Judgment Janak Raj Kotwal, J.—Appellants, Girdhari Lal, who was accused No.1 (hereinafter to be referred as A-1) and Janki Devi, who was accused No.2 (hereinafter to be referred as A-2), have filed this appeal against Judgment dated 27.08.2001 rendered by learned Sessions Judge, Poonch whereby they have been convicted under sections 302 and 201 RPC read with section 34 RPC and order dated 14.09.2001, whereby each one of them has been sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/ in proof of offence under section 302 RPC and imprisonment for a term of 10 years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/ in proof of offence under section 201 RPC. 2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. Facts of the prosecution case are that on 13.10.1997 Police Station, Poonch received source information about commission of suicide by Nirmal Devi the wife of A-1 (hereinafter to be referred as the deceased). On this information police registered offence under section 306 RPC as FIR No. 127/1997 and took up the investigation. The Investigating Officer (I.O.) proceeded to the spot, seized the dead body and dispatched it for autopsy. He seized two bottles, one of them smelling kerosene, one half burnt matchbox and one partially burnt lady-suit from the spot. He prepared the sketch map (Ex. PW-MN) of the crime scene. He arrested A-1, his brother Amrit Lal, father, Jia Lal and mother, the A-2. On obtaining the autopsy report, I.O. found commission of offence under sections 302/34 and 201/120-B RPC as strangulation was the cause of death and therefore, dropped the offence under section 306 RPC. On 22.10.1997 A-1 made a disclosure statement and on its basis I.O. on the same day recovered a ‘dupatta’ (cloth used for cover her head by a woman), which, according to the prosecution was used by the appellants for strangulating the deceased. The I.O. in the course of investigation recorded statements of witnesses in terms of section 161 CrPC. On the basis of investigation, it was found that A-2 wanted to solemnize another marriage of A-1 for the reason that deceased had not given birth to any child. A-2 was also desirous of solemnizing second marriage and therefore, the appellants had been harassing and quarrelling with the deceased. On the basis of investigation, it was found that A-2 wanted to solemnize another marriage of A-1 for the reason that deceased had not given birth to any child. A-2 was also desirous of solemnizing second marriage and therefore, the appellants had been harassing and quarrelling with the deceased. They hatched a conspiracy to liquidate her and in furtherance of that conspiracy on 13.10.1997 at 1.30 PM the appellants took the deceased in a room of their house where A-1 put a noose around her neck, A-2 gave a beating to her and both of them killed her. After the deceased was dead, appellants in order to destroy the evidence doused the dead body in kerosene and set it ablaze. Thereafter the appellants screamed that deceased has burnt. 4. After completion of the investigation, police, preferred charge sheet under sections 302, 120-B, 201 and 34 RPC against the appellants in the committal court. No evidence about involvement of Amrit Lal and Jia Lal in the offence, however, was found and they were given benefit under section 169 Cr.P.C. On committal the case came up for trial before the learned Sessions Judge. Learned trial court framed charges under sections 302, 201/34 RPC against the appellants. Appellants denied the charges and claimed to be tried. Prosecution, therefore, entered its evidence. 5. Prosecution case proceeded on circumstantial evidence only as there was no eye witness of the incident. The prosecution examined a number of witnesses before the trial court. We are giving a detailed resume of the evidence of important prosecution witnesses though shorn of unessential: 6. PW Khem Raj, Chowkidar, cited as PW-1 in the charge, has stated that Parshotam Lal had called him saying that the deceased has died of burning. He went to the house of the appellants. He saw the deceased dead in the house. He went to Police Station, Poonch for lodging report. He was declared as hostile witness by the prosecution. In cross-examination by the prosecution he stated that he had entered the room in which dead body was lying. The dead body was lying on the floor on its back. Its face was slightly burnt but he did not see the tongue protruding out of the mouth. In cross-examination by the defence he stated that he had taken Jia Lal and Amrit Lal to Police Station with him and Police had detained both of them there. The dead body was lying on the floor on its back. Its face was slightly burnt but he did not see the tongue protruding out of the mouth. In cross-examination by the defence he stated that he had taken Jia Lal and Amrit Lal to Police Station with him and Police had detained both of them there. Other members of brotherhood were present on the spot when he had gone there. On his asking A-1 had said that he had gone for mowing grass and A-2 was saying that she had gone with, cattle for grazing them. Both of them were weeping. He had lodged verbal report. Jia Lal was accompanying him and names of both of them were written in the daily diary. Amrit Lal and Jia Lal were released by the Police after twelve/thirteen days. 7. PW Jaswant Singh, cited as PW-2, has stated that on the day of the incident ‘laetri’ was arranged by him and he had gone to the house of the appellants at 7 in the morning for inviting them for joining the ‘laetri’. (It was explained by learned counsel for both the sides that ‘laetri’ means an annual community gathering arranged by a person for mowing grass in rural areas). A quarrel was going on in their house. There had been similar quarrel in their house during the night also as his house is located in front of their house. Appellants were beating the deceased. Father of A-1 had asked him (witness) that he should dissuade them. He, however, left that place as he had arranged ‘laetri’ in his house. The deceased had once/twice complained to him that the appellants say that she has not given birth to any child and they will kill her. On the same day, Roshan Lal came to him and informed that deceased has been killed. He went to the house of the appellants where he saw the dead body of the deceased lying at door of the room. Her eyes were bulging out, tongue was protruding out of the mouth and there were marks on the neck. Others too had reached there. Police came on spot, inspected the crime scene and clicked photographs of the dead body. On asking of the police, he, chowkidar and Ghulam Mahedi entered the room. Police took into its possession the dead body of the deceased vide memo, Ex. Others too had reached there. Police came on spot, inspected the crime scene and clicked photographs of the dead body. On asking of the police, he, chowkidar and Ghulam Mahedi entered the room. Police took into its possession the dead body of the deceased vide memo, Ex. PW-GM, which was signed by him. In cross-examination, he has stated that Roshan Lal was also invited by him for the ‘laetri’. He had stated before the police that Roshan Lal had told him that the deceased has been killed and also that on the asking of the police, he along with the chowkidar and Ghulam Mahedi had gone inside the room. This, however, is not contained in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. read over to him in the Court. His statement was recorded by the police at the police station 10/11 days after the incident. Deceased was related to him as his granddaughter (daughter’s daughter) but she was not his real granddaughter. He had seen none other than the appellants and the father of A-1 in their house when he had gone there in the morning. House of Parshotam Lal falls at the back of the house of the appellants and that of Amarnath in the front thereof. House of Shiv Ram falls at a distance of 15/20 yards from the house of the appellants and his house is at a height at a distance of 10/20 yards from the house of Shiv Ram. He had stated before the police also that there was a quarrel in the house of the appellants in the night also and that deceased had once/twice complained to him. This, however, is not contained in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded by the police. He did not take any action on seeing the appellants quarreling with the deceased or after having been complained to by her because such matters keep on going in the households. 8. PW Ghulam Mahedi, cited as PW-3, has stated that he had gone to the house of the appellants on coming to know that wife of A-1 has burnt. It was 5.30 in the evening. Police and number of other persons had come there. This witness was declared hostile by the prosecution. 9. PW Yog Raj, cited as PW-4, has stated that relations between A-1 and his wife had turned strained after some time of their marriage. It was 5.30 in the evening. Police and number of other persons had come there. This witness was declared hostile by the prosecution. 9. PW Yog Raj, cited as PW-4, has stated that relations between A-1 and his wife had turned strained after some time of their marriage. He had gone to their house in the evening on the day the deceased had died. He had seen partially burnt dead body of the deceased. Her tongue was protruding out of the mouth and eyes were bulging out. Police had come on spot. In cross-examination, he has stated that he had gone to the house of the appellants at 5/6 in the evening. The dead body was lying near the door inside the living room of the appellants. The house comprised of two rooms and a kitchen. 10. PW Om Parkash S/o Khem RaL cited as PW-6, has stated that A-2 had started harassing the deceased, who was his sister, after six months of her marriage with A-1. A-2 used to tell the deceased that she will kill her as she has not given birth to any child. Appellants had assaulted the deceased 5-6 times and he had come to their house and persuaded them that they should not harass her saying also that their daughter too was in their (witness’s) house. Two days prior to the incident, deceased came to his house and said that A-2 has threatened to kill her. A-1 also came there and started using hot words to him and the deceased. He persuaded him that he should not harass the deceased and as to why he was bent upon killing her. Deceased and A-1 stayed in his house for the night and next morning A-1 took the deceased along with him. Thereafter he sent his younger brother, who is son-in-law of A-2, to the house of the appellants for enquiring as to why they harass and assault their sister and threaten to kill her. On his return his brother informed him that he has persuaded the appellants but they are bent upon killing the deceased. He and his brother then decided that they will take some respectable persons of their village to the house of the appellants and after that he left for his work at Poonch. At 5 O’clock in the evening, he was informed at Poonch that the deceased has been murdered. He and his brother then decided that they will take some respectable persons of their village to the house of the appellants and after that he left for his work at Poonch. At 5 O’clock in the evening, he was informed at Poonch that the deceased has been murdered. He left for his village and en route he saw the police bringing the dead body. On looking at the dead body, he saw her tongue protruding out, eyes bulging and marks of ‘dupatta’ on the neck. Waist of the deceased had not burnt. After autopsy police handed over the dead body to him vide seizure memo, Ex. PW-OP. In cross-examination he has stated that they had not earlier reported the matter to the police though they had called panchayat of the village as they wanted their sister to settle with in the house of the appellants and also for the reason that sister of A-1 was in their house and they never wanted that their relations are soured. On being informed by his brother that appellants are bent upon killing their sister, he did not inform the police as they had decided to go to their house with brotherhood panchayat in the evening. He did not narrate this aspect to the police as he was out of his wits due to death of his sister. After the appellants had started maltreating his sister, he had sent 4/5 persons including Avtar Singh, Ram Parkash and Kewal Krishan to their house to persuade them. He himself had gone to their house six months after the marriage and had persuaded the appellants that birth of a child is in the hands of the almighty and they should not harass her sister on this score. The appellants had assured him that they will not harass her sister in future but even after that her harassment had continued. He had visited the house of 5-6 times. 