ORDER : 1. As all the aforesaid petitions raise a common issue for decision before this Court, they are heard and decided concomitantly. 2. The Supreme Court in the cases of St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. National Council for Teacher Education, (2003) 3 SCC 321 , Govt. of A.P. and another v. J.B. Educational Society and another (2005) 3 SCC 212 , National Council for Teacher Education and others v. Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan and others, (2011) 3 SCC 238 and Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya and others v. Subhash Rahangdale and others, (2012) 2 SCC 425 and on numerous other occasions has taken judicial notice of the fact that the field of imparting education has nowadays become a fertile perennial and profitable business with the least capital outlay and that several societies and individuals are establishing educational institutions without complying with the statutory requirements. The Supreme Court has also observed that unfortunately, in spite of repeated pronouncements by the Supreme Court over the past two decades deprecating the setup of such institutions, there has been a great mushrooming of private Technical Training Institutions, Degree Colleges and Engineering Colleges who are functioning without complying with the necessary statutory requirements, at times with the complicity of the statutory authority who has failed to or has been unable to enforce the statutory provisions of the Regulations governing recognition and establishment of such institutions. 3. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions has also taken note of the provisions of the National Council for Teacher Education, Act 1993, which covers the field of technical education in respect of private institutions imparting B.Ed. and M.Ed. Degrees and has observed that there are only four Regional Committees in the country as against thousands of institutions and, therefore, it is practically impossible for these Regional Committees to conduct periodical inspections for the purposes of ensuring that these private educational institutions conform to the necessary requirements regarding infrastructure facilities and qualified teaching staff, etc., and that it is for this reason that the assistance of the State Government or the Union Territory in which the institution is located, is taken by the Regional authorities. 4. 4. Though the Supreme Court has issued repeated directions to these Regional Committees to conduct periodical inspections, the fact remains that the State and other authorities are flooded with complaints against these private educational institutions regarding non-compliance of the statutory provisions and providing the necessary infrastructure. 5. Faced with the aforesaid problems, the State of M.P. through the Commissioner, Higher Education, has issued an order on 25.1.2016 to all the Collectors in the State of M.P. to constitute committees for the purposes of inspecting such private educational institutions with a view to conduct a preliminary fact finding enquiry and to forward the same through the Collector to the Commissioner, Higher Education who in turn, it has been stated on affidavit before this Court, would forward the same to the Western Regional Committees for further action in accordance with law. 6. It is this order of the Commissioner dated 25.1.2016 that has been assailed by the petitioners in the present batch of petitions on the ground that the field of Teacher Training Education, i.e. imparting B.Ed. and M.Ed. Courses, is fully governed by the Parliamentary legislation ie. the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder and in view of the provisions of the aforesaid Parliamentary legislation the State is denuded of all the powers to take any action or steps against the institutions granted recognition under the Act of 1993, more particularly for issuing the impugned order even if the State is flooded with such complaints. It is vehemently urged before this Court in the present petitions that whatever be the situation, the State can only be a moot spectator in respect of the institutions that have been granted recognition under the Act of 1993 and even if it is flooded with complaints, it has no power or authority to take any action in the matter or to issue the impugned order. 7. We have extensively heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also taken into consideration the statutory provisions and the above mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court as well as several other decisions of the Supreme Court and have arrived at a conclusion that the State has a definite role to play in the establishment and granting of recognition and affiliation to private educational institutions imparting B.Ed., M.Ed. Degrees which has been clearly defined and statutorily provided under the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder; that the State has concurrent power to legislate in respect of technical institutions and, therefore, apart from the field covered under the Act of 1993, and in addition to the powers conferred upon the State by the aforesaid Act, the State can legislate in respect of the matter that are not covered under the Act of 1993 or the Regulations framed thereunder; that as the State is bound to discharge its constitutional powers and duties under Articles 21-A, 41, 162 and 256 of the Constitution of India, it has power to issue the impugned order in exercise of its executive powers to fill up the vacuum in the law and that apart, from the above, in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, the State in discharge of its constitutional obligations and in the exercise of its general power of governance, is empowered to issue the impugned order for the general welfare of the citizens which would also go a long way towards fulfilling not just the aims and objects of the Act of 1993, and be of great assistance to the Regional Committee in the performance of its statutory duties, but shall also result in mitigating the grievance of the citizens and prevent exploitation and defrauding of the citizens by the private institutions which in any case are performing a public duty and function. 8. The facts, the reasons and the law on the basis of which we have arrived at the aforesaid conclusions are given in detail by us in the following paragraphs. 9. The petitioners, who are unaided self financing institutions imparting B.Ed. and M.Ed. Courses and are registered societies or trusts, have filed these petitions challenging the validity of order dated 25.1.2016 issued by the Commissioner, Higher Education, Bhopal, on receiving several complaints by which the Commissioner has directed all the Collectors in the State of M.P. to examine the B.Ed. and M.Ed. Colleges that are functioning in their respective areas and to forward information to the Commissioner as to whether they have complied with and conform to the standards that have been prescribed by the National Council for Teachers Education (for short 'the NCTE'). 10. and M.Ed. Colleges that are functioning in their respective areas and to forward information to the Commissioner as to whether they have complied with and conform to the standards that have been prescribed by the National Council for Teachers Education (for short 'the NCTE'). 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioner institutions have been granted recognition under the provisions of the National Council for Teacher Education, Act 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1993') by the Western Regional Committee constituted thereunder in accordance with law after being satisfied that the petitioner institutions conform to and possesses the necessary infrastructure and all other facilities that are prescribed by the competent authority under the NCTE Act of 1993. It is submitted that the petitioner institutions are imparting courses in Teacher Education like B.Ed., M.Ed. etc. and are fully governed by the provisions of the Act of 1993 which has been enacted by the Parliament in exercise of its legislative powers under Entry 66 List-I of the VIIth to the Constitution of India, and in such circumstances as the field of Teacher Education is totally covered and governed by the provisions of the NCTE Act of 1993, the State Government or its authorities have no power or authority to interfere in the management of the petitioners institution or to issue the impugned directions for inspection or in respect of any other issue related to Teacher Education as the power and authority of the State to do so is totally excluded in view of the law made by the Parliament. It is submitted that in such circumstances, as the provisions of the NCTE Act of 1993 do not provide or confer any such power or authority on the Commissioner, Higher Education to issue an order like the impugned order, Annexure P-1, nor does it empower the State to take any action or conduct an inspection in respect of Colleges that are covered by the provisions of the NCTE Act of 1993, the impugned order dated 25.01.2016 passed by the Commissioner, Higher Education, Bhopal, being without authority of law deserves to be quashed. 11. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order is in total violation of the provisions of Section 13 of the Act of 1993 which confers the power of inspection upon Council under section 13 of the NCTE Act of 1993, which alone has the power to conduct an inspection and take action against an institution. It is submitted that the Council is the sole repository of the power to take action against an institution and for conducting an inspection and thereafter taking follow up action in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder and the State Government cannot be permitted to usurp this power and step into the shoes of the Council as that would amount to violation of the provisions of Section 13 of the NCTE Act of 1993. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that in similar circumstances the Gwalior Bench of this Court in W.P No.8632/2011 had quashed the action of the respondent department in reflecting the name of the petitioner institute involved in that petition on the website by marking it with three stars, i.e. as an institution which was deficient in respect of the infrastructure that was required to be provided. It is submitted that the aforesaid action of the department and the State had been taken on the basis of its own inspection and, therefore, the Gwalior Bench of this Court in its order dated 6.1.2012 passed in W.P No.8632/2011 was pleased to quash the same and to hold that the State had no power or authority to do so and had, accordingly, directed the State to remove the marking against the petitioner institute. It is submitted that the issue raised by the petitioners in the present petition is squarely covered by the decision of the Gwalior Bench rendered in the aforesaid case and, therefore, the impugned order be quashed and the petitions filed by them be allowed. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Rungta Engineering College, Bhilai and Another v. Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical University and Another, (2015) 11 SCC 291 , as well as the decision rendered in the case of Chairman, Bhartia Education Society and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2011) 4 SCC 527 in support of his submissions. 14. 14. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioners prays for quashing the impugned order passed by the Commissioner and allow the petitions filed by the petitioners. 