ORDER : Heard Mr. V.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Hardeo Prasad Singh, learned APP for the State. 2. In this application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in connection with U.C. Case No.265 of 1997, including order dated 03.09.1997 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chatra, whereby and whereunder cognizance has been taken for the offence under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act against the petitioner. 3. The offence report was made on the allegation that the petitioner was ploughing forest land. After institution of the aforesaid U.C. Case, cognizance was taken subsequently by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chatra on 03.09.1997. 4. It has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that in fact, the land in question belongs to the petitioner and since there was dispute with respect to the same with the Forest Department, the petitioner has preferred a Title Suit No.11 of 2004, which is still pending. It has been submitted that earlier also, two cases were instituted against the petitioners being U.C. Case No.224 of 1992 and U.C. Case No.147 of 1997 which ended in acquittal. Learned counsel further submits that the land, in fact, was settled by Zamindar by virtue of Hukumnama in favour of the petitioner and same was mutated and rent receipt was also issued in favour of the petitioner. 5. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that since the notification, which declared the area to be protected forest, was issued on 05.03.1955 and after expiry of 30 years, same have not been renewed, the land in question does not remain forest land. 6. Mr. Hardeo Prasad Singh, learned APP on the other hand submitted that from the offence report itself, the case under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act is made out and in such, circumstances, this application is liable to be dismissed. 7. The case under forest offence was instituted in the year 1997 whereas Title Suit was filed subsequent to institution of the said case being Title Suit No.11 of 2004. 7. The case under forest offence was instituted in the year 1997 whereas Title Suit was filed subsequent to institution of the said case being Title Suit No.11 of 2004. This Court, in a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not empowered to conduct a roving inquiry or sift through the evidences to come to a conclusion as to whether forest offence has been committed or not; or as to whether the land in question belongs to the petitioner or not? 8. The facts, which have been narrated above reveal prima facie offence committed by the petitioner and the same cannot be diluted merely because of the fact that Title Suit is pending. 9. In such, circumstances, I am not inclined to entertain the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. So far as second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned with respect to validity of the notification dated 05.03.1955, which has been brought on record in the counter affidavit filed by the State, on perusal of the same, it reveals that it was issued under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, which deals with Protected Forest. It further reveals that forest area demarcated as protected forest by virtue of notification issued under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, continues to remain as such until and unless it is de-notified by subsequent notification. 11. So far as period of 30 years is concerned, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner primary revolves around Section 30(b) of the Indian Forest Act, which gives power to the State Government by notification to declare any portion of a protected forest to be closed for such term, not exceeding thirty years, and the rights of private persons over such portion of land shall remain suspended during that period. Section 30(b) of the Act is by way of an emergency provisions and the same cannot be connected by the learned counsel for the petitioner with respect to the validity of the protected forest only for a period of 30 years. 12. Section 30(b) of the Act is by way of an emergency provisions and the same cannot be connected by the learned counsel for the petitioner with respect to the validity of the protected forest only for a period of 30 years. 12. In such circumstances, therefore, it cannot be presumed that the notification, so issued was under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act would be valid for 30 years and, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that after 30 years from the date of issuance of the notification, the protected forest looses its characteristics, is misconceived and the same is thus, negated. 13. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, I do not find any merit in this application and hence, it is accordingly, dismissed. Application dismissed.