11. PW Puran Chand, cited as PW-7, has stated that he had gone to the house of his daughter falling some four, ‘Jaribs’ (chains) away from the house of the appellants. It was about 8.30/9.00 in the morning. The deceased came to him in the house of his daughter. She was weeping. He had visited the house of 5-6 times. 11. PW Puran Chand, cited as PW-7, has stated that he had gone to the house of his daughter falling some four, ‘Jaribs’ (chains) away from the house of the appellants. It was about 8.30/9.00 in the morning. The deceased came to him in the house of his daughter. She was weeping. On enquiry, she told that her husband and mother-in- law beat her and are bent upon killing her as her mother-in-law says that why she is to be kept alive if she has not given birth to any child. He persuaded her to go back to his house saying that he will come to her house along with her relatives. He then left for his water mill. On the same day at 2-2.30 PM Jia Lal, the father of A-1 met him at Mangnar. His face had turned pale and on asking by him he told that the deceased has died. She set herself ablaze after dousing in kerosene. He went to the house of the appellants where number of persons had collected. He saw the deceased burnt. Her tongue was protruding out and eyes were bulging. Her clothes, however, were not fully burnt. The body was burnt on anterior side and not on the posterior side. Jia Lal told him that he was not present in the house at the time of incident. He also told him that deceased has burnt after dousing herself in kerosene. Police had recorded his statement third day after the incident. In cross-examination by the defence, he has stated that he is paternal uncle of the deceased. The deceased had met him when he had reached ten yards away from the house of his daughter on his way back from there. He did not state before the police that deceased had come in the house of his daughter and after some time had called him out of the house. It is not recorded in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that he had persuaded deceased to go back to her house and he will come there later along with her relatives. Police had recorded his statement in village Mangnar near a temple and on the same day statements of Jaswant Singh, Ghulam Mahedi and others were also recorded. It is not recorded in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that he had persuaded deceased to go back to her house and he will come there later along with her relatives. Police had recorded his statement in village Mangnar near a temple and on the same day statements of Jaswant Singh, Ghulam Mahedi and others were also recorded. Houses of Amarnath and Parshotam are located near the house of the appellants and house of Jaswant Singh is located in front thereof. He had not stated before the police that he had gone to his water mill and after that Jia Lal had met him when he had reached on the road. 12. PW Shri Ram, cited as PW-8, in chief examination by the prosecution denied any knowledge about the cause of death of the deceased stating also that he had seen her in a burnt condition at the hospital. He was declared hostile and on cross-examination by the prosecution he admitted that on the day of incident A-1 had come to his shop and had said that he would like to sell his buffalo for Rs.7000/. He had asked him as to why he wanted to sell his buffalo at such a low price after having purchased the same for Rs.11,000/- just 4/5 days before that. A-1 had said that buffalo was fetching less milk. He, however, denied that A-1 had told him that he wants money as he is going to commit murder of his wife. He also stated that both the parties are related to him and that brother of the deceased is his sister’s husband. He denied to have stated before the police that A-1 had said that he will kill his wife because if he gives her divorce, Kewal Krishan may also divorce his sister so better he will kill and burn his wife and will say that she has committed suicide. He also denied that he had stated before the police that he had persuaded A-1 that in case he does so both the families will get ruined. 13. PW Roshan lal, cited as PW-9, has stated that at 1.00 PM he was going to join the ‘laetri’ of Jaswant Singh. En route he heard noise from the house of the appellants. 13. PW Roshan lal, cited as PW-9, has stated that at 1.00 PM he was going to join the ‘laetri’ of Jaswant Singh. En route he heard noise from the house of the appellants. He went there and saw that A-1 had caught hold of the deceased and A-2 was beating her with a ‘chappel’ and was saying that she has not given birth to any child. He rescued her from the appellants and left for the ‘laetri’. At 3.30 he was told in the ‘laetri’ that the deceased has died. On this, he and Jaswant Singh came to the house of the appellants. 8/10 other persons had also come there. He saw the deceased lying on her back inside a room. The appellants were sitting near the dead body. Eyes of the deceased were open and her tongue was protruding out of the mouth. Police came there and lifted the dead body. Police recorded his statement 7/8 days later. In cross-examination, he has stated that on reaching in the ‘laetri’ he had told Jaswant Singh that he had seen the appellants beating the deceased and has rescued her. It took him 10/15 minutes in reaching the ‘laetri’. The police at that time did not enquire about the cause of death from him nor did he himself narrate to the police what he had seen. He did not narrate the incident to the other persons present there. As farming work was in progress during those days so he did not narrate the incident to anyone for 7/8 days. All the three brothers of the deceased were present there but he did not narrate the incident to them also. However, Jaswant Singh had narrated the incident to them. He was called by a police constable to the police station where his statement was recorded. He had stated in his statement before the police that he had seen A-1 catching hold of the deceased and A-2 beating her with ‘chappel’. (This aspect, however, was not found in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C.). He did not state in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. that ‘on entering the house of the appellants he had seen Girdhari Lal and Jia Lal beating the deceased with fist blows and kicks’. Police has wrongly recorded in his statement that on seeing him in verandah of the house deceased was pushed and thrown in the verandah. He did not state in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. that ‘on entering the house of the appellants he had seen Girdhari Lal and Jia Lal beating the deceased with fist blows and kicks’. Police has wrongly recorded in his statement that on seeing him in verandah of the house deceased was pushed and thrown in the verandah. He had also stated before the police that he had told Jaswant Singh that the appellants were beating the deceased and he had rescued her. (This aspect is not found in the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.). He had also stated before the police that the appellants were sitting near the dead body. (This aspect is not found in the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.). Deceased was the daughter of his maternal uncle. Girdhari Lal is son of his cousin. 14. PW Ram Parkash, cited as PW-12, has stated that on 13th they were informed that their daughter has been killed. He and 4/5 others gathered and they went to the house of the appellants. The appellants were sitting by the side of the deceased towards her head. He asked them about the incident. A-1 said that deceased has set herself ablaze after dousing in kerosene. Chowkidar and some respectable persons were present there and in their presence he turned the dead body upside down and it was found that only anterior side of the body had burnt whereas posterior side had not burnt. Chowkidar lodged report at the police station. Police came on spot and took the dead body along with them. In cross-examination he has stated that in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. he had not stated that Roshan Lal had informed him about the incident. He has also not stated before the police that deceased was burnt on frontal side only or that the appellants had said that the deceased had set herself ablaze. 15. PW Kewal Krishan, cited as PW-13, is brother of the deceased. He has stated that on 13.10.1997 he was informed by his cousin, Roshan Lal that appellants have killed and burnt his sister. On getting this information he and his uncle Ram Prakash accompanied by Puran Chand and Jaswant Singh came to the house of the appellants. He saw his sister lying at the door, her tongue was protruding out and there was a mark of “fandha” (noose) on her neck. On getting this information he and his uncle Ram Prakash accompanied by Puran Chand and Jaswant Singh came to the house of the appellants. He saw his sister lying at the door, her tongue was protruding out and there was a mark of “fandha” (noose) on her neck. The marriage of the deceased had taken place one and a half years prior to the incident and relations between them remained good for initial six months. Thereafter, A-2 started harassing, abusing and beating the deceased for the reason that she had not given birth to any child. A-2 also used to say that whereas her daughter, who is married with him (witness), has given birth to a child, why the deceased, did not. He had persuaded the appellants not to quarrel with each other and live in harmony. On this A-2 had said that they will kill the deceased and solemnize other marriage of A-1. Two days before the incident deceased had fled to the house of her brother as she was beaten by the appellants. A-1 had also come and stayed there for the night where he was persuaded to maintain good relations with each other. A day before the incident he had gone to the house of the appellants, that is, his in-laws, and had stayed there for the night. He had persuaded the appellants that they should not beat the deceased and maintain good relation. On this A-1 and A-2 had said that they will kill the deceased. He returned to his house in the morning and narrated the incident to his elder brother and informed his uncle also. They decided that they will go the house of the appellants after two days and will take up the matter. However, at 12 noon information about death of the deceased was received. In cross-examination he has stated that hair and face of his sister were burnt. Neck was partially burnt. Back had not burnt. Police recorded his statement twice, firstly, it was taken at the place of occurrence, which was not recorded and secondly it was recorded after ten days of the incident at the police station. He had not seen the appellants killing the deceased. Neck was partially burnt. Back had not burnt. Police recorded his statement twice, firstly, it was taken at the place of occurrence, which was not recorded and secondly it was recorded after ten days of the incident at the police station. He had not seen the appellants killing the deceased. He had stated before the police that Darshan Lal had told him that the appellants have killed his sister but this does not figure in the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Police did not read over his statement to him. He did not state before the police that “on his return to his house, he had narrated the entire incident to his elder brother, who had said that both of them will go together and in case deceased has not given birth to any child they will ask for her divorce and provide her maintenance” even though it is so recorded in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. He had stated before the police that he had persuaded the appellants that there should be no dispute on the issue of not giving birth to any child as this is in the hands of almighty. However, it is not so contained in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. His wife is now living in the house of her parents as their relations got strained after this incident. It, however, is not correct that he has turned his wife out of his house. He had stated before the police that Jaswant Singh, Ram Parkash and Puran Chand had accompanied him to the place of occurrence but the same is not recorded in his statement. By the term “noose” he means marks of ‘dupatta’. The ‘dupatta’, however, was not present around the neck. The neck of the deceased was bearing bruises. Bruises were of the nature which is indicative of killing a person. Marks of the headgear were around the neck. Skin of the neck had burnt. Hairs of the head were burnt in the frontal area but not in the posterior area. 16. Defence produced two witnesses before the trial court and we give the resume of their evidence also: 17. DW Parshotam Lal has stated that on 13.10.1997 at 2/2.30 PM on his way back from his place of duty he had heard noise from house of the appellants. He went there. 