ORDER : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. This is defendants' appeal against the judgment and decree dated 28.2.2015 passed by Additional District Judge No. 2, Kota, who thereby affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Kota. 2. Plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in the trial court inter alia pleading that defendant-appellant allotted a plot No. F2 (1), Indraprastha Industrial Area, Kota to deceased Amar Lal on 8.6.1976 and a lease deed was executed in his favour on 21.1.1977. Possession was also handed over to the plaintiff and since then he has continued in possession of the land. Plaintiff claimed that he raised construction and when the boundary wall was constructed, a civil suit came to be filed by M/s. Kota Industries through one Mathuresh Kumar Gopi Lal, the neighbour of the allotted land. In that suit, an interim injunction order was passed against the plaintiff. Even though he was not impleaded as party to the suit, owning to the interim order however plaintiff could not raise any construction. The defendant-appellants in the meantime issued a letter dated 3.3.1989 informing that since construction was not made, therefore, the allotment of plot should be cancelled. The Resident Engineer of the appellant wrote a letter dated 11.4.1978 to the plaintiff stating that since there was a dispute pending in the Court, therefore, the construction may not be raised. It is owning to these facts that the plaintiff could not raise the construction. The defendant-appellants filed their written statement to the plaint pleading that the suit was dismissed by the trial court on 27.4.1985 and thus the injunction order in his favour came to an end. Even thereafter the plaintiff failed to raise the construction, thus it has violated the provisions of clause 2(d) and 3(a) of the lease agreement. The defendants also raised objection about valuation of the suit and that there was an arbitration clause which ought to be opted by the plaintiff, rather than filing the suit. The trial court framed as many as seven issues. The plaintiff produced 2 witnesses and exhibited 6 documents. The defendants produced 1 witness and exhibited 17 documents. The learned trial court decreed the suit which was affirmed by the appellate court. 3. The trial court framed as many as seven issues. The plaintiff produced 2 witnesses and exhibited 6 documents. The defendants produced 1 witness and exhibited 17 documents. The learned trial court decreed the suit which was affirmed by the appellate court. 3. Shri R.A. Katta, learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the learned trial court as well as first appellate court committed serious illegality in deciding Issue No. 1. Issue No. 1 pertains to the fact as to whether the plaintiff could not complete construction over the disputed plot because of pendency of the case? It is submitted that the defendants have specifically pleaded and proved the fact that the suit filed by M/s. Kota Industries came to be dismissed on 27.04.1985. In that suit, the plaintiff was also party and this fact is admitted. This is also uncontroverted fact that there was no stay order passed by any competent court for raising construction after 27.04.1985. Plaintiff himself could not give and prove any justified and valid reason for not raising any construction after 27.04.1985 but the learned courts below did not accept the contention of the defendants illegally on the ground that the suit was not finally decided as the appeal was still pending. It is submitted that the suit filed by M/s. Kota Industries was decided on 27.04.1985 and thereafter there was no stay order by any competent court. In absence of stay order, the party cannot presume the fact that it is restrained from raising any construction. Learned courts below committed serious illegality and perversity in accepting the contention of plaintiff that since the appeal was pending, therefore, he could not raise construction even though there was no restraint order from any court. Learned trial court though noted this fact that there is no stay order after 27.04.1985 but wrongly observed because of principles of natural justice, the party was expected to not raise any construction. The finding of learned trial court as well as appellate courts are contrary to the provisions of Section 115(3) C.P.C. which says that a revision shall not operate as stay of suit or other proceedings before the court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by this Court. Even otherwise, the principles of natural justice are not attracted where the parties have a remedy under procedural law. Even otherwise, the principles of natural justice are not attracted where the parties have a remedy under procedural law. Therefore, the findings of both the courts below on Issue No. 1 are perverse. 4. Learned counsel further argued that the findings of learned courts below on Issue No. 2 are perverse and illegal and contrary to the record of the case and material on record. Issue No. 2 was to the effect as to what would be effect if the plaintiff did not raise construction after 27.04.1985 when there was no stay order of the Court? The learned trial court as well as appellate court decided this issue against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiff. It is submitted that the learned courts below did not appreciate the fact that the parties are bound by the agreement in between them assuming that there was no stay order in existence in the suit filed by M/s. Kota Industries, but the suit came to be dismissed on 27.04.1985 and the stay order also came to an end on that day and further there was no stay order in appeal. If the analogy of the court below is accepted, then mere filing of the suit would be sufficient to restrain a party from taking any step, in such circumstances filing of stay application is not required at all. But the stay order or restrain order are never automatic. The party defaulting and violating terms of agreement cannot plead innocent by not complying with the condition of the agreement. 