15. The learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the respondent/State, submits that a bare perusal of the provisions of the NCTE Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder including the Regulations of 2014, a copy of which has been filed by the petitioners along with the petition as Annexure P-3, it is apparent that the State is not denuded of the authority to take any action in respect of an institution imparting Teacher Education. It is submitted that the statutory provisions itself, specifically Regulations 5 and 7 of the Regulations of 2014, makes it clear that an NOC from the State is required to be obtained prior to filing an application for recognition and a report from the State Government is obtained by the Regional Committee before proceeding further in processing of the application filed by the institution seeking recognition. It is submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. National Council for Teacher Education, (2003) 3 SCC 321 , National Council for Teacher Education and others v. Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan and others, (2011) 3 SCC 238 and Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya and others v. Subhash Rahangdale and others, (2012) 2 SCC 425 , has clearly held that the State has a definite role to play in the process of granting recognition and the running of the Education institutions imparting teacher education and, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the State is denuded of any such power, deserves to be rejected. 16. It is further submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 17 of the NCTE Act of 1993, any person can submit a representation to the concerned Regional Committee bringing to its notice the fact that the recognised institution is violating any of the provisions of the NCTE Act of 1993, the Rules, Regulations or Orders. 16. It is further submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 17 of the NCTE Act of 1993, any person can submit a representation to the concerned Regional Committee bringing to its notice the fact that the recognised institution is violating any of the provisions of the NCTE Act of 1993, the Rules, Regulations or Orders. It is submitted that the State, in its return, has categorically stated that the State has received several complaints against these institutions and, therefore, the State has issued the impugned order dated 25.1.2016 for the purpose of conducting an exercise akin to a preliminary fact finding enquiry for the purpose of verification of the complaint received by the authorities and that thereafter, they shall furnish the entire report/findings observed by the Committee constituted by them to the concerned authority of the NCTE without taking any action thereon as a representation under Section 17 of the Act of 1993 and that further action shall thereafter be taken up by the Regional Committee in accordance with law. 17. In other words, the State has categorically stated in its return that it shall not take up any action towards withdrawing recognition of the institution on their own and that it is only proposing to conduct a non-statutory preliminary fact finding enquiry in view of the complaint received by them in respect of most of the institutions imparting teacher education as it is the bounden duty of the State to exercise its inherent powers of administration to address such issues which directly effect the welfare of the citizens in discharge of its constitutional obligations and, therefore, they have issued the impugned order which does not call for any interference. 18. The learned counsel for the University as well as the NCTE, during the course of arguments, have supported the submission of the learned Govt. Advocate. 19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 20. The issue that arises for adjudication in the present petition is whether the impugned order issued by the State encroaches upon the field already occupied by the parliamentary legislation, i.e. the Act of 1993 and usurps the power conferred thereunder upon the Council and the Regional Committee and is, therefore, without the authority of law and whether the impugned order is contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1993 and Regulations framed thereunder. The second issue that arises for adjudication is whether the State in its inherent power of administration and its general executive powers and in discharge of its Constitutional duty and for the general welfare of the citizens of the State can issue the impugned order in case the same is not prohibited or and is not in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act of 1993. 21. The first issue has been considered extensively in a series of judgments by the Supreme Court and, therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court in this regard and the law laid down therein needs to be considered and followed in this regard. 22. In the case of St. Johns Teachers Training Institute (supra), the Supreme Court was required to consider the constitutional validity of Regulations 5(e) and (f) of the National Counsel for Teacher Education (Application for Recognition, the Manner for Submission, Determination of Conditions for Recognition of Institutions and Permission to Start New Course or Training) Regulations, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulation of 1995') which provided that the application made by an institution for grant of recognition had to be accompanied by an NOC issued by the concerned State or the University. The aforesaid Regulations were challenged on the ground that they were contrary to the Act of 1993, which conferred full and absolute authority on the Regional Committee to grant recognition and the said power of recognition conferred upon the Regional Committee could not be whittled down or set at knot by making this power conditional upon issuance of a NOC by the concerned State or Union Territory. The Supreme Court, while upholding the Regulations, held as under :- (underlying by this Court) "15. Sub-section (3) of Section 14 casts a duty upon the Regional Committee to be satisfied with regard to large number of matters before passing an order granting recognition to an institution which has moved an application for the said purpose. The factors mentioned in sub-section (3) are that the institution has adequate financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and that it fulfils such other conditions required for proper functioning of the institution for a course or training in teacher education as may be laid down in the Regulations. The factors mentioned in sub-section (3) are that the institution has adequate financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and that it fulfils such other conditions required for proper functioning of the institution for a course or training in teacher education as may be laid down in the Regulations. As mentioned earlier there are only four Regional Committees in the whole country and, therefore, each Regional Committee has to deal with applications for grant of recognition from several States. It is therefore obvious that it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for the Regional Committee to itself obtain complete particulars and details of financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and other conditions of the institution which has moved an application for grant of recognition. The institution may be located in the interior of the district in a far away State. The Regional Committee cannot perform such herculean task and it has to necessarily depend upon some other agency or body for obtaining necessary information. It is for this reason that the assistance of the State Government or Union Territory in which that institution is located is taken by the Regional Committee and this is achieved by making a provision in Regulations 5(e) and (f) that the application made by institution for grant of recognition has to be accompanied with a NOC from the concerned State or Union Territory. The impugned Regulations in fact facilitate the job of the Regional Committees in discharging their responsibilities." 23. The Supreme Court, thereafter taking into consideration the amended Regulation of 2002 upheld the Regulation by holding that refusal of an NOC by the State or Union Territory is not conclusive or binding and that the Regional Committee, while taking a decision on the application for grant of recognition would be required to take the same into consideration and that the role of the State Government is certainly important for supplying the requisite data which is essential for formulating an opinion by the Regional Committee while taking a decision under Sub-section(3) of Section 14 of the Act of 1993. 24. 24. A similar challenge to Regulations 5 and 7 of the National Council for Teacher Education (Recognition, Norms and Procedure) Regulations, 2014, framed under the Act of 1993, and the instructions for filling up online applications for grant of recognition or permission to start an institution, which mandatorily provide for submitting a NOC from the affiliating body along with the application seeking recognition, has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in the cases of Maa Reweti Educational & Welfare Society v. National Council for Teachers Education and others, W P No.4205/2016 and Shri Ramkripal Siksha Samiti v. National Council for Teachers Education and others, (W.P No.4375/2016) decided on 14.03.2016.[Reported in 2017 (1) M P L J 73] 25. From the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, it is clear that the Parliamentary legislation, i.e. the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder, which have been enacted in exercise of powers under Entry- 66 List-I of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India, itself confers an important and vital, though limited, role upon the State and the affiliating bodies in respect of the process for granting recognition and running of technical institutions under the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder. 26. In the case of Govt. of A.P. and another v. J.B. Educational Society and another (2005) 3 SCC 212 , the Supreme Court, was required to consider the constitutional validity of Section 20(3(a)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982, under which obtaining permission of the State Government was made a condition precedent for starting a technical institution which was challenged on the ground that it was ultra vires the provisions of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 (for short 'the AICTE Act') and the Regulations framed thereunder, which is an Act similar to the Act of 1993 and which regulates Institutions imparting Technical Education. 27. 27. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and upheld the provisions by referring to Articles 245, 246 and 254(2) of the Constitution of India and Entry-66 of List-I and Entry-25 of List-III of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India, by holding that it is the State authorities alone who can decide about the educational facilities and needs of the locality and that the State certainly has the legislative competence to make a law in respect of education including Technical Education under Entry-25 of the concurrent list subject to the legislative power of Parliament under Entry 66 of List-I of the VIIth Schedule and that the impugned Section of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 was intended for general welfare of the citizens of the State and was also in furtherance of the constitutional duty enumerated under Article 41 of the Constitution of India, in the following terms:- "13. ….The provisions of the AICTE Act are intended to improve technical education and the various authorities under the Act have been given exclusive responsibility to coordinate and determine the standards of higher education. It is a general power given to evaluate, harmonise and secure proper relationship to any project of national importance. Such a coordinate action in higher education with proper standard is of paramount importance to national progress. Section 20 of the A.P. Act does not in any way encroach upon the powers of the authorities under the Central Act. Section 20 says that the competent authority shall, from time to time, conduct a survey to identify the educational needs of the locality under its jurisdiction notified through the local newspapers calling for applications from the educational agencies. Section 20(3)(a)(i) says that before permission is granted, the authority concerned must be satisfied that there is need for providing educational facilities to the people in the locality. The State authorities alone can decide about the educational facilities and needs of the locality. If there are more colleges in a particular area, the State would not be justified in granting permission to one more college in that locality. Entry 25 of the Concurrent List gives power to the State Legislature to make laws regarding education, including technical education. The State authorities alone can decide about the educational facilities and needs of the locality. If there are more colleges in a particular area, the State would not be justified in granting permission to one more college in that locality. Entry 25 of the Concurrent List gives power to the State Legislature to make laws regarding education, including technical education. Of course, this is subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I to which the legislative source is traced for the AICTE Act, deals with the general power of Parliament for coordination, determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical educational institutions and Entry 65 deals with the union agencies and institutions for professional, vocational and technical training, including the training of police officers, etc. The State has certainly the legislative competence to pass the legislation in respect of education including technical education and Section 20 of the Act is intended for general welfare of the citizens of the State and also in discharge of the constitutional duty enumerated under Article 41 of the Constitution." 28. In the case of Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan (supra), while taking into consideration and extensively quoting the decision in the case of St. Johns Teachers Training Institute (supra), the Supreme Court again discussed the role of the State Government and has held as under in paras 33, 34, 38, 39 and 41:- (underlining by this Court) "33. The consultation with the State Government/Union Territory Administration and consideration of the recommendations/suggestions made by them are of considerable importance. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that majority of the candidates who complete B.Ed. and similar courses aspire for appointment as teachers in the government and government aided educational institutions. Some of them do get appointment against the available vacant posts, but large number of them do not succeed in this venture because of non-availability of posts. The State Government/Union Territory Administration sanctions the posts keeping in view the requirement of trained teachers and budgetary provisions made for that purpose. They cannot appoint all those who successfully pass B.Ed. and like courses every year. The State Government/Union Territory Administration sanctions the posts keeping in view the requirement of trained teachers and budgetary provisions made for that purpose. They cannot appoint all those who successfully pass B.Ed. and like courses every year. Therefore, by incorporating the provision for sending the applications to the State Government/Union Territory Administration and consideration of the recommendations/suggestions, if any made by them, the Council has made an attempt to ensure that as a result of grant of recognition to unlimited number of institutions to start B.Ed. and like courses, candidates far in excess of the requirement of trained teachers do not become available and they cannot be appointed as teachers. If, in a given year, it is found that adequate numbers of suitable candidates possessing the requisite qualifications are already available to meet the requirement of trained teachers, the State Government/Union Territory Administration can suggest to the concerned Regional Committee not to grant recognition to new institutions or increase intake in the existing institutions. If the Regional Committee finds that the recommendation made by the State Government/Union Territory Administration is based on valid grounds, it can refuse to grant recognition to any new institution or entertain an application made by an existing institution for increase of intake and it cannot be said that such decision is ultra vires the provisions of the Act or the Rules. 34. The importance of the role of the State Government in such matters was recognised in St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council For Teacher Education and another (2003) 3 SCC 321 . In that case, vires of Regulation 5(e) and (f) of the 1995 Regulations was challenged insofar as they incorporated the requirement of obtaining NOC from the State Government. A learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that Regulation 5(e) and (f) were ultra vires the provisions of the Act. The order of the learned Single Judge was reversed by the Division Bench of the High Court. 35. xxx xxx xxx 36. xxx xxx xxx 37. xxx xxx xxx 38. In State of Tamil Nadu and another v. S.V. Bratheep and others (2004) 4 SCC 513 , the Court interpreted the provisions of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987, referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Dr. 35. xxx xxx xxx 36. xxx xxx xxx 37. xxx xxx xxx 38. In State of Tamil Nadu and another v. S.V. Bratheep and others (2004) 4 SCC 513 , the Court interpreted the provisions of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987, referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Dr. Preeti Srivastava's case and observed that the State Government can prescribe additional qualification to what has been prescribed by AICTE for admission to engineering courses and no fault can be found with such a provision. 39. In Govt. of A.P. and another v. J.B. Educational Society and another (2005) 3 SCC 212 , this Court considered the question whether the provision contained in Section 20(3)(a)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 under which obtaining of permission of the State Government was made sine qua non for starting an institution for Teacher Training Course was ultra vires the provisions of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 and the Regulations framed thereunder. While rejecting the challenge, the Court referred to Articles 245, 246 and 254(2) and Entries 66 of List-I and 25 of List-III of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and observed: "41. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the cut off dates specified in clauses (4) and (5) of Regulation 5 of the 2007 Regulations as also the amendment made in Regulation 5(5) vide notification dated 1.7.2008 are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were not right in recording a contrary finding qua the date specified in notification dated 1.7.2008. We further hold that the provisions contained in Section 14 and the Regulations framed for grant of recognition including the requirement of recommendation of the State Government/Union Territory Administration are mandatory and an institution is not entitled to recognition unless it fulfils the conditions specified in various clauses of the Regulations. The Council is directed to ensure that in future no institution is granted recognition unless it fulfils the conditions laid down in the Act and the Regulations and the time schedule fixed for processing the application by the Regional Committees and communication of the decision on the issue of recognition is strictly adhered to." 29. The Council is directed to ensure that in future no institution is granted recognition unless it fulfils the conditions laid down in the Act and the Regulations and the time schedule fixed for processing the application by the Regional Committees and communication of the decision on the issue of recognition is strictly adhered to." 29. In the case of Visveswaraiah Technological University and Another v. Krishnendu Halder and Others, (2011) 4 SCC 606 , the Supreme Court was required to consider the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Visveswaraiah Technological University Act, 1994 and the Regulations framed thereunder regarding B.E/B.Tech. Degree Course by which eligibility criteria that was higher than the eligibility criteria prescribed by the A.I.C.T.E Act was prescribed by the University. The issue before the Supreme Court was as to whether the higher eligibility criteria prescribed by the University was ultra vires the provisions of the A.I.C.T.E Act. The Supreme Court, while repelling the challenge, upheld the prescription of higher eligibility criteria by the Visveswaraiah Technological University. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, while taking into consideration the decisions rendered in the cases of State of T.N. v. S. V. Bratheep, (2004) 4 SCC 513 , Preeti Srivastava (Dr.) v. State of M.P. (1999) 7 SCC 120 and State of T.N v. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute, (1995) 4 SCC 104 , has held as under:- "14. The respondents (colleges and the students) submitted that in that particular year (2007-2008) nearly 5000 engineering seats remained unfilled. They contended that whenever a large number of seats remained unfilled, on account of nonavailability of adequate candidates, para 41(v) and (vi) of Adhiyaman would come into play and automatically the lower minimum standards prescribed by AICTE alone would apply. This contention is liable to be rejected in view of the principles laid down in the Constitution Bench decision in Dr. Preeti Srivastava and the decision of the larger Bench in S.V. Bratheep which explains the observations in Adhiyaman in the correct perspective. We summarise below the position, emerging from these decisions : (i) While prescribing the eligibility criteria for admission to institutions of higher education, the State/University cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Central Body/AICTE. The term 'adversely affect the standards' refers to lowering of the norms laid down by Central Body/AICTE. We summarise below the position, emerging from these decisions : (i) While prescribing the eligibility criteria for admission to institutions of higher education, the State/University cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Central Body/AICTE. The term 'adversely affect the standards' refers to lowering of the norms laid down by Central Body/AICTE. Prescribing higher standards for admission by laying down qualifications in addition to or higher than those prescribed by AICTE, consistent with the object of promoting higher standards and excellence in higher education, will not be considered as adversely affecting the standards laid down by the Central Body/AICTE. (ii) The observation in para 41(vi) of Adhiyaman to the effect that where seats remain unfilled, the state authorities cannot deny admission to any student satisfying the minimum standards laid down by AICTE, even though he is not qualified according to its standards, is not good law. (iii) The fact that there are unfilled seats in a particular year, does not mean that in that year, the eligibility criteria fixed by the State/University would cease to apply or that the minimum eligibility criteria suggested by AICTE alone would apply. Unless and until the State or the University chooses to modify the eligibility criteria fixed by them, they will continue to apply in spite of the fact that there are vacancies or unfilled seats in any year. The main object of prescribing eligibility criteria is not to ensure that all seats in colleges are filled, but to ensure that excellence in standards of higher education is maintained. (iv) The State/University (as also AICTE) should periodically (at such intervals as they deem fit) review the prescription of eligibility criteria for admissions, keeping in balance, the need to maintain excellence and high standard in higher education on the one hand, and the need to maintain a healthy ratio between the total number of seats available in the State and the number of students seeking admission, on the other. If necessary, they may revise the eligibility criteria so as to continue excellence in education and at the same time being realistic about the attainable standards of marks in the qualifying examinations." 30. If necessary, they may revise the eligibility criteria so as to continue excellence in education and at the same time being realistic about the attainable standards of marks in the qualifying examinations." 30. While upholding the fixation of higher criteria by the State University, the Supreme Court also took judicial notice of the fact that there was a sudden mushrooming of private institutions in higher education specially in regard to Teachers Training Institute, Dental Colleges and Engineering Colleges and observed that if the seats in these colleges remain unfilled, the remedy was not in lowering down of eligibility qualification but in (a) not permitting new colleges; (b) reduce the intake in the existing colleges and; (c) improving the infrastructure and quality of the institution to attract more students. 31. In the case of Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya (supra) the power and authority of the State in respect of the Act of 1993, was again extensively considered by the Supreme Court. In para-70 of the judgment in the case of Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya (supra) the Supreme Court considered and extensively quoted the decision rendered in the case of St. Johns Teachers Training Institute (supra). In para-72 in the case of Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya (supra) the Supreme Court considered and extensively quoted the decision of the J.B. Educational Society and another (supra) and while doing so took into account the fact that the States had the power to legislate in respect of higher education including technical education by referring to Articles 245, 246 and 254(2) of the Constitution of India and Entry-66 of List-I and Entry-25 of List-III of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India as well as Article 41 of the Constitution of India. In para-74 of the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court considered and extensively quoted the decision rendered in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and Others, (2006) 9 SCC 1 . In para-76 the Supreme Court considered and quoted the decision in the case of National Council for Teacher Education v. Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan (2011) 3 SCC 238 and extensively quoted from the same and thereafter held as under in paras 77 to 79:- (underlining by this Court) "77. In para-76 the Supreme Court considered and quoted the decision in the case of National Council for Teacher Education v. Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan (2011) 3 SCC 238 and extensively quoted from the same and thereafter held as under in paras 77 to 79:- (underlining by this Court) "77. The above survey of precedents makes it clear that under Regulation 7(2) and (3), the State Government/Union Territory Administration is entitled to make recommendations on the application made for grant of recognition and the same are required to be considered by the concerned Regional Committee before taking a final decision on the application. 78. Learned counsel for the appellants did not seriously contest the position that the provisions contained in Sections 14(3) and 15(3) read with Regulation 7(2), (3), (4), (5) and (9) are mandatory and the Regional Committee cannot grant recognition unless it is satisfied that the applicant has fulfilled the mandatory conditions prescribed in the 1993 Act and the Regulations. They also did not dispute that in view of Section 16, examining body cannot grant affiliation, whether provisional or permanent to any institution or hold examination for the courses of training conducted by a recognised institution unless the institution concerned has obtained recognition under Section 14 or permission for a course or training under Section 15. 79. What needs to be emphasised is that no recognition/permission can be granted to any institution desirous of conducting teacher training course unless the mandatory conditions enshrined in Sections 14(3) or 15(3) read with the relevant clauses of Regulations 7 and 8 are fulfilled and that in view of the negative mandate contained in Section 17-A read with Regulation 8(10), no institution can admit any student unless it has obtained unconditional recognition from the Regional Committee and affiliation from the examining body." 32. In the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust and Others v. All India Council for Teachnical Education and Others, (2013) 3 SCC 385 , the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of the A.I.C.T.E Act, has held in para-24 that the State and the affiliating university have a role to play but it is limited in its application and that they cannot lay down any guidelines or policies in conflict with the Control statute or by the Central body and though the State can frame its policies, the same should not be in conflict with the direction issued by the Central body. The Supreme Court has further held in para-24 that all the three authorities, i.e. the authority of the A.I.C.T.E, the State Government and the University have to work in tandem as all of them have the common object to ensure maintenance of proper standard of education, examination and proper infrastructure for betterment of technical educational system. 33. From a perusal of the order passed by the Gwalior Bench of this Court in the case of Maa Kailadevi College of Education v. State of M.P. and another W.P No.8632/2011 decided on 6.1.2012, which has been heavily relied upon by the petitioner it is apparent that the Court, while deciding the matter and holding that the State Government has no power whatsoever under the NCTE Act of 1993, has not taken note of the above mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court wherein it has been held that the State certainly has powers under the NCTE Act of 1993 though the same is limited by the provisions of law in respect of educational institutions recognised under the NCTE Act of 1993. It is also apparent that as no adverse action has been taken by the State in the instant case against the petitioners and as they have stated that the information received by them on inspection shall be forwarded to the authority under the NCTE Act of 1993, for further action. It is also apparent that the facts of the present case and the issue involved herein are totally different. 34. It is also apparent that the facts of the present case and the issue involved herein are totally different. 34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it is apparent that the decision in the case of Maa Kailadevi College of Education (supra) by the Gwalior Bench has no applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case and does not render any assistance to the case of the petitioners. In all the cases of the Supreme Court that have been referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the Supreme Court has categorically held that the State Legislature has the power to make laws regarding education including technical education under Entry 25 of List 3 of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India, subject to law made under Entry-66 of List-I of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India, which in the instant case the Act of 1993 and that even under the Act of 1993 the State has a definite but limited role to play. 35. From a perusal of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above quoted cases, it is clear that (a) while the State legislature has the power to make laws regarding education including technical education, medical education and university under Entry-25, List-III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, however this Entry-25 of List-III itself makes the said legislative power of the State legislature subject to the provisions of Entries-63, 64, 65 and 66 of List-I of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India, and that the Act of 1993, has been made by the Parliament under Entry-66 List-I of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the State can exercise its powers subject to and in accordance with the Act of 1993 and in respect of the field of technical education that is not covered by the Act of 1993. (b) that the State has the legislative competence to pass legislation in respect of education including technical education and, therefore, it can make a provision keeping in mind the general welfare of the citizen of the State and in discharge of its constitutional duty under Article 41 of the Constitution of India, specifically in respect of granting approval for establishing an educational institution looking to the needs of the locality falling within the State as the State alone would be competent to say as to whether there is a need for providing educational facilities to the people in the locality and as to where that institution should be established within the State; (c) that under the NCTE Act, all the three bodies, namely the Regional Committee under the Act of 1993, the State and the University have a definite role to play and while the role of the State and the local University is limited but as all the three of them have the common object to ensure maintenance of proper standard of education, examination and proper infrastructure for betterment of proper educational system and therefore, all three have to work in tandem, so that each assists the other in the discharge of its role under the Act and the Regulations. 36. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, we now proceed to examine the extent to which the field of Technical education is covered by the Act of 1993 and whether the impugned order transgresses or violates the same. 37. In the backdrop of sections 13, 14(3) and 17 of the Act of 1993, and Regulation-7 of the Regulations of 2014, notified under the Act, the learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the absolute power of granting recognition or withdrawal of recognition under the Act of 1993 has been solely conferred upon the Council or the Regional Committee constituted under the Act of 1993 and the State Government has no power to either to conduct an inspection on its own or to take any steps towards derecognition of a recognised institution and, therefore, the impugned order dated 25.1.2016 which has directed the local collectors to constitute a committee for conducting an inspection of a recognised institutions is beyond the scope and authority of the powers conferred upon the State by the Act of 1993. 38. 38. In the instant case, all the petitioner institutions have already been granted recognition but they have filed the present petitions against the impugned order alleging that the State is usurping the powers of the Council and the Regional Committee in respect of inspection and withdrawing recognition and, therefore, we proceed to examine the aforesaid issue. 39. The provisions of the Act, which deal with the aforesaid aspect are Sections 13 and 17 of the Act. Section 13 of the Act, confers power of inspection upon the Counsel in the following terms:- "13. Inspection (1) For the purpose of ascertaining whether the recognised institutions are functioning in accordance with the provision of this Act, the Council may cause inspection of any such institution, to be made by such person as it may direct, and in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) The Council shall communicate to the institution the date on which inspection under subsection (1) is to be made and the institution shall be entitled to be associated with the inspection in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) The Council shall communicate to the said institution, its views in regard to the results of any such inspection and may, after ascertaining the opinion of that institution, recommend to that institution the action to be taken as a result of such inspection. (4) All communications to the institution under this section shall be made to the executive authority thereof, and the executive authority of the institution shall report to the Council the action, if any, which is proposed to be taken for the purpose of implementing any such recommendation as is referred to in sub-section (3). 40. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the Council, with a view to ascertain as to whether the recognised institutions are functioning in accordance with the provision of this Act, may cause inspection of any institution in such a manner as may be prescribed and may thereafter recommend that institution the action required to be taken but before it does so it shall initiate the proceedings for inspection by informing the institution the date on which the inspection shall be made. 41. 41. Section 17 of the Act, is to the following effect:- "17.Contravention Of Provisions Of The Act And Consequences Thereof- (1) Where the Regional Committee is, on its own motion or on any representation received from any person, satisfied that a recognised institution has contravened any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules, regulations, orders made or issued thereunder, or any condition subject to which recognition under sub-section (3) of section 14 or permission under sub-section (3) of section 15 was granted, it may withdraw recognition of such recognised institution, for reasons to be recorded in writing: Provided that no such order against the recognised institution shall be passed unless a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the proposed order has been given to such recognised institution: Provided further that the order withdrawing or refusing recognition passed by the Regional Committee shall come into force only with effect from the end of the academic session next following the date of communication of such order. (2) A copy of every order passed by the Regional Committee under sub-section (1), - (a) shall be communicated to the recognised institution concerned and a copy thereof shall also be forwarded simultaneously to the University or the examining body to which such institution was affiliated for cancelling affiliation; and (b) shall be published in the Official Gazette for general information. 42. A perusal of Section 17 makes it clear that it provides for consequences of contravention of the provisions of the Act and gives power to the Regional Committee to withdraw the recognition granted to an institution on its own motion or on any representation received from any person, on being satisfied that the institution concerned is contravening any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules, Regulations or Orders made or issued thereunder or is vitiating any conditions subject to which recognition has been granted to the petitioner institution. Section 17 of the Act, further provides that before withdrawing the recognition, the institution shall be given a reasonable opportunity to make a representation against the proposed order. Section 17 also provides that on withdrawal of recognition, the institution shall discontinue the course from the end of the academic session next following the date of communication of the order and that the qualification obtained from such an institution shall not be recognised for employment purposes. 43. Section 17 also provides that on withdrawal of recognition, the institution shall discontinue the course from the end of the academic session next following the date of communication of the order and that the qualification obtained from such an institution shall not be recognised for employment purposes. 43. Section 18 of the Act, makes provisions for filing an appeal by a person aggrieved against the order under sections 14,15 or 17 of the Act. 44. From a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that while Section 13 gives power of inspection to the Council in such a manner as may be prescribed and thereafter recommend to the institution the action that is required to be taken up pursuant to such inspection, Section 17 of the Act, gives power to the Regional Committee to withdraw recommendation of a recognised institution, if the Regional Committee on its own motion or on any representation received from any person, is satisfied that the institution has violated any of the provisions of the Act, Rules, Regulations, etc., or that it has violated any of the conditions subject to which recognition has been granted to it, provided that the Regional Committee, before doing so, shall give reasonable opportunity for making representation against the proposed order to the institution. 45. Apparently, there is no provision in the Act, Rules or Regulations which provides for or regulates the steps that may or can be taken prior to initiation of proceedings under Sections 13 or 17 of the Act, or for conducting a preliminary fact finding enquiry for the purpose of examining any complaint against recognised institutions prior to initiating any proceeding under Section 13 or 17 of the Act of 1993 and forwarding the report thereof to the Council or to the Regional Committee as is sought to be done by the impugned order dated 25.1.2016 nor is their any provision which prohibits any such preliminary fact finding enquiry prior to initiation of proceedings under Sections 13 or 17 of the Act. 46. It is pertinent to note that Section 17 of the Act, in fact permits involvement of a third party or authority as it specifically provides for and permits initiation of proceedings for withdrawal of recognition of a recognised institution on receiving a representation in that regard from any person. 47. 46. It is pertinent to note that Section 17 of the Act, in fact permits involvement of a third party or authority as it specifically provides for and permits initiation of proceedings for withdrawal of recognition of a recognised institution on receiving a representation in that regard from any person. 47. In the instant case it is also an undisputed fact that the impugned order dated 25.1.2016 has not been issued by the State in purported exercise of any of the powers under the Act of 1993 or the Regulations framed thereunder nor has any proceedings been initiated by the impugned order against any recognised institution for the purpose of withdrawing recognition or taking any steps against the institution nor has the State usurped, violated or contravened any of the powers of the Regional Committee or any other authority under the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder. On the contrary, the State has issued the impugned order simply directing the Collectors to constitute a Committee to visit the institution granted recognition under the Act of 1993 to conduct a preliminary fact finding enquiry to ascertain and verify the correctness of the complaints received by the authorities of the State against recognised institutions to the effect whether they are functioning in contravention of the provisions of the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder and, apparently, relates to a stage prior to initiation of any proceeding under the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder as there is a vacuum and in fact no provision in the Act or Regulations providing for conducting a preliminary fact finding enquiry and, therefore, the impugned order does not violate or contravene any of the statutory provisions nor does it usurp or take over the powers vested in the Council or the Regional Committee regarding inspection and withdrawal of recognition which still remains intact and can be invoked by them at any point of time with absolute independence and without any fetters being placed upon them by the impugned order. It is also apparent that the Council and the Regional Committee are also not bound by the finding or opinion of the visiting committee recorded in the preliminary fact finding enquiry and have the full power and discretion to pass any orders after applying their independent mind and following the procedure prescribed by law. 48. It is also apparent that the Council and the Regional Committee are also not bound by the finding or opinion of the visiting committee recorded in the preliminary fact finding enquiry and have the full power and discretion to pass any orders after applying their independent mind and following the procedure prescribed by law. 48. This fact is clearly established in view of the clarification given by the respondents themselves in their return on affidavit wherein they have stated that the authorities of the State do not propose to take any action against any of the recognised institution under the Act of 1993. The State in its return has clarified that they have issued the impugned order only in view of the fact that they have received several complaints regarding violation of the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder and, therefore, they have issued directions to all the Collectors to conduct preliminary fact finding enquiry by constituting committees for the purpose of visiting and verifying the correctness of the several complaints received by them and to forward the opinion and result thereof to the State, who in turn shall not take any action thereon, but shall forward the same to the Regional Committee for further action in accordance with law who may take up proceedings on their own or by treating the reports as representations or complaints under Section 17 of the Act of 1993. 