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Rajasthan High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 671 (RAJ)

Hosihyar Singh v. Anita

2016-05-12

BANWARI LAL SHARMA

body2016
JUDGMENT : Mr. Banwari Lal Sharma, J. The present petition is preferred by the petitioner accused Hoshiyar Singh assailing the impugned order dated 10.02.2016 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khetri in criminal revision petition No. 5/2016 by which learned Revisional Court while dismissing the revision petition affirmed order dated 22.12.2015 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Buhana in criminal case no. 968/2015 (State v. Dharamveer Singh & ors.) (Criminal misc. case no. 628/2015 (FIR No. 184/2015, PS, Buhana, Dist., Jhunjhunu) offences u/s 498-A, 406 and 323 IPC. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent No. 1 complainant lodged a report at PS, Buhana, Dist., Jhunjhunu on which FIR no. 184/2015 u/s 323, 498-A, 406 IPC was registered. During investigation of said FIR, the vehicle swift desire V.D.I. Car no. HR-34-G-7455 was seized by the Investigating Officer. Two applications for supurdaginama of said car were submitted before learned judicial Magistrate, Buhana. For supurdaginama of the said car one by the petitioner Hoshiyar Singh and another by Respondent no. 1 complainant Smt. Anita, after hearing on both the applications, learned Magistrate vide order dated 22.12.2015 dismissed the application of the present petitioner and allowed the application of respondent no. 1 and ordered to release the said car on supurdaginama in favour of the respondent no. 1 complainant. 3. The said order dated 22.12.2015 was assailed in the revision petition by the petitioner Hoshiyar Singh. The revision petition was again dismissed vide impugned order dated 10.02.2016 (Annex.-3) by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khetri, Rajasthan. Aggrieved by the said orders, petitioner moved this misc. petition before this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Mithun Chaturvedi submits that the car in question was purchased from the Army Canteen, Hisar by the petitioner and registration of said car is in the name of present petitioner after getting loan of Rs. 4,50,000/- from the State Bank of India, Branch Mahendragarh, Haryana, therefore, petitioner is owner of the said car and he is entitled to get it on supurdaginama. He submits that Bank statement was also submitted by the petitioner as Annex-1. He submits that as per M.V. Act, petitioner is owner of the said car which is registered in his name and he is only entitled for retaining car other than the registered owner if retains ca: without his consent is an offence. He submits that Bank statement was also submitted by the petitioner as Annex-1. He submits that as per M.V. Act, petitioner is owner of the said car which is registered in his name and he is only entitled for retaining car other than the registered owner if retains ca: without his consent is an offence. Without considering all these facts, both the courts below wrongly passed the impugned order. Therefore, same may be quashed and application of petitioner may be allowed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on judgment in the case of Smt. Lali Devi & Ors. v. Prabhu Narayan & Ors. reported in 2015(1) WLC (Raj.) 143, HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Kumari Reshma and ors. reported in 2015(1) WLC (SC) Civil 239. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 complainant Shri Sandeep Sharma supported the impugned orders and submitted that Rs. 6,50,000/- were given in cash for purchasing car. Therefore, it is Stridhan belonging to respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 1 is entitled for getting the car on supurdaginama. As enshrined in section 113 of Hindu Law. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon judgment in the case of Bhuvnesh Sharma v. The State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 2014 WLC (Raj.) UC 30 & Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar & ors. reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court 628. 7. Learned PP Shri S.K. Saini submits that though it is alleged in F.I.R. and statements of the witnesses that Rs. 6,50,000/- were given in cash for purchasing the car but it reveals from the material collected during investigation, it is proved that the said car was purchased by the petitioner accused from Army Canteen, Hisar Haryana. After seeing permission and getting loan of Rs. 4,50,000/- by the petitioner from the State Bank of India Branch Mahendragarh. Therefore, the money which is said to be given by the complainant party is not used for purchasing this car. Rather the car was purchased, after getting loan facility from the State Bank of India and the car is hypothecated to the said Bank. Transferring possession of the said car without consent of the Bank is an offence. As petitioner can not transfer the possession or ownership of the vehicle. Rather the car was purchased, after getting loan facility from the State Bank of India and the car is hypothecated to the said Bank. Transferring possession of the said car without consent of the Bank is an offence. As petitioner can not transfer the possession or ownership of the vehicle. Since it is hypothecated to the Bank and there is clear condition in this regard in the agreement executed between the Bank and petitioner, in the terms that "It is also certified that the car applied is for my personal use and will not sold/transferred to any person during next 4 years as per the orders on the subject." 