JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 2. This Second Appeal No. 270/1990 was preferred by two appellants namely, Sanjai Singh and Santosh Singh, against three respondents namely Girja Shanker Upadhyaya, Sohan and Mohan. Admittedly, two appellants and the respondent No. 1 Sohan are real brothers. All the parties of this appeal are resident of same village Mathpur, Pargana Karanda, District Ghazipur. 3. It is also admitted fact that respondent No. 1 Girja Shanker Upadhyay had died on 3.3.2006 and was not substituted. Since no substitution application was preferred within period of limitation, therefore the appeal against him had automatically been abated. So the respondent side had moved Abatement Application No. 360049/2014. Appellant side had moved Substitution Application No. 18669/2016 on 19.1.2016. Same day, appellants have moved Delay Condonation Application No. 18665/2016 for condoning the delay in filing substitution application, and also the Application No. 18669/2016 for setting aside the abatement of appeal against respondent No. 1. 4. The grounds of condonation of delay in moving substitution application and for setting aside the abatement of appeal regarding respondent No. 1 is mentioned in affidavit filed in support of aforesaid application, the deponent of which is appellant No. 2 Santosh Singh. These grounds are that deponent’s brother Sanjai Singh (appellant No. 1) had been doing all required pairvi of the case, but for about 15 years he has been confined to bed due to his 100% disability owing to an accident, and the deponent (appellant No. 1) had very little knowledge of law, and was under impression that the substitution application would be moved by the heirs of deceased. Some time back, deponent/appellant No. 1 had come Allahabad, then the clerk of his counsel had informed about moving of abatement in year 2014 by respondents. Thereafter, on advice of his counsel present substitution application alongwith other applications are being moved. 5. These grounds mentioned in affidavit of appellant No. 2 were reiterated by learned counsel for the appellant during arguments. He contended that this Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court had condoned much longer delay earlier and there should be liberal approach in condonation of delay. So his applications for condonation of delay in moving substitution and for setting aside abatement of appeal should be allowed. 6. He contended that this Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court had condoned much longer delay earlier and there should be liberal approach in condonation of delay. So his applications for condonation of delay in moving substitution and for setting aside abatement of appeal should be allowed. 6. It is admitted fact that appellants and respondent No. 2 are real brothers, and all parties are resident of same village. It is never mentioned in affidavit or application that appellants had no knowledge of death of respondent No. 1 immediately after his death. Therefore, admittedly appellants had deliberately not filed substitution application within time. So far contention of appellant No. 2 doing pairvi of the case is concerned, this contention is also not acceptable because said appellant No. 1 had undergone accident and allegedly became disabled 15 years back. For last about 10 years, appellant including appellant No. 2 had knowledge of death of respondent No. 1, but had not moved any substitution application nor approached his counsel for the same. Therefore, there appears no sufficient ground for accepting the reason presented by appellants’ side for condonation of delay in moving substitution application or for setting aside abatement of appeal regarding respondent No. 1. 7. This contention of learned counsel for the appellants is not acceptable that it was duty of the respondent side to inform the Court about death of respondent No. 1 and take appropriate steps. The death of respondent No. 1 was in knowledge of appellants from very beginning and they being appellants were duty bound to move substitution application in time. It was not responsibility of the surviving respondents to assist appellants for prosecuting the case against them. Apart from it, the respondents had already informed not only to this Court but also to counsel for appellant regarding death of respondent No. 1 by moving their Abatement Application No. 360049/2014. In spite of such application being moved, no appropriate steps were taken in moving substitution application. Even from the moving of Abatement Application No. 360049/2014 by respondents, more than sufficient time has already been passed; therefore, appeal regarding respondent No. 1 had been abated. 8. In Popat and Kotech Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 , Hon’ble Apex Court had held as under : “7. Even from the moving of Abatement Application No. 360049/2014 by respondents, more than sufficient time has already been passed; therefore, appeal regarding respondent No. 1 had been abated. 8. In Popat and Kotech Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 , Hon’ble Apex Court had held as under : “7. The period of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure the quiet of the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken writ diligence and to prevent oppression. The statute i.e. the Limitation Act is founded on the most salutary principle of general and public policy and incorporates a principle of great benefit to the community. It has, with great propriety, been termed a statute of repose, peace and justice. The statute bar discourages litigation by burying in one common receptacle all the accumulations of past times which are unexplained and have not from lapse of time become inexplicable. It has been said by John Voet, with singular felicity, that controversies are limited to a fixed period of time, lest they should be immortal while men are mortal. (Also see France B. Martins v. Mafalda Maria Teresa Rodrigues; (1999) 6 SCC 627 ). 8. Bar of limitation does not obstruct the execution. It bars the remedy. (See V. Subbf Rao v. Secy. to Government Panchayat Raj and Rural Development, Government of A.P.; (1996)7 SCC 626 ). 9. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So, a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is general welfare that a period be put to litigation). So, a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is general welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time (See N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy; (1998) 7 SCC 123 ).” 9. In Damodaran Pillai and others v. South Indian Bank Ltd., AIR 2005 SC 3460 , Hon’ble Apex Court had held as under : “14. It is also trite that the Civil Court in absence of any express power cannot condone the delay. For the purpose of condonation of delay in absence of applicability of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court cannot invoke its inherent power. 15. It is well-settled that when a power is to be exercised by a Civil Court under an express provision, the inherent power cannot be taken recourse to. “20. The principles underlying the provisions prescribing limitation are based on public policy aiming at justice, the principles of repose and peace and intended to induce claimants to be prompt in claiming relief. 