ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. At the outset, the learned Senior counsels appearing for the parties stated that they are not pressing the interlocutory applications filed on behalf of the respective parties and they agreed for final hearing of the Second Appeal on merits. 2. Vide order dated 24.11.2006 the following substantial questions of law were formulated: (1) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Court of Appeal below can be sustained in law for non-substitution of heirs of the sole defendant who died in 1961 whereas the preliminary decree was filed in 1955 and application for final decree was filed in 1997 ? (2) Whether the appearance of Pleader Commissioner without substituting heirs of the sole deceased defendant is vitiated in law ? 3. Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, the learned Senior counsel for the appellant submits that from the pleadings of the parties another substantial question of law on the issue of allotment of share to the plaintiffs more than for what they have been found entitled to in the preliminary decree, also arises for consideration in the instant Second appeal. 4. On perusal of the judgment dated 07.04.2004 in Title Appeal No. 13 of 1999, I find that a specific plea was raised on behalf of the appellant on the above issue however, there is no discussion by the Lower Appellate Court on the said issue and accordingly, I am satisfied that the instant appeal requires to be heard on the following substantial question of law: Whether the First Appellate Court erred in law in dismissing Title Appeal No. 13 of 1999 without deciding the plea raised by the appellant that the plaintiffs were allotted 5 annas share in the suit schedule property on the basis of a collusive report of Amin-Commissioner whereas, they have been held entitled to the extent of 4 annas 6 pie share in the suit schedule property? 5. Briefly stated, Title Suit No. 15 of 1952/23 of 1955 was instituted by one Most. Zahiran and others claiming 4/6th share in the Schedule-I to V properties. It was pleaded that the husband of the plaintiff no. 1 namely, Diljor Momin and Huron Momin @ Ledo Momin were full-brothers who lived together and jointly cultivated the suit lands. Diljor Momin died leaving behind his widow namely, Most. Zahiran and others claiming 4/6th share in the Schedule-I to V properties. It was pleaded that the husband of the plaintiff no. 1 namely, Diljor Momin and Huron Momin @ Ledo Momin were full-brothers who lived together and jointly cultivated the suit lands. Diljor Momin died leaving behind his widow namely, Most. Zahiran and two daughters namely, Bibi Zaibun and Bibi Airun who succeeded to his share in the suit properties. Bibi Airun also died leaving behind her mother (plaintiff no. 1), her husband namely, Sk. Moinuddin (plaintiff no.2), two sons namely, Jamaluddin and Nainuddin and daughter Bibi Abrun who were arrayed as plaintiff nos. 3, 4 and 5 as her legal heirs and successors. The plaintiffs claimed that the parties were governed by School of Mohamadan law and they claimed 9 shares in the properties of Diljor Momin leaving 7 share to Bibi Zaibun who was the performa defendant. The suit was decreed vide judgment and order dated 29.04.1955 holding that the suit properties were jointly held by Diljor Momin and Huro Momin and after the death of Diljor Momin his legal heirs also cultivated the suit properties jointly with Huro Momin. The plaintiffs were held entitled for 9 annas share in the properties of Diljor which was to the extent of 4 annas 6 pies share in the entire disputed lands. And, accordingly, 4 annas 6 pies share was jointly allotted to five plaintiffs. A preliminary decree was prepared on 11.05.1955 against which Title Appeal No. 21 of 1955/17 of 1956 was preferred by Huro Momin which was dismissed for default on 28.05.1957. The plaintiff nos. 3 and 4 took steps for preparation of final decree after a lapse of 42 years and during this period plaintiff nos. 1, 2 and 5 had died. The sole defendant Huro Momin also died prior to 1960 however, his legal heirs were not brought on record. A survey knowing Commissioner was appointed who submitted a report on 18.02.1999 allotting 15 Bighas 07 kathas and 4 dhurs land in different Mouza to the respondents/plaintiffs. The appellant filed two objections dated 15.12.1998 and 07.07.1999 to the Commissioner's report dated 18.02.1999 which were ultimately rejected by the trial court vide order dated 02.09.1999. The said order was not challenged by the appellant. The appellant filed two objections dated 15.12.1998 and 07.07.1999 to the Commissioner's report dated 18.02.1999 which were ultimately rejected by the trial court vide order dated 02.09.1999. The said order was not challenged by the appellant. In the meantime, Title Execution Case No. 03 of 1999 was initiated by the plaintiffs in which the appellants filed their show-cause on 24.03.2000 which was dismissed on 15.09.2000. 