8. He submits that as per section 2(30) owner is a registered owner of the said vehicle and as per sections 39 and 192 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, driving of motor vehicle without registration, is an offence. Therefore, the best entitlement is of petitioner Hoshiyar Singh. 9. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner so also the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 complainant Shri Sandeep Sharma and learned PP Shri S.K. Saini and perused the impugned orders. 10. It is not disputed that the said car is registered in the name of petitioner and was purchased after getting loan from State Bank of India, Branch, Mahendragarh and is hypothicated to the said Bank. The loan of Rs. 4 lac 50 thousand is advanced by the Bank and the total value of car is Rs. 5,89,251/- (Rs. Five lac Eighty nine thousand two hundred fifty one) out of which 4 lac 50 thousand is advanced by the Bank, therefore, it is prima facie apparent that the amount alleged Rs. 6 lac 50 thousand, was not used for the car. 11. 5,89,251/- (Rs. Five lac Eighty nine thousand two hundred fifty one) out of which 4 lac 50 thousand is advanced by the Bank, therefore, it is prima facie apparent that the amount alleged Rs. 6 lac 50 thousand, was not used for the car. 11. Learned Revisional Court in impugned order also Observed that :- ^^fuxjkuhdkj dh vksj ls izLrqr lkexzh ls izFke n`"V;k ;g izdV gksrk gS fd bl izdj.k esa tCr'kqnk dkj dks dz; djus gsrq fuxjkuhdkj dh vksj ls lsuk dh dsUVhu esa izkFkZuk i= izLrqr fd;k x;k] tgkWa ls mls dkj [kjhnus dh Lohd`fr izkIr gqbZA dsUVhu ds ek/;e ls fuxjkuhdkj dh vksj ls mDr dkj vius uke ls dz; dh xbZ rFkk mDr dkj dz; djus gsrq mlus LVsV cSad vkWQ b.fM;k 'kk[kk egsUnzx<+] gfj;k.kk ls dkj _.k izkIr fd;k] ftudk 4]50]000@& :i;s izkIr fd;s FksA dkj dk iath;u fuxjkuhdkj ds uke ls gqvk ftlesa mDr dkj cSad ds ikl gkbZiksfFkds'ku gksuk izdV gksrk gSA vr% fuxjkuhdkj dh vksj ls izLrqr nLrkostksa ls ;g izdV gksrk gS fd mDr dkj fuxjkuhdkj }kjk fookg ds dqN fnu iwoZ dz; dh xbZA ftlds dz; djus dh izfdz;k mlus dqN ekg iwoZ 'kq: dh Fkh vkSj lsuk dh dsUVhu ds ek/;e ls cSad _.k ysdj dkj dz; dh x;hA** 12. Therefore, prima facie, it reveals that if any money in advanced by the complainant party, the same was not used for car. 13. In the matter of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar & ors. (Supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 27, it was observed that- "To sum up, the position seems to be that a pure and simple entrustment of stridhan without creating any rights in the husband excepting putting the articles in his possession does not entitle him to use the same to be detriment of his wife without her consent. The husband has no justification for not returning the same articles as and when demanded by the wife nor can be burden her with losses of business by using the said property which was never intended by her while entrusting possession of stridhan. On the allegations in the complaint, the husband is no more and no less than a pure and simple custodian acting on behalf of his wife and if he diverts the entrusted property elsewhere or for different purposes he takes a clear risk of prosecution u/s 406 of the IPC. On the allegations in the complaint, the husband is no more and no less than a pure and simple custodian acting on behalf of his wife and if he diverts the entrusted property elsewhere or for different purposes he takes a clear risk of prosecution u/s 406 of the IPC. On a parity of reasoning, it is manifest that the husband, being only a custodian of the stridhan of his wife, cannot be said to be a joint possession thereof and thus acquire a joint interest in the property." 14. In the matter of Bhuvnesh Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (Supra) and Mangal Singh Khinchi v. State of Rajasthan & ors. 2012(4) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1895. The motor cycle was registered in the name of husband which was seized during investigation in criminal case and the same was given on supurdaginama to the wife complainant. 15. In the matter of HDFC Bank v. Kumari Reshma & ors. (Supra) in para 22-25 observed that- "22. Recently in Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam. & Anr. [2014(1) WLC Civil 709 : 2014(4) SCALE 586 ], a three-Judge Bench was dealing with the issue when an offending vehicle is that under the requisition of the State Government under the Assam Requisition and Control of Vehicles Act, 1968 (‘Assam Act’, for short) the registered owner would be liable or the State Government that has requisitioned the vehicle. The Court referred to the definition of the term ‘owner’ under the 1939 Act as well as the 1988 Act. As was necessary in the said case, the Court referred to the relevant provisions pertaining to release from the requisition under the Assam Act. After analysing the provisions, the three-Judge Bench set aside the award passed by the High Court which had held that owner was liable solely on the basis of the definition of the word ‘owner' contained in Section 2(30) of the 