JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar, J. 1. By order dated 09.05.2016, Contempt Case No.614 of 2015 was dismissed by a learned Judge holding that no willful disobedience was made out on the part of the respondents in relation to the order dated 11.12.2014 passed by him in W.P.M.P.No.47844 of 2014 in W.P.No.38238 of 2014. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner in the contempt case filed this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 2. The Registry however raised an objection as to how the appeal was maintainable. The matter was therefore posted for hearing before this Court on the issue of maintainability of the appeal. 3. Sri M.Pitchaiah, learned counsel for the appellant, would contend that this appeal is maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and that restrictions under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1971’) would have no application. He placed reliance on case law to support his contention: In V.M. Manohar Prasad Vs. N. Ratnam Raju, (2004) 13 SCC 610 , the Supreme Court was considering a case where an appeal was filed against further directions given by a learned Judge exercising contempt jurisdiction and the Division Bench of the High Court had held that such an appeal was not maintainable. In this situation, the Supreme Court held that the appeal was maintainable as an appeal would lie to the Court normally exercising appellate jurisdiction against directions given by a Court without jurisdiction. Similarly, In the Matter of : State of West Bengal and etc. 2004 CRL. L.J. 1594, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was dealing with a case where a learned Judge, exercising contempt jurisdiction, issued directions. In such circumstances, the appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was held to be maintainable. These cases are therefore different from the present case. 4. The decision in Parents Association of Students Vs. M.A. Khan, (2009) 2 SCC 641 is also distinguishable. That was a case where an interim order was passed by a learned Judge exercising contempt jurisdiction against a third party to the writ proceedings from which the contempt case arose. An appeal was preferred against the order by the third party. Maintainability of the appeal was in issue as no order of punishment had been passed warranting exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act of 1971. An appeal was preferred against the order by the third party. Maintainability of the appeal was in issue as no order of punishment had been passed warranting exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act of 1971. Reliance was placed by the Supreme Court on its earlier decision in R.N. Dey Vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400 , wherein it was held that exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with initiation of proceedings for contempt and if an order is passed not discharging the rule, it would be an order in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and an appeal would be maintainable. In effect, these were also cases relating to actual exercise of contempt jurisdiction unlike the case on hand where the learned Judge found it fit and proper not to exercise such jurisdiction. 5. Sujitendra Nath Singh Roy Vs. State of West Bengal, (2015) 12 SCC 514 was a case wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with refusal by the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal to exercise contempt jurisdiction vested in it by the statute. The Supreme Court disagreed with the view taken by the High Court as to the scope of testing such refusal and held that merely because the power of contempt was vested in it, the Tribunal does not cease to be inferior to the High Court. It was observed that High Courts have constitutional status and are vested with extraordinary writ jurisdiction whereas the Tribunal is only a creature of the statute. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution would be available to a party aggrieved by the refusal of the Tribunal to exercise contempt jurisdiction. This case is therefore not comparable to the case on hand. 6. The Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Ashoke Kumar Rai Vs. Ashoke Arora, LAWS(CAL)-1991-12-14 is also relied upon, but we find this case to have no application on facts. This was also a case where a learned Judge, exercising contempt jurisdiction, having held the contemnor guilty of contempt, directed him to redeliver possession of property. It was against this direction that an appeal was preferred. Ashoke Arora, LAWS(CAL)-1991-12-14 is also relied upon, but we find this case to have no application on facts. This was also a case where a learned Judge, exercising contempt jurisdiction, having held the contemnor guilty of contempt, directed him to redeliver possession of property. It was against this direction that an appeal was preferred. As the learned Judge had held the contemnor guilty of contempt, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held the appeal to be maintainable under Section 19 of the Act of 1971. 7. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Clough Engineering Ltd. Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, 2009 Law Suit (Bom) 310, was dealing with the maintainability of an appeal under Section 19 of the Act of 1971, notwithstanding the fact that there was no conviction. It was held that the only requirement for maintaining such an appeal is that the order should have been passed in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and the words ‘in its jurisdiction to punish’ cannot be pedantically interpreted to mean that there must actually be some ‘punishment’. 8. Similar was the view taken by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in S.C. Sekar Vs. Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association, (LAWS (MAD)-2008-7-221). The issue before the Court was whether an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Act of 1971 against an interim order passed in a contempt case. In this context, the Madras High Court held that an appeal would lie from any order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and it need not necessarily mean that only in cases where the Court ‘punishes’ the contemnor, an appeal would lie and not when some other adverse order is passed. The ratio decidendi was that in the event an order is passed adversely affecting any person, he would be entitled to prefer an appeal. It is on the strength of the above case law that Sri M.Pitchaiah, learned counsel, would contend that Section 19 of the Act of 1971 provides for an appeal against an order passed in exercise of ‘the jurisdiction to punish’ but appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent need not be contoured by such narrow parameters. It is on the strength of the above case law that Sri M.Pitchaiah, learned counsel, would contend that Section 19 of the Act of 1971 provides for an appeal against an order passed in exercise of ‘the jurisdiction to punish’ but appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent need not be contoured by such narrow parameters. We are however not persuaded to agree as all the decisions cited dealt with cases where the Contempt Court had exceeded its jurisdiction and issued supplemental orders/directions, which were held to be appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The case on hand cannot be brought within this ambit as the learned Judge altogether refused to exercise contempt jurisdiction. Stray observations in judgments cannot be read out of context to mean that any and every order passed in a contempt case would be appealable, be it under Section 19 of the Act of 1971 or under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 9. On the other hand, it may be noticed that in State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy, (1996) 4 SCC 411 , while dealing with the issue as to whether an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Act of 1971 against an order refusing to initiate contempt proceedings, the Supreme Court observed that an appeal is a creature of the statute and unless provided for thereunder, it could not be claimed as a matter of right or course. It was held that if the High Court passed an order dropping the proceedings for contempt or refusing to initiate proceedings for contempt, no appeal would be maintainable against such an order. Reference was made to the fact that contempt proceedings were not in the nature of a dispute between two parties but were proceedings primarily between the Court and the person alleged to have committed contempt. It was further observed that a person who informs the Court of the alleged contempt is not in the position of a prosecutor but is only assisting the Court in maintaining and upholding its dignity and majesty. The Supreme Court therefore held that it is for the Court to ultimately decide whether proceedings should be initiated for contempt or to discharge the contemnor on the facts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court therefore held that it is for the Court to ultimately decide whether proceedings should be initiated for contempt or to discharge the contemnor on the facts and circumstances of the case. It was however pointed out that a person aggrieved by dropping of the contempt proceedings or failure to initiate the same is not without remedy as he could invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Though this case arose in the context of an appeal under Section 19 of the Act of 1971, the observation that the remedy provided to an aggrieved petitioner in a contempt case is only under Article 136 of the Constitution unequivocally puts it beyond the pale of doubt that no appeal would lie from such an order under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. This view was reiterated thereafter by the Supreme Court in Midanapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. Vs. Chunilal Nanda, (2006) 5 SCC 399. 10. On the above analysis, we hold that the appellant cannot invoke Clause 15 of the Letters Patent to file an appeal against the order passed by the learned Judge refusing to exercise contempt jurisdiction. 11. The office objection is therefore upheld and the appeal is dismissed on the ground of maintainability.