JUDGMENT : B.R. Sarangi, J. The petitioner has filed this application seeking for following reliefs: “(i) to direct the opp. parties to implement the directions given by this Hon’ble Court in the decisions reported in 74(1994) C.L.T. 332 and 1995(2) O.L.R. 574 by fixing individual responsibility on opp. parties 1 and 2. (ii) to direct the opp. parties to take sincere attempts inasmuch as to implement the directions in letter and spirit to remove the stray cattle/dogs from the public interest in Cuttack city. (iii) to direct the opp. parties to pay damages of Rs.2,00,000/- to the petitioner for the unfortunate death of her husband due to the attack of the stray cattle. (iv) to direct the opp. parties to take immediate steps for making the roads within the Municipal limits free from stray cows, bulls and dogs as the life of the inhabitants have been in endanger and public safety has been jeopardize. (v) and to pass such other order/orders as this Hon’ble Court deems just and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. (vi) if the opp. parties fail to show cause or show insufficient cause, to make the said rule absolute.” 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that late Abdul Lyakuddin, husband of the petitioner, became a victim of attack of a stray bull on 30.01.1998 at about 7.55 a.m. at Mangalabg Chhak, while he was going to purchase some sweets from a nearby shop. He was immediately shifted to S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack, where he, ultimately, succumbed to the injuries on 04.02.1998 and, consequently, an U.D. Case was registered bearing No.85 of 1998 at Mangalabag Police Station. According to the petitioner, the above incident was nothing but an outcome of negligence on the part of the opposite party Corporation and its authorities in removing the stray bulls and cows from the public street. By that, they have not only failed to discharge their statutory duties but also neglected to comply with the directions given in the decisions of this Court in Madhabananda Pal v. The Executive Officer and others, 78 (1994) C.L.T. 332 and Govinda Ch. Patra v. Chairman (Mayor), Cuttack Municipal Corporation and others, 1995 (II) OLR 574. By that, they have not only failed to discharge their statutory duties but also neglected to comply with the directions given in the decisions of this Court in Madhabananda Pal v. The Executive Officer and others, 78 (1994) C.L.T. 332 and Govinda Ch. Patra v. Chairman (Mayor), Cuttack Municipal Corporation and others, 1995 (II) OLR 574. Therefore, by means of this writ petition, besides claiming compensation, the petitioner seeks for directions to the opposite parties to take immediate steps in compliance of the directions contained in the aforementioned judgments of this Court. 3. Mr. A.K. Choudury, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strenuously urged before this Court that every citizen has a right to life within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which includes right to life with human dignity and, as such, the opposite parties-Municipal Corporation owe a responsibility to ensure public health and safety of its citizens. Furthermore, even though Section 287 of the Orissa Municipal Act, in order to prevent nuisance or danger, requires the opposite parties-Municipal Corporation to impose restrictions against keeping animal within the municipal area, Section 253 of the Act requires the opposite parties-Municipal Corporation to maintain road safety, and Section 88 of the Act confers emergency powers upon the Executive Officer of the opposite parties-Municipal Corporation for immediate execution or doing/taking action, which is, in his opinion, necessary for the service of safety of the public and, more particularly, when there is specific direction from this Court in Madhabananda Pal (supra) and Govinda Ch. Patra (supra) to ensure public health and safety, the same having not been complied with, consequence thereof the petitioner’s husband has lost his life on the attack of a stray bull. Therefore, the petitioner should be awarded compensation for such negligence on the part of the opposite parties- Municipal Corporation. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance, apart from the aforementioned judgments, upon Rajasthan Pradesh V.S. Sardarshahar & Anr. Therefore, the petitioner should be awarded compensation for such negligence on the part of the opposite parties- Municipal Corporation. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance, apart from the aforementioned judgments, upon Rajasthan Pradesh V.S. Sardarshahar & Anr. V. Union of India and Ors., 2010 (4) Supreme 449 , Pramila Khata and others v. CESU of Orissa, 2013 (Supp.-I) OLR 405, Biswanath Senapati v. Chief Executive Officer, Central Electricity Supply Utility, Bhubaneswar, 2013(Supp.-I) OLR 427, Udaya Gagarai v. Executive Engineer, Electrical Division and another, 2014 (Supp.-I) OLR 51, T. Bimala v. Cuttack Municipal Corporation, Cuttack and others, 2015 (I) OLR 637 and Haramani Das & another v. C.E.S.U. of Orissa, 2015 (Supp.-I) OLR 1032. 4. Mr. D. Nayak on behalf of Mr. S.K. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for opposite parties no. 1 and 2- Cuttack Municipal Corporation vehemently urged before this Court that due to disputed questions of facts involved in this case, the petitioner is not entitled to get any compensation, as claimed in this writ application. So far as compliance of the judgments passed by this Court in Madhabananda Pal (Supra) and Govinda Ch. Patra (supra) is concerned, the opposite parties-Municipal Corporation have taken necessary steps for removal of stray cattle and dogs from the road and to that extent a counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties-Municipal Corporation in a connected writ application (OJC No. 5911 of 2000). His further submission was that once the authorities have taken steps for compliance of the judgments of this Court, the allegation that the order has not been complied with, is absolutely misconceived one and, more so, the opposite parties do not admit that the death of the petitioner’s husband was due to attack by bull or cow. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief, as prayed for, in this writ application and the same is liable to be dismissed, as disputed questions of facts are involved. In order to substantiate his case, he has relied upon the judgment in Chairman, GRID Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another, (1999) 7 SCC 298 . 5. The admitted facts are that the Cuttack Municipal Corporation owes a duty to keep the road clean and free from stray cows, bulls etc. In order to substantiate his case, he has relied upon the judgment in Chairman, GRID Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another, (1999) 7 SCC 298 . 5. The admitted facts are that the Cuttack Municipal Corporation owes a duty to keep the road clean and free from stray cows, bulls etc. As per the provisions contained in Section 409(2) of the Orissa Municipal Corporation Act, it has to remove the animal from public road and also prohibit tether any animal on any public road. Section 414 lays down to take precaution for public safety in any street. Similarly, Section 513(1) empowers the Corporation to control the cattle and other animal in the Corporation area. Section 343 prohibits to keep animal and Section 544 also puts a restriction to the extent that no portion of building would be used for keeping animal, i.e., cow, cattle, bullock, buffalo, goat etc. Sections 287, 253 and 88 of the Orissa Municipal Act empower the Municipality/Municipal Authority to keep such roads clean and free from stray cows, bulls & dogs. 6. At this stage, it is worthwhile to mention, that before coming into force of Municipal Corporation Act, the Cuttack city was a Municipality and was regulated under the provisions of Orissa Municipal Act. Section 287 thereof deals with imposition of prohibition by the Municipality against keeping animal so as to prevent nuisance or danger. Section 253 of the Orissa Municipal Act postulates with regard to maintenance of road safety by the Municipality and Section 88 of the Orissa Municipal Act confers emergency powers upon the Executive Officer of the Municipality for immediate execution or doing/taking action, which is, in his opinion, necessary for the service of safety of the public. A similar question had come up for consideration by this Court in Madhabananda Pal (supra), where this Court had issued the following guidelines. A similar question had come up for consideration by this Court in Madhabananda Pal (supra), where this Court had issued the following guidelines. “(i) A Committee be formed with the Revenue divisional Commissioner, Cuttack as its Chairman and in the said Committee apart from the Chairman, Cuttack Municipality and its Executive officer, the Collector of the district and the Superintendent of Police should also be its members; (ii) The revenue Divisional Commissioner can cope up the public spirited people who would be willing to render their valuable assistance in formulating a scheme to tackle the menace of stray cows, bulls and dogs; (iii) The Vice Chairman, Cuttack Development Authority should also be a member of the said committee so that, if necessary some land could be ear-marked and allotted for the purpose of establishing Kine House; (iv) The committee would be empowered to suggest any amendment to the Municipal Laws if they find that the existing law is not sufficient to tackle the problem and on such suggestion, if made, the appropriate authority should take steps in that regard; (v) As an immediate interim measure, the Executive Officer of the Cuttack Municipality can publicise and announce that if any person allows their cows, bulls of dogs to roam on the road, the Municipal authorities would be entitled to take them for the purpose of impounding in the Kine House; (vi) The so-called Dog Squad which is stated to be in vogue should be energised to destroy the stray dogs moving on the roads which will be a step in solving the menace in accordance with the ultimate scheme to be framed; (vii) The committee in question be constituted by the Government in the Urban Development Department bearing in mind our observations made in this case within two months from the date of the receipt of our order and the said committee should frame the scheme within three months from the date of its formulation; (viii) The Secretary to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner should be