1988 Act. The dictum laid down in the said case is as follows : "The High Court failed to appreciate that at the relevant time the offending vehicle was under the requisition of Respondent No. 1 - State of Assam under the provisions of the Assam Act. Therefore, Respondent No. 1 was squarely covered under the definition of "owner" as contained in Section 2(30) of the 1988 Act. Therefore, Respondent No. 1 was squarely covered under the definition of "owner" as contained in Section 2(30) of the 1988 Act. The High Court failed to appreciate the underlying legislative intention in including in the definition of "owner" a person in possession of a vehicle either under an agreement of lease or agreement of hypothecation or under a hire-purchase agreement to the effect that a person in control and possession of the vehicle should be construed as the "owner" and not alone the registered owner. The High Court further failed to appreciate the legislative intention that the registered owner of the vehicle should not be held liable if the vehicle was not in his possession and control. The High Court also failed to appreciate that Section 146 of the 1988 Act requires that no person shall use or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place without an insurance policy meeting the requirement of Chapter XI of the 1988 Act and the State Government has violated the statutory provisions of the 1988 Act." 23. In the present case, as the facts have been unfurled, the appellant bank had financed the owner for purchase of the vehicle and the owner had entered into a hypothecation agreement with the bank. The borrower had the initial obligation to insure the vehicle, but without insurance he plied the vehicle on the road and the accident took place. Had the vehicle been insured, the insurance company would have been liable and not the owner. There is no cavil over the fact that the vehicle was subject of an agreement of hypothecation and was in possession and control under the respondent no. 2. The High Court has proceeded both in the main judgment as well as in the review that the financier steps into the shoes of the owner. Reliance placed on Kachraji Rayamalji (supra), in our considered opinion, was inappropriate because in the instant case all the documents were filed by the bank. In the said case, two-Judge Bench of this Court had doubted the relationship between the appellant and the respondent therein from the hire-purchase agreement. Be that as it any, the said case rested on its own facts. In the said case, two-Judge Bench of this Court had doubted the relationship between the appellant and the respondent therein from the hire-purchase agreement. Be that as it any, the said case rested on its own facts. The decision in Kailash Nath Kothari (supra), the Court fastened the liability on the Corporation regard being had to the definition of the ‘owner’ who was in control and possession of the vehicle. Simmilar to the effect is the judgment in Deepa Devi (supra). Be it stated, in the said case the Court ruled that the State shall be liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimant and not the registered owner of the vehicle and the insurance company. In the case of Degala Satyanarayanamma (supra), the learned Judges distinguished the ratio in Deepa Devi (supra) on the ground that it hinged on its special facts and fastened the liability on the insurer. In Kulsum (supra), the principle stated in Kailash Nath Kothari (supra) was distinguished and taking note of the fact that at the relevant time, the vehicle in question was insured with it and the policy was very much in force and hence, the insurer was liable to indemnify the owner. 24. On a careful analysis of the principles stated in the foregoing cases, it is found that there is a common thread that the person in possession of the vehicle under the hypothecation agreement has been treated as the owner. Needless to emphasise, if the vehicle is insured, the insurer is bound to indemnify unless there is violation of the terms of the policy under which the insurer can seek exoneration. 25. In Purnya Kala Devi (supra), a three-Judge Bench has categorically held that the person in control and possession of the vehicle under an agreement of hypothecation should be construed as the owner and not alone the registered owner and thereafter the Court has adverted to the Page 28 legislative intention, and ruled that the registered owner of the vehicle should not be held liable if the vehicle is not in his possession and control. There is reference to Section 146 of the Act that no person shall use or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place without insurance as that is the mandatory statutory requirement under the 1988 Act. There is reference to Section 146 of the Act that no person shall use or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place without insurance as that is the mandatory statutory requirement under the 1988 Act. In the instant case, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, Centurion Bank, was the registered owner along with respondent no. 2. The respondent no. 2 was in control and possession of the vehicle. He had taken the vehicle from the dealer without paying the full premium to the insurance company and thereby getting the vehicle insured. The High Court has erroneously opined that the financier had the responsibility to get the vehicle insured, if the borrower failed to insure it. The said term in the hypothecation agreement does not convey that the appellant financier had become the owner and was in control and possession of the vehicle. It was the absolute fault of the respondent no.2 to take the vehicle from the dealer without full payment of the insurance. Nothing has been brought on record that this fact was known to the appellant financier or it was done in collusion with the financier. When the intention of the legislature is quite clear to the effect, a registered owner of the vehicle should not be held liable if the vehicle is not in his possession and control and then is evidence on record that the respondent no.2, without the insurance plied the vehicle in violation of the statutory provision contained in Section 146 of the 1988 Act, the High Court could not have mulcted the liability on the financier. The appreciation by the learned Single Judge in appeal, both in fact and law, is wholly unsustainable." 16. In the matter of Smt. Lali Devi & ors. v. Prabhu Narayan & ors. 2015(1) WLC (Raj.) 143, "Owner in regard to motor vehicle is defined in para and 21 as follow:- "20. However, for the purpose of the MV Act, the word "owner" has been restricted to a totally different class of persons, namely a person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered, or where such a person is minor his guardian, or in relation to a motor vehicle bought under hire purchase agreement, the person in whose possession the vehicle under the agreement is kept. Thus obviously the definitions of owner in two different Acts, differ greatly from each other. Interestingly, while the Act of 1972 does not make the person who is in possession of the goods as the owner, in the MV Act the person who is in possession becomes the owner by operation of law. Thus the word "owner" for the purpose of MV Act is totally different than the word "owner" in the Act of 1972. Needless to say, the definition given in on a particular Act cannot be transported or transplanted into another Act, unless and until the Acts can be read mutatis, which obviously in the present case cannot be. Therefore, as far as the MV Act is concerned, one would have to confine the meaning of the word "owner" as defined in the MV Act itself. One cannot travel beyond the MV Act and consider the definition of ‘owner’ given in the Act of 1972. Hence the first contention was bought under a hire-purchase agreement, therefore, it would be covered by the definition of the word "owner" given in the Act of 1972, is untenable. While the learned Tribunal was dealing with a claim petition under the MV Act, naturally the learned Tribunal has to continue its interpretation to the definition of "owner" as given in the said MV Act. A bare perusal of the impugned award clearly reveals that this is exactly what the learned Tribunal had done. 21. The learned Tribunal was certainly justified in concluding that since the "owner" means in whose name the vehicle stands registered, and in whose possession the vehicle is under a hire-purchase agreement, such a person would be deemed to be the "owner" of the vehicle. In the present case, admittedly, the motor vehicle was registered in the name of Surajmal, and on the date of the accident it was under his possession as he was riding as a pillion rider on the said motorcycle. Thus, the learned Tribunal was legally justified in its conclusion. 17. Here in the present case as the allegation of complainant party is that it gave Rs. 6 lack 50 thousand for purchasing car but as discussed above the car was purchased after taking loan from State Bank of India and is registered in favour of petitioner and is hypothicated to the said Bank. 17. Here in the present case as the allegation of complainant party is that it gave Rs. 6 lack 50 thousand for purchasing car but as discussed above the car was purchased after taking loan from State Bank of India and is registered in favour of petitioner and is hypothicated to the said Bank. And there is clear agreement between the Bank and petitioner that it shall not be transferred in such situation. If the car is given in possession of respondent no.1 who is not registered owner and has not privity of contract with the Bank, so many complications will arise. The facts of case law’s cited by learned counsel respondent no. 1 are different from the facts of present case. As in those cases the vehicles was not purchased on loan and are not hypothicated to the Bank. 18. Therefore, these case laws do not help the respondent no. 1. Both the learned Courts below without considering the facts of hypothecation of Bank, loan and agreement of Bank and without considering the fact that the alleged money given by respondent No. 1 was not used for purchasing the 2 car allowed the application of respondent no. 1 & dismissed the application of petitioner which is not sustainable and are quashed and set aside & application for supurdagi of petitioner is allowed and application of respondent no. 1 is dismissed. 19. Learned Trial Court is directed that after taking in possession 2 release the car in favour of present petitioner on Supurdaginama and Jamanatnama as released in favour of respondent no. 1 on same conditions. Car Released in Favour of Petitioner.