49. Before this Court, the learned counsel for the respondent/State as well as the learned counsel for the NCTE submit that the said opinion and result of the visiting/verification committee can and shall be treated as a representation that has been received under section 17 of the Act of 1993 and, thereafter it will be the Regional Committee alone who shall take up further steps or proceedings in accordance with the procedure under section 17 or any other provision of the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder. 50. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 25.1.2016 has not been issued in exercise of or in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act of 1993 or the Regulations framed thereunder nor has the State usurped any of the powers conferred upon the Regional Committee or any other authority under the Act of 1993 or the Regulations framed thereunder. 51. 51. We are also of the opinion that the steps that have been directed to be taken up by all the Collectors in the State pursuant to the impugned order are also not in contravention or in violation of any of the provisions of the Act of 1993 or the Regulations framed thereunder as the field in which the same shall operate is not covered by the aforesaid statutory provisions and the contention to the contrary of the learned counsel for the petitioners is hereby rejected. We are also of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not violate any of the petitioners' rights under the Act of 1993 or result in any adverse consequences as the State Government has categorically stated that it shall not take any action against the petitioner institution for withdrawing their recognition and, therefore, the impugned order perse is not against any of the rights conferred upon the petitioner institution nor does it interfere with or prohibit their functioning. 52. We now proceed to decide the second issue raised by the petitioners regarding competency of the State to issue the impugned order in the absence of any statutory power to do so. To put it differently, as we have categorically held in the preceding paragraphs that the impugned order dated 25.01.2016 does not violate nor is it in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act of 1993, and that it does not encroach upon the field covered by the law made by the Parliament, we now proceed to examine the source of power and authority of the State to issue the impugned order. 53. At this stage, it is pertinent to take note of the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of St. Johns Teachers Training Institute (supra) which have been reiterated and quoted in the case of Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan (supra) and Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya (supra) above. 54. 53. At this stage, it is pertinent to take note of the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of St. Johns Teachers Training Institute (supra) which have been reiterated and quoted in the case of Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan (supra) and Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya (supra) above. 54. In the said decisions, the Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that there has been a great mushrooming of private Technical Training Institutions, Dental Colleges and Engineering Colleges and that these institutions have acquired a bad reputation due to lack of infrastructure, bad faculty and indifferent teaching and there are only four Regional Committees functioning in the whole country and it is, therefore, obvious that it is not only difficult but almost impossible for the Regional Committee to itself obtain complete particulars and details of financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and other conditions in respect of the Institution that has moved an application for grant of recognition. The Supreme Court has observed that it is for this reason that the assistance of the State Government or the Union Territory in which the Institution is located is taken by the Regional Committee. 55. In the case of Shri Morvi Sarvajanik Kelavni Mandal Sanchalit Mskm B.Ed. College v. National Council for Teachers' Education and others, (2012) 2 SCC 16 , the Supreme Court has taken judicial note of the fact that the field of education had become a "fertile, perennial and profitable business with the least capital outlay in some States and that societies and individuals were establishing such institutions without complying with the statutory requirements. The unfortunate part is that despite repeated pronouncements of this Court over the past two decades deprecating the setting up of such institutions. The mushrooming of the colleges continues all over the country at times in complicity with the statutory authorities, who fail to check this process by effectively enforcing the provisions of the NCTE Act and the Regulations framed thereunder." 56. Even in this case, the learned counsel for the respondent NCTE has submitted that there are several thousand colleges which have been granted recognition and it is nearly impossible for the Regional Committee to address each and every complaint and to conduct periodic half yearly to yearly inspection of the institution. 57. Even in this case, the learned counsel for the respondent NCTE has submitted that there are several thousand colleges which have been granted recognition and it is nearly impossible for the Regional Committee to address each and every complaint and to conduct periodic half yearly to yearly inspection of the institution. 57. From a perusal of the impugned order, it is also apparent that the State Government has been continuously receiving several complaints from various quarters against recognised non-government B.Ed and M.Ed. Colleges in respect of non-availability of staff and other deficiencies regarding infrastructural facilities prescribed by the NCTE and, therefore, the Commissioner, Higher Education has directed all Collectors to constitute Committees at their level for the purposes of visiting and examining as to whether these non-government B.Ed. and M.Ed. Colleges are conforming to the stipulations and guidelines issued by the NCTE and thereafter to submit their findings which shall ultimately be forwarded to the Regional Committee concerned for further action. 58. We can profitably take note of the fact that the students who are undertaking B.Ed., M.Ed., and other courses in the petitioners' institution and other institutions recognised under the Act of 1993, have filed complaints before the State and not before any other authority under the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder as they are rightly harbouring the legitimate apprehension of adverse consequences at the hands of the institution in which they are undertaking the course in case their name and identity is disclosed and in case they take up such proceedings openly against them. The complaints have been filed by them before the State legitimately expecting the State to take up the issue at their behest as the State is under an obligation to do so. 59. In such a situation when the State is flooded with complaints against such recognised institutions regarding various deficiencies, be taken and the State be directed to ignore the plight of its citizens and the repeated complaints made by them and to quietly sit by as a bystander and to ignore such complaints of exploitation by the institutions, violation of the statutory rights, right to proper education and educational facilities and the alleged violation of the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder and not do anything about it ? 60. 60. Article 21-A of the Constitution of India, casts a mandatory duty upon the State to provide free and compulsory education of all children up to the age of 6 to 14 years in such a manner as the State may by law determine and Article 41 of the Constitution of India provides that the State shall within its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment. It is also undisputed that the petitioner institutions and the other institutions granted recognition under the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder, are involved in imparting B.Ed. and M.Ed. degree courses and are, therefore, producing teachers in the State of M.P. who in turn would also be involved in imparting primary education to children of the age of 6 to 14 years which is an obligation of the State to provide under Article 21-A of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the State is vitally interested in ensuring that the petitioner institutions and the other recognised institutions under the Act of 1993, conform to the necessary standard so that these institutions are able to achieve the basic object of producing competent and qualified teachers and, therefore, the State cannot be expected to sit back with folded hands like an unconcerned by-stander and not act upon the huge number of complaints that are received against the institutions recognised under the Act of 1993, imparting B.Ed. and M.Ed. degrees. 61. In the instant case it is not in dispute that while no law under Engry 25 List-III of the Constitution of India has been made by the State in this regard however, Article 162, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, extends the executive power of the State in matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has powers to make laws, and Article 256 of the Constitution of India casts an obligation on the State to exercise its executive powers to fill up the lacuna and vacuum to ensure compliance of the law made by the Parliament which in the instant case is the Act of 1993. 62. In the case of Dr. 62. In the case of Dr. Ambesh Kumar v. Principal, L. L. R. M. Medical College, Meerut and others, (1986) Supp (1) SCC 543, a similar issue regarding validity of an order issued by the State in exercise of its executive powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, came up for decision before the Supreme Court wherein a notice issued by the Government of U.P. laying down the qualification regarding eligibility of a candidate to be considered for admission to the Post Graduate Degree Course in M.D., M.S. and diploma, etc. was challenged on the ground that it was in violation of the provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and that it trenches upon Entry 66 of List-I of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The matter travelled up to the Supreme Court on account of the fact that the High Court of Allahabad upheld the order of the State Government on the ground that it was competent to pass the order as the State Legislature had the powers to legislate under Entry 25 of List-III of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India, and therefore, in the absence of such legislation the State had rightly exercised its executive powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of India which was coextensive with its legislative powers and that the said order does not in any way encroach upon nor was in conflict with the power of the Central Government or the Medical Council of India Act, 1956 made under Entry 66 of List-I of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India. 63. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court of Allahabad by affirming that the State in exercise of its executive powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, could lay down additional eligibility qualifications for the candidates to be considered on merits for admission to the P.G. Courses of Medical Colleges in the State in the following terms in Para-18:- "18. ...Two questions arise for our consideration which are firstly whether the State Government is competent to make the aforesaid order in question in exercise of its executive powers under Article 162 of the Constitution. This Article specifically provides that the executive powers of the State shall extend to matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has power to make laws. This Article specifically provides that the executive powers of the State shall extend to matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has power to make laws. Entry 25 of the Concurrent List i.e. List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution provides as follows: Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour." 19. The State Government can in exercise of its executive power make an order relating to matters referred to in Entry 25 of the Concurrent List in the absence of any law made by the State Legislature. The impugned order made by the State Government pursuant to its executive powers laying down the eligibility qualification for the candidates to be considered on merits for admission to the post-graduate courses in Medical Colleges in the State, is valid and it cannot be assailed on the ground that it is beyond the competence of the State Government to make such order provided it does not encroach upon or infringe the power of the Central Government as well as the Parliament provided in Entry 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I is in the following terms: Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions. 20. xxx xxx xxx 21. …..The order in question merely specifies a further eligibility qualification for being considered for selection for admission to the post-graduate courses (degree and diploma) in the Medical Colleges in the State in accordance with the criteria laid down by Indian Medical Council. This does not in any way encroach upon the Regulations that have been framed under the provisions of Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act. On the other hand in order to promote and further the determination of standards in institutions for higher education, the State Government who runs these colleges provide an additional eligibility qualification. A similar question crept up in the case of State of A.P. and Ors., v. Lavu Narendranath and Ors. (1971) 1 SCC 607 . In that case the Government of Andhra Pradesh prescribed for the first time in July, 1970 an entrance test for admission to the Medical Colleges and also prescribed the standard for eligibility for the test. A similar question crept up in the case of State of A.P. and Ors., v. Lavu Narendranath and Ors. (1971) 1 SCC 607 . In that case the Government of Andhra Pradesh prescribed for the first time in July, 1970 an entrance test for admission to the Medical Colleges and also prescribed the standard for eligibility for the test. The validity of this order prescribing the entrance test was challenged by some unsuccessful candidates on the ground that it encroaches upon the central subject listed in Entry 66 of List I of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It was held by the Court that this test prescribed by the Government in no way militated with the powers of the Parliament under Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It was also held that the Entry conferred power on the Parliament to make laws for laying down how standards in an institution for higher education are to be determined and how they can be coordinated. It had no relation to a test prescribed by Government or by a university for selection of a number of students from out of a large number applying for admission to a particular course of study. 22. In the instant case the number of seats for admission to various post-graduate courses both degree and diploma in Medical Colleges is limited and a large number of candidates undoubtedly apply for admission to these courses of study. In such circumstances the impugned order laying down the qualification for a candidate to be eligible for being considered for selection for admission to the said courses on the basis of the merit as specified by Regulations made under the Indian Medical Council Act, cannot be said to be in conflict with the said Regulations or in any way repugnant to the said Regulations. It does not in any way encroach upon the standards prescribed by the said Regulations. On the other hand by laying down a further qualification of eligibility it promotes and furthers the standard in an institution. 23. The Government who runs these colleges has the right to prescribe a test of eligibility as has been held by this Court in the case referred to above." 64. On the other hand by laying down a further qualification of eligibility it promotes and furthers the standard in an institution. 23. The Government who runs these colleges has the right to prescribe a test of eligibility as has been held by this Court in the case referred to above." 64. In the case of R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1823 and the Constitutional Bench in the case of Preeti Srivastava (Dr.) (supra), the Supreme Court has again upheld the exercise of executive powers by the State in similar circumstances. 65. In the light of the aforesaid, as the State is bound to uphold the high standards of education and to look after the welfare of its citizens and is also bound to look into the complaints received by it and to protect the interest of the students that are undertaking courses in B.Ed. and M.Ed. Colleges moreso as the State is vitally interested in the same as it is the State which would ultimately utilize the B.Ed./M.Ed. students, who come out of the Institution like the petitioner's institution by utilizing their services in imparting education to the citizens of the State and as it is also duty bound to see that the persons obtaining B.Ed./M.Ed. degrees from these non-government Institutions prescribe to the proper standard so that they impart proper education to the citizens, therefore, the State was compelled to and has rightly exercised its powers by issuing the order dated 25.1.2016 passed by the Commissioner, Higher Education. 66. Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case, as the State in exercise of its general powers of governance and administration is bound to look into the welfare of the citizen and discharge its constitutional obligations in that regard, therefore, the State was compelled to and has rightly acted upon the complaints received by them with a view to prevent exploitation and protect the interest of the students that are undertaking courses in B.Ed. and M.Ed. in the petitioner institutions moreso as the petitioner institutions are discharging a public function and performing a public duty. 67. and M.Ed. in the petitioner institutions moreso as the petitioner institutions are discharging a public function and performing a public duty. 67. We also find support on the view taken by us from the decision rendered in the case of Rungta Engineering College, Bhilai (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has held that the shortcomings found on inspection by the University concerned could not have been acted upon by the University on its own by usurping the powers of the A.I.C.T.E and the University, on finding the deficiencies regarding infrastructure on inspection of the institution, could bring the shortcoming to the notice of the A.I.C.T.E and seek appropriate action against that institution but could not pass any order against the institution on its own. This is precisely what the State proposes to do in the instant case. 68. As far as the duty of the State to take action for the general welfare of the citizens and the constitutional obligations under Article 41 of the Constitution of India are concerned, we may with profit rely upon the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of J. B. Educational Society and another (supra) which has been relied upon in subsequent decisions which have also been referred to by us in the preceding paragraphs, while dealing with the issue of validity of the provisions of Section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982, which provides that an education institution shall not be established without obtaining permission under the said Section which was challenged on the ground that it was contrary to the AICTE Act of 1987 which is in similar terms as the Act of 1993. The Supreme Court, after taking into consideration Entry 25 of List-III, Entry 66 of List-I of the VII Schedule and Articles 41, 245, 246, and 254 of the Constitution of India, while stating that the State Legislature had the power to legislate in respect of technical education subject to the law made by the Parliament upheld the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982, by holding that it was not in conflict with the A.I.C.T.E Act, on the ground, amongst others, that it was intended for the general welfare of the citizen of the State and also in discharge of the constitutional duty enumerated under Article 41 of the Constitution of India. 69. 69. In view of the aforesaid analysis of the provisions of the Act of 1993, the provisions of Article 21-A, 41, 162 and 256, Entry 66 of List I, Entry 25 of List-III of the Constitution of India and the fact that we have already held that the impugned order fills up a gap, lacuna and vacuum and is not in violation of any of the provisions of the Act of 1993 nor does it usurp any of the powers conferred on the authorities thereunder, therefore we are of the considered opinion that the State has the powers and authority to issue the impugned order under Article 162 and 256 of the Constitution of India in exercise of its executive power which is co-extensive with its legislative powers and in discharge of its obligation to ensure proper implementation of the parliamentary legislation, i.e. the Act of 1993 to uphold the high standard of education and, therefore, the same deserves to be and is hereby upheld. 70. We are also of the considered opinion that as the procedure of conducting a preliminary fact finding enquiry and forwarding the report thereof to the Regional Committee for initiating proceedings under Section 17 of the Act of 1993 that is provided and directed to be conducted by the impugned order is not covered by the Act of 1993 and the regulations framed thereunder and as there is a gap, lacuna and vacuum in that regard, the State in addition to its executive powers under Articles 162 and 256 of the Constitution of India, has the power and authority to issue the impugned order in discharge of its constitutional duties and obligations and in exercise of its general power of governance and administration moreso as the impugned order does not violate or contravene any statutory provision. 71. 71. We are strengthened in the view taken by us by the fact that the action sought to be taken by the authorities of the State by the impugned order dated 25.01.2016 would in fact go a long way towards achieving the aims and objects of the Act of 1993 and to ensure that the Act and the Regulations are strictly followed and the preliminary or fact finding exercise undertaken pursuant to the impugned order would be of great assistance to the Western Regional Committee in performing its duty and discharging its responsibilities and obligations under Regulation 7 and the other Regulations of the Regulation of 2014 and Section 17 and the other provisions of the Act of 1993, which admittedly is short handed and is unable to take up periodic inspection and perform all the duties conferred upon it by the Act of 1993 and the Regulations framed thereunder. 