6. After arguing for sometime Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, the learned Senior counsel for the appellant concedes that the substantial questions of law formulated vide order dated 24.11.2006 which were formulated on the ground of non-substitution of legal heirs of the sole defendant do not arise in the present case. The learned Senior counsel however, advanced arguments on the substantial question of law formulated during the course of hearing. 7. Mr. Manjul Prasad, the learned Senior counsel for the respondents contended that the objection raised by the appellant in petitions dated 15.12.1998 and 07.07.1999 were considered by the trial court and finally, rejected vide order dated 02.09.1999 which has attained finality. It is contended that in view of the earlier rejection to the objection to the Commissioner's report dated 18.02.1999, no elaborate discussion was required by the First Appellate Court and therefore, no substantial question of law on the issue of allotment of share to the plaintiffs arises in the present case. 8. It is not in dispute that Title Appeal No. 13 of 1999 was filed against the final decree dated 18.11.1999. The plea raised on behalf of the respondents that after the dismissal of objection to the Commissioner's report vide order dated 02.09.1999 it was not open to the appellant to raise further objection to allotment of share to the plaintiffs in the Title Appeal No. 13 of 1999, is liable to be rejected. Order dated 02.09.1999 was passed during the proceeding of the final decree and thus, it was an interlocutory order. The appellant while challenging the final decree dated 18.11.1999 can throw a challenge to allotment of more share to the plaintiffs than what was allotted to them in the preliminary decree. Order dated 02.09.1999 was passed during the proceeding of the final decree and thus, it was an interlocutory order. The appellant while challenging the final decree dated 18.11.1999 can throw a challenge to allotment of more share to the plaintiffs than what was allotted to them in the preliminary decree. As noticed above, paragraph 9 of the appellate order records the contention of the appellant on the question of allotment of share to the plaintiffs however, without considering the aforesaid plea, in the concluding paragraph of the judgment the Lower Appellate Court concluded that the trial court has rightly passed order for preparation of final decree on accepting the Amin-Commissioner report dated 19.02.1999. The impugned judgment in Title Appeal No. 13 of 1999 is completely silent on the plea raised by the appellant. In my opinion the Appellate Court has failed to discharge its duty under Section 96 C.P.C. r/w Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C. 9. In “B.V. Nagesh and Another v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy” (2010) 13 SCC 530 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, “the First Appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on question of facts and law. The judgment of the Appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and the Appellate Court should also record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision.” 10. Considering the facts noticed above and the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, the instant Second Appeal merits acceptance for a limited remand to the First Appellate Court to decide the issue which is reflected in the substantial question of law as framed by the Court during the course of hearing. 11. Considering the facts noticed above and the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, the instant Second Appeal merits acceptance for a limited remand to the First Appellate Court to decide the issue which is reflected in the substantial question of law as framed by the Court during the course of hearing. 11. In the result, holding that the instant Second Appeal questioning the legality of order dated 07.04.2004 in Title Appeal No. 13 of 1999 on the ground of non-substitution of legal heirs of the sole defendant fails however, for the purpose of a limited remand the judgment dated 07.04.2004 is set-aside and the matter is remanded to the Lower Appellate Court to frame an issue on the question of allotment of 5 annas share to the plaintiffs whereas, the judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 15 of 1952 & 23 of 1955 permits 4 annas 6 pie share to the plaintiffs. 12. The instant Second Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. S.A. allowed.