16. Defence produced two witnesses before the trial court and we give the resume of their evidence also: 17. DW Parshotam Lal has stated that on 13.10.1997 at 2/2.30 PM on his way back from his place of duty he had heard noise from house of the appellants. He went there. The door of the house was closed from inside and smoke was coming out. As soon as he reached there A-1 also reached there via another path. A-2, who had gone with her cattle, reached there later. On his asking, A-1 pushed the door ‘with force and the door opened. They saw that the deceased was lying on the floor and was burnt. After that he did not stay there even for a minute and returned to his house. He again came there after sometime when he found a number of persons collected there. After that he called the chowkidar. Chowkidar came on spot and then left for informing the police. After short while he left for his house. He had seen Jaswant Singh at the house of the appellants when he had gone there for the second time and he had narrated the incident to him. The deceased was lying on the floor of her sleeping room and on his asking A- 1 had covered her with a cloth. In cross-examination he has stated that after seeing the dead body for the first time he had quietly left for his house but they had raised lot of noise. Only his wife was at his house who had told him that something has happened in the house of the appellants as noise is coming from there. He was inside his house and had not heard any noise but was informed about the noise by his wife. His wife had told him that noise is being raised by A-2, who, according to her, had gone with her cattle. He went to the house of the appellants. Police had come at 5 PM. He at that time was mowing grass. Police came at 6 o’clock and had taken the dead body with them. There had been no quarrel between the appellants and the deceased and relations between them were good. His wife and the deceased were cousins. He went to the house of the appellants. Police had come at 5 PM. He at that time was mowing grass. Police came at 6 o’clock and had taken the dead body with them. There had been no quarrel between the appellants and the deceased and relations between them were good. His wife and the deceased were cousins. It is correct that first time on seeing the naked dead body of the deceased he had returned from the door of the room and gone to his house. To a specific question put by the court this witness stated that by saying that appellants were raising noise he means that they were weeping. 18. DW Somawanti has stated that Kewal Krishan, the brother of the deceased, had come to the house of the deceased and stayed there for the night. In the morning there was a quarrel between him and the deceased. Kewal Krishan was saying as to why she had gone to the house of their brother as his terms with him are not good. She was present there at that time. Kewal Krishan gave a beating to the deceased and told her that she should not go to the house of her elder brother but she refused to agree. A-1 was not present at that time. On coming back to his house, A-1 found that deceased had gone out of the house. He brought her back to the house. Kewal Krishan told the deceased that thereafter he will never come to her house nor she should come to his house. Thereafter, Girdhari Lal left the house for mowing. She stayed back there and later left for the house of her brothers for taking her meals and after that she left for mowing the grass. A-2 had left her house for grazing her cattle at 12 noon. At 2.30 PM she heard noise from the house of the appellants and she went there. She found that the deceased was held up in a room. Window was broken open and deceased was found lying burnt in the room. Thereafter A-1 followed by No.2 reached there and the door was opened. After that a number of persons including Parshotam Lal, Jia Lal, Kaka Lal, Amarnath etc reached there. Jaswant Singh, who resides one and a half kilometers away from the house of the deceased, had come there much later. Thereafter A-1 followed by No.2 reached there and the door was opened. After that a number of persons including Parshotam Lal, Jia Lal, Kaka Lal, Amarnath etc reached there. Jaswant Singh, who resides one and a half kilometers away from the house of the deceased, had come there much later. Relation between A-1 and the deceased were good and it is wrongly alleged that former had burnt the latter. A-1 was not present in his house at the time of the incident as he had gone for mowing the grass. In cross examination, she has stated that she resides at Rajouri as also at Mangnar. They have ancestral property at Mangnar, her parents-in-law reside at Mangnar and her husband resides at Rajouri where their house comprises of four/five rooms. Her ration card relates to Rajouri and they own sixty/seventy kanals of land there. She keeps on visiting Mangnar after every second/third month. Father of A-1 is her cousin. Her daughter Pushpa Devi is married in village Mangnar. Her husband is uncle of A-1. DW Parshotam Lal is her brother’s son. She had come to Mangnar five/six days prior to the incident and was staying in the house of DW Parshotam Lal. She and DW Parshotam Lal had come together. She was mowing grass two ‘furlongs’ away when she had heard the noise from the house of the appellants. When she along with DW Parshotam reached at the house of the appellants, they were already present there but the window was not yet opened. Hereafter the witness has changed her version and stated that she and Parshotam had heard the noise of weeping when they were having meals together and when they reached at the house of the appellants they found two girls aged 4 and 5 of Amarnath weeping there. None else was present there, whereas appellants were at a distance of two ‘furlongs’ from there. 19. The defence in the cross-examination of some of the aforementioned prosecution witnesses has sought to point out contradictions/omissions in their testimonies recorded by the trial court vis-a-vis their statements recorded in terms of section 161 Cr.P.C. by the I.O. We, therefore, at this stage refer to the statement of the I.O. who recorded the statements under section 161 to find out whether such contradictions/omissions have been duly proved and do exist. 20. 20. Contextually, we may state that in terms of section 162 Cr.P.C. a statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded during investigation of a case or any part thereof primarily cannot be used for any purpose at trial of the case. Nonetheless, any part of the statement of a prosecution witness recorded under section 161, if duly proved, may be used by the defence and, with ‘permission of the court, by the prosecution to contradict such witness with his testimony recorded by the trial court in the manner provided by section 145 of the Evidence Act. To use any part of statement of a prosecution witness under section 161 for contradicting him with his testimony before the court the two conditions to be fulfilled are that the particular part of statement under section 161 is duly proved and procedure provided under section 145 of the Evidence Act is followed. It is well settled that the party using any part of statement of a prosecution witness recorded under section 161 for the purpose of contradicting him with his testimony made before the court has to draw attention of the witness to that part of statement recorded under section 161 in terms of section 145 of the Evidence Act and after that has to get that part proved from the I.O. who had recorded that statement. Same procedure will have to be applied in proving any omission in the statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. as compared to what he stated in his testimony. 21. Initial and the major part of investigation was conducted by Mohd. Naseeb Khan, Head Constable, cited as PW-21. He has stated in cross-examination that he recorded statements of PWs Khem Raj, Jaswant Singh and Ghulam Mehndi on 13.10.1997, PWs Gurdev Singh and Yog Raj on 14.10.1997, PW Om Parkash on 15.10.1997, PW Puran Chand on 17.10.1997, PW Shri Ram on 19.10.1997 and PW Kewal Krishan on 23.10.1997. We on reading the testimony of PW Mohd. Naseeb Khan (I.O.) recorded by the learned trial court have found that no part of the statement of any witness recorded by him under section 161 Cr.P.C. was got proved from him by the defence nor any question was asked in regard to those aspects, which a witness stated before the trial but were not found in his statement recorded under section 161. Contradictions/omissions, whatsoever, sought to be pointed out in the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses recorded by the trial court and the statement recorded under section 161, therefore, have no legal value and whatever was stated before the trial court has to prevail. 22. Statement of PW-9, Roshan Lal, under section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded by PW-22, Harjit Singh, Inspector, who took over the investigation of the case from PW, Mohd. Naseeb on 20.10.1997. The statement of PW-22 in his cross-examination indicates that two different statements of PW-9 under section 161 might have been recorded inasmuch as the contents of the statement lying on the court file on a vital aspect have been found different than the one read out to the court by PW-22 from the CD file in the course of his cross-examination. The say of PW-9 in the court in regard to what he had seen in the house of the appellants in the morning on the day of incident is significantly contrary to what is contained ‘in his statement under section 161, copy whereof is lying on the court file though it is in line with the statement read out to the court by PW-22 from the CD file, which was taken on record by the learned trial court in the course of his cross-examination. In the statement under section 161 lying on the court file PW-9 had stated that on entering the house of the appellants, he had seen the appellants inflicting fist and kick blows on the deceased whereas in the statement lying on the CD file he ‘had stated that he had seen A-1 having put the ‘dupatta’ around neck of the deceased and A-2 inflicting fist and kick blows to her. In such a scenario, evidence of PW-9, Roshan Lal is rendered doubtful and is therefore, excluded from consideration. Medical Evidence 23. Autopsy on the dead body of the deceased was performed by a Board of Doctors comprising of Dr. Joginder Singh, Dr. Vipan Kumar and Dr. Fameeda on 14.10.1997 at 10.55 AM. All the three doctors were examined before the learned trial court as prosecution witnesses. They have proved the autopsy report prepared by them as Ex. PW-Dr JS. Doctors found that the body was in flexed position with clinching of fists and was blackened all over. There was no sign of decomposition. The hairs were burnt on head. All the three doctors were examined before the learned trial court as prosecution witnesses. They have proved the autopsy report prepared by them as Ex. PW-Dr JS. Doctors found that the body was in flexed position with clinching of fists and was blackened all over. There was no sign of decomposition. The hairs were burnt on head. Rigor mortis were present. Post mortem burns were present all over the body. The anterior aspect of the body was totally burnt whereas posterior aspect was spared partially. The tongue was protruding out, bitten by teeth and burnt blackish in colour. The skin was burnt over anterior aspect of the neck and there was a small bruise in the centre of the neck anteriorly. A faint ligature mark was observed posteriorly, which was about 3 inches wide. Eyes were open and slightly bugling. Brain memberance and brain substance were found congested. A faint ligature mark about 3 inch wide on posterior aspect of the neck was found. A small bruise anteriorily in centre of the neck was also found. There was bi-lateral substance bruise present. Internal carotid artery on right side depicted bruising. There was fracture of larynged cartilage and upper two trachea rings. Pleura larynx trachea congested. Lungs and pericardium were found congested. Right side of the heart distended and full of blood (dark in colour). Left side of the heart was empty. Liver, spleen and gall bladder were found congested. Similarly Walls, peritoneum and peritoneal cavity were found congested. Stomach and urinary stomach were found empty. 24. The opinion recorded by the doctors in the autopsy report is that “the deceased had died of Asphyxia caused by strangulation. The burns were post mortem and time since death was less than 36 hours”. PW-Dr. Joginder Singh also stated before the Court that the injury, that is, strangulation was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased. He stated also that at a later stage police had produced before him a ‘dupatta’ and had sought his opinion whether the same could have caused strangulation of the deceased and that he had issued a certificate, Ex. PW Dr. JS-1, certifying that the ‘dupatta’ produced before him could have well caused strangulation of the deceased. PW Dr. Joginder Singh also identified before the court the ‘dupatta’ Ex. P-1 that has been shown to him. 25. In his cross-examination, PW-Dr. PW Dr. JS-1, certifying that the ‘dupatta’ produced before him could have well caused strangulation of the deceased. PW Dr. Joginder Singh also identified before the court the ‘dupatta’ Ex. P-1 that has been shown to him. 25. In his cross-examination, PW-Dr. Joginder Singh has explained in detail the difference between a case of strangulation and a case of suicidal hanging. For ready reference we cull out the relevant from his cross-examination: “…..there is difference between hanging and strangulation. In case of suicidal hanging there is ligature mark at the side of hyoid bone and their may be fracture of hyoid also. There is always dislocation of cervical vertebera at level 1 and 2. Dislocation or fracture of vertebera usually occurs, ligature is usually oblique in position and the mark of knot on the right side. There is no significant bulging of eyes and protruding of tongue in hanging where it is present in strangulation. Driveling of the saliva occurs along the angle of the mouth vertically down the neck and the chest bar whereas in the strangulation, this is not the case. In case of hanging it is rare for bulging of the eyes and protruding of tongue ....” 26. PW Dr. Joginder Singh, however, expressed his inability to state the duration of burns after death of the deceased but emphasized that burns were definitely caused after death and that deceased had not died because of the burns. He stated also that strangulation is possible by hands also and is called ‘throttling’. 27. Evidence of Dr. Fameeda Banday and Dr. Vipan Kumar in their chief examination is in line with the evidence of Dr. Joginder Singh. In cross-examination, Dr. Fameeda Banday has stated that duration since death can be less than 24 hours depending upon presence of rigor mortis. While stating that asphyxia could be possible by inhaling of the smoke, she stated further that in that case smoke should be present in the lungs but in this case no smoke was so present, though she cannot say for how many days smoke will remain present saying also that smoke can remain present if body is not disposed of for days. 28. Dr. 28. Dr. Vipan Kumar in his cross-examination stated that as there was all around ligature mark on the neck so question of presence of hairs may not arise, however, stating also that he cannot say as to whether the hairs of the deceased should be present or not on the ‘dupatta’. The presence of burns was allover the body except small area posteriorily. The hairs of the deceased were burnt. He had signed the inquest report after going through and agreeing with it. Eyes do not bulge out in all cases though usually they bulge out in case of suffocation. If someone is set ablaze bulging of the eyes is not possible and also it is not correct to say that in all burn cases the tongue gets protruded if one cries. Eyes bulge out and tongue protrude in case of hanging also but in that case ligature is always higher up just below the mandible and fracture of tracheal rings is not found. Cause of death 29. On reading the evidence of the three doctors and the post mortem report in juxtaposition, as they should be, we can imagine that the defence had made an effort to indicate that it might be a case of suicide by the deceased by burning herself or by hanging. But the well elucidated opinion of the doctors that the burn injuries found on the dead body of the deceased were post mortem, that is, were caused after the death, has not been shaken, much less rebutted. Rather in cross-examination Dr. Joginder Singh has stated with emphasis that the burn injuries definitely were caused after the death. We find no difficulty in accepting the evidence of the doctors that the cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation and the burn injuries, which, as per PW-Dr. Joginder Singh covered about 80% of the body of the deceased, were caused after death of the deceased. Once it is so, any suggestion that it might be a case of suicidal burning or suicidal hanging becomes totally worthless and unworthy of any more discussion. Strangulation being the cause of death and presence of post mortem burn injuries on the body would lead to the only irresistible conclusion and we hold that deceased had met homicidal death by strangulation and there was involvement of a third hand in causing the death. Strangulation being the cause of death and presence of post mortem burn injuries on the body would lead to the only irresistible conclusion and we hold that deceased had met homicidal death by strangulation and there was involvement of a third hand in causing the death. To say otherwise, someone had first committed murder of the deceased by strangulating her and then set her dead body ablaze to cause disappearance of the evidence of strangulation and camouflage it as a case of suicide by burning. 30. On discussing and analyzing the evidence in backdrop of legal principles relating to the standard of proof in the cases based upon circumstantial evidence, learned trial court arrived at a conclusion and held the appellants guilty of committing murder of the deceased by strangulating her and thereafter setting her dead body ablaze with the sole object of destroying the evidence of murder. Learned trial court, therefore, convicted the appellants under section 302 and 201 RPC read with section 34 RPC and sentenced them. 31. The question raised for determination of this Court in this appeal is; whether learned appellate court has erred in holding the appellants guilty of murder of the deceased? Indisputably there is no eye witness of the incident and entire prosecution case proceeded on circumstantial evidence. The primary question for determination of this Court is whether the prosecution has cogently and firmly established such circumstances at the trial, which unerringly point to the guilt of the appellants and to no other hypothesis? 32. We have analyzed and appreciated the evidence, in backdrop of the grounds taken in this appeal and submissions of learned counsels at bar. We heard Ms. Surinder Kour, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants and Mr. L.K. Moza, learned AAG for the State at length. We have perused entire record on the trial court file. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that circumstances relied upon by the prosecution have not been proved and the chain of the circumstances is not complete so as to bring home the guilt to the appellants. 33. We find ourselves in agreement with the learned trial court in identifying the circumstances, which the prosecution had relied upon and sought to prove to establish the guilt of the appellants. We may, however, restate them in brief. 33. We find ourselves in agreement with the learned trial court in identifying the circumstances, which the prosecution had relied upon and sought to prove to establish the guilt of the appellants. We may, however, restate them in brief. The prosecution has lead evidence in regard to the change in attitude of the appellants towards the deceased to establish the motive of the appellants to do away with the life of the deceased, happenings in the household immediately prior to the day of incident, happenings on the day of incident, death of the deceased inside the house of the accused, strangulation as cause of death, recovery of the weapon of offence, i.e. ‘dupatta’ on disclosure by A-1 and false defence and attempt to camouflage by the appellants. Defence version: 34. Before proceeding to discuss the evidence and submissions of the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants we may refer to the defence version as that would help in defining the campus of consideration in this appeal. The defence version as specifically stated by the appellants in their statements recorded in terms of section 342 Cr.P.C. is total denial of their involvement in the death of the deceased and plea of alibi that they were away from their house when the incident had taken place. Primarily both the appellants have refused the entire incriminating material against them in the prosecution evidence. The clear and categorical stand of A-1 is that at the time of incident he and his mother were away from their house in connection with mowing gross/grazing cattle. They were informed by Joginder Lal that smoke was coming out of their house and the door was closed. On getting this information, he and his mother came back and found that smoke was coming out of the room of the deceased and the room was closed from inside. They broke open the door and saw that the deceased had burnt. On seeing this he became unconscious and when he gained consciousness he found himself in Police Station. He has further stated categorically that he neither killed nor burnt his wife. The stand of A-2 is in line with the stand taken by A-1. She has stated that she was grazing her cattle and had come back on being told that smoke was coming out of her house and the door was locked. He has further stated categorically that he neither killed nor burnt his wife. The stand of A-2 is in line with the stand taken by A-1. She has stated that she was grazing her cattle and had come back on being told that smoke was coming out of her house and the door was locked. As the door was bolted from inside so it was broken open and the deceased was found badly burnt inside the house. The broken door was shown to the police. A-1, nonetheless, has stated also that the deceased had committed suicide as a day before the incident Kewal Krishan, who is the brother of the deceased, had come to their house, he had scolded and beaten the deceased for her having gone to the house of her elder brother. The deceased had told him that she has been shamed by the beating given to her by her brother and that it was due to this incident that she committed suicide. 35. It is apt to note here that examination of accused under section 342 Cr.P.C. (section 311 of the Central Code) serves dual purpose of giving the accused chance to explain the incriminating evidence against him and give his own version with regard to the incident for which he is being tried and the nature of his involvement or otherwise therein. It is well settled that even though the prosecution cannot succeed on the basis of the statement of the accused recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C. alone, nonetheless, this statement can be used by the court insofar as it corroborates the case of the prosecution and if the statement made is false, the court is entitled to draw adverse inference and pass consequential orders, as may be called for in accordance with law. It has now evolved as a settled principle of law that the statement of accused can be used to test the veracity of exculpatory of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any inquiry or trial but still it is not strictly an evidence in the case. It has now evolved as a settled principle of law that the statement of accused can be used to test the veracity of exculpatory of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any inquiry or trial but still it is not strictly an evidence in the case. The courts may rely on the portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statement made under this section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. (refer Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 2010 SC 2839 ). 36. The plea that the deceased had committed suicide is liable to be rejected without any discussion in view of the medical evidence and opinion of the doctors about the cause of death of the deceased as discussed above. We thus, proceed to discuss whether the prosecution has cogently and firmly established such circumstances at the trial which unerringly and conclusively point to the guilt of the appellants. Change in attitude of the appellants and happenings prior to the day of incident: 37. We have noticed in the evidence of PW-6, Om Parkash and PW-13, Kewal Krishan, the two real brothers of the deceased, which we, on scrutiny of their testimonies, hold as sufficiently proved, that some six months after the marriage of the deceased with A-1 the appellants had started harassing and beating the deceased for the reason that she had not given birth to any child and A-2 had been saying that they will kill the deceased and solemnize second marriage of A-1. Both these witnesses had been intervening and persuading them to live in harmony. We find no substance in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that the marriage between deceased and A-1 had taken place only one and half years prior to the incident so there is no plausibility in the allegation that appellants would have developed annoyance or dislike towards the deceased for not having given birth to any child in such a short period. We rather fail to understand why this can be ruled out. We rather fail to understand why this can be ruled out. We have further noticed in their evidence, which we hold as sufficiently proved, that two days prior to the incident, deceased had come to the house of PW-6 and had complained that A-2 has threatened to kill her and on the same day A-1 had also come there and had used harsh words towards PW-6 and the deceased. The next morning A-1 had taken the deceased back to his house and on the same day PW-13 had gone to the house of the appellants, which happens to be his in-laws also, for intervening in the matter. PW-13 stayed there for the night, persuaded the appellants that they should not beat the deceased and should maintain good relations and left their house in the morning, i.e. the morning of the date of incident. The appellants had said on that day that they will kill the deceased. In regard to the visit of PW 13 to the house of the appellants a day prior to the date of incident and h is overnight stay there we have found corroboration in the statement of A-1 recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C. A-1, however, in admitting the presence of PW 13 in his house in the morning of the day of incident has sought to connect his presence there with the reason behind committing suicide by the deceased by stating that PW-13 had beaten the deceased which had ashamed her and she committed suicide. We are not discussing this aspect as we have already held that the death of the deceased was homicidal and not suicidal. 38. In according consideration to the evidence of PWs 6 and 13, we have reminded ourselves about the principles applicable to appreciation of evidence of near relatives of the victim of an offence in order to address the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that the close relatives of the deceased have falsely implicated the appellants. It has quite often been pointed out in various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts and is rather a settled principle that a close relative of victim of an offence, especially victim of murder, generally would not screen the real culprit and fabricate a false case against an innocent person, may be hardest of his adversaries. It has quite often been pointed out in various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts and is rather a settled principle that a close relative of victim of an offence, especially victim of murder, generally would not screen the real culprit and fabricate a false case against an innocent person, may be hardest of his adversaries. Generally close relatives of the victim of a heinous offence like murder have an urge to see that the real culprit is arrested and brought to justice. The theory that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness was replied by the Supreme Court as early as in Dalip Singh and Ors. v State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 . It has been laid down as under: “A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause’ for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism ‘and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts. This is not to say that in a given case a Judge for reasons special to that case and to that witness cannot say that he is not prepared to believe the witness because of his general unreliability, or for other reasons, unless he is corroborated. Of course, that can be done. This is not to say that in a given case a Judge for reasons special to that case and to that witness cannot say that he is not prepared to believe the witness because of his general unreliability, or for other reasons, unless he is corroborated. Of course, that can be done. But the basis for such a conclusion must rest on facts special to the particular instance and cannot be grounded on a supposedly general rule of prudence enjoined by law as in the case of accomplices.” 39. Recently in Nagappan v State, Inspector of Police, the Supreme Court after surveying a series of decisions on the point including that in Dalip Singh’s case has in the judgment dated 17 July, 2013, held as under: “As regards the first contention about the admissibility of the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 being closely related to each other and the deceased, first of all, there is no bar in considering the evidence of relatives. It is true that in the case on hand, other witnesses turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. The prosecution heavily relied on the evidence of PW-1, PW-3 and PW-10. The trial Court and the High Court, in view of their relationship, closely analysed their statements and ultimately found that their evidence is clear, cogent and without considerable contradiction as claimed by their counsel. This Court, in series of decisions, has held that where the evidence of “interested witnesses” is consistent and duly corroborated by medical evidence, it is not possible to discard the same merely on the ground that they were interested witnesses. In other words, relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. [vide Dalip Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 , Guli Chand & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, (1974) 3 SCC 698 , Vadivelu Thevar vs. The State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 , Masalti & Ors. vs. The State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202 , The State of Punjab vs. Jagir Singh & Ors. (1974) 3 SCC 277 = AIR 1973 SC 2407 , Lehna vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 76 , Sucha Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643 = 2003(6) JT SC 348, Israr vs. State of U.P., (2005) 9 SCC 616 , S. Sudershan Reddy & Ors. (1974) 3 SCC 277 = AIR 1973 SC 2407 , Lehna vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 76 , Sucha Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643 = 2003(6) JT SC 348, Israr vs. State of U.P., (2005) 9 SCC 616 , S. Sudershan Reddy & Ors. vs. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 163 = AIR 2006 SC 2716 and Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahiman Patel & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra JT 2007 (9) SC 194, Waman and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 7 SCC 295 , State of Haryana vs. Shakuntla and Others, (2012) 5 SCC 171 , Raju @ Balachandran & Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2012 (11) Scale 357 , Subal Ghorai & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 607 ].” 40. Plea of false implication by closely related persons, therefore, cannot be entertained unless a strong indication in this regard is available from their evidence or the record of the case. Near relationship with victim of an offence per se is not a ground for branding a witness as interested witness and discarding his evidence. Nonetheless, evidence of close relatives of the victim are to be scrutinized and considered with great care to rule out any impression of false implication. 41. On careful analysis and consideration of the evidence of PWs 6 and 13, we could not find any plausible reason to entertain any doubt that they might have falsely implicated the appellants for the reason that their sister had met unnatural and painful death in the house of the appellants and we are rather satisfied about the truthfulness of whatever has been stated by them. In appreciating and accepting their evidence we accorded our serious consideration to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that it is a common trend to implicate husband and in-laws whenever a young woman commits suicide in the house of her in-laws. In appreciating and accepting their evidence we accorded our serious consideration to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that it is a common trend to implicate husband and in-laws whenever a young woman commits suicide in the house of her in-laws. We could not find substance in the submission of learned Senior Counsel in this regard also for the reason that it was not a case of committing suicide by the deceased and was rather a barbaric act of murder by strangulation followed by setting the dead body ablaze to cause disappearance of strangulation and camouflage it as a case of suicide and it being so the only urge in the mind of brothers of the deceased would be to see the real culprits brought to justice instead of falsely implicating her in-laws, who happen to be in-laws of one of them too. Happenings on the day of incident: 42. Evidence in regard to the happenings on the day of incident is available in the testimonies of Jaswant Singh-PW-2, Puran Chand-PW-7 and Shri Ram, PW-8. PW-2 had gone to the house of the appellants in the morning for inviting them for the ‘Laetri’ arranged by him where he observed a quarrel going on and had seen the appellants beating the deceased. Such was the scene that Jia Lal, the father of A-1, had asked him to advise them, meaning that to dissuade the appellants from beating the deceased. He stated also that during the night also he had observed a quarrel going on in the house of appellants as his house is located in front of their house. Such was the scene that Jia Lal, the father of A-1, had asked him to advise them, meaning that to dissuade the appellants from beating the deceased. He stated also that during the night also he had observed a quarrel going on in the house of appellants as his house is located in front of their house. Learned counsel for the appellants questioned the veracity of his evidence primarily on the grounds that he is a close relative of the deceased and that his say that there had been a quarrel in the house of the appellants during the night is not contained in his statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. Correct it is that according to this witness the deceased was related to him as his granddaughter, though not real, but, as we have stated the legal position hereinabove, we find no reasonable ground for entertaining any doubt about, much less disbelieving, his evidence on that score inasmuch as on reading his entire testimony comprising of exploring cross-examination we could not entertain any doubt that any attempt to falsely implicate the appellants or strengthen the prosecution case would have been made by him. The omission pointed out in statement under section 161 is too trivial to have any significance and has no legal value in face of his clear say that he had stated so before the police also and the failure on the part of the defence to prove the omission while cross-examining the I.O. It was also argued by the learned Senior Counsel that there was undue delay in recording the statement of this witness under section 161 as he stated in his testimony that the same was recorded 10/11 days after the incident. It is noticed that according to the I.O. PW-21 statement of this witness was recorded on 13.10.1997, that is the date of incident. The said statement lying on the trial court file is similarly dated. The witness, however, states that it was recorded after 10/11 days. Contradiction in this regard being obvious we cannot reject defence argument that there had been delay in recording statement of this witness under section 161. Delay in recording statement of an eye witness in terms of section 161 Cr.P.C. however, per se is not a ground for rejecting his evidence if it is found otherwise trustworthy and reliable. Contradiction in this regard being obvious we cannot reject defence argument that there had been delay in recording statement of this witness under section 161. Delay in recording statement of an eye witness in terms of section 161 Cr.P.C. however, per se is not a ground for rejecting his evidence if it is found otherwise trustworthy and reliable. Nonetheless, such a delay is a factor to be accorded consideration along with other factors and circumstances of the case. 43. In Gunnana Penteyya v State of A.P., 2008 AIR SCW 6132, Supreme Court has relied upon an earlier decision in State of U.P. v Satish, ( 2005) 3 SCC 114 where it has been held: “18. As regards delayed examination of certain witnesses, this Court in several decisions has held that unless the Investigating officer is categorically asked as to why there was delay in examination for the witnesses the defence cannot gain any advantage therefrom. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that if there is any delay in examination of a particular witness the prosecution version become suspect. It would depend upon several factors. If the explanation offered for the delayed examination is plausible and acceptable and the court accepts the same as plausible, there is no reason to interfere with the conclusion” “20. It is to be noted that the explanation when offered by I.O. on being questioned on the aspect of delayed examination, by the has to be tested by the Court on the touchstone of credibility. If the explanation is plausible then no adverse inference can be drawn. On the other hand, if the explanation is found to be implausible, certainly the Court can consider it to be one of the factors to affect credibility of the witnesses who were examined belatedly. It may not have any effect on the credibility of prosecution’s evidence tendered by the other witnesses.” 44. On the other hand, if the explanation is found to be implausible, certainly the Court can consider it to be one of the factors to affect credibility of the witnesses who were examined belatedly. It may not have any effect on the credibility of prosecution’s evidence tendered by the other witnesses.” 44. PW-7, Puran Chand had gone to the house of his daughter located near the house of the appellants where at 9.30/9.00 in the morning the deceased had come to him, she was weeping and had complained that her husband and mother-in-law beat her and are bent upon killing her as her mother-in-law says that, why she is to be kept alive as she has not given birth to any child and that he had advised the deceased to return to her house saying that he will come to her house along with her relatives. 45. PW-8 initially did not support the prosecution case in tune with what he is said to have stated before the police. He was declared hostile witness. On cross-examination by the prosecution he admitted that on the day of incident A-1 had come to his shop and had offered to sell his buffalo for Rs. 7,000/ which he had purchased for Rs. 11,000/ only 4/5 day prior thereto, saying that he was in need of money. 46. Having regard to the testimony of PW-7 in its entirety and the nature of evidence rendered by him, we find no sufficient ground for rejecting his evidence for the reason that he is paternal uncle of the deceased. Learned counsel for the appellants questioned the evidence of PW 7 by pointing out some omissions in his statement under sections 161 Cr.P.C. as compared to what he stated before the court and for his being a relative of the deceased. We, however, on scrutiny of the evidence have found him trustworthy. 47. The evidence of PWs 2, 7 and 8 read in sequence and juxtaposition proves that on the day of incident there had been high voltage tension in the household of the appellants. The focal point whereof was the harassment and torture to the extent of beating of the deceased. 47. The evidence of PWs 2, 7 and 8 read in sequence and juxtaposition proves that on the day of incident there had been high voltage tension in the household of the appellants. The focal point whereof was the harassment and torture to the extent of beating of the deceased. Besides, What the deceased had said to PW-7, that is, ‘her husband and mother-in-law beat her and are bent upon killing her for having not given birth to any child’ has the evidentiary value as her dying declaration as it relates to a circumstance relating to cause of her death. Death inside the house of the appellants: 48. Next in the sequence of circumstances is the death of the deceased inside the house of the appellants and recovery of the dead body from there. It is fully proved from the evidence that the deceased died of asphyxia caused due to strangulation and her dead body was set ablaze inside the house of the appellants though it has also come in the evidence that Jia Lal, the father of A-1 and husband of A- 2 also was residing in the same house. Recovery of the weapon of offence: 49. Prosecution case is that the ‘dupatta’ used for strangulation by the appellants was recovered from the cattle house of the appellants on the basis of a disclosure statement of A-1 recorded by the I.O. (Ex.PW-JS). A-1 is said to have stated before the I.O. on 22.10.1997, when he was in police custody, that he has concealed a ‘dupatta’ pale blue in colour under heap of fodder kept in the eastern corner of his cattle house, which is known to him alone. Prosecution case further is that on the same day A-1 brought out the said ‘dupatta’ from the aforementioned place, which was seized by the police vide disclosure memo Ex.PW-OP/1. Evidence in regard to the disclosure statement of A-1 has come in the testimonies of I.O. PW-22, Harjeet Singh, Sub Inspector, PW-2 Jaswant Singh, PW-10, Ranjeet Singh and PW-11 Mohd. Akhter Khan, and evidence in regard to recovery of ‘dupatta’ has come in the testimonies of PW-6 am Parkash and PW-12, Ram Parkash. 50. Evidence in regard to the disclosure statement of A-1 has come in the testimonies of I.O. PW-22, Harjeet Singh, Sub Inspector, PW-2 Jaswant Singh, PW-10, Ranjeet Singh and PW-11 Mohd. Akhter Khan, and evidence in regard to recovery of ‘dupatta’ has come in the testimonies of PW-6 am Parkash and PW-12, Ram Parkash. 50. I.O. PW-22, while proving the contents of the disclosure memo, says that A-1 had stated before him that he has concealed the ‘dupatta’, which he had used for strangulating the deceased in his cattle house and further that A-1 had got the said ‘dupatta’ recovered from aforementioned place, which was seized vide recovery memo, Ex.PW-OP/1. He has stated further that after recovery he had prepared sketch map of place of recovery, which he proved before the trial court as Ex.PW-HS. There is nothing in the cross-examination of this witness in regard to the disclosure statement and the recovery. 51. PW-2 in regard to disclosure statement has stated in chief-examination that A-1 had stated in the Police Station in his presence that he has kept a ‘dupatta’ in a corner of this cattle house and this statement was recorded by the police. In cross-examination in this regard he stated that he was called by the police to the Police Station at 10/11 in the morning and was taken to the S.H.O. He was told that some papers are to be signed and A-1 has to make a statement and that statement of A-1 was recorded in his presence by a Head Constable. The statement was recorded in the language, in which he is speaking in the court, A-1 and Ranjeet Singh had signed the statement and after that he had signed the same. He cannot read Urdu but statement was read over to him. 52. PW-10 has stated that he had gone to Police Station for getting prepared his identity card. He was accompanied by Jaswant Singh. In his presence A-1 had made a statement that he has kept one pale blue coloured ‘dupatta’ of his wife under a heap of fodder in his cattle house. Police recorded statement of A-1 in his presence. The statement, Ex.PW-JS, was signed by him, A-1 and Jaswant Singh. In cross-examination he has stated that it was 9/10 in the morning. In his presence A-1 had made a statement that he has kept one pale blue coloured ‘dupatta’ of his wife under a heap of fodder in his cattle house. Police recorded statement of A-1 in his presence. The statement, Ex.PW-JS, was signed by him, A-1 and Jaswant Singh. In cross-examination he has stated that it was 9/10 in the morning. Statement was recorded in the office of the S.H.O. He was asked by the S.H.O. to sign a paper and on this he signed the paper. A-1 had made the statement in Urdu and it was recorded in Urdu. It was also recorded in the disclosure memo that A-1 had strangulated his wife with ‘dupatta’. He denied a suggestion by the defence that his signature was obtained by the police on a paper, which had been already written. 53. PW-11, who was a Selection Grade Constable in Police Station, Poonch has stated that on 22.10.1997 in-charge Police Station, Harjeet Singh had called him in his room. He was questioning A-1 about the incident and in his presence A-1 had stated that he has concealed the ‘dupatta’, used by him for strangulating his wife, under heap of fodder in his cattle house which he can get recovered. He has also proved the contents of disclosure memo, Ex. PW-JS. In cross-examination he has stated that it was 9.30 in the morning” when the statement was recorded. Other police personnel were also present at that time. He had left the room after signing the statement and cannot say who else signed the same. A-1 had made the statement in his local language but it was recorded in Urdu. He cannot say whether any civilian had also signed the statement or not. However, no civilian was present ‘when the disclosure statement was being recorded. 54. We find a significant contradiction in the evidence In regard to the disclosure statement coming through the testimony of PW-11, who happened to be police personnel posted at Police Station, Poonch. This witness, while stating in chief-examination that the statement was given and recorded in his presence, has clearly stated in the cross-examination that no civilian was present when the statement was being recorded and that he does not know whether it was got signed by some other witness also. This witness, while stating in chief-examination that the statement was given and recorded in his presence, has clearly stated in the cross-examination that no civilian was present when the statement was being recorded and that he does not know whether it was got signed by some other witness also. This is contrary to evidence of PWs 2 and 10, who are other marginal witnesses to the disclosure memo, as according to them disclosure statement was recorded in their presence. The prosecution cannot succeed in proving a fact on the basis of such contradictory evidence and truthfulness of the fact is rendered highly doubtful. We, therefore, are unable to concur with the learned trial court in accepting the evidence relating to the disclosure statement of A-1 leading to the recovery of the ‘dupatta’. We rather cannot but hold that disclosure statement in regard to the ‘dupatta’ said to have been used for strangulating the deceased has not been proved and therefore, we need not discuss the evidence in regard to recovery of any such ‘dupatta’ as such recovery loses its evidentiary value if the preceding disclosure statement is not proved. Other recoveries: 55. I.O. PW-Naseeb Khan has stated that he had seized two bottles, one of which smelt of kerosene, and a match box from the crime scene vide seizure memo Ex. PW-GM/2 and had sealed them. In cross-examination he has stated that he had not obtained finger prints from the seized bottles but they were dispatched to Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) after getting them resealed for FSL test though FSL report was not received till the investigation remained with him. PW-1 Khem Raj, PW-2 Jaswant Singh and PW-3 Ghulam Mehandi are other witnesses to the seizure memo. PW-3, who entered the witness box first in sequence and was declared as hostile witness, in cross-examination by the prosecution clearly admitted that in his presence police had seized one match box and two bottles from the crime scene, which were seized vide seizure memo Ex. PW-GM/2and the memo was signed by him also. However, in cross-examination by defence he denied that seized material was sealed on .spot. PW-2 has also supported the factum of the seizure of a match box and two bottles, one of them containing a little kerosene vide seizure memo Ex. PW-GM/2. PW-1 even though declared as hostile witness has admitted the contents of Ex. PW-GM/2. However, in cross-examination by defence he denied that seized material was sealed on .spot. PW-2 has also supported the factum of the seizure of a match box and two bottles, one of them containing a little kerosene vide seizure memo Ex. PW-GM/2. PW-1 even though declared as hostile witness has admitted the contents of Ex. PW-GM/2. We have found nothing in the cross-examination of these three witnesses to disbelieve their evidence in regard to seizure of a match box and the two bottles, one of them smelling kerosene, from the crime scene. 56. We, however, could not find any reliable evidence in regard to the use of the match box or the bottles seized from the crime scene by the appellants as there is no connecting evidence between the two. In this regard we have noticed that in the course of trial prosecution produced Finger Prints’ report issued by one Shujad Shafqat, Scientific Officer, showing that the prints developed on one of the bottles matched with the specimen impression. However, we could not find any evidence in regard to the obtaining of the impression of the finger prints of either of the appellants for matching them with the prints developed on the bottles. Matching of finger prints, which provides opinion evidence, requires evidence about obtaining finger prints of the person against whom such opinion is to be used, which, however, is not available in this case. The recovery of the two bottles, one of them smelling kerosene, and the match box from the crime scene, nonetheless, corroborates the case of prosecution that burning of the body was done at the crime scene, that is, inside the house of the appellants where the dead body was lying. Camouflage and false defence: 57. It has come in the evidence of PW-1, Khem Raj, Chowkidar, whom prosecution has declared as hostile witness, and PW-12 Ram Parkash that both the appellants were present by the side of the dead body when they had reached there. According to PW-1, on asking, A-1 had said that he had gone for mowing grass and A-2 had said that she had gone with the cattle for grazing them. Likewise PW-12 has stated that on asking A-1 had said that deceased had set herself ablaze after dousing in kerosene. 58. According to PW-1, on asking, A-1 had said that he had gone for mowing grass and A-2 had said that she had gone with the cattle for grazing them. Likewise PW-12 has stated that on asking A-1 had said that deceased had set herself ablaze after dousing in kerosene. 58. While not denying that the deceased died inside the house in which all of them resided, the stand taken by the appellants in their statements recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C. is that the deceased had died in their absence as at the relevant time both of them had gone out in connection with mowing grass/grazing cattle and had returned home after getting the information about smoke coming out of their house. Having found the door closed/bolted from inside, the door was broken open and the deceased was found burnt. Besides, A-1 stated clearly that the deceased had committed suicide because she felt ashamed due to the scolding and beating given to her by her brother, PW-13 in the morning. The theory of suicide, however, has been negated by the medical evidence and the opinion of the doctors and we have already rejected it. It having been found to be a case of murder and post mortem ‘burning of the dead body, the plea that it was case of suicide can be said to be a false plea. 59. In support of the plea of alibi, that is, appellants were away from their house, at the relevant time and had returned on getting information that smoke was coming out of the house, the defence has produced DWs Parshotam Lal and Somawanti. We on scrutiny of the testimonies of these witnesses and comparing them with the plea of alibi taken by the appellants in their statements under section 342 Cr.P.C. have found compelling reasons to entertain serious doubt about veracity of their versions and to reject the same. We have noticed self-contradictions of significant nature in their testimonies as also contradictions in the version of the two. We have noticed significant contradiction in the evidence of these two witnesses’ in their chief examination and a lot of them coming by way of cross-examination and more importantly we have noticed contradiction in their evidence and the version of the appellants. 60. We have noticed significant contradiction in the evidence of these two witnesses’ in their chief examination and a lot of them coming by way of cross-examination and more importantly we have noticed contradiction in their evidence and the version of the appellants. 60. We have noticed that DW Somawanti is a resident of Rajouri and claims to have come to her brothers in village Manganar on her routine visit. She, firstly, claims to be present in the house of the appellants in the morning and has supported version of A-1 that PW-13, Kewal Krishan, had scolded and beaten the deceased for her going to the house of his brother. She claims also to have gone there on hearing the noise after the incident. Evidence of DW Parshotam Lal in his chief-examination is that on his way back from the place of his duty he had gone to the house of appellants on hearing screams. Alongside A-1 had also reached there via on other path and A-2, who had gone with her cattle, had reached a little later and that on his asking, A-1 had pushed open the door with force and they had found the deceased lying on the floor. What has been said by this witness is that he and A-1 were the first to reach on spot and the door was pushed open by A-1 in his presence. As against this the evidence of DW Somawanti in her chief-examination is that she had reached at the house of the appellants on hearing noise and had found the deceased held up in a room. Window was broken and deceased was lying burnt in the room. A-1 followed by A-2 had reached’ after that and then door was opened. Contradiction in two versions is writ large. As per the evidence of DW Parshotam, he and A-1 had reached at the crime scene first of all and door was pushed open before anyone else reached there. As against this evidence of DW Somawati is that she had reached first of all and window of the room was broken first. The two witnesses do not indicate presence of each other on spot. The reading of the evidence of DW Prashotam in cross-examination would show as if he had first gone to his house where his wife had told him about the noise coming from the house of the appellants. The two witnesses do not indicate presence of each other on spot. The reading of the evidence of DW Prashotam in cross-examination would show as if he had first gone to his house where his wife had told him about the noise coming from the house of the appellants. A totally different version in regard to reaching of these two witnesses on spot has come in the cross-examination of DW Somawati. At one stage, she stated that she had heard noise when she was mowing grass at a distance of two ‘furlongs’ and she and DW Parshotam, who is her brother’s son, had reached at the house together and the appellants were already present there but the window was not yet opened. However, she hastened to change her version and state that she and DW Parshotam had heard noise when they were having meals together and on reaching the house of the appellants they had found two daughters of Amarnath weeping there. 61. We are reminded of the standard of defence evidence as compared to the standard of prosecution evidence in a criminal trial. We may state briefly that, whereas prosecution evidence must prove the commission of offence beyond any shadow of doubt, defence evidence may succeed by probablising a version other than the prosecution case. However, we may observe that defence cannot succeed by putting a fairy tale and evidence of defence witnesses, nonetheless, must be trustworthy and inspire confidence, which is lacking in this case. 62. The plea of alibi and theory of suicide rather fall flat under their own weight in face of the cause of death and involvement of a third hand In committing murder of the deceased and setting the dead body ablaze. The stand of the appellants rather corroborates the case of prosecution that the appellants had first committed the murder of the deceased by strangulating her and then set ablaze the dead body to cause disappearance of the evidence of strangulation and camouflage it as a case of suicide. 63. Having analyzed and discussed the evidence, we will now take up those contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants, which we have not addressed hereinabove. 64. The general contention advanced was that there is no direct evidence of the incident and the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution does not satisfy and fulfil the requirements of imposing conviction. 63. Having analyzed and discussed the evidence, we will now take up those contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants, which we have not addressed hereinabove. 64. The general contention advanced was that there is no direct evidence of the incident and the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution does not satisfy and fulfil the requirements of imposing conviction. Learned counsel cited various judgments in this regard, which we, however, would not be referring to as we know law in this regard is well settled. For a crime to be proved it is not necessary that in all circumstances it must be proved by direct evidence of the witnesses. In a number of criminal cases no eye witness is available for the reason that either the offence is committed by the accused in isolation or the investigating agency is unable to trace any eye witness. It is well recognized that commission of offence by the accused in the cases lacking direct evidence is proved by drawing inference(s) on the basis of circumstances attending the commission of the crime. What is, however, required is that every incriminating circumstance and all the incriminating circumstances from which inference as to guilt of the accused is to be drawn have to be proved by cogent evidence beyond reasonable doubt and all such circumstances should establish a complete chain, which is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence or any other hypothesis. 65. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the time of death has not been proved inasmuch as the opinion of the doctors in regard to the duration of the death is inconsistent with the evidence of the witnesses. Dilating the point, learned counsel sought to point out that as per the post-mortem report (Ex. PW-Dr. JS) and the evidence of the three Doctors, autopsy was performed at 10.55 AM on 14.10.1997 and the time of death was within thirty six years prior to the autopsy, which means that the deceased would have died in the evening of 12th October contrary to the evidence that she was alive in the morning on 13th October. PW-Dr. JS) and the evidence of the three Doctors, autopsy was performed at 10.55 AM on 14.10.1997 and the time of death was within thirty six years prior to the autopsy, which means that the deceased would have died in the evening of 12th October contrary to the evidence that she was alive in the morning on 13th October. Contextually, it was argued by learned counsel that the death according to post mortem report having taken place in the evening on 12th October belies entire evidence in regard to the appellants having been last seen with the deceased on 13th October and all that said to have happened on that day prior to death of the deceased. It was in this context argued also that strict proof of the time of death is important factor in a case resting on circumstantial evidence only and important link in the chain of circumstances. In support of these contentions, learned counsel relied upon Bajirao Gondappa Chaugule v State of Maharashtra, 2016 (4) Supreme 618 , Roopsena Khaton v State of West Bengal, 2011 AIR SCW 3169 and Niranjan Panja v State of West Bengal (2010) 6 SCC 525 . 66. In the aforementioned contentions relating to time of death and the theory of ‘last seen together’, we are unable to see anything more than the assumed confusion on behalf of the appellants. There is neither any contradiction nor any confusion about the day and time of the death though, as there is no eye witness, evidence about exact time of death cannot be insisted upon. That the incident occurred on 13.10.1997 is sufficiently proved from the prosecution evidence in particular the evidence of PW-13, Kewel Krishan and is corroborated by defence witness Parshotam Lal also and is not even disputed. There is no denial or different say by or on behalf of the appellants in regard to the date of the incident. In regard to the time of death, we have evidence of PW-7, Puran Chand, whom the deceased had met on the day of the incident at 8.30/9.00 in the morning. Opinion of the Doctors is that time duration between death and the time of autopsy, which was performed at 10.55 AM on 14.10.1997, was less than 36 hours. There is no assail to the opinion of the Doctors nor do we find any reason for not accepting their opinion. Opinion of the Doctors is that time duration between death and the time of autopsy, which was performed at 10.55 AM on 14.10.1997, was less than 36 hours. There is no assail to the opinion of the Doctors nor do we find any reason for not accepting their opinion. The death as per the medical opinion had taken place any time between 10.55 PM on 12.10.1997 and 10.55 AM on 14.10.1997. It being so we do not find any inconsistency in the ocular evidence and the medical evidence in regard to the time of death of the deceased. Likewise, we cannot, entertain any doubt about the evidence of PWs 2, 7, 8 and 13 in regard to the events having taken place prior to the death of the deceased on 13.10.1997. 67. We also do not find any substance in the contention relating to the theory of ‘last seen together’. We have rather noticed that the theory of ‘last seen together’ has not been specifically relied upon by the prosecution, may be for the reason that the incident had taken place inside the residential house of the appellants and the deceased. Nonetheless, it has come in the evidence of PW-2 and we hold that it is sufficiently proved that the deceased was alive in her house in the morning on 13.10.1997 and both the appellants were present there and were beating her. The case law cited on behalf of the appellants is of no support to their cause. Where the prosecution depends upon the theory of ‘last seen together’, it is always necessary that prosecution should establish the time of death (Niranjan Panja’s case). Besides, the time of ‘last seen together’ should have proximity with the time of death (Roopsena Khatoon’s case). In the case on hand the murder of the deceased followed by burning of the dead body having taken place inside the residential house and the plea of alibi having been found false, contention of appellants that theory of ‘last seen together’ has not been proved loses importance. 68. Another contention on behalf of the appellants was that the motive neither has been sufficiently established nor was sufficient to result into the killing of the deceased by the appellants. Learned counsel argued that motive has importance in the chain of circumstances and prosecution case cannot succeed if the motive is not proved. 68. Another contention on behalf of the appellants was that the motive neither has been sufficiently established nor was sufficient to result into the killing of the deceased by the appellants. Learned counsel argued that motive has importance in the chain of circumstances and prosecution case cannot succeed if the motive is not proved. In support, learned counsel relied upon State v Mahindra Singh Dahiya, (2011) 3 SCC 109 . 69. Legal principles in regard to motive are well settled. We may state that in a case based upon circumstantial evidence, motive becomes quite important link in the chain of incriminating circumstances to establish whether accused had committed the crime or not. Motive is the inducement for doing an act. No doubt it is a sound principle to remember that every criminal act was done with a motive but its corollary is not that no criminal offence would have been committed if the prosecution has failed to prove the precise motive of the accused. The proof of motive is never an indispensable factor for conviction. The absence of proof of motive does not break the link in the chain of circumstances connecting the accused with the crime, nor militates against the prosecution case. Motive, however, always locks up in the mind of the accused and sometimes it is difficult to unlock. It is almost an impossibility for the prosecution to unravel the full dimension of the mental imposition of an offender towards the person whom he offended. When the prosecution succeeds in showing the possibility of some ire for the accused towards the victim, the inability to further put on record the manner in which such ire would have swelled up in the mind of the offender to such a degree as to impel him to commit the crime cannot. be construed as a fatal weakness of the prosecution. In Mahender Singh Dahiya relied upon on behalf of the appellants, Supreme Court in para 29 of the reporting has held: “29. In assessing the evidence, the High Court was aware of the legal principles that absence of motive may not necessarily be fatal to the prosecution. Where the case of the prosecution has been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the material produced before the court, the motive loses its significance. But in cases based on circumstantial evidence, motive for committing the crime assumes great importance. Where the case of the prosecution has been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the material produced before the court, the motive loses its significance. But in cases based on circumstantial evidence, motive for committing the crime assumes great importance. In such circumstances, absence of motive would put the court on its guard to scrutinise the evidence very closely to ensure that suspicion, emotion or conjecture do not take the place of proof.” 70. Prosecution through the evidence of PWs 6 and 13, the two real brothers of the deceased, have succeeded in proving that some six months after her marriage with A-1 the appellants had developed a dislike towards the deceased for the reason that she had not given birth to any child. Two days prior to the incident, that is, on 11.10.1997 the deceased had gone to the house of PW-6 and had complained that A-2 has threatened to kill her. We have rejected appellants’ contention that there was no plausibility in the allegation for the reason that the marriage had taken place only one and a half years prior to the incident. We cannot expect more evidence to establish motive as whatever has been proved is sufficient to draw inference of appellants’ intention to do away with the life of the deceased to pave way for second marriage of A-1. 71. Another reason projected by the learned Counsel for the appellants for rejecting the prosecution case was that even though the prosecution had sought to rely upon the evidence of recovery of the ‘dupatta’ used as the weapon of offence at the instance of A-1 but this aspect has not been proved. We have indeed rejected the evidence in regard to the disclosure statement of A-1 leading to discovery of the ‘dupatta’ and have held that disclosure statement has not been proved. The question raised, thus, is whether, non-recovery of the weapon of offence in itself is sufficient to dismantle and reject the entire prosecution case. 72. The proof of the recovery of the weapon of the offence at the instance of the accused or otherwise and its production before the court are important factors in bringing home the guilt to the accused. 72. The proof of the recovery of the weapon of the offence at the instance of the accused or otherwise and its production before the court are important factors in bringing home the guilt to the accused. Non-recovery of weapon of offence or any other incriminating article at the instance of the accused or otherwise, however, has no adverse effect on the prosecution case and cannot be taken as a ground to exonerate the accused when the other evidence is sufficient to prove the complicity of the accused. 73. In Mritunjoy Biswas v Pranab and Kunti Biswas, (2013) 12 SCC 766, Supreme Court, while reiterating that identification of the body, cause of death and recovery of weapon of offence are some of the important factors to be established by the prosecution to bring home the charge of offence under section 302 IPC, has held that ‘this, however, is inflexible rule. It cannot be held as a general broad preposition of law that where these factors are not established, it would be fatal to the case of prosecution and in all cases and eventualities, it ought to result into an acquittal.’ Supreme Court in this case has referred with approval to Lakhan Sao v State of Bihar, (2000) 9 SCC 82 where it has been opined that non recovery of pistol or spent cartridge does not detract from the case of the prosecution where direct evidence is acceptable. Supreme Court has also referred to State of Rajasthan v Arjun Singh and others (2011) 9 SCC 115 where Supreme Court has ‘expressed that mere non recovery of pistol or cartridge does not detract the case of the prosecution where clinching and direct evidence is acceptable. 74. In this case from the medical evidence, it has been proved that the death had been caused by strangulation. It has also been proved that such strangulation could have been caused by using a ‘dupatta’. A ‘dupatta’ is a household item of a common nature. It is not something so peculiar or having no normal availability in a household necessitating its matching with the cause of death of the deceased and production before the court. It is not a case where the prosecution had failed to recover the ‘dupatta’. Evidence in this regard, however, failed due to contradictory evidence of a witness. It is not something so peculiar or having no normal availability in a household necessitating its matching with the cause of death of the deceased and production before the court. It is not a case where the prosecution had failed to recover the ‘dupatta’. Evidence in this regard, however, failed due to contradictory evidence of a witness. The mere failure of the prosecution to prove the recovery of the ‘dupatta’, that is the weapon of offence, therefore, cannot detract the entire prosecution case in general and evidence in regard to the cause of death in particular. 75. It was pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants and rightly so that according to PW-1, Khem Raj, the information of the incident was lodged by him at Police Station, Poonch and contrary to this, as per the prosecution case, FIR had been registered on a source information received by the police. We are not inclined to give any importance any contention on this behalf. We have no hesitation in accepting PW.-1’s say that information was lodged by him but we cannot draw any adverse inference against the prosecution for the police having treated it as a source information. No prejudice can be said to have been caused to the appellants on this score. 76. For all that said and discussed above, we would hold that, even though there is no direct evidence about complicity of the appellants in the act leading to death of the deceased, that is, committing murder of the deceased, the prosecution has succeeded in proving such circumstances which establishes a complete chain sufficient to prove the involvement of the appellants in causing death of the deceased by strangulation and setting ablaze her dead body to cause disappearance of evidence of strangulation as a cause of death and camouflage it as a case of suicidal death by burning. 77. To restate and conclude precisely, prosecution has proved facts, which are sufficient to draw inference that appellants had been nourishing intention to do away with the life of the deceased to pave way for second marriage of A-1 for the reason that deceased had not given birth to any child. Two days prior to the incident the deceased had fled to the house of her brother, Om Parkash (PW-6) and had complained that A-2 has threatened to kill her. Two days prior to the incident the deceased had fled to the house of her brother, Om Parkash (PW-6) and had complained that A-2 has threatened to kill her. The next day A-1 had taken the deceased back to his house. On the day of incident, that is, 13.10.1997 there was high voltage tension in the household of the appellants, the appellants were found beating the deceased inasmuch as the father of A-1 was constrained to request Jaswant Singh (PW-2) to dissuade the appellants from beating her and thereafter, the deceased had gone weeping to Puran Chand (PW-7), who had come to the house of his daughter in that village, and complained that her husband and mother-in-law were bent upon killing her as her mother-in-law was saying that why she is to be kept alive as she is not given birth to any child. On the same day dead body of the deceased was found in the house of the appellants. She had died of asphyxia caused by strangulation and her dead body was set ablaze. Strong link in the chain of circumstances has been provided by false defence of alibi and commission of suicide by the deceased put forth by the appellants. We would, thus, hold that prosecution has succeeded in proving that the appellants committed murder of the deceased inside their house by strangulated her to death and in order to cause disappearance of evidence of murder and camouflage it as a case of suicide set her dead body ablaze. 78. Viewed thus, this appeal fails and is dismissed. Confirmation No. 07/2001 is also answered accordingly. 79. Outcome of the appeal and confirmation be intimated to the learned trial court in terms of section 425 Cr.P.C. Bail bonds of the appellants are now cancelled. 80. Record of the trial court be remitted back along with a copy of this judgment. Both of appellants (accused) shall surrender before the learned trial court on 20.01.2017 and learned trial court shall take steps to implement the sentence. Appeal dismissed.