Fatik Routh, son of Sripati Routh v. Thakur Routh, son of Late Runa Routh
2016-04-23
SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The main question involved in the present appeal is, “whether a judgment rendered on contest can be setaside by the Appellate Court on the ground that an issue which legally arise in the case was not framed by the trial court?” 2. At the outset, I notice that an issue on the question of adoption of Thakur Routh was not framed by the trial court. The case pleaded by the original plaintiff namely, Tunu Routhain who instituted the suit for decree for partition of her share was that Schedule-A and Schedule-B properties were jointly recorded in the name of Maga Routh and Runa Routh. The plaintiff Tunu Routhain was one of the legal heirs and successors of Maga Routhain who died leaving behind his widow Dabu Bala and daughter Tunu Routhain. The mother of the plaintiff also died before institution of the suit. During their lifetime Maga Routh and Runa Routh possessed the suit properties according to their convenience however, without any partition by metes and bounds and after their death the plaintiff and the defendants also entered into joint possession of the suit properties. The facts pleaded by the defendants was that Maga Routh died about 25 years ago leaving behind his widow Dabu Bala and daughter Tunu Routhain and the adopted son namely, Thakur Routh defendant no. 1. It was further pleaded by the defendants that on 12.07.1958 Thakur Routh was adopted by Maga Routh and a Deed of Adoption was registered in the year, 1958 and thereafter, he started living with Maga Routh and after the death of Maga Routh, Thakur Routh came in joint possession over the suit property along with the plaintiff. It appears that during the trial the defendants led some evidence on the point of adoption of Thakur Routh by Maga Routh and the trial court returned a finding that the defendants failed to establish that the defendant no. 1 Thakur Routh was the adopted son of Maga Routh. The suit was decreed vide judgment and order dated 28.06.2010. The defendants preferred Title Appeal No. 06 of 2010 challenging the aforesaid order passed in Title (Partition) Suit No. 18 of 1999. 3.
1 Thakur Routh was the adopted son of Maga Routh. The suit was decreed vide judgment and order dated 28.06.2010. The defendants preferred Title Appeal No. 06 of 2010 challenging the aforesaid order passed in Title (Partition) Suit No. 18 of 1999. 3. Before the Appellate Court a contention was raised on behalf of the appellants that ignoring the evidence produced on record, the trial court failed to frame an issue on the question of adoption and thus, the judgment in Title (partition) Suit No. 18 of 1999 has been rendered unsustainable. As noticed above, the lower Appellate Court holding that no issue on the question of adoption was framed by the trial court, set aside order dated 28.06.2010 in Title (Partition) Suit No. 18 of 1999. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. Mr. Atanu Banerjee, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the factum of adoption of Thakur Routh was under challenge and the trial court has disbelieved the story of adoption of Thakur Routh by Maga Routh and therefore, the order of the lower Appellate Court interfering with the judgment and decree in Title (Partition) Suit No. 18 of 1999 on the ground that no issue was framed on the question of adoption is erroneous. Alternatively, it has been argued that while exercising powers under Order 41, Rule 25 C.P.C., the lower Appellate Court could have remanded the matter to the trial court for taking additional evidence on an issue framed by it however, a mere lapse in framing an issue would not render the whole of the judgment unsustainable. 6. Per contra, Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the whole case of the defendants is based on the adoption of defendant no. 1 namely, Thakur Routh, a fact which was disputed by the plaintiff and therefore, the trial court was under a duty to frame an issue on the question of adoption. The learned counsel submits that failure of the trial court to frame an issue on the question of adoption would definitely vitiate the judgment of the trial court. 7. No doubt, the Appellate Court has power under Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure to frame an issue and remand the same for trial.
The learned counsel submits that failure of the trial court to frame an issue on the question of adoption would definitely vitiate the judgment of the trial court. 7. No doubt, the Appellate Court has power under Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure to frame an issue and remand the same for trial. However, the exercise of such power is regulated by the provisions under Order 41, Rule 23 to 25 and Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, Rule 25 Order 41 C.P.C. is attracted. The power of the Appellate Court under Rule 25 is circumscribed and one of the limitations is, whether the trial court has omitted to frame an issue which the Appellate Court considers essential for arriving at a right decision in the case. The object of framing of an issue is to identify the questions from the pleadings which is required to be decided by the court and to enable the parties to lead evidence thereon. It is well settled that for a valid adoption it must be proved that there was an intention to give the child and the same was reciprocated by adoptee by expressing an intention to adopt the child. There are certain other rituals also which a party claiming adoption may be required to prove. Undoubtedly, one of the questions contested by the parties before the trial court was the question of adoption. The parties led some evidence on the said question however, that does not satisfy the requirement of law. 8. However, in Title (Partition) Suit No. 18 of 1999, the question of adoption is not the only question which would conclusively decide the fate of the case. May be, it was one of the issues which should have been framed and the Lower Appellate Court has rightly held that it was one of the issues arising in the suit and therefore, it should have been decided by framing an issue. But, the Lower Appellate Court just went tangent and instead of exercising powers under Order 41, Rule 25 C.P.C., set aside the entire judgment and order dated 28.06.2010 in Title (Partition) Suit No. 18 of 1999. The procedure adopted by the lower Appellate Court was completely erroneous.
But, the Lower Appellate Court just went tangent and instead of exercising powers under Order 41, Rule 25 C.P.C., set aside the entire judgment and order dated 28.06.2010 in Title (Partition) Suit No. 18 of 1999. The procedure adopted by the lower Appellate Court was completely erroneous. A judgment cannot be set aside on the ground that the trial court has failed to frame one of the issues which may arise in the case. 9. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, order dated 09.05.2012 in Title Appeal No. 06 of 2010 is hereby set aside and the Title Appeal No. 06 of 2010 is restored to its original file. However, the issue framed by the lower Appellate Court would be treated as one under Order 41, Rule 25 C.P.C. The trial court shall adjudicate the said issue and, if necessary, permit the parties to lead additional evidence. Let this exercise be done within a period of 9 months and after the trial court records its finding on the issue so framed, the lower Appellate Court shall proceed to decide the Title Appeal No. 06 of 2010, in accordance with law. Appeal allowed.