72. In view of the submissions of the learned counsel for the N.C.T.E and the State, we are also of the considered opinion and we hereby direct that the report forwarded by the State Government shall be treated as a representation by the Regional Committee under Section 17 of the Act and thereafter the Regional Committee shall take up proceedings in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the NCTE Act of 1993 and shall process the matter in accordance with law thereafter. 73. Before we part with the case, it is pertinent to note that on account the inability or complicity of the authorities under the NCTE Act of 1993, as several Institutes that had been granted recognition under the NCTE Act of 1993, had not been inspected by the Regional Committee and their illegality continued and persisted unabated, the matter had been taken up by this Court in the case of Subhash Randhadhale and other matters which ultimately travelled to the Supreme Court and was decided in the case of Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya (supra) and in view of the aforesaid backdrop the Supreme Court had issued the following directions in para 87 as under:- "87. .As a sequel to the above discussion, we hold that the impugned orders do not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court. .As a sequel to the above discussion, we hold that the impugned orders do not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court. We also reiterate that: (i) The Regional Committees established under Section 20 of the 1993 Act are duty bound to ensure that no private institution offering or intending to offer a course or training in teacher education is granted recognition unless it satisfies the conditions specified in Section 14(3)(a) of the 1993 Act and Regulations 7 and 8 of the Regulations. Likewise, no recognised institution intending to start any new course or training in teacher education shall be granted permission unless it satisfies the conditions specified in Section 15(3)(a) of the 1993 Act and the relevant Regulations. (ii) The State Government/UT Administration, to whom a copy of the application made by an institution for grant of recognition is sent in terms of Regulation 7(2) of the Regulations, is under an obligation to make its recommendations within the time specified in Regulation 7(3) of the Regulations. (iii) While granting recognition, the Regional Committees are required to give due weightage to the recommendations made by the State Government/UT Administration and keep in view the observations made by this Court in St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE (2003) 3 SCC 321 and National Council for Teacher Education v. Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan, which have been extracted in the earlier part of this judgment. (iv) The recognition granted by the Regional Committees under Section 14(3)(a) of the 1993 Act read with Regulations 7 and 8 of the Regulations and permission granted under Section 15(3)(a) read with the relevant Regulations shall operate prospectively, i.e., from the date of communication of the order of recognition or permission, as the case may be. (v) The recognition can be refused by the Regional Committee under Section 14(3)(b), in the first instance, when an application for recognition is made by an institution. Likewise, permission can be refused under Section 15(3)(b). (vi) If the recognition is refused under Section 14(3)(b) after affording reasonable opportunity to the applicant to make a written representation, the concerned institution is required to discontinue the course or training from the end of the academic session next following the date of receipt of the order. Likewise, permission can be refused under Section 15(3)(b). (vi) If the recognition is refused under Section 14(3)(b) after affording reasonable opportunity to the applicant to make a written representation, the concerned institution is required to discontinue the course or training from the end of the academic session next following the date of receipt of the order. (vii) Once the recognition is granted, the same can be withdrawn only under Section 17(1) if there is a contravention of the provisions of the Act or the Rules, or the Regulations, or orders made therein, or any condition subject to which recognition was granted under Section 14(3)(a) or permission was granted under Section 15(3)(a). (viii) The withdrawal of recognition becomes effective from the end of the academic session next following the date of communication of the order of withdrawal. (ix) Once the recognition is withdrawn under Section 17(1), the concerned institution is required to discontinue the course or training in teacher education and the examining body is obliged to cancel the affiliation. The effect of withdrawal of the recognition is that the qualification in teacher education obtained pursuant to the course or training undertaken at such institution is not to be treated as valid qualification for the purpose of employment under the Central Government, any State Government or University or in any educational body aided by the Central or the State Government. (x) In view of the mandate of Section 16, no examining body, as defined in Section 2(d) of the 1993 Act, shall grant affiliation unless the applicant has obtained recognition from the Regional Committee under Section 14 or permission for starting a new course or training under Section 15. (xi) While granting affiliation, the examining body shall be free to demand rigorous compliance of the conditions contained in the statute like the University Act or the State Education Board Act under which it was established or the guidelines/norms which may have been laid down by the concerned examining body. (xii) No institution shall admit any student to a teacher training course or programme unless it has obtained recognition under Section 14 or permission under Section 15, as the case may be. (xiii) While making admissions, every recognised institution is duty bound to strictly adhere to para 3.1 to 3.3 of the Norms and Standards for Secondary/Pre-School Teacher Education Programme contained in Appendix-1 to the Regulations. (xiii) While making admissions, every recognised institution is duty bound to strictly adhere to para 3.1 to 3.3 of the Norms and Standards for Secondary/Pre-School Teacher Education Programme contained in Appendix-1 to the Regulations. (xiv) If any institution admits any student in violation of the Norms and Standards laid down by the NCTE, then the Regional Committee shall initiate action for withdrawal of the recognition of such institution and pass appropriate order after complying with the rules of natural justice. (xv) The students admitted by unrecognised institution and institutions which are not affiliated to any examining body are not entitled to appear in the examination conducted by the examining body or any other authorised agency. (xvi) The students admitted by the recognised institutions otherwise than through the entrance/eligibility test conducted in accordance with the admission procedure contained in para 3.3 of Appendix-1 of the Regulations are also not entitled to appear in the examination conducted by the examining body or any other authorised agency. (xvii) The NCTE shall issue direction for mandatory inspection of recognised institutions on periodical basis and all the Regional Committees are duty bound to take action in accordance with those directions. (xviii) In future, the High Courts shall not entertain prayer for interim relief by un-recognised institutions and the institutions which have not been granted affiliation by the examining body and/or the students admitted by such institutions for permission to appear in the examination or for declaration of the result of examination. This would also apply to the recognised institutions if they admit students otherwise than in accordance with the procedure contained in Appendix-1 of the Regulations." 74. From a perusal of the directions issued by the Court, it is apparent that the Supreme Court had directed the NCTE to take up the mandatory inspection of the recognised Institution on periodical basis and all the Regional Committees had been directed to take action in accordance with the aforesaid direction and perform its statutory duties. 75. Apparently, the present situation has arisen only on account of the fact that the Regional Committees are either unable to or are deliberately not performing their statutory duties as a result of which the State Government is flooded with complaints against such Institutions which has ultimately resulted in issuance of the impugned order dated 25.01.2016. 76. 75. Apparently, the present situation has arisen only on account of the fact that the Regional Committees are either unable to or are deliberately not performing their statutory duties as a result of which the State Government is flooded with complaints against such Institutions which has ultimately resulted in issuance of the impugned order dated 25.01.2016. 76. During the course of hearing, we had directed the NCTE to furnish information regarding compliance of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya (supra) and the respondent/NCTE vide I.A. No. 10600/2016 has filed documents to indicate that they are in the process of undertaking inspection of the petitioner's Institutions, however, in the affidavit there is no mention of the fact as to when and how they would undertake periodical inspection of all the Institutions granted recognition by them in the State of M.P.. 77. In the light of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, we find no merit in the petitions which are accordingly dismissed and the impugned order dated 25.1.2016 is hereby upheld, however, while dismissing the petitions, in addition to the directions issued by us in the preceding paragraphs, we are constrained to direct the respondent/NCTE to take necessary steps to comply with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya (supra) as well and also to take up proceedings for withdrawing recognition in accordance with law in case they receive any report from the State Government or any person against any institution in a time bound manner. 78. However, while upholding the impugned order we make it clear that the exercise undertaken by the authorities of the State in view of the impugned order of the State shall not and cannot be used by the authorities of the State to take any action regarding withdrawal of recognition against the Institution on its own by usurping the powers of the council or the Regional Committee conferred upon them by the Act of 1993 as the said power is exclusively vested in the Council and the Regional Committee constituted under the NCTE Act of 1993 and that the State, in accordance with the affidavit submitted by it before this Court shall forward the same to the concerned authority under the NCTE Act of 1993 for further action. 79. The petitions stand dismissed with the aforesaid directions. 79. The petitions stand dismissed with the aforesaid directions. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Petitions Dismissed.