JUDGMENT : Dhiraj Singh Thakur, J. 1. In this reference we have been called upon to resolve the difference of opinion expressed by a Division Bench of this court to an earlier Division Bench judgment passed in LPA(SW)-D No. 21/2002 and LPA No. 69/2002 as regards the rights of casual employees to seek either continuance or regularization in service. Briefly stated the material facts are as under: 2. SWP No. 591/2003 came to be filed by the petitioners, Basharat Ahmad Parray and Aliyas Ahmad Wani wherein it was claimed that they had been engaged as casual labourers by virtue of orders dated 1.6.1998 and 19.5.1999 at Fodder Farm, Rambipora for agriculture operations. 3. It was stated that by virtue of Govt. Order No. 144-GAD of 2001, dated 2.2.2001, all daily wagers, who had been engaged after 31.1.1994, were directed to be disengaged, which led the petitioners to question the order of disengagement by filing SWP No. 1135/2002 before this court. 4. Further the case as set up by the petitioners before the writ court was that another petition bearing SWP No. 1577 of 2002 was filed by petitioner No. 2 seeking his continuance as a casual labourer on the basis of the initial order of engagement dated 19.5.1999. This petition, however, is stated to have been withdrawn subsequently upon some assurance given by the official respondents. It is, in those circumstances, that the petitioners yet again filed writ petition bearing SWP No. 591/2003 wherein a mandamus was sought with a view to allow the petitioners to continue as a casual labourers in the Rabbit Fodder Farm, Rambipora, Anantnag and also sought a direction for framing of a scheme for their regularization. This petition came to be disposed of vide judgment and order dated 8.7.2003 by holding as under: "........Case of the petitioners is that they enjoy the status of casual labourers in the respondent department. Dealing with the entitlement of casual labourers to their continuation, this court in Nazir Ahmad Hajam v. State and others reported in 2002 SLJ 42 has held that the stage is not powerless to dispense with the service of the casual labourers if there is no work and their continuation dependents upon the availability of work. Mr. Dealing with the entitlement of casual labourers to their continuation, this court in Nazir Ahmad Hajam v. State and others reported in 2002 SLJ 42 has held that the stage is not powerless to dispense with the service of the casual labourers if there is no work and their continuation dependents upon the availability of work. Mr. Khawaja submits that the judgment aforementioned takes care of the grievances of the petitioners which would mean that they can be considered for continuation if work is available to be extracted from them. In the aforementioned backdrop, this petition is disposed of with the direction that petitioners shall be considered for continuation if need be......" 5. Against the aforementioned judgment and order dated 8.7.2003, an appeal bearing LPA No. 126/2003 came to be preferred by the petitioners before a Division Bench of this Court where counsel for the appellants questioned the judgment as being contrary to the ratio of another Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in LPA(SW)-D No. 21/2002 and LPA No. 69/2002 where certain directions were given with regard to casual employees, who had completed four years as such. It is worthwhile to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment of the Division Bench for facility of reference, which is as under: "That so far as the casual employees are concerned, they are not regulated by the rules in question but the fact would remain that an employee who has completed a tenure of four years and in case, the need if permanent then the said employee would be protected by the observations made by the Supreme Court in Piara Singh's judgment (supra). Paragraph 51 stands quoted above. The state Government would accordingly consider the claims of this category of employees and deal with them individually of frame a scheme in this regard." 6. The Division Bench, however, while considering the Letters Patent Appeal bearing LPA No. 126/2003 against the order of the writ court was not inclined to accept the contention of the counsel for the appellants based upon the earlier judgment and was of the opinion that the judgment rendered by Division Bench in LPA(SW)-D No. 21/2002 and LPA No. 69/2002, which placed reliance upon the Apex Court judgment in Piara Singh's case was per incuriam inasmuch as the observations of the Division Bench were not in accordance with the ratio of the said judgment. 7. 7. It is in the backdrop of the aforementioned facts that we have been called upon to determine as to whether casual employees would have any right to seek continuance in their engagement or their regularization in service. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon Piara Singh's Judgment and certain other judgments of the Apex Court as also the judgment of this court to suggest that this court would have the power to issue a mandamus to direct the continuance of the appellants as casual labourers with the official respondents as also order their regularization after the preparation of a formal scheme pertaining to casual workers in that regard. 