5. Shri R.A. Katta, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the learned courts below have erred in law in not dismissing the suit for non-payment of court fee in view of fact that possession on the disputed land was that of the appellant. Learned counsel relied on the statement of Smt. Sheela Devi, the widow of late Shri Amar Lal, who in cross examination when asked to clarify as to who is presently in possession of the disputed land, stated that it could be that of the Government and also referred to the statement of Jai Kumar, the son of the deceased Amar Lal that they do not possess any document with regard to construction of boundary wall. Learned counsel argued that plaintiffs have nowhere pleaded that they are in possession. Learned counsel argued that plaintiffs have nowhere pleaded that they are in possession. They should therefore cannot be compelled to pay the Court fee and the suit cannot be maintained without payment of the Court fee. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants in support of his arguments has relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2013) 9 SCC 32 , M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar & Ors., (1975) 2 SCC 530 , American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 199 and Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation & Anr. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr., (2013) 5 SCC 470 . Learned counsel has also relied on the judgement of coordinate bench of this Court in M/s. Nidhikamal Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Ltd. & Anr., S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 3811/2015 decided on 12.10.2015. 7. Shri Amit Dadhich, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that stray part of the statement of Sheela Devi and Jai Kumar only cannot be relied and their statements have to be read in entirety. In fact, the possession was throughout with the respondent. Jai Kumar also in his statement categorically admitted in the line immediately preceding the part of statement relied on by learned counsel for the appellants that they got the boundary wall constructed as per the conditions of allotment. Since the plaintiffs continued to retain possession of the disputed land and therefore did not pray for relief of possession. They were therefore not required to pay the Court fee on that basis. Issue No. 3 has rightly been decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. It is also argued that even during pendency of the appeal, the appellants have served upon the respondent-plaintiffs a notice admitting their possession, but alleging that the respondents were raising construction of shed despite status quo order by this Court. 8. Perusal of the impugned judgment especially finding on Issue Nos. It is also argued that even during pendency of the appeal, the appellants have served upon the respondent-plaintiffs a notice admitting their possession, but alleging that the respondents were raising construction of shed despite status quo order by this Court. 8. Perusal of the impugned judgment especially finding on Issue Nos. 1 and 2 recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court indicates that after allotment dated 8.6.1976, the lease deed was executed in favour of plaintiff on 21.1.1977 and possession of the disputed plot was also handed over to him, but M/s. Kota Industries filed a civil suit No. 57/83 wherein injunction order was passed in their favour with regard to land in dispute. The defendant-RIICO send a letter Ex. 3 dated 11.4.1978 to the plaintiff advising them not to raise construction. Since the suit filed by M/s. Kota Industries was rejected by the Court of Munsif vide judgment dated 27.4.1985, the order of injunction also came to an end. Even then, for as long as four years, no shed was constructed and no other construction was raised by the plaintiffs on the disputed industrial plot, therefore, the appellants invoking clauses 2(d) and 3(a) of the lease agreement, cancelled the allotment. Virendra Kumar (DW1) as witness of the defendant in cross examination has admitted that appeal was filed by M/s. Kota Industries before the High Court against the dismissal of suit. The matter then remained pending from 1977 to 1999. The appeal was finally dismissed on 24.4.1999. The contention relying on Section 115 that mere filing of appeal would not operate as a stay of suit or other proceedings, cannot be accepted because that provision has been engrafted in CPC for a different purpose altogether, namely to ensure that the proceedings of a civil suit are not hampered by mere filing of revision petition. It is therefore advisedly provided therein that mere filing of the revision petition would not operate as a stay of suit or proceedings, but here in the present case, it is not under dispute that the plaintiff could not raise construction of shed in the industrial plot allotted to him because of the injunction order passed in the suit, but when the suit was dismissed, the appeal was filed by the plaintiff, which appeal remained pending till 1999. While it is true that there was no interim order in that appeal, yet the fact remains that the allotment of the plot was cancelled by the defendant-RIICO on 3.3.1989, but at the same time, the fact is that they did not take any steps to take possession of the industrial plot from the plaintiff. Plaintiff thus continued to remain in possession of the industrial plot till the dismissal of the appeal by this Court. The