JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. 1. In these writ petitions since the common question regarding the order of punishment having been imposed upon the workmen is under challenge and as such the same are being disposed of by common order. 2. Case of the petitioner-Management while assailing the award dated 31.7.1992 passed in Industrial Dispute Case No. 33 of 1990 (Central), award dated 25.6.1993 in Industrial Dispute Case No. 34 of 1990 (C) and award dated 29.9.1992 in Industrial Dispute Case No. 42 of 1990 (Central) in O.J.C. No. 744 of 1994, O.J.C. No. 745 of 1994 and O.J.C. No. 3789 of 1993 respectively that the industrial tribunal ought to have decided the maintainability of the reference on the ground that the opposite party-workmen are not coming under the definition of workmen within the meaning of workmen as per the definition provided under the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the awards are per se illegal and are not sustainable. 3. While on the other hand, case of the opposite party-workmen that the definition of workmen as stipulated in the Industrial Disputes Act they are coming under the purview of the workmen and this is the reason the conciliation having been failed against the order of punishment the matter has been referred by the appropriate Government by making a Reference for its adjudication before the Tribunal. Petitioner-Management has not challenged the direction of reference on the ground of maintainability rather they have also not raised this point even before the Conciliation Officer. Petitioner-Management has not raised this point before the Tribunal in course of time of leading evidence rather after closure of evidence this point has been raised in the written notes of argument and as such the Tribunal has rightly not taken into consideration and held that they are workmen within the meaning of definition of workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act. It has further been submitted that the Tribunal has taken into consideration that in earlier reference being Reference Case No. 29 of 1990 (Central) the self-same plea has been negative and the same has not been assailed by the petitioner-Management and as such this ground is not available to the petitioner-Management to be raised at the fag end of hearing of the case. O.J.C. No. 744 of 1994 It has been submitted that the order of punishment suspending them for a period of 15 days itself on the ground of misconduct since it is punishment, it was duty of the petitioner-Management to follow principles of natural justice but before inflicting punishment the petitioner-Management has conducted enquiry behind their back and found the charges proved and thereafter order of punishment has been imposed. O.J.C. No. 745 of 1994 The issues involved in this case is regarding reinstatement of Sri Tejraj Chhtria and 20 others with back wages from 24.12.1979 in which reference has been answered in favour of the workmen. O.J.C. No. 3789 of 1993 In this case, reference is regarding termination of the workman Shri Dilip Kumar Sidhartha and in whose favour reference has been answered which is being assailed by the petitioner-Farm. 4. So far as the sole issue raised by the petitioner-Management that the Central Cattle Breeding Farm is not coming under the definition of industry. In order to appreciate the submission it would be appropriate to discuss the definition of industry as provided under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act which speaks as follows: “2(j) “Industry” means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.” The historical background definition of industry is that there was no definition of industry in the Trade Disputes Act, 1919. The present definition continues to be as originally enacted in the IDA which is based on Section 4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-25 of Australia which reads thus: “(i) Any business, trade, manufacture, undertaking or calling of employers on land or water; (ii) any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of employees on land or water; (iii) a branch of an industry and a group of industries.” Thus, the definition of industry in this clause is both exhaustive and inclusive and is ambivalently comprehensive in scope. It is in two parts. The first part says that it means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employees and then goes on to say that it includes any calling, service, employment handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. Thus, one part defines it from the standpoint of the employer; the other from the standpoint of the employees. The first part says that it means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employees and then goes on to say that it includes any calling, service, employment handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. Thus, one part defines it from the standpoint of the employer; the other from the standpoint of the employees. The first part of the definition gives the statutory meaning of industry, whereas the second part deliberately refers to several other items of industry and brings them in the definition in any inclusive way. The first part of the definition determines an industry by reference to the occupation of the employers in respect of certain activities. The activities are specified by five words, namely, business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling. These words determine the scope of the word industry and they describe what the cognate expression industrial is intended to convey. Business is a word of wide import. This expression is wider than the term trade and is not synonymous with it, and it means practically anything which is not an occupation. Trade is not only in the etymological or dictionary sense, but in legal usage as well, a term of a wide scope; it may mean the occupation of a smaller shopkeeper just as well as that of a commercial magnate, while it may also mean a skilled craft. The word trade in its primary meaning is an exchange of goods for goods or goods for money and in its secondary meaning, it is any business carried on with a view to profiting, whether manual or mercantile, as distinguished from the liberal arts or learned professions or from agriculture. The word undertaking is the most elastic of all the words used in the definition. An undertaking means anything undertaken or any business, work or project which one engages in or attempts as an enterprise. The word undertaking in the context of the definition, has been understood to mean any business or any work or project which one engages in or attempts as an enterprise, analogous to business or trade. Manufacture is a kind of a productive activity, in which the making of articles or materials, often on a large scale, is by physical labour or mechanical power. The second part views the matter from the angle of the employees and is designed to include something more than what the term primary denotes. Manufacture is a kind of a productive activity, in which the making of articles or materials, often on a large scale, is by physical labour or mechanical power. The second part views the matter from the angle of the employees and is designed to include something more than what the term primary denotes. By this part of the definition, any calling, employment, handicraft, industrial occupation or avocation of workmen, is included in the concept of an industry. The word calling finds place in both the parties of the definition. In the first part, it refers to the employers and in the second part, to the workmen. The word service in the second part is again of a very wide import. The word employment brings in the contract of service between the employer and the employee. The word handicraft means any manual labour exercised by way of trade or for purposes of gain in or incidental to the making of any article or a part of an article. The word avocation is a word of wide signification, meaning the way in which a man passes his life or spends his time. The word occupation is a word of a still wider signification. In other words, what does not amount to avocation, may amount to an occupation. The phrase occupation or avocation is, however, qualified by the word industrial, which indicates that the occupation or avocation in which the workmen are employed should be of an industrial character. 5. Thus from the import of meaning of industry, it is evident that the scope is very exhaustive. The phrase occupation or avocation is, however, qualified by the word industrial, which indicates that the occupation or avocation in which the workmen are employed should be of an industrial character. 5. Thus from the import of meaning of industry, it is evident that the scope is very exhaustive. After the amendment having been made in the definition of section 2(j) by virtue of Act 46 of 1982 as per which definition of industry speaks as follows: (j) "industry" means any systematic activity carried on by co-operation between an employer and his workmen (whether such workmen are employed by such employer directly or by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not:- (i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; (ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit, and includes:- (a) any activity of the Dock Labour Board established under section 5A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948). (b) any activity relating to the promotion of sales or business or both carried on by an establishment. But does not include:- (1) any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is referred to in the foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the predominant one. But does not include:- (1) any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is referred to in the foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the predominant one. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-clause "agricultural operation" does not includes any activity carried on in a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951); (2) hospitals or dispensaries; (3) educational, scientific, research or training institutions; (4) institutions owned or managed by organizations wholly or substantially engaged in any charitable, social or philanthropic service; (5) khadi or village industries; (6) any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government including all the activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with defence research, atomic energy and space; (7) any domestic service; (8) any activity, being a profession practised by an individual or body of individuals, if the number of persons employed by the individual or body of individual or body of individuals in relation to such profession is less than ten; (9) any activity, being an activity carried on by a co-operative society or a club or any other like body of individuals, if the number of persons employed by the co-operative society, club or other like body of individuals in relation to such activity is less than ten.” In the light of these definition, now it is to be adjudicated as to whether the Central Cattle Breeding Farm, Chiplima is an industry or not. 6. So far as the case of the petitioner that the petitioner-Farm is engaged in Research and Development activities for improvement of cattle and fodder. 