9. We do not deem it absolutely necessary to refer to the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in view of the fact that the controversy is no longer res integra with regard to the issue at hand after what has been stated by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors., v. Uma Devi & Ors., 2006 (4) SCC 1 . 10. In the aforementioned case, the court highlighted that the role of the courts was not to encourage, ignore or approve appointments made or engagements given outside the constitutional scheme, which would result in depriving many of their opportunities to compete for public employment and that by ordering regularization of daily wagers, casual employees or employees on contract en masse otherwise than by regular process of selection would defeat the concept of 'equality' as recognized by Article 16 of the Constitution, 11. It was held that directions for regularization or framing of schemes for absorption of casual or daily rated employees, in fact, has enormous economic consequences. While dealing with the directions for regularization of ad hoc or temporarily employees, who had continued for a fairly long spell, the Apex Court held as under: "26. .....With great respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of employment recognized in the earlier part of the decision. Really, it cannot be said that this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or casual employees engaged without following the regular recruitment procedure should be made permanent." 12. The Apex court in the aforementioned judgment proceeded to hold in paragraph 43 as under: "43. Really, it cannot be said that this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or casual employees engaged without following the regular recruitment procedure should be made permanent." 12. The Apex court in the aforementioned judgment proceeded to hold in paragraph 43 as under: "43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules......" 13. The Apex court further held that the mere fact that a person, who has worked on temporary or casual basis, does not warrant regularization on that account alone as he accepts the employment with open eyes so as to earn his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets and that it does not by itself justify jettisoning the constitutional scheme of employment by ordering his continuance or regularization on a permanent basis. In paragraph 47 of the judgment, the Apex Court proceeded to hold as under: "47. In paragraph 47 of the judgment, the Apex Court proceeded to hold as under: "47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where there are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post." 14. The only exception, which was carved out for regularization, was in regard to the services of those employees whose appointments were irregular but not illegal and who had been adjusted against duly sanctioned vacant posts without intervention of court orders or tribunals as a "one time exception". 15. In view of the clear ratio of the aforementioned Constitution Bench judgment, it is clear that the view expressed by the Division Bench in LPA(SW)-D No. 21/2002 and LPA No. 69/2002 was not the correct view and, therefore, no direction could have been issued for regularization of those casual employees, who had worked for more than four years. 16. In view of the above, we hold that the appellants do not have any right to claim either continuance of their engagement as casual workers nor have they any right to seek regularization as such. 17. During the course of arguments, learned Advocate General, Mr. D.C. Raina, submitted that the Govt. on its own had constituted a high level committee vide Govt. Order No. 65-F of 2016, dated 03.03.2016. The terms of reference of which was as under: "(a) To look into the extent/magnitude of problems relating to Casual workers i.e. financial, legal and administrative that may arise in regularization of such employees. D.C. Raina, submitted that the Govt. on its own had constituted a high level committee vide Govt. Order No. 65-F of 2016, dated 03.03.2016. The terms of reference of which was as under: "(a) To look into the extent/magnitude of problems relating to Casual workers i.e. financial, legal and administrative that may arise in regularization of such employees. (b) To work out an appropriate policy outlining all possible options in this regard." It was further stated by him that the Govt. on its own was looking into the entire issue pertaining to the casual workers and, therefore, no mandamus at all was required to be issued for framing any such policy. Needless to say that any decision by the Govt. with regard to casual workers would necessarily have to be in accord with the ratio of the judgment of Uma Devi's case (supra). Having considered the LPA No. 126/2003 on merits, the same is found to be without any merit and is accordingly dismissed along with connected application.