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2016 DIGILAW 659 (HP)

Pritam Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2016-05-04

MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, SANDEEP SHARMA

body2016
JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. 1. Subject matter of this appeal is judgment and order, dated 30th November, 2010, made by the Writ Court/learned Single Judge in CWP (T) No. 3903 of 2008, titled as Pritam Chand and another versus State of H.P. and others, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants-writ petitioners came to be dismissed (for short “the impugned judgment”). 2. In order to determine this appeal, it would be profitable to give a brief resume of the facts of the case, which has given birth to the instant appeal. 3. The appellants-writ petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by the medium of CWP No. 493 of 1995, titled as Pritam Chand & another versus State of H.P. & others. Interim orders were passed in the said writ petition on 15th May, 1995, allowing the appellants-writ petitioners to discharge the same duties which they performed on or before 6th May, 1995 (Annexure A3 to the writ petition). Ultimately, the said writ petition came to be dismissed on 29th October, 1996 and the interim orders were vacated (Annexure A4 to the writ petition), constraining the appellants-writ petitioners to approach the H.P. State Administrative Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”) by the medium of Original Application No. 1837 of 1996. Interim directions were passed in the Original Application and they were allowed to continue. The appellants-writ petitioners claimed six reliefs, the details of which have been given in para 7 of the Original Application. During the pendency of the Original Application, the Tribunal came to be abolished and the said Original Application was transferred to this Court and registered as CWP (T) No. 3903 of 2008. 4. It appears that during the pendency of the writ petition, the appellants-writ petitioners were reengaged and the only question which was left to be determined was – whether they were to be regularized as Parking Fee Collectors? 5. The Writ Court, after examining the pleadings, the documents on record and the law applicable, held that the appellants-writ petitioners had no case and dismissed the writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants-writ petitioners argued that the Writ Court has fallen in an error in holding that the appellants-writ petitioners were not appointed as Parking Fee Collectors, in fact, they were appointed as Parking Fee Collectors and were discharging their duties as such. 7. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants-writ petitioners argued that the Writ Court has fallen in an error in holding that the appellants-writ petitioners were not appointed as Parking Fee Collectors, in fact, they were appointed as Parking Fee Collectors and were discharging their duties as such. 7. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants-writ petitioners is devoid of any force for the following reasons. 8. The record from the concerned department was called for, which, after perusal, was returned to the department. The perusal of the record does disclose that the appellants-writ petitioners were appointed as Beldars on daily wages, were paid as such and in the muster roll also, were recorded as such. The same muster roll was examined by the Writ Court and the Writ court has recorded the findings in para 8 of the impugned judgment. It is profitable to reproduce para 8 of the impugned judgment herein: “8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The case of the petitioners is that they were engaged as Parking Fee Collectors in the year 1992 by respondent No. 2. They were not paid wages of Parking Fee Collectors. The respondent No. 3 verbally disengaged the petitioners on 8.5.1995. The respondent No. 3 in order to give benefit to his favourites illegally discriminated the petitioners. The further case of the petitioners is that Parking Fee Collector job is that of Clerk and, therefore, petitioners are entitled to wages of Clerk enhanced from time to time in accordance with the Minimum Wages Act. They have also claimed regularisation as Parking Fee Collectors. The petitioners have claimed arrears of wages with interest. The respondent No. 2 has produced the record at the time of hearing. The musterroll for the month of April, 1992 indicates that the petitioner No. 1 was engaged Beldar for collection of parking fee. The musterroll for November, 1992 indicates that petitioners were engaged as daily wage Beldars for collection of parking fee. Thus petitioners were initially engaged as Beldars on daily wages for collection of parking fee.” 9. The record does disclose that the appellants-writ petitioners were appointed as Beldars on daily wages, were regularized as such and they have accepted the same. The musterroll for November, 1992 indicates that petitioners were engaged as daily wage Beldars for collection of parking fee. Thus petitioners were initially engaged as Beldars on daily wages for collection of parking fee.” 9. The record does disclose that the appellants-writ petitioners were appointed as Beldars on daily wages, were regularized as such and they have accepted the same. Before the Writ Court, the joining report of only one of the appellants-writ petitioners, namely Shri Surjeet Singh, was made available, which finds place in the writ record and he has accepted the order without any demur. 10. The another joining report relates to one Shri Madan Lal, who is not a writ petitioner before the Writ Court, but in the LPA, the appellants have annexed the joining report of writ petitioner-appellant Pritam Chand, which was not made available before the Writ Court. 11. It is apt to record herein that on 26th July, 2010, it was brought to the notice of the Writ Court that the services of writ petitioner No. 1, namely Shri Pritam Chand were regularized as Beldar with effect from June, 2000. The respondents have placed on record office order, dated 11th June, 2000, in the Writ Petition, in terms of which the services of appellant-writ petitioner No. 1 were regularized as Beldar. They have also placed on record order, dated 8th August, 2007, whereby services of appellant-writ petitioner No. 2 were also regularized as Beldar. 12. It is a subsequent development because the Original Application was filed in the year 1996 and the writ petition came to be registered before this Court in the year 2008. No effort was made by the appellants-writ petitioners to amend the writ petition, bring the subsequent development before the Court and seek appropriate reliefs. 13. The appellants-writ petitioners have not made even a single whisper about the said orders and have not even questioned the same by seeking leave to amend the writ petition or by the medium of another writ petition that they were entitled to regularization as Parking Fee Collectors, not as Beldars. They have accepted the same and now, cannot be allowed to make a u-turn. 14. Having said so, the impugned judgment is well reasoned, needs no interference. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed alongwith all pending applications.