JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Challenge in this appeal is to judgment and award, dated 6th March, 2009, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P. (for short "the Tribunal") in MAC Petition No. 172MAC/2 of 2004, titled as Litesh Kumar and others versus Subhash and others, whereby the claim petition filed by the appellants-claimants came to be dismissed (for short “the impugned award”). 2. The manner in which the case has been conducted and the appellants-claimants are suffering, who are the victims of a vehicular accident, is a travesty of justice. 3. This appeal has been presented before this Court on 7th September, 2009. Notices were issued in the limitation petition, which was granted vide order, dated 10th March, 2011 and the appeal came to be admitted. After admission, notices were issued, Mr. Suneet Goel, Advocate, appeared on behalf of respondent No. 3 and Mr. Deepak Kaushal, Advocate, put in appearance on behalf of respondent No. 4. It appears that the names of respondents No. 1 and 2 came to be deleted from the array of respondents in terms of order, dated 12th March, 2012. 4. After noticing the said facts, this Court, on 26th February, 2016, commanded the Superintendent of Police Ambala to direct SHO Mulana to produce the copy of FIR No. 176 of 2003, dated 31st August, 2003, registered at Police Station Mulana, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”), failed to do so, constraining this Court to issue bailable warrants against the Superintendent of Police, Ambala, vide order, dated 1st April, 2016. This is how he has produced requisite information by way of affidavit, which finds place at page No. 36 of the paper book. 5. Perusal of the said affidavit/information does disclose that FIR was lodged by one Puran Chand against the driver of Maruti Var No. PB08H7909, who was later on traced as Subhash Chand, who has already been arrayed as respondent No. 1 in the array of the respondents. There is no dispute about the fact that respondent No. 2Kuldeep Kumar was the owner-insured of the said vehicle. 6. There is no dispute about the fact that respondent No. 2Kuldeep Kumar was the owner-insured of the said vehicle. 6. In the interest of justice read with the aim and object of granting of compensation and the fact that the claim petitions should not succumb to the hypertechnicalities, niceties of law and the mystic maybe's, I deem it proper to recall the order, dated 12th March, 2012, so far it relates to deletion of the names of respondents No. 1 and 2 from the array of the respondents. 7. The question is – whether notice is required to be issued to respondents No. 1 and 2? 8. I am of the considered view that there is no need to issue notice to respondents No. 1 and 2, at this stage, because much water has flown down and the appellants-claimants are suffering from the year 2003 till today for the reasons discussed hereinabove and the appeal can be determined without hearing them. 9. In order to determine this appeal, it is necessary to give a flashback of the case, the womb of which has given birth to the instant appeal. 10. Appellants-claimants invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for grant of compensation on the ground that they became the victims of the vehicular accident, which was caused by the driver, namely Shri Subhash, while driving Maruti Van, bearing registration No. PB08H7909, on 27th August, 2003, at about 6.30 P.M. near Village Sirasgarh, Police Station Mulana (Haryana) in which deceased-Komal Kumar alias Ganga Ram sustained injuries and succumbed to the injuries. 11. The respondents resisted the claim petition on the grounds taken in the respective memo of objections. 12. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal on 14th November, 2006: “1. Whether Komal Kumar alias Ganga Ram who was going on cycle on dated 27-8-2003 as such was struck by Maruti Van No. PB08H7909 at about 6.30 PM near Village Sirasgarh under Police Station Mullana (Haryana) which van was being driven by respondent No. 1 (owner and driver) as a consequence whereof Komal Kumar sustained multiple injuries to his person which subsequently proved to be fatal, as alleged? OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the petitioners being legal heirs of deceased are entitled to compensation, if so to what amount and from whom? OPP 3. OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the petitioners being legal heirs of deceased are entitled to compensation, if so to what amount and from whom? OPP 3. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form? OPR3 4. Whether the driver of the offending vehicle was not in possession of a valid and effective driving licence, as alleged? OPR3 5. Whether the offending van was being driven in contravention of the terms and conditions of insurance policy, as alleged? OPR3 6. Whether this tribunal lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, as alleged? OPR3 7. Whether the petition is filed by the petitioners in collusion with respondents No. 1 and 2, as alleged? OPR3 8. Relief.” 13. Parties have led evidence. Issue No. 1: 14. There is evidence on the record which does disclose that the accident has taken place and deceased-Komal Kumar alias Ganga Ram became the victim of the said accident. FIR No. 176, dated 31st August, 2003, was registered at Police Station, Mulana, which came up for trial before Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ambala. This information was placed before this Court by the Deputy Commissioner of Police concerned. Annexure C3 (at page 50 of the paper book) is the order of acquittal in the said case, being Criminal Case No. 6941 of 2003, titled as State versus Subhash Chand. It is apt to reproduce para 10 of the said judgment herein: “10. In view of my above discussion, it is held that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, accused is hereby acquitted of the charges framed against him. His bail bond and surety bonds stand discharged. File be consigned to record room, after due compliance.” 15. Perusal of the said judgment does disclose that the accused-driver of the offending vehicle came to be acquitted on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. So, this is not a clean case of acquittal, rather, he got acquittal on the basis of the doubts, which have crept in during the trial. 16. It is apt to record herein that driver-Subhash had given a slip to law and had not appeared before the trial Court, was declared as proclaimed offender and stood convicted for the same in terms of Annexure C5 (at page 57 of the paper book). 16. It is apt to record herein that driver-Subhash had given a slip to law and had not appeared before the trial Court, was declared as proclaimed offender and stood convicted for the same in terms of Annexure C5 (at page 57 of the paper book). It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 15 of the said judgment herein: “15. …...........In these circumstances, the prosecution has fully proved that the accused has failed to appear before the Court even after the issuance of proclamation under section 82 of Code of Criminal Procedure and has committed an offence punishable under Section 174A of Indian Penal Code. Thus, he is hereby held guilty and convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 174A of Indian Penal Code. Let, he be heard on quantum of sentence after lunch.” 17. However, I have gone through the record, minutely perused all the documents and am of the considered view that the claimants have proved that the driver-Subhash had driven the offending vehicle rashly and negligently on 27th August, 2003, at about 6.30 P.M. near Village Sirasgarh, Police Station Mulana (Haryana) and caused the accident, in which deceased-Komal Kumar alias Ganga Ram sustained injuries and succumbed to the injuries. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 1 are set aside and the issue is decided in favour of the appellants-claimants and against the respondents. 18. Before dealing with issue No. 2, I deem it proper to determine issues No. 3 to 7. Issue No. 3: 19. The insurer has not led any evidence to prove this issue. However, while going through the averments contained in the claim petition read with Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “MV Act”), one comes to an inescapable conclusion that the claim petition was maintainable. The MV has gone through a sea change and even a police report can be treated as claim petition in terms of the mandate of Sections 156(8) and 166(4) of the MV Act. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 3 are upheld. Issue No. 4: 20. It was for the insurer to plead and prove that the driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the same. The driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle is on the record as Ext. Issue No. 4: 20. It was for the insurer to plead and prove that the driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the same. The driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle is on the record as Ext. PW5/A, which does disclose that the driver of the offending vehicle was having a valid driving licence to drive motor cycle/scooter and tractor. Meaning thereby, the driver was competent to drive light motor vehicle. The offending vehicle, i.e. Maruti Van, also falls within the definition of light motor vehicle in terms of Section 2(21) of the MV Act. Accordingly, it is held that the driver of the offending vehicle was competent to drive the same. 21. At this stage, learned counsel for the insurer argued that there was no endorsement on the driving licence. The argument is not tenable for the reason that endorsement was not required. 22. A Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Srinagar, of which I (Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice) was a member, in a case titled as National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Muhammad Sidiq Kuchey & ors., being LPA No. 180 of 2002, decided on 27th September, 2007, has discussed this issue and held that a driver having licence to drive “LMV” requires no “PSV” endorsement. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment herein: “The question now arises as to whether the driver who possessed driving licence for driving abovementioned vehicles, could he drive a passenger vehicle? The answer, I find, in the judgment passed by this court in case titled National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Irfan Sidiq Bhat, 2004 (II) SLJ 623, wherein it is held that Light Motor Vehicle includes transport vehicle and transport vehicle includes public service vehicle and public service vehicle includes any motor vehicle used or deemed to be used for carriage of passengers. Further held, that the authorization of having PSV endorsement in terms of Rule 41(a) of the Rules is not required in the given circumstances. It is profitable to reproduce paras 13 and 17 of the judgment hereunder: “13. Further held, that the authorization of having PSV endorsement in terms of Rule 41(a) of the Rules is not required in the given circumstances. It is profitable to reproduce paras 13 and 17 of the judgment hereunder: “13. A combined reading of the above provisions leaves no room for doubt that by virtue of licence, about which there is no dispute, both Showkat Ahamd and Zahoor Ahmad were competent in terms of section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act to drive a public service vehicle without any PSV endorsement and express authorization in terms of rule 4(1)(a) of the State Rules. In other words, the requirement of the State Rules stood satisfied. …....................... 17. In the case of Mohammad Aslam Khan (CIMA no. 87 of 2002) Peerzada Noorud-Din appearing as witness on behalf of Regional Transport Officer did say on recall for further examination that PSV endorsement on the licence of Zahoor Ahmad was fake. In our opinion, the fact that the PSV endorsement on the licence was fake is not at all material, for, even if the claim is considered on the premise that there was no PSV endorsement on the licence, for the reasons stated above, it would not materially affect the claim. By virtue of “C to E” licence Showkat Ahmad was competent to drive a passenger vehicle. In fact, there is no separate definition of passenger vehicle or passenger service vehicle in the Motor Vehicles Act. They come within the ambit of public service vehicle under section 2(35). A holder of driving licence with respect to “light Motor Vehicle” is thus competent to drive any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for carriage of passengers i.e. a public service vehicle.” In the given circumstances of the case PSV endorsement was not required at all.” 23. The mandate of Sections 2 and 3 of the MV Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court in a case titled as Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & ors. versus Smt. Santosh & Ors., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 2791, and after examining the various provisions of the MV Act held that Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on the driver to hold an effective driving licence for the type of vehicle, which he intends to drive. It is apt to reproduce paras 19 and 23 of the judgment herein: “19. It is apt to reproduce paras 19 and 23 of the judgment herein: “19. Section 2(2) of the Act defines articulated vehicle which means a motor vehicle to which a semitrailer is attached; Section 2(34) defines public place; Section 2(44) defines 'tractor' as a motor vehicle which is not itself constructed to carry any load; Section 2(46) defines `trailer' which means any vehicle, other than a semitrailer and a sidecar, drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle. Section 3 of the Act provides for necessity for driving license; Section 5 provides for responsibility of owners of the vehicle for contravention of Sections 3 and 4; Section 6 provides for restrictions on the holding of driving license; Section 56 provides for compulsion for having certificate of fitness for transport vehicles; Section 59 empowers the State to fix the age limit of the vehicles; Section 66 provides for necessity for permits to ply any vehicle for any commercial purpose; Section 67 empowers the State to control road transport; Section 112 provides for limits of speed; Sections 133 and 134 imposes a duty on the owners and the drivers of the vehicles in case of accident and injury to a person; Section 146 provides that no person shall use any vehicle at a public place unless the vehicle is insured. In addition thereto, the Motor Vehicle Taxation Act provides for imposition of passenger tax and road tax etc. 20. …....................... 21. …...................... 22. …..................... 23. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold an effective driving license for the type of vehicle which he intends to drive. Section 10 of the Act enables the Central Government to prescribe forms of driving licenses for various categories of vehicles mentioned in subsection (2) of the said Section. The definition clause in Section 2 of the Act defines various categories of vehicles which are covered in broad types mentioned in subsection (2) of Section 10. They are 'goods carriage', 'heavy goods vehicle', 'heavy passenger motor vehicle', 'invalid carriage', 'light motor vehicle', 'maxicab', 'medium goods vehicle', 'medium passenger motor vehicle', 'motorcab', 'motorcycle', 'omnibus', 'private service vehicle', 'semitrailer', 'tourist vehicle', 'tractor', 'trailer' and 'transport vehicle'.” 24. They are 'goods carriage', 'heavy goods vehicle', 'heavy passenger motor vehicle', 'invalid carriage', 'light motor vehicle', 'maxicab', 'medium goods vehicle', 'medium passenger motor vehicle', 'motorcab', 'motorcycle', 'omnibus', 'private service vehicle', 'semitrailer', 'tourist vehicle', 'tractor', 'trailer' and 'transport vehicle'.” 24. The Apex Court in another case titled as National Insurance Company Ltd. versus Annappa Irappa Nesaria & Ors., reported in 2008 AIR SCW 906, has also discussed the purpose of amendments, which were made in the year 1994 and the definitions of 'light motor vehicle', 'medium goods vehicle' and the necessity of having a driving licence. It is apt to reproduce paras 8, 14 and 16 of the judgment herein: “8. Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the contention raised herein by the appellant has neither been raised before the Tribunal nor before the High Court. In any event, it was urged, that keeping in view the definition of the 'light motor vehicle' as contained in Section 2(21) of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 ('Act' for short), a light goods carriage would come within the purview thereof. A 'light goods carriage' having not been defined in the Act, the definition of the 'light motor vehicle' clearly indicates that it takes within its umbrage, both a transport vehicle and a non-transport vehicle. Strong reliance has been placed in this behalf by the learned counsel in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., [ 1999 (6) SCC 620 ]. 9. ….................. 10. …............... 11. …............... 12. ….............. 13. ….............. 14. Rule 14 prescribes for filing of an application in Form 4, for a licence to drive a motor vehicle, categorizing the same in nine types of vehicles. Clause (e) provides for 'Transport vehicle' which has been substituted by G.S.R. 221(E) with effect from 28.3.2001. Before the amendment in 2001, the entries medium goods vehicle and heavy goods vehicle existed which have been substituted by transport vehicle. As noticed hereinbefore, Light Motor Vehicles also found place therein. 15. ….......................... 16. From what has been noticed hereinbefore, it is evident that 'transport vehicle' has now been substituted for 'medium goods vehicle' and 'heavy goods vehicle'. The light motor vehicle continued, at the relevant point of time, to cover both, 'light passenger carriage vehicle' and 'light goods carriage vehicle'. As noticed hereinbefore, Light Motor Vehicles also found place therein. 15. ….......................... 16. From what has been noticed hereinbefore, it is evident that 'transport vehicle' has now been substituted for 'medium goods vehicle' and 'heavy goods vehicle'. The light motor vehicle continued, at the relevant point of time, to cover both, 'light passenger carriage vehicle' and 'light goods carriage vehicle'. A driver who had a valid licence to drive a light motor vehicle, therefore, was authorised to drive a light goods vehicle as well.” 25. The Apex Court in the latest judgment in the case titled as Kulwant Singh & Ors. versus Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., reported in JT 2014 (12) SC 110, held that PSV endorsement is not required. 26. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 27. The insurance policy is on the record as Ext. RZ. The factum of insurance of the offending vehicle is admitted. So, there is no dispute about the factum of insurance. The insurance policy also does disclose that the offending vehicle was insured in the name of respondent No. 2 Kuldeep Kumar. Thereafter, the offending vehicle was transferred in the name of respondent No. 4 Sarvjeet Kaur. But, at the time of the accident, the offending vehicle was registered in the name of respondent No. 2 Kuldeep Kumar and the insurance was subsisting. 28. It is not the case of the insurer projected before the Tribunal that the owner-insured Kuldeep Kumar had committed any breach while making transfer of the offending vehicle. Even otherwise, transfer of a vehicle cannot absolve the insurer from third party liability in terms of Section 157 of the MV Act. 29. My this view is fortified by the Apex Court Judgment in case titled as G. Govindan versus New India Assurance Company Ltd. and others, reported in AIR 1999 SC 1398 . It is apt to reproduce paras 10, 13 and 15 of the judgment herein: “10. This Court in the said judgment held that the provisions under the new Act and the old Act are substantially the same in relation to liability in regard to third party. This Court also recognized the view taken in the separate judgment in Kondaiah's case that the transferee insured could not be said to be a third party qua the vehicle in question. This Court also recognized the view taken in the separate judgment in Kondaiah's case that the transferee insured could not be said to be a third party qua the vehicle in question. In other words, a victim or the legal representatives of the victim cannot be denied the compensation by the insurer on the ground that the policy was not transferred in the name of the transferee. 11. …………………… 12. …………………... 13. In our opinion that both under the old Act and under the new Act the Legislature was anxious to protect the third party (victim) interest. It appears that what was implicit in the provisions of the old Act is now made explicit, presumably in view of the conflicting decisions on this aspect among the various High Courts. 14. ……………………. 15. As between the two conflicting views of the Full Bench judgments noticed above, we prefer to approve the ratio laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kondaiah's case (AIR 1986 Andh Pra 62) as it advances the object of the Legislature to protect the third party interest. We hasten to add that the third party here will not include a transferee whose transferor has not followed procedure for transfer of policy. In other words in accord with the well-settled rule of interpretation of statutes we are inclined to hold that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kondaiah's case is preferable to the contrary views taken by the Karnataka and Delhi High Courts (supra) even assuming that two views are possible on the interpretation of relevant sections as it promotes the object of the Legislature in protecting the third party (victim) interest. The ratio laid down in the judgment of Karnataka and Delhi High Courts (AIR 1990 Kant 166 (FB) and AIR 1989 Delhi 88) (FB) (supra) differing from Andhra Pradesh High Court is not the correct one.” 30. The Apex Court in case titled as Rikhi Ram and another versus Smt. Sukhrania and others, reported in AIR 2003 SC 1446 , held that in absence of intimation of transfer to Insurance Company, the liability of Insurance Company does not cease. It is apt to reproduce paras 5 to 7 of the judgment herein: “5. The aforesaid provision shows that it was intended to cover two legal objectives. It is apt to reproduce paras 5 to 7 of the judgment herein: “5. The aforesaid provision shows that it was intended to cover two legal objectives. Firstly, that no one who was not a party to a contract would bring an action on a contract; and secondly, that a person who has no interest in the subject matter of an insurance can claim the benefit of an insurance. Thus, once the vehicle is insured, the owner as well as any other person can use the vehicle with the consent of the owner. Section 94 does not provide that any person who will use the vehicle shall insure the vehicle in respect of his separate use. 6. On an analysis of Ss. 94 and 95, we further find that there are two third parties when a vehicle is transferred by the owner to a purchaser. The purchaser is one of the third parties to the contract and other third party is for whose benefit the vehicle was insured. So far, the transferee who is the third party in the contract, cannot get any personal benefit under the policy unless there is a compliance of the provisions of the Act. However, so far as third party injured or victim is concerned, he can enforce liability undertaken by the insurer. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that whenever a vehicle which is covered by the insurance policy is transferred to a transferee, the liability of insurer does not ceases so far as the third party/victim is concerned, even if the owner or purchaser does not give any intimation as required under the provisions of the Act.” 31. The Apex Court in another case titled as United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla versus Tilak Singh and others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 404 , has laid down the same principle. It is apt to reproduce paras 12 and 13 of the judgment herein: “12. In Rikhi Ram v. Sukhrania [ (2003) 3 SCC 97 , 2003 SCC (Cri) 735] a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had occasion to consider Section 103A of the 1939 Act. It is apt to reproduce paras 12 and 13 of the judgment herein: “12. In Rikhi Ram v. Sukhrania [ (2003) 3 SCC 97 , 2003 SCC (Cri) 735] a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had occasion to consider Section 103A of the 1939 Act. This Court reaffirmed the decision in G. Govindan case and added that the liability of an insurer does not cease even if the owner or purchaser fails to give intimation of transfer to the Insurance Company, as the purpose of the legislation was to protect the rights and interests of the third party. 13. Thus, in our view, the situation in law which arises from the failure of the transferor to notify the insurer of the fact of transfer of ownership of the insured vehicle is no different, whether under Section 103A of the 1939 Act or under Section 157 of the 1988 Act insofar as the liability towards a third party is concerned. Thus, whether the old Act applies to the facts before us, or the new Act applies, as far as the deceased third party was concerned, the result would not be different. Hence, the contention of the appellant on the second issue must fail, either way, making a decision on the first contention unnecessary, for deciding the second issue. However, it may be necessary to decide which Act applies for deciding the third contention. In our view, it is not the transfer of the vehicle but the accident which furnishes the cause of action for the application before the Tribunal. Undoubtedly, the accident took place after the 1988 Act had come into force. Hence it is the 1988 Act which would govern the situation.” 32. Having said so, it is held that the insurance was valid at the relevant point of time and the owner-insured Kuldeep Kumar has not committed any willful breach. Accordingly, issue No. 5 is decided against the insurer and in favour of the owners-insured, driver and appellants-claimants. Issue No. 6: 33. I wonder why this issue was framed. Having said so, it is held that the insurance was valid at the relevant point of time and the owner-insured Kuldeep Kumar has not committed any willful breach. Accordingly, issue No. 5 is decided against the insurer and in favour of the owners-insured, driver and appellants-claimants. Issue No. 6: 33. I wonder why this issue was framed. In terms of mandate of Section 166(2) of the MV Act, a claim petition can by filed by the claimants at their own option, either before a Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or before the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimants reside or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides. Accordingly, issue No. 6 is decided against the insurer and in favour of the appellants-claimants and the findings returned by the Tribunal on the said issue are upheld. Issue No. 7: 34. It was for the insurer to plead and prove that the claimants have filed the claim petition in collusion with respondents No. 1 and 2, has not led any evidence, thus, has failed to do so. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue no. 7 are upheld. Issue No. 2: 35. The claimants before the Tribunal were the minor children and mother of deceased Komal Kumar alias Ganga Ram. It is averred that the age of the deceased was 30 years at the time of the accident. The post mortem report is on the record as Ext. PW4/A, which does disclose that the age of the deceased was 30 years at the relevant point of time. 36. The claimants have claimed that he was earning 15,000/- per month, but there is no proof on the file as to how he was earning such amount. However, treating him as labourer, by guess work, it is held that he would not have been earning 4,500/- per month. After deducting one third towards his personal expenses, it is held that the appellants-claimants have lost source of dependency/income to the tune of 3,000/- per month. 37. However, treating him as labourer, by guess work, it is held that he would not have been earning 4,500/- per month. After deducting one third towards his personal expenses, it is held that the appellants-claimants have lost source of dependency/income to the tune of 3,000/- per month. 37. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case titled as Sarla Verma (Smt) and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another, reported in (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121, which was upheld by a larger Bench of the Apex Court in Reshma Kumari & Ors. versus Madan Mohan & Anr., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 3120, read with the Second Schedule appended with the MV Act, multiplier of 15' is just and appropriate. 38. Viewed thus, it is held that the claimants have lost source of income/dependency to the tune of 3,000 x 12 x 15 = 5,40,000/-. 39. The claimants are also held entitled to compensation to the tune of 10,000/- each under the heads 'loss of estate', 'loss of love and affection' and 'funeral expenses'. 40. Viewed thus, the claimants are held entitled to compensation to the tune of 5,40,000/- + 10,000/- + 10,000/- + 10,000/- = 5,70,000/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition till its finalization. 41. The insurer is saddled with liability and is directed to deposit the awarded amount before the Registry within eight weeks. 42. It is provided that appellant-claimant No. 3, i.e. mother of the deceased, is entitled to only one-fourth share of the awarded amount. Rest three-fourth share of the awarded amount be deposited in the names of the appellants-claimants No. 1 and 2 till the age of their majority. 43. Having glance of the above discussions, the impugned award is set aside, the claim petition is granted, as indicated hereinabove, and the appeal is disposed of. 44. Send down the record after placing copy of the judgment on Tribunal's file.