JUDGMENT Kailash Chandra Sharma, J. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 17.08.2010 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Churu in Sessions Case No.13/2008 whereby the accused appellant was convicted for the offence under Sections 457 & 376 IPC and was sentenced for five years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5000/- for the offence under Section 457 IPC and ten years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5000/- for the offence under Section 376 IPC, in default thereof to further undergo for six months' additional simple imprisonment for each offence. Both the sentences was ordered to run concurrently. 2. Brief facts of the case are that a complaint was lodged by complainant Ramesh Chandra on 24.2.2008. On the above said complaint, FIR was registered against the accused-appellant under Sections 457 & 376 IPC and investigation commenced. 3. After investigation, a charge-sheet for the above said offence was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Churu. The learned Magistrate after necessary compliance, committed the charge-sheet to the learned Sessions Judge, Churu who framed the charges against the accused-appellant to which accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses and exhibited the documents. 5. The accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. who denied all the incriminating circumstances appeared against him in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. In his defence, accused appellant examined Kishan Lal Gupta as DW-1. 6. Heard learned counsel for the accused-appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor. 7. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant firstly raised the objection that this is a case of purely consent of the so called victim prosecutrix. About this argument of consent, learned counsel for the accused-appellant tried to attract the attention of the Court on the various statements of prosecutrix. But in my opinion, this argument is not acceptable for the acquittal of the accused-appellant. 8. Under the Indian Penal Code, offence of rape is defined under Section 375 IPC, which is as under: "375.Rape.- A man is said to commit "rape" if he-........ Sixthly.- With or without her consent, then she is under eighteen years of age." 9. According to above mentioned provision, if a person commits sexual intercourse with woman then she is under eighteen years of age with or without her consent, it will come in the scope of rape.
Sixthly.- With or without her consent, then she is under eighteen years of age." 9. According to above mentioned provision, if a person commits sexual intercourse with woman then she is under eighteen years of age with or without her consent, it will come in the scope of rape. 10. In this case, according to First Information Report (Ex. P-2),the victim prosecutrix was only 15 years old girl at the time of commission of this offence and also according to the medical examination, the age of prosecutrix was only 14-16 years at the time of commission of this offence. 11. According to the First Information Report (Ex. P- 2), the offence was committed on 23.2.2008. The prosecutrix at that time was studying in Royal Public School, Poonia Colony, Ward No. 21 Churu. She was the student of class 5th of this school and in her progress report for the year 2006-07 (Ex. P-16) her date of birth was 17.01.1994. According to this document at the time of commission of the offence i.e. 23.2.2008, her age was 14 years, 1 month and 7 days only. 12. According to all evidences mentioned above, the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the time of commission of offence. So, if we accept the contention of learned counsel for the accused-appellant that this is a case of consent but by this argument or by this reason, accused-appellant cannot get any benefit because he committed offence of rape with prosecutrix, who was a girl below 18 years of age. 13. The prosecutrix was examined as PW-1, she in her statement narrated as under: " lqfuy us esjh lyokj dk ukMk [kksy dj esjs lkFk cykRdkj ------- lQsn ikuh lk vk;k FkkA " 14. During the course of argument, learned counsel for the accused-appellant submits that the statement of prosecutrix is not reliable and only on the basis of statement of prosecutrix, accused-appellant cannot be convicted for the alleged offences. 15. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the accused-appellant relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ali @ Guddu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 272 and judgment passed by the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Lakhanlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2004 CRI.L.J. 3962. 16.
15. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the accused-appellant relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ali @ Guddu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 272 and judgment passed by the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Lakhanlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2004 CRI.L.J. 3962. 16. In my considered opinion, accused-appellant is not entitled to get any benefit from the above mentioned various judicial pronouncements because in the case in hand, the statement of the prosecutrix recorded in the court as prosecution witness no.1 and in her examination-in-chief and in cross-examination, no such statement came which appears likely to be false or such a type of statement which falsely implicate the accused-appellant in the commissioning of the alleged offence. This argument of the learned counsel for the accused appellant is not acceptable. There is nothing in the objections submitted by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant. 17. The crime here is rape. It is a particularly heinous crime, a crime against society, a crime against human dignity, one that reduces a man to an animal. The penal stature has prescribed a maximum and a minimum punishment for an offence under Section 376 IPC. 18. On the basis of above discussion, in my considered opinion, I find that the prosecution has fully proved the charges leveled against the accused and learned Sessions Judge rightly passed the judgment on the basis of evidence available on record which are sufficient and awarded the adequate punishment to the accused-appellant which does not require any interference by this Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and hereby dismissed.