possession of the plaintiff over the industrial plot cannot be said to be illegal or otherwise he cannot be described as trespasser. Not only plaintiff, but also defendants were party to the appeal pending before this Court against the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff has replied to the letter dated 25.1.1989 (Ex. 9) issued to him by order dated 28.1.1989 (Ex. 11) to the effect that since the matter is pending consideration before this Court, therefore, he cannot run the risk of raising construction. Even then the defendants did not proceed to take possession of the plot. Admittedly, the plaintiff stopped the construction activities on being required by the defendants and thereafter he also was impleaded as party respondent (defendant) to the said suit and therefore any judgments of the High Court would have binding effect not only on the plaintiff but also on the defendant-appellants with regard to the dispute. 9. Even though the appellants sought to assert that they have taken possession of the disputed plot, but the court below did not accept this plea. While dealing with Issue No. 1, the trial court has rather observed that plaintiff has merely asked for declaration and perpetual injunction and did not pray for recovery of possession and therefore could not be held liable to pay the deficit court fee. 10. The statement of the witnesses of the plaintiff Sheela Devi (PW1) has to be read in entirety. She is widow of late Amar Lal. In the examination-in-chief, she has stated that after taking possession of the plot, they started construction. They also got the pooja performed and boundary wall was also constructed by them and electricity connection was also taken. When the construction was made, the adjoining plot holder-M/s. Kota Industries objected to the same. This lady witness in cross examination stated that all this construction was made in 1979. There was no other construction except the boundary wall. They also got the pooja performed and boundary wall was also constructed by them and electricity connection was also taken. When the construction was made, the adjoining plot holder-M/s. Kota Industries objected to the same. This lady witness in cross examination stated that all this construction was made in 1979. There was no other construction except the boundary wall. Her husband got the boundary wall constructed. She was unaware whether there was electricity connection. During cross examination in response to a query as to presently who was in possession, this lady has been made to say that possibly at present government could be in possession of the land. This does not make her entire statement liable to be ignored. Jai Kumar, the son of Amar Lal has clarified this position and categorically stated that they did not proceed with the construction because of the stay order passed by the Court. The Resident Engineer Shri Mathur sent a communication on 11.4.1978 to the effect that in view of stay order, further construction may not be carried out. In cross examination, this witness has stated that allotment letter contains certain conditions and the construction of the boundary wall was got done as per those conditions. Even if, therefore, in the next line, this witness has stated that they did not have any documents with regard to construction of boundary wall, this does not tantamount to his admission that they were not in possession of the disputed land. When the plaintiffs did not pray for the relief for recovery of possession, they were not required to pay appropriate amount of court fee. Their prayer was only with regard to injunction. It is wrong to suggest that the plaintiffs did not plead that they were in possession. This fact was very much pleaded by the plaintiffs in their plaint and has been taken note of by both trial court as well as first appellate court in the opening of the judgment that plaintiffs pleaded that they were put in possession on 21.1.1977 and since then they are in possession of the said plot. 11. The cited judgments are distinguishable on fact and therefore cannot be of any help to the appellants. 11. The cited judgments are distinguishable on fact and therefore cannot be of any help to the appellants. The judgment of this Court in M/s. Nidhikamal Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. supra, which arose out of allotment of an industrial plot of RIICO to the appellant therein, which was cancelled on failure of the appellant to raise construction within two years, is also distinguishable on facts because therein no litigation with regard to that land at the instance of third party was pending so as to justify the failure or delay on the part of the allottee to raise construction of industrial shed etc. within 24 months of the date of allotment. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants at this stage has argued that even if eventually the impugned judgments are upheld, respondents may not be permitted to use the land for any other purpose except the one for which it was allotted and that they may be required to pay the remaining sale consideration at the present rate. 13. No such plea was raised before the courts below and therefore cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time before this Court. The trial court having declared the order of cancellation bad, things now have to march ahead to proceed further from that stage where it was when the said order was passed and, therefore, the further process would take place in terms of judgment and decree passed by the trial court and affirmed by the first appellate court from that stage onwards. 14. The appeal in my considered view does not raise any question of law much less any substantial question of law so as to justify interference by this Court. 15. The appeal is dismissed.