ORDER : Mr. Sandeep Mehta, J. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner Dan SIngh has approached this Court being aggrieved of the award dated 18.9.2000 passed by the Central Govt. Industrial and Labour Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'CGIT') in Industrial Reference No. 151/96 whereby, the Tribunal rejected the labour reference instituted at the instance of the petitioner workman challenging the termination of his services by the respondent Food Corporation of India. 2. The petitioner raised a labour dispute against his so-called termination/illegal retrenchment by the respondent Corporation upon which, conciliation proceedings were undertaken but failed. The Central Govt. referred the matter to the CGIT under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner workman set up a case in his statement of claim that he was engaged by the respondent Corporation as a Casual Labour/Watchman on daily wages between 15.9.1979 to 20.5.1980 and that by an oral order dated 20.5.1980, his services were terminated without following the mandatory requirements of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondents filed a reply to the claim petition claiming that the petitioner was not engaged as a Watchman but rather, was engaged as a labour on 15.9.1979. He worked for a period of 182 days only. He abandoned services and did return not return to work in the corporation thereafter. He was not present in the office on 20.5.1980. A pertinent objection was raised that the industrial dispute was raised after an inordinate delay of almost 17 years and thus, the same should be dismissed. The Tribunal framed the relevant issues for consideration. The petitioner submitted his affidavit and examined himself in support of the claim. On the basis of the available record submitted by the respondents, the Tribunal concluded that the workman worked for a period of 240 days with the respondents during the disputed period. The Tribunal further held that the petitioner himself did not come to the office of the respondent on and after 20.5.1980 and thus, it was a case of abandonment of service. The Tribunal also held that the claim set up by the petitioner that the respondents engaged/retained persons junior to him in service after his termination to be untenable because the three persons viz.
The Tribunal also held that the claim set up by the petitioner that the respondents engaged/retained persons junior to him in service after his termination to be untenable because the three persons viz. Omprakash, Sita Ram and Sabir whose names were taken by the petitioner in this regard were admittedly working in the office from much earlier than the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner’s assertion in this regard was also turned down and the reference was answered in the negative. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of this writ petition. 3. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material available on record and the impugned award. 4. Considered in light of the evidence led by the parties, the findings arrived at by the Tribunal in the impugned award that the petitioner himself abandoned the services and that it was not a case of illegal retrenchment is perfectly just and proper. The petitioner’s case that the respondents violated the mandatory requirement of Section 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act, inasmuch as, persons junior to him were reemployed after termination of his services is also without any basis because the petitioner himself admitted in his evidence that the three other persons viz. Omprakash, Sita Ram and Sabir in relation to whom, this aspersion was cast were employed in the office of the respondent long before the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner failed to prove that the respondents re-employed/retained any casual labour in service after the petitioner’s alleged termination. A specific objection was raised by the respondents before the Tribunal regarding the labour dispute having been raised after a gross delay of 17 years. However, the Tribunal did not advert to the said objection. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Om Parkash & Anr. reported in (1998) 8 SCC 733 examined almost similar circumstances and held that abandonment of service by a daily rated workman does not attract the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
However, the Tribunal did not advert to the said objection. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Om Parkash & Anr. reported in (1998) 8 SCC 733 examined almost similar circumstances and held that abandonment of service by a daily rated workman does not attract the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also examined the issue of undue and unexplained delay in raising an industrial dispute in the case of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board v. Mohan Lal reported in 2013 (14) SCC 543 and held as below: "...delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this Court in Gitam Singh (2013) 5 SCC 136 , that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed." 5. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that as the industrial dispute was raised after more than 17 years, on the question of delay also, the petitioner was not entitled to any relief whatsoever. The Tribunal was perfectly justified in turning down the petitioner’s claim and rejecting the reference. The impugned award does not suffer from any illegality, irregularity or perversity so as to call for exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. The writ petition thus being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed.