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2016 DIGILAW 658 (ORI)

Udayanath Sahu v. Secretary, Revenue Department, State of Orissa

2016-08-19

BISWANATH RATH

body2016
JUDGMENT : Biswanath Rath, J. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing the impugned orders vide Annexures-4 & 5 passed by the appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority under the Orissa Land Reforms Act. At the first journey of the litigation, the present petitioner filed O.L.R Case No.81/1986 under Section 15(I)(d) of the O.L.R. Act for declaring him as a tenant on the premises that he was continuing as a tenant under one Dibyasingha Parida and was also discharging his duty as a tenant by providing 50% of the gross income to the land owner Nidhi Patra. In the meantime, Nidhi Patra transferred the land to the petitioner by way of Sale Deed No.4738 dated 18.6.1969. The petitioner while remaining in possession over the land as owner, transferred the land to one Sanatana Senapati by way of Registered Sale Deed bearing No.7686 date 10.11.1969. It was contended by the petitioner in the O.L.R. Proceeding that even though he had sold the land to one Sanatana Senapati but he still remained as a tenant as there was no delivery of possession of the land in favour of the opposite party and his right as a tenant continued. Fact reveals in the meantime is that Sanatana Senapati transferred the suit property vide Registered Sale Deed No.5911 dated 10.10.1973 to the petitioner again and consequently, the petitioner again became the owner of the suit property since 10.12.1973. Three years after, the petitioner transferred the suit property to the present opposite party No.5 vide Registered Sale Deed No.4336 dated 18.10.1976. The petitioner asserted his rights under the opposite party No.5 as tenant in the proceeding vide O.L.R. Case No.81/1986 initiated by him. In filing the written statement the opposite party No.5 contended that in view of purchase by the petitioner at several occasions, the petitioner lost the status of a tenant and therefore, the O.L.R. Case No.81 of 1986 was not maintainable. Above matter was posted to 28.9.1987 for hearing on the question of maintainability being raised by opposite party No.5. The petitioner did not attend the Court for his illness and the matter was decided on merit after observing that the O.L.R. proceeding was not maintainable for the grounds taken by the opposite party No.5. 2. Above matter was posted to 28.9.1987 for hearing on the question of maintainability being raised by opposite party No.5. The petitioner did not attend the Court for his illness and the matter was decided on merit after observing that the O.L.R. proceeding was not maintainable for the grounds taken by the opposite party No.5. 2. After recovering from illness, the petitioner filed a petition under Order 9 Rule 8 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C, which was registered as Misc. Case No.3/1988. This Misc. Case was disposed of after hearing both the sides with an order of restoration of the proceeding vide O.L.R. Case No.81/1986. 3. Being aggrieved by the order passed in Misc. Case No.3/1988 as appearing at Annexure-2, the opposite party No.5 preferred Appeal bearing O.L.R. Appeal No.69/1989. This proceeding was also decided on contest. Initially at the time of admission of the appeal even though a stay order was passed but the same was not communicated to the Original Authority and in the meantime, the original proceeding vide O.L.R. Case No.81/1986 was disposed of by a final order dated 22.7.1989 holding petitioner as a tenant. In the meantime, the appeal at the instance of the petitioner was also allowed on 22.8.1989 vide Annexure-4. This order being challenged in a revision, the revision was dismissed giving rise cause of action to file the present writ petition. 4. In making his submission, Sri Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the orders passed under Annexures-4 & 5 are not only beyond the materials available on record but also contrary to the pleadings made by the parties and further remaining the final adjudication of the Original Proceeding vide Annexures-3 for which orders vide Annexure-4 & 5 becomes redundant. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in view of non-challenge to the order passed in Annexure-3, orders vide Annexures-4 & 5 becomes inoperative. In his opposition, Sri D.P. Mohanty, learned counsel for the opposite party No.5 submitted that the contentions raised by Sri Panda, learned counsel remains against Law. He further contended that in the event the orders under Annexures-4 & 5 are set-aside, the order vide Annexure-3 being the superstructure based on orders vide Annexure-2 will also lose its force automatically. In his opposition, Sri D.P. Mohanty, learned counsel for the opposite party No.5 submitted that the contentions raised by Sri Panda, learned counsel remains against Law. He further contended that in the event the orders under Annexures-4 & 5 are set-aside, the order vide Annexure-3 being the superstructure based on orders vide Annexure-2 will also lose its force automatically. In relying upon a decision as reported in AIR 1964 (Ori.) 156 , Sri Mohanty, learned counsel contended that this decision has a great support to his contention and this decision takes away the effect of Annexure-3. Further for petitioner’s purchasing the disputed land at different stages, he had lost his status as tenant therefore, the decision vide Annexure-3 was palpably illegal. 