appointed as the convenor and he should take steps for convening the meeting of the committee; (ix) It would be open for the petitioner to approach for any further direction in this regard if he finds that the aforesaid committee is not functioning to the satisfaction of all concerned” This Court disposed of the said writ petition with the aforesaid observation and direction. In spite of the up quoted directions, the Municipal authorities did not rise from the slumber and comply with the same in letter and spirit. As a result, one Gobinda Ch. Patra got injured by a cow within the premises of Cuttack Collectorate and was hospitalized. He filed OJC No.5999 of 1994 claiming compensation and this Court by the judgment reported in Gobinda Ch. Patra (supra) directed payment of Rs.20,000/- and further issued direction to implement the directions contained in the judgment in previous writ petition reported in Madhabananda Pal (supra). 7. In the case in hand, it is stated that the husband of the petitioner, while going to purchase some sweets at Mangalabag Chhak, one stray bull attacked him from behind by its horns. As a result, he sustained injuries on his head and ultimately expired at S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack. Accordingly, U.D. Case No. 85 of 1998 has been registered in Mangalabag Police Station. It is further stated that due to inaction of the authorities and non-compliance of the directions given by this Court in earlier writ applications, and also due to their negligence, the petitioner lost her husband on account of attack by the stray cow/bull. It is also stated that the deceased husband of the petitioner was discharging duties of Asst. Post Master and was getting an amount of Rs.8750/- per month and after his death nobody is there to look after his family. Therefore, necessary compensation should be paid by the opposite parties to make good the loss caused to the petitioner. 8. The opposite parties 1 and 2 in their counter affidavit in paragraph 3, 4 and 7 have specifically stated to the following effect: 3. That the writ petition is not entertainable since the facts stated by the petitioner for compensation are not correct. It may kindly be noted that the petitioner did not suffer or die due to attack by a stray cow or Bull. The petitioner has not clearly stated as to who attacked her husband. In paragraph-2 the petitioner alleges that the stray cow was the cause of the death of her husband, but in paragraph-4 of the writ petition the petitioner alleged that the bull attacked her husband. 4. The petitioner has not clearly stated as to who attacked her husband. In paragraph-2 the petitioner alleges that the stray cow was the cause of the death of her husband, but in paragraph-4 of the writ petition the petitioner alleged that the bull attacked her husband. 4. That the opposite party has definite information that nobody was attacked by a stray Bull or cow on the date and time mentioned in paragraph 13 of the writ petition. On being asked by the staff of the Municipal Corporation none of the people of the local area at Mangalabag Chhak, supported the allegation of the petitioner. On other hand they refused to have seen such incident in the morning hour on that particular date. The document as per Annexure-1 does not show in clear terms the cause of death. Therefore, the allegations of the petitioner in this regard are false and fabricated and have been made for illegal gain. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed by the Hon’ble Court. 7. That as regards the reported case as referred to by the petitioner in paragraph-2 of the writ petition, these opp. parties humbly submit that steps were taken for removal of stray cattle and dogs which has been categorically stated in the counter affidavit filed in the another case bearing OJC No. 11362/99, which is pending before the Hon’ble Court. 9. On perusal of the pleadings available on records, it appears that in paragraph-2 of the writ application a contention has been raised that due to attack of stray cow, death has been caused to the husband of the petitioner, whereas in paragraph-4 it is stated that due attack of the stray bull, the husband of the petitioner succumbed to the injuries. This apart, the FIR Annexure-1, on which reliance has been placed, nowhere indicates that the death has been caused due to attack of the stray cow/bull, rather, under the heading “cause of death as reported with date and hour of death” it is mentioned “expired on 4.2.98 at 6.55 due to head injury”. When the opposite parties filed their counter affidavit disputing the cause of death of the husband of the petitioner, a rejoinder affidavit was filed, in which an attempt has been by the petitioner to controvert the same, by referring to certain documents annexed therewith. When the opposite parties filed their counter affidavit disputing the cause of death of the husband of the petitioner, a rejoinder affidavit was filed, in which an attempt has been by the petitioner to controvert the same, by referring to certain documents annexed therewith. But, however, as would be apparent from the post mortem report, the medical officer, Department of F.M. & T, S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack has opined as follows; “All the injuries are antemortem in nature and could have resulted from blunt force impact over head and death is due to crania-cerebral injuries and complications thereof. Therefore, death is about within 18-24 hrs. in the time of p. mensem.” Similarly, in the letter addressed to the C.M.O., S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack dated 04.02.1998, it has been indicated as follows: “A case of head injury died in this ward on 4.2.98 at 6.35 p.m. & this is for your information & necessary action” In the aforesaid documents, nowhere it is indicated that the death of the husband of the petitioner has been caused due to the injury caused by cow/bull. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it involves disputed questions of facts. 10. So far as compliance of the directions given by this Court in the judgments reported in Madhabananda Pal (supra) and Govinda Ch. Patra (supra) is concerned, in the affidavit filed by the Chief Executive Officer of the Cuttack Municipal Corporation in the present case it has been categorically indicated that steps have been taken for compliance of the same. We hope and trust that the authorities must have looked into the matter and left no stone unturned in compliance of the directions of this Court, particularly when the opposite parties Municipal Corporation owe a statutory duty to discharge towards safety of road as well as public in conformity with the provisions of law and, any violation thereof, may amount non-compliance of directions given by this Court in the judgments referred to above. 11. Much reliance has been placed in the judgments passed by the apex Court in Rajasthan Pradesh V.S. Sardarshahar (supra), and by this Court in Pramila Khata, Biswanath Senapati, Udaya Gagarai, T. Bimala and Haramani Das (supra), where the death had been occurred due to electrocution and on the basis of the factual matrix of the respective cases, this Court awarded ad-interim/full compensation. But, those cases have no application to the present case, because on the basis of the fact involved in this case, there is no admission on the part of the opposite parties that the death has been occurred to the husband of the petitioner due to attack of the stray cow/bull. 12. The reliance placed in Rajasthan Pradesh V.S. Sardarshahar (supra), it appears that the apex Court held that in the writ petition or in the counter affidavit, not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it, unless the pleadings are complete, Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. Applying the said principle to the present context, it appears that the petitioner has relied upon the FIR, post-mortem report and letter of the doctor, which have been annexed to the writ application and subsequently in the rejoinder affidavit nowhere it has been stated that the death of the husband of the petitioner has been occurred due to the attack of the cow/bull, rather, the materials available on record indicate that the death has been occurred due to cerebral injuries. The opposite parties have disputed the cause of death of the husband of the petitioner, which this Court cannot adjudicate in exercise of power under article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. In Chairman, GRID Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (supra), the apex Court has categorically laid down the principles that where disputed questions of fact involved, the matter ought not to be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The apex Court, while saying so, came to observe that the High Court has committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions, even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellant Grid Corporation. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to the Grid Corporation had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with the same and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to the Grid Corporation had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with the same and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the Grid Corporation and under which circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the Grid Corporation in each of these cases it deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond its control or unauthorized intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. 14. Applying the aforesaid analogy to the present context, it appears that nothing has been placed before this Court for consideration how the direction of this Court has not been complied with and what is the negligence caused by the authorities so as to grant compensation to the petitioner and standard of proof requires that the death has been occurred due to negligence on the part of the authorities. In absence of the same, where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not proper remedy. In that view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to entertain this writ application, which is hereby dismissed. 15. While parting with the case, this Court makes it clear that dismissal of the writ application will not stand on the way of the petitioner to move appropriate forum to establish the cause of death of her husband by adducing proper evidence in accordance with law so as to claim compensation.