) shall not apply to the following:-- (a) where an employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove the person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person such opportunity; or (c) where the visitor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to give to that person such opportunity. (8) If, in respect of such person as aforesaid, any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give to an opportunity referred to under clause (b), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as the case may be, shall be final. (9) A member of the staff aggrieved by any order imposing penalty passed by the Director against him shall be entitled to prefer an appeal to Board of Governors against the order and there shall be no further appeal from the decision of the Board. (10) A member of the staff aggrieved by any order passed by the Board inflicting a penalty on him shall be entitled to prefer an appeal to the Visitor against such order. (12) The authority to whom an appeal against an order imposing penalty lies may, of its own motion or otherwise call for the records of the case from the Director or the Board, as the case may be, review any order passed in such a case and pass such orders as it deems fit. (12) The authority to whom an appeal against an order imposing penalty lies may, of its own motion or otherwise call for the records of the case from the Director or the Board, as the case may be, review any order passed in such a case and pass such orders as it deems fit. (13) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Statute, the Visitor may, on his own motion or otherwise after calling for the records of the case, review any order which is made under this Statute, and (a) confirm modify or set aside the order; (b) impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order, (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such further action or enquiry as he considers proper in the circumstances of the case, or (d) Pass such other orders as he deems fit: Provided that an order imposing or enhancing a penalty shall not be passed unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty." 24. It can be thus seen that the Statute provides for the employees to be governed by the Central Government Conduct Rules and there is no reference to being governed by the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules. On the contrary, the Statute 26 is a self-contained code providing for suspension, penalties and disciplinary proceedings against the employees of the institute. It envisages placing a staff member under suspension, continuation of such suspension, payment or discontinuation of payment of subsistence allowance and so on. It prescribes penalties ranging from censure to dismissal from service. It lays down in clauses (6) and (7) of the said Statute the procedure for imposing minor and major penalties. The Statute also provides for appellate and revisional powers. When such detail procedure has been contained in the Statutes framed by the Central Government in discharge of its delegated legislative powers vested under the parent Act, the procedure set out in Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 would not be applicable. This would be for two reasons. Section 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 clearly envisages the procedure prescribed to be followed only when the service rules are silent. This would be for two reasons. Section 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 clearly envisages the procedure prescribed to be followed only when the service rules are silent. Secondly when the service rules hold the field to refer to the general procedure laid down under the Rules of 2013 would lead to conflict of procedures which would not be envisaged by the legislation. 25. Under the circumstances, we do not concur with the view of the learned Single Judge that the procedure under the CCS (CCA) Rules or at any rate that laid down in Rule 7 of Rules 2013 was required to be followed before imposing any punishment on the petitioners. However, it cannot be gainsaid that at any rate the procedure under Statute 26 of the first Statute had to be followed. Even if such procedure was flexible and in view of serious charges of sexual harassment against the professor by the girl students, require certain safeguards, conclusion of the learned Single Judge that neither such procedure nor the very basic rules of natural justice were followed, was completely justified. We have noted the procedure adopted by the ICC once, such committee was constituted and the matter was referred for its consideration. On 6.2.2015, the petitioners were summoned without any written communication. Even assuming that they were made aware about the gist of the allegations against them, their responses were obtained extempore and orally. The ICC thereafter submitted its report without any further participation from the petitioners. 26. The procedure adopted by the ICC for drawing the report which forms basis for the institute to impose the major punishment would not satisfy any requirement of principles of natural justice. The petitioners were not communicated in writing the charges. Even the gist of complaints and contents of statements that may have been made against the petitioners were not conveyed. The petitioners were not given any time to collect material and make the representations. Their oral response was heard without reducing into writing. After such meeting further statements were recorded without ever sharing gist thereof with the petitioners. On all counts therefore the procedure adopted by the ICC falls short of satisfying the requirement of the natural justice. We, therefore, would not temper with the decision of the learned Single Judge. Their oral response was heard without reducing into writing. After such meeting further statements were recorded without ever sharing gist thereof with the petitioners. On all counts therefore the procedure adopted by the ICC falls short of satisfying the requirement of the natural justice. We, therefore, would not temper with the decision of the learned Single Judge. We would, however, recognize the anxiety of the institute to grant certain flexibility in the procedure to be followed, when we are dealing with the serious allegations of sexual harassment against the teaching faculty of an educational institution and the complainants are none other than the girl students of tender age. We may recall clause (6) of the Statute 26 of the first Statute provides that no order imposing any of the major penalties would be passed by an authority subordinate to which he was appointed and except after an inquiry has been held and the staff members have been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in this regard. Thus, this clause provides for two requirements, one is of a major penalty not being imposed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority and without holding an inquiry, where the member of the staff has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against proposed action. In tune with these requirements and looking to the peculiar facts of the case, we direct the institute to reduce in writing the allegations against the petitioners emerging from various complaints received by the institute. This would form the charge-sheet against the petitioners and would be served on them. The petitioners would have time of 14 days to reply to such charge-sheet. The institute shall also supply to the petitioners the statements or copies of complaints unless to maintain secrecy of the complainants, it is found not desirable to provide the entire documents in which case gist of the complaints/statements would be supplied. 27. If the institute desires to examine any other witness, the petitioners would have right to cross-examine them. However, this would not mean that it will be obligatory on the institute to examine girl students, who might have complained or whose statements have been recorded on which the institute desires to rely and in which case the petitioners would have no right to seek their cross-examination. 28. However, this would not mean that it will be obligatory on the institute to examine girl students, who might have complained or whose statements have been recorded on which the institute desires to rely and in which case the petitioners would have no right to seek their cross-examination. 28. It would be open for the petitioners to lead evidence before the ICC in their defence which will be admitted by the ICC depending on its relevance. 29. Upon completion of this procedure ICC shall submit a fresh report to the institute. The institute would after supplying copy of the report of the ICC and enabling the petitioners to make their representation shall take a final decision in accordance with law on the basis of the material that may be available on record. 30. It is clarified that this procedure is provided looking to the peculiar facts of the case and the background leading to these appeals; in order to ensure fair enquiry and conclusions. 31. Coming to the question of retention of the staff quarters we concur with the views of the learned Single Judge that the continued presence of the petitioners at the campus would not be desirable for a fair and impartial inquiry. When it is pointed out that the petitioners themselves have suitable residential accommodation at Surat nearby to the site of the institute, they must vacate the staff quarters latest by 15th April, 2016. This would be subject to two riders viz. that the petitioners would receive H.R.A. in terms of the rules as may be payable to the employees under suspension and that they will be paid travel charges whenever they are called in the departmental inquiry. The learned Single Judge has provided that pending fresh decision by the institute the petitioners would remain under suspension. Such direction would continue to operate. The departmental inquiry may be concluded as early as possible and preferably within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 32. With these further observations and directions all the four appeals are disposed of.