JUDGMENT By the Court.—This special appeal has been preferred challenging the validity and correctness of the judgment and order dated 30.1.2009 and 9.11.2010 passed by the Writ Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5243 of 2009, Smt. Sarla Mishra v. State of U.P. through its Principal Secretary, Secondary Education, Lucknow and others. 2. The writ petition was filed with the following prayers: “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding respondent No. 3 to pass appropriate order on the representation dt. 3.4.2008 (i.e. Annexure 6 to the writ petition) in the light of the appended judgment/order dt. 27.9.2004 of this Hon’ble Court passed in the writ petition No. 11208 of 1982 of Smt. Bimla Kumari/Petitioner’s junior colleague; (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding respondents to allow the same basic grade i.e. Rs. 200-320 in place of the modified/reduced grade Rs. 175-250 at the relevant time to the petitioner as was given to her junior colleague Smt. Bimla Kumari and add the deduction made from her salary in pursuance of the impugned order dt. 6.4.1982 passed by the respondent No. 4 in the salary of the petitioner and fix her salary accordingly; (iii) Issue any other writ, order or direction which the Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the instant writ petition; (iv) Award the cost of the petition to the petitioner.” 3. The Writ Court after hearing counsel for the petitioner-appellant dismissed the writ petition holding that mere filing of repeated non-statutory and unsolicited representations are not defence or explanation for laches. Referring to the judgment of the Apex Court the Writ Court concluded that such explanation for inordinate delay and laches cannot be a ground for exercising the extraordiary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Noticing the fact that the petitioner-appellant had approached this Court after about 27 years of her pay fixation the writ petition was dismissed by order dated 30.1.2009 in the following terms: “Mere filing of repeated non-statutory and unsolicited representation cannot be taken as a defence or explanation for laches. Noticing the fact that the petitioner-appellant had approached this Court after about 27 years of her pay fixation the writ petition was dismissed by order dated 30.1.2009 in the following terms: “Mere filing of repeated non-statutory and unsolicited representation cannot be taken as a defence or explanation for laches. The Apex Court about two scores of years ago in K.B. Laxmiya Shetty and others v. State of Mysore and others, AIR 1967 SC 993 and again reiterated in Gyan Singh v. High Court Punjab & Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 1894 , has held that such explanation for inordinate delay and laches cannot be a ground for exercising the extra ordiary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This view has again been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case oft Karnakata Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, 2006 (4) SCC 322].” 4. It appears from the record that a review application was preferred by the petitioner-appellant, which was also dismissed vide order dated 9.11.2010 saying that no ground for review is made out. 5. This defective special appeal No. 326 of 2011 has thereafter been filed by the appellant alongwith delay condonation application. The office has reported that the appeal filed on 19.3.2009 is beyond time by 2 years 11 days. 6. It appears from the report of the Stamp Reporter as well as from the judgment impugned in this appeal that the appellant had approached the Court after a delay of 27 years and thereafter had preferred the special appeal after 2 years. The laches of 29 years have not been satisfactorily explained. 7. A reference may be made to the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and another v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 , paragraphs 52, 53 and 54 whereof are quoted as under : “52. In the very first appeal, the respondent filed Writ Petition on 11.11.2005 claiming relief under the Notification dated 6.10.1989 w.e.f. 1.1.1986 without furnishing any explanation for such inordinate delay and on laches on her part. In the very first appeal, the respondent filed Writ Petition on 11.11.2005 claiming relief under the Notification dated 6.10.1989 w.e.f. 1.1.1986 without furnishing any explanation for such inordinate delay and on laches on her part. Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1963, makes it obligatory on the part of the Court to dismiss the Suit or appeal if made after the prescribed period even though the limitation is not set up as a defence and there is no plea to raise the issue of limitation even at appellate stage because in some of the cases it may go to the root of the matter. (See: Lachhmi Sewak Sahu v. Ram Rup Sahu and others, AIR 1944 Privy Council 24; and Kamlesh Babu v. Lajpat Rai Sharma and others, (2008) 12 SCC 577 ). 53. Needless to say that Limitation Act 1963 does not apply in writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. In a case like at hand, getting a particular pay-scale may give rise to a recurring cause of action. In such an eventuality, the petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the Court may refuse to grant relief for the initial period in case of an unexplained and inordinate delay. In the instant case, the respondent claimed the relief from 1.1.1986 by filing a petition on 11.11.2005 but the High Court for some unexplained reason granted the relief w.e.f. 1.6.1984, though even the Notification dated 6.10.1989 makes it applicable w.e.f. 1.1.1986. 54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable time. (See: Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 674 ; State of Karnataka and others v. S.M. Kotrayya and others, (1996) 6 SCC 267 ; and Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 2366 ).” 8. (See: Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 674 ; State of Karnataka and others v. S.M. Kotrayya and others, (1996) 6 SCC 267 ; and Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 2366 ).” 8. In view of the above noted decision in the case of State of Orissa and another v. Mamata Mohanty (supra) no relief can be granted to the appellant on the basis of judgment and order dated 27.9.2004 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 11208 of 1982 (Smt. Bimla Kumari v. State of U.P. and others). It may also be noticed that Annexure-1 to the review application at page 66 of the paper book was never filed before the Writ Court to establish that the petitioner had ever agitated her case in the year 1982 itself before the concerned state authority. It is only a letter issued to the petitioner allegedly in the year 1983 by the Manager of the institution. 9. On the contrary Annexure-6 to the writ petition at page 52 of the paper book indicates that she had represented for the first time in the year 2008 vide representation dated 3.4.2008, which was rejected vide order dated 28/29.4.2008 by the District Inspector of Schools, Etawah on the ground that Smt. Bimla Devi was granted relief in pursuance of the judgment of this Court. 10. It is, therefore, clear that even after passing of the judgment in Writ Petition No. 11208 of 1982 dated 27.9.2004 the petitioner did nothing for four years. As such no relief can now be granted to the petitioner on the strength of the judgment dated 27.9.2004 passed in Writ Petition No. 11208 of 1982. 11. In our considered opinion, the approach of the Writ Court cannot faulted with and the writ petition filed by the petitioner has rightly been dismissed on the ground of laches. 12. For all the reasons stated above, this special appeal is dismissed on the ground of laches. ——————