JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. 1. This writ petition is on behalf of Management of Dainik Asha Private Ltd. whereby and where under the award dated 3.9.1994 passed in I.D. Case No. 39 of 1993 has been assailed. 2. Brief facts of the case of the petitioner-management is that the opposite party-workman is not the workman within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Working Journalists Act and as such the award passed by the Tribunal without answering this issue is not sustainable in the eye of law. None appears for opposite party-workman. 3. After having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and opposite party-State and after appreciating the rival submissions of the parties, it is evident that a dispute has been raised by the opposite party-workman to the effect that:- “Whether the amount of Rs.1,85,760/- claimed by Sri Sambhu Panigrahi, special correspondent from M/s. Dainik Asha Pvt. Ltd. Hilpatna, Berhampur is actually due to him? If not, what should be the details? 4. Case of the opposite party-workman is that he was engaged as a whole time correspondent under the first party management w.e.f. 15.03.1983, which is a news paper establishment and thus he became a working journalists as defined in Section 2(f) of the Working Journalists and other News Paper Employees (conditions of service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the “Working Journalists Act”) and by virtue of his employment, he was sending various news items for publication in daily news paper Dainika Asha. 5. Though he had been engaged as full time in collection of news for publication in their news paper, but he was not being paid his legitimate dues as required to be paid by the establishment, however he has been paid honorarium till September, 1991 and thereafter it has totally been stopped, in the result he raised a claim and when conciliation failed, the present reference has been made in which he has claimed his monetary benefit to the tune of Rs.2,36,960/- till 31.08.1993 as per the schedule attached to the written statement. 6. While on the other hand, case of the first party-management is that the opposite party-workman is not the journalist and employee under them. 6. While on the other hand, case of the first party-management is that the opposite party-workman is not the journalist and employee under them. According to the management, opposite party-workman was sending some news for which he was getting some amount, as such he cannot be said to be the workman within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Working Journalists Act. 7. The Tribunal after appreciating the submissions of the parties has framed the following five issues:- 1. Whether Sri Panigrahi is a workman under the Management as defined in Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act? 2. Whether Sri Panigrahi is a working journalist as defined in Section 2(f) of the Working Journalists Act and is he an employee under the Management? 3. Whether the reference in the present form is maintainable? 4. Whether Sri Panigrahi is entitled to the claim laid? 5. To what relief Sri Panigrahi is entitled? The Issue Nos. 1 to 4 has been discussed together which is with respect to the Card issued as to whether the opposite party-workman is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act and working journalist as defined in Section 2(f) of the Working Journalists Act. 8. The Tribunal however has gone into Ext. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I. These are the documents which have been issued by the petitioner-management which is the Identity Card, letter written by the Editor of the Management, the letter addressed to the petitioner to attend the Press correspondence of the Dainik Asha, the letter of the Editor, Dainik Asha who has given a character certificate, letter of the workman from Rambha N.A.C. and on the basis of these documents, the opposite party-workman has been brought under the purview of the workman. 9. It transpires from the award that the opposite party-workman has been held to be working journalist within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Working Journalists Act and as per the definition of the working journalist as provided under Section 2(f) which means that a person whose principal avocation is that of a journalist and who is employed as such, either whole time or part time in or in relation to, one or more newspaper establishment and includes an editor, a leader-writer, news editor, sub-editor, feature writer, copy tester, reporter, correspondent, cartoonist, news photographer and proof-reader. 10. 10. The Tribunal, on the basis of available evidence has found that the Editor Sri Chandra Sekhar Mohapatra had issued application for accreditation of press correspondent to the District Magistrate, Ganjam requesting to grant the same to the opposite party-workman and to allow all facilities to working in the head quarters at Chatrapur for the newspaper Dainik Asha in their application marked as Ext-A and he was issued with an I-Card by the Management on 20.07.1986 designating him as special correspondent of Chatrapur Sub-Division and on the basis of these acceptance, he has been brought under the purview of Section 2(f) and accordingly reference has been answered in his favour by directing the petitioner-management to compute the Basic Pay, Dearness allowances and House Rent allowances applicable to him w.e.f. 25.01.1990. 11. At this juncture, it needs to reference the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Management of Express Newspaper vs. B. Somayajulu and Others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 279 , wherein it has been observed that the categories of persons mentioned in the classification part of the definition only for the purpose of removing the doubt as to whether the persons specified in the said clause are journalists or not and they will have still further to show that journalist is their principal avocation and found that unless principal avocation is journalist, he cannot be considered to be working journalist. 12. From perusal of the award, it does not transpires that the Tribunal has taken into consideration the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of Express Newspaper (supra), since no evidence has been laid by the opposite party-workman to the effect that he is a journalist which is his principal avocation so that he can be said to be a working journalist which is the prime requirement to answer the reference. In view of such a situation, the award passed by the Tribunal cannot be said not to suffer from perversity and error apparent on the face of record. 13. We are conscious of the fact that this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not interfere to reverse the fact finding, but if the finding is perverse or if there is error apparent on the face of record, certainly the writ court can interfere. 13. We are conscious of the fact that this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not interfere to reverse the fact finding, but if the finding is perverse or if there is error apparent on the face of record, certainly the writ court can interfere. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court by its Full Bench in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein at paragraph-7 their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 14. We have also perused the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Swaran Singh and another vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 , their Lordships discussing the power of writ court under Article 226 for issuance of writ of Certiorari has been pleased to hold at para-12 and 13, that certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from Appellate jurisdiction. The writ jurisdiction can extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice. The writ jurisdiction can extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice. In regard to finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evident which is legally inadmissible or has refused to admit admissible evidence or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law, a pure error of fact, however grave, cannot be corrected by a writ. In another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Heinz India Private Limited and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 , their Lordships has been pleased to hold at para-66 and 67, which is being quoted herein below:- “66. That the Court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra, reported in AIR 1957 SC 264 , this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. In Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra, reported in AIR 1957 SC 264 , this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. In the case of Thansingh Nathmal reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” Yet in another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways vs. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose vs. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J. as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” Thus, it is evident that the proposition laid down in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good. 15. Applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as indicated hereinabove and after appreciating the fact that the Tribunal has not gone into the fact as to whether the opposite party-workman is coming within the purview of working journalist as per the law laid down in the case of Management of Express Newspaper (supra), hence we have no hesitation to hold that the award suffers from perversity. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner-management has submitted that in view of the order passed by this Court on 26.11.1997, while staying the operation of the award subject to deposit of Rs.40,000/- within six weeks from the date of passing of the order. 17. It has been informed by the learned counsel for the opposite party that the amount of Rs.40,000/- has been deposited, out of it Rs.20,000/- has been allowed to be withdrawn by the opposite party no. 17. It has been informed by the learned counsel for the opposite party that the amount of Rs.40,000/- has been deposited, out of it Rs.20,000/- has been allowed to be withdrawn by the opposite party no. 3 vide order passed by this Court on 30.06.1998 and as such we thought it proper to modify the award by making the interim order dated 26.11.1997 absolute. Accordingly, with the above observations and discussions, the writ petition stands disposed of.