6. So far as the case of the petitioner that the petitioner-Farm is engaged in Research and Development activities for improvement of cattle and fodder. These activities are agricultural nature and are sovereign functions of State and as such the petitioner-Farm is not coming under the definition of Industry as per Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act but submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner-Farm is not accepted for the reasons that primary nature of work of the petitioner-Farm is to achieve genetic improvement of herd for milk production by scientific selection and mating system, testing of bulls to make available proven sires, production and distribution of superior bulls for improvement of cattle population in the country, providing bulls and semen of these bulls to State projects, production of seeds of high yielding varieties of fodder and demonstration of scientific breeding of cattle and farm management practices and as such although the Farm is engaged in Search and Development but it is not exclusively for the agriculture purpose, rather the activities relating to the promotion of sales or business or both carried on by an establishment and as such the petitioner-Farm is coming under the pre-amended or amended definition of industry as contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Although the learned Tribunal has not gone into these aspects of the matter for the reason that this point has not been raised by the petitioner-Management in course of adjudication of the issue before it, but we thought it proper to discuss and decide it accordingly, we are of the considered view that the petitioner-Farm is an industry within the wider concept of the definition of industry as per discussion made above. O.J.C. No. 744 of 1994 7. O.J.C. No. 744 of 1994 7. So far as case of O.J.C. No. 744 of 1994 is concerned, it has been submitted that the Tribunal has taken into consideration that the allegation leveled against them cannot be said to be misconduct since the allegation does not pertain to in course of discharging duties rather it is purely personal in between the opposite party-workmen and the Management Witness No. 2 and as such the award has been passed quashing the order of punishment with a direction to release wages of the said period by directing that the workmen would be deemed to be in service for the period in question, after going through the award we are of the considered view that before inflicting minor punishment an opportunity of being heard ought to have been provided to the workmen and on this ground the order of punishment has been held to be illegal, as such there is no infirmity in the award. We, accordingly, are of the conscious view that the order of suspension being a minor punishment which is based upon enquiry, hence the management ought to have allowed the workman full participation in the enquiry and thereafter opportunity to defend himself which admittedly has not been done and according the order of punishment of suspension for the petitioner for 15 days has been said to be illegal, hence we find no illegality in the finding of the Tribunal and accordingly, the award assailed in O.J.C. No. 744 of 1994 needs no inference by this Court. O.J.C. No. 745 of 1994 8. So far as O.J.C. No. 745 of 1994 is concerned, the award is in relation to regularization of Sri Tejran Chhatria and 20 others with back wages from 24.12.1979, the Tribunal after going from the rival submissions of the parties and relying upon the evidence produced before it, has come to conclusion that as the poor workers raised certain demands with the management, they have worked for the whole period in question and they have got disengagement. Accordingly, the Tribunal has held that refusal of employment to the aggrieved workmen for the period from 24.12.1979 till re-employment being illegal and unjustified the same be treated as their duty period and they be paid full wages for the aforesaid period. O.J.C. No. 3789 of 1993 9. Accordingly, the Tribunal has held that refusal of employment to the aggrieved workmen for the period from 24.12.1979 till re-employment being illegal and unjustified the same be treated as their duty period and they be paid full wages for the aforesaid period. O.J.C. No. 3789 of 1993 9. So far as case of workman involved in O.J.C. No. 3789 of 1993 which pertains to termination of Sri Dilip Kumar Sidhartha is concerned, the Tribunal after discussing the fact in detail land after appreciating evidence produced before it has been pleased to hold that the termination is illegal and unjustified and accordingly order of re-instatement and back wages has been passed. After going through the awards which are impugned in these writ petitions, we find that the Labour Court, after appreciating evidences and depositions, has given a well reasoned finding and as such this Court cannot act as a court of appeal to re-appreciate the evidences. 10. The petitioner-Management has raised sole issue regarding maintainability of the reference on the ground that the petitioner-Management is not coming under the definition of industry as per the definition stipulated in the Industrial Disputes Act but since we have answered against the petitioner-Management and the awards having been passed after appreciating evidence, hence this Court cannot act as an appellate Court in order to reverse the fact finding which is based upon evidence, Reference in this regard needs to be made of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good since the same has been considered by Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways vs. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose vs. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J. as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 11. There is no dispute about the settled proposition that this court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot act as a court of appeal to differ with the finding given by the Tribunal which is based upon cogent evidence and the materials placed before it subject to exceptions that if there is perversity in finding or there is error apparent on the face of record or order is without jurisdiction, but we find that these cases are not coming under these exception warranting interference with the award. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed.