JUDGMENT The special appeal has arisen from a judgment of a learned Single Judge dated 28 January 2016 by which a writ petition that was filed by the sixth respondent in order to challenge an order dated 28 December 2015 passed by the Joint Director (Secondary Education), Agra has been allowed. 2. Briefly stated, the dispute relates to the post of Manager in Blackstone Girls Inter College, Mathura which is an educational institution established and administered by a religious minority within the protection of Article 30 of the Constitution. Under the scheme of administration, which is approved in pursuance of the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act 1921 (1), the Manager of the institution is an ex officio member of the Committee of Management. Clause (viii) of the scheme provides that the Bishop shall appoint a Manager for the institution. The appellant was appointed as a Manager until further notice. Subsequently on 22 July 2015, the Bishop Cabinet made a recommendation to the Presiding Bishop of the Agra Regional Conference Methodists Church to relieve the appellant from the post of Manager of the Committee of Management with immediate effect. In place of the appellant, a recommendation was made to appoint the sixth respondent. This recommendation was made inter alia in the backdrop of the position that an enquiry was to be conducted against the appellant in regard to an allegation that without the Bishop or the Selection Committee having authorised the appointment of teaching staff, the appellant had, as Manager, proposed and recommended such appointments. (1) Act 3. Be that as it may, in pursuance thereof the Bishop relieved the appellant from the post of Manager with effect from 22 July 2015 and on 29 July 2015, this decision was communicated to the District Inspector of Schools, Mathura. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant has filed a writ petition (2) before the Court. The admitted position is that no stay enures to the benefit of the appellant in the writ proceedings. In the meantime, a direction was issued for appointing the sixth respondent on the post of Manager. However, acting on a complaint filed by the appellant, the Joint Director of Education issued an order on 3 August 2015 directing the parties to maintain the status quo until conclusion of the hearing on the complaint filed by the appellant. This order was challenged by the sixth respondent in writ proceedings. However, acting on a complaint filed by the appellant, the Joint Director of Education issued an order on 3 August 2015 directing the parties to maintain the status quo until conclusion of the hearing on the complaint filed by the appellant. This order was challenged by the sixth respondent in writ proceedings. A learned Single Judge by a judgment and order dated 20 August 2015 held that the power to appoint a Manager was a discretionary power which was vested in the Bishop. There was no provision for election of a Manager. The learned Single Judge noted that the Bishop had appointed the sixth respondent as the Manager in place of the appellant and though the appellant had challenged the order in a writ petition, no interim order had been granted against the action of the Bishop. In these circumstances, the order passed by the Joint Director (Secondary Education) issuing a direction of status quo was quashed. However, it was left open to the Joint Director (Secondary Education) to consider the claim of the appellant and the sixth respondent in the light of the scheme of administration. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 20 August 2015 was confirmed in a special appeal by the Division Bench of this Court on 26 November 2015. After adverting in a considerable amount of detail to the scheme of administration, the Division Bench entered the following findings : (2) Writ Petition No. 42731 of 201. “A bare perusal of the provisions quoted above would go to show that under the scheme of administration as far as the appointment of Manager of institution is concerned, he/she is not an elected representative rather appointment of Manger is made at the sole discretion of the Bishop. Governing Body is a superior body and Committee of Management which is responsible for running of the institution has to carry out its activity under the supervision and control of Governing Body. On the parameters of the provisions of Scheme of Administration, Bishop has the authority to appoint Manager of Committee of Management of Institution. Once Bishop has the authority to appoint Manager of Committee of Management, then to conceive of a situation that Bishop has no authority of removal cannot be accepted. The authority to remove flows from the provision itself. On the parameters of the provisions of Scheme of Administration, Bishop has the authority to appoint Manager of Committee of Management of Institution. Once Bishop has the authority to appoint Manager of Committee of Management, then to conceive of a situation that Bishop has no authority of removal cannot be accepted. The authority to remove flows from the provision itself. Here Bishop has passed an order of removal, same has been subjected to challenge before this Court, this Court on 03.08.2015 only proceeded to issue notice and no interim order was passed. On the same day Director of Education entertained complaint and passed order of status quo. We do not approve of passing such an interim order by Joint Director of Education. Merely on asking for interim order has been passed and that too without assigning any valid reason. Director of Education has not even cared to find out as to whether he has the requisite authority to entertain such dispute and pass such an order that has traces of impinging right of administration conferred under Article 30(1) of Constitution. Learned Single Judge is absolutely right on the point when he proceeded to pass order setting aside the order of status-quo.” 4. After this order of the Division Bench, the Joint Director of Education passed an order on 28 December 2015 disapproving the removal of the appellant from the post of Manager on the ground that she was not furnished an adequate opportunity before the decision was taken. That led to the filing of the writ petition. 5. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition by the impugned judgment and order dated 28 January 2016. That led to the filing of the writ petition. 5. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition by the impugned judgment and order dated 28 January 2016. The learned Single Judge has held as follows : (i) the institution in question is established and administered by a minority and is entitled to the protection of Article 30 of the Constitution; (ii) a Manager of the institution is not an elected representative but is appointed by the Bishop and holds the post at the pleasure of the Bishop; (iii) the appellant was to continue as Manager till further notice, no fixed term is provided for the appointment of Manager; (iv) the Bishop Cabinet advised that the appellant should be relieved from the post of Manager to pave the way for a free and fair inquiry in respect of the appointments made of teachers in the institution; (v) the appointment of the appellant not being a tenure appointment, there was no occasion to furnish an opportunity of being heard to the appellant; (vi) in the present case, there is no final finding as such of misconduct on the part of the appellant and only a prima facie opinion was arrived at; and (vii) having due regard to the judgment of the Division Bench, the case of the appellant could not be accepted. Accordingly, the writ petition had been allowed. 6. In our view, the first and most important aspect which needs to be emphasised is that aggrieved by the decision of the Bishop, the appellant has filed a writ petition which is pending before the Court. No stay has been granted of the order of the Bishop in which the action for the removal of the appellant has originated. At the present stage, the Court must also be guided by the fact that in the judgment of the Division Bench dated 26 November 2015, the provisions contained in the scheme of administration have been duly noticed and it has been held that the Bishop has the authority to appoint a Manager of the Committee of Management. The Bishop would necessarily have the power of removal which flows from the power of appointment itself. The order of the Bishop is the subject matter of a substantive challenge in the writ proceedings in which the order has not been stayed since no interim order has been passed. 7. The Bishop would necessarily have the power of removal which flows from the power of appointment itself. The order of the Bishop is the subject matter of a substantive challenge in the writ proceedings in which the order has not been stayed since no interim order has been passed. 7. In this background, particularly when the appointment of the appellant was not on the basis of a tenure or substantive appointment but was only an appointment till further notice, there was no substance in the contention that the appellant was entitled to be heard prior to an order of recall. The removal of the appellant would not form part of the ambit of the expression “a dispute with respect to the Management of an institution” within the meaning of Section 16 A (7) of the Act. 8. For these reasons, we see no reason to interfere with the decision of the learned Single Judge. 9. The special appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.