21. Hardship or injustice may be a relevant consideration in applying the principles of interpretation of statute, but cannot be a ground for extending the period of limitation.” 10. This legal position is explicitly clear that the principles underlying provisions of limitation are based on public policy aiming that justice should be furnished to all the parties and hardship or injustice may be relevant consideration in applying the discretion for condoning the delay. But such hardship of both the parties should be considered. In condoning the delay beyond period of limitation provided by the statute there must be cogent and satisfactory reasons. Such reasons are lacking in present matter. 11. Learnned counsel for the applicant-appellant had cited Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh v. Additional Registrar, (Co-operative Societies, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow and another, AIR 1962 All 439 , in which relevant portion pointed out is as under : “The position of affidavits is that of a statement on oath. Such reasons are lacking in present matter. 11. Learnned counsel for the applicant-appellant had cited Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh v. Additional Registrar, (Co-operative Societies, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow and another, AIR 1962 All 439 , in which relevant portion pointed out is as under : “The position of affidavits is that of a statement on oath. Their importance is enhanced in proceedings like a writ where no parol evidence is recorded and if a party makes a definite allegation and the other party does not controvert it for summons the deponent of that affidavit for cross-examination, the only conclusion at which Courts can arrive is that the allegations being uncontroverted and not challenged by cross-examination must be accepted.” 12. On basis of this ruling, counsel for the applicant-appellant contended that since his application was uncontroverted, therefore, said application for condonation of delay in moving the substitution application and for setting aside the abatement should be treated as based on sufficient grounds and should be allowed. 13. The application for condonation of delay has been moved by appellant under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under: “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” 14. There is period prescribed for initiation of every legal proceedings in Limitation Act, and such period may be extended in accordance with mandatory provisions of the Act. The said provisions of Section-5 make its explicitly clear and mandatory that an application for extension of prescribed period of limitation may be allowed only if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Courts that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. As discussed above, for deciding the matter of limitation not only the case of applicant/appellant should be considered, but the principles underlying the provisions the Act, which are based on public policy alongwith hardship and injustice to other party should also be considered. In the present matter, every consideration leads to inference against applicant-appellant. As discussed above, for deciding the matter of limitation not only the case of applicant/appellant should be considered, but the principles underlying the provisions the Act, which are based on public policy alongwith hardship and injustice to other party should also be considered. In the present matter, every consideration leads to inference against applicant-appellant. It has also been proved that applicant-appellant had failed to satisfy this Court that he had sufficient cause for moving the application for setting aside the abatement or for not moving the substitution application within period of limitation therefore under the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act his application should not be allowed. So far the above mentioned ruling of this Court is concerned, it is not applicable in present matter, because the order is being passed on the basis of sufficiency of grounds for condoning the delay and this sufficiency is based on satisfaction of the Court. Again principle of said ruling is not applicable in present matter because respondent was never asked or afforded opportunity to file any counter-affidavit. So non filing of counter-affidavit, in present matter, cannot prejudice legal rights of respondents’ side. 15. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant contended that it is duty of the respondent side to inform the death of respondent under Order XXII, Rule 10-A CPC. He relied on Gangadhar and another v. Shri Rai Kumar, AIR 1983 SC 1202 and argued that since death of respondent No. 1 was not informed by counsel for the respondent so abatement should be set aside. Rule 10-A of Order XXII CPC reads as under: “10A. Duty or pleader to communicate to Court death of a party— Wherever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform the Court about it, and the Court shall there upon give notice of such death to the other party, and, for this purpose, the contract between the pleader and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist.” 16. As discussed above, parties are resident of same village and had knowledge of death of respondent No. 1 from very beginning. It is nowhere mentioned in affidavit or application of appellant that he had no knowledge of death of respondent No. 1 earlier. As discussed above, parties are resident of same village and had knowledge of death of respondent No. 1 from very beginning. It is nowhere mentioned in affidavit or application of appellant that he had no knowledge of death of respondent No. 1 earlier. Apart from it the respondent side had already moved Application No. 360049/2014 for abatement of appeal due to non-substitution after death of said respondent, which had given information of his death to Court and appellant side. But no application for substitution was moved within period of limitation. Thus in spite of information given in accordance with provisions of Order XXII, Rule 10-A CPC substitution application was not moved within period of limitation. Therefore said ruling is not applicable in this matter and the arguments are also not acceptable. Provisions of Rule 1-A of Order XXII CPC is not applicable in cases when appellant had already in knowledge of person concerned, but no substitution application is moved within stipulated period of limitation without sufficient reason. 17. In present case there is no sufficient ground for condoning the deliberate very long delay in moving substitution application. In absence of any reasonable or sufficient ground, the Delay Condonation Application No. 18665/2016 and Abatement (Setting Aside) Application No. 18666/2016 are rejected. Therefore, being time barred, Substitution Application No. 18669/2016 is also rejected. Accordingly, Abatement Application No. 360049/2014 moved by respondents’ side is allowed. This appeal is declared abated against deceased respondent No. 1 Girija Shanker Upadhyaya. 18. After the death of respondent No. 1, whether the appeal can proceed against other respondents or whether cause of action had also abated is a matter that requires hearing. 19. List on 18th March, 2016 for hearing. ————————