5. The undisputed facts remain that there is no dispute that at the initial stage the petitioner remains as a tenant but subsequently, there have been at least two sale deeds in favour of the petitioner establishing that the petitioner has purchased the disputed land at least by way of two transactions. Therefore, the claim of the petitioner that he continued as a tenant for the reason that he was not only continuing as tenant under the subsequent purchasers but he had also contributed 50% of the shares to the owner remaining as tenant and that there was no transfer of land even taken place does not hold good. Once the petitioner purchased the disputed land at the same time, he cannot claim the status of a tenant. Be that as it may, coming to the subject involved in the matter of quashing of the Annexures-4 & 5 and the effect of Annexure-3 thereby, this Court finds the opposite party has the support from the decision reported in the AIR 1964(Ori.)156. The question involved in the aforesaid cited decision remained as follows : “(2) The learned trial Court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit holding that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff had no reversionary right, that the suit was barred by res judicata and that in fact defendant No.1 was the adopted son of Bidya Padhan. The learned lower appellate Court reversed the first two findings and remanded the suit for fresh disposal on the question of adoption on the finding that no issue was framed on that question and that the parties must be given full opportunities to adduce evidence. The learned lower appellate Court reversed the first two findings and remanded the suit for fresh disposal on the question of adoption on the finding that no issue was framed on that question and that the parties must be given full opportunities to adduce evidence. This miscellaneous appeal against the judgment of the learned appellate Court was filed on 5.11.1962, but therefore this, the learned trial Court decreed the plaintiff’s suit, after remand, on 19.9.1962. No appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned trial Court passed after remand. (3) Mr. Misra raised two preliminary objections (i) that a Civil Revision and not Miscellaneous Appeal lies; (iii) that the judgment of the learned trial Court dated 19.9.1962 in accordance with the order of remand, against which no appeal was filed, concludes the matter and the miscellaneous appeal is infructuous. The conclusion arrived at by the Hon’ble Judge in the reported case is as follows: “(6) The second preliminary objection has no substance. In 10 Moo Ind App 203 (PC), Shama Purshad Roy v. Hurro Purshad Roy, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed thus – “Money recovered under a decree or judgment cannot be recovered back in a fresh suit or action whilst the decree or judgment under which it was recovered remains in force; but this rule of law rests, as their Lordships apprehend, upon this ground, that the original decree or judgment must be taken to be subsisting and valid until it has been reversed or superseded by some ulterior proceeding. x xx xx xx xx x Moreover, the decrees now under appeal rest on precisely the same cause of suit as the original decree which was reversed by the Order of Her Majesty in Council. x xx xx xx xx x Moreover, the decrees now under appeal rest on precisely the same cause of suit as the original decree which was reversed by the Order of Her Majesty in Council. The plaint in the case on which the original decree was recovered describes the interest recovered by the decrees under appeal as part of the same cause of suit, separated only for the convenience of Tara Purshad, and the decrees under appeal, therefore, were mere subordinate and dependent decrees, and their Lordships do not think that decrees can be held to have remained in force when the decree on which they were dependent had been reversed.” This dictum received the approval of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee subsequently in AIR 1923 PC 167 , B Nanganna v. R. Venkatapayya, though it dealt with another type of case, and of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1955 SC 576 , Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Shiv Rattan Deo Singh. The judgment of the learned trial Court, after remand, dated 19.9.1962 is based on the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge which is under challenge in the High Court. If the basis itself collapses, the superstructure standing on it must go. This Court has jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of the learned Subordiniate Judge, and if it so sets aside, the judgment of the trial Court, after remand, must automatically be inoperative. The second preliminary objection must accordingly fail.” The aforesaid judgment has also support of decision of the Preve Counsel 10 Moo Ind App 203 (PC), Shama Purshad Roy v. Hurro Purshad Roy and also AIR 1923 (PC) 167 (V 10) AIR 1955 SC 576 (V. 42): ILR (1955) Punj 1108, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Shiv Rattan Deo Singh, AIR 1923 PC 2167 (V 10): ILR 46 Mad 895, B. Naganna v. R. Venkatapayya. 6. Now coming back to decide on the impugned orders vide Annexures-4 & 5, this Court finds no error in the impugned order as the order vide Annexure-1 was a final order and there was no scope for the very same Court to entertain a restoration application and review a final order in the guise of consideration of restoration. The only remedy for the petitioner to file appeal as against Annexure-1. The only remedy for the petitioner to file appeal as against Annexure-1. Consequently, while refusing to interfere in the impugned orders vide Annexures-4 & 5, this Court restores back the order of the Original Authority vide Annexure-1. In deciding the fate of order passed vide Annexure-3 in O.L.R. Case No.81/1986, this Court finds the submission of learned counsel for private opposite party is well supported by the decision reported in AIR 1964 Orissa 156 and being the superstructure on the foundation vide Annexure-2, the superstructure vide Annexure-3 automatically collapse. 7. Consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed. Parties are to bear their own cost.