Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 697 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Bharatbhai Devabhai Dodiya

2016-03-30

G.B.SHAH, K.S.JHAVERI

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 4.5.1994 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 176 of 1993. By the impugned judgment, the accused was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') and ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment of three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further simple imprisonment of two months was imposed. However, the accused was acquitted from the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of present appeal is as under:- 2.1 As per the complaint of the complainant, accused is the husband of the victim. Their marriage was solemnized three years prior to the incident and they have one child out of this wedlock. Since it was love marriage, family members of the victim were not happy with her and they were not on talking terms with her. On 17.5.1993 at about 9 p.m., Daxaben Gunvantray Pathak was watching TV in her home situated in Nursing Staff Quarters, Village-Zamrala, Taluka-Botad, District-Bhavnagar. At that time, the accused entered the house after drinking liquor by jumping over the wall and dragged her out of the house and started beating her. Since people gathered there, the accused took her back in the house and closed the door. It is alleged that thereafter the accused poured kerosene over her body and set her on fire. Thereafter, the accused ran away from the scene of offence and the victim was shifted to the hospital for treatment. Since she was conscious at that time, she stated that the accused was demanding money from her and was harassing her mentally and physically. It is also alleged that the accused was also having suspicion over her character. With these allegations, complaint was filed against the accused by the complainant. The victim expired eight days after the incident. 2.2 Upon filing of the complaint, investigation was carried out and the accused came to be arrested. At the end of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused before the Magistrate Court. Since the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of sessions, the case was committed to Sessions Court and, ultimately, trial was initiated and charge came to be framed. At the end of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused before the Magistrate Court. Since the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of sessions, the case was committed to Sessions Court and, ultimately, trial was initiated and charge came to be framed. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.3 In order to bring home the charges against the accused, prosecution has examined following witnesses. Sr. No. Name Exh. 1 Savjibhai Gamit. 46 2 Balvantray Girijashankar. 43 3 Gunvantray Pathak, father of the deceased. 25 4 Ravjibhai Thakar Dhola, Executive Magistrate. 21 5 Dr. Hardev Mohanbhai. 17 6 Vajsurbhai Nanbhai. 26 7 Trikambhai Lakhmanbhai. 27 8 Balvantray Girjashankar Dave. 43 9 Savjibhai Thavraji Gameti. 46 2.4 The prosecution has also produced following documents in support of its case:- Sr. No. Description Exh. 1 P.M. Note. 13 2 Extract of the register. 15 3 Medical Certificate. 18 4 Xerox of original case papers. 19 5 Yadi by doctor to police. 20 6 Police Yadi. 22 7 Dying declaration. 23 8 Inquest panchnama. 29 9 Panchnama of the place of offence. 32 10 Arrest panchnama. 33 11 Panchnama of seizure. 34 12 Yadi sent to Executive Magistrate. 36 13 Report of medical opinion. 37 14 Yadi of police station. 38 15 Map of the place of offence. 39 16 Yadi to FSL. 40 17 Dispatch note of FSL. 41 18 Extract station diary. 44 19 Complaint. 47 2.5 Thereafter, after filing of closing purshis by the prosecution, further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recorded. The accused denied the case of the prosecution and submitted that a false case is filed against him. 3. At the conclusion of trial and after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned Judge passed the impugned Judgment. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order dated 4.5.1994 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 176 of 1993 acquitting the respondent from the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, the appellant-State has preferred present appeal before this Court. 4. Ms. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order dated 4.5.1994 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 176 of 1993 acquitting the respondent from the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, the appellant-State has preferred present appeal before this Court. 4. Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP has taken us through the evidence and contended that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused from the charge of offence punishable under Section 302of IPC inspite of voluminous evidence against him and contended that the trial Court ought not to have acquitted the accused. She submitted that though the prosecution has examined 9 witnesses and produced 19 documents in support of its case, the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated them and acquitted the accused of the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. She submitted that the prosecution has successfully proved its case against the accused. She submitted that even the medical evidence supports the case of the prosecution. She has also taken us through the complaint and the dying declaration of the deceased, wherein she has stated about the ill-treatment given to her by the accused and the manner in which she was set ablaze by the accused. In her dying declaration, the deceased has also narrated the role of the accused and the way in which she was set on fire. Therefore, she submitted that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the respondent-accused from the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. She also submitted that this fact regarding the torture given to the deceased was narrated by her after the incident when she was conscious. In this regard, she took us through the evidence of Executive Magistrate and father of the deceased, who have also supported her version. In view of this, she submitted that the case against the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective. In view of all these, she prays that this appeal may be allowed by convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 4.1 Ms. In view of all these, she prays that this appeal may be allowed by convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 4.1 Ms. Shah has also submitted that considering the gross offence of bride burning, the accused should not be allowed to go scot-free when the deceased was the wife of the accused. She has submitted that this Court may consider this case seriously in view of the clinching evidence against the accused and award suitable punishment so that it may have deterrent effect on the society as a whole. 4.2 In support of her submissions Ms. Shah has relied upon the following decisions: (i) Panneerselvam vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2008) 17 SCC 190; (i) Kamalavva and another vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2009) 13 SCC 614 ; (ii) Ongole Ravikanth vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 647 ; (iii) Shudhakar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2012) 7 SCC 569 ; (iv) M. Sarvana Alias K.D. Sarvana vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2012) 7 SCC 636 . 5. Mr. Mrudul Barot, learned advocate appearing for the respondent-accused has supported the impugned judgement and order passed by the trial court and submitted that the same does not call for any interference by this Court. Mr. Barot submitted that she was not in a fit state of mind to give her dying declaration as she was under sedation and that the dying declaration itself is doubtful. He submitted that the panch witnesses have turned hostile. He submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned order and the lower court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and acquitted the respondent from the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. He submitted that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. He further contended that so far as acquittal appeals are concerned, the law is well settled that when two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the court below. By taking us through the impugned judgment, he submitted that this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and present appeal may be dismissed. By taking us through the impugned judgment, he submitted that this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and present appeal may be dismissed. 5.1 He has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: (i) Habib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh with Manuwa vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 2013 SC 1764 ; (ii) State of Andhra Pradesh vs. P. Khaja Hussain reported in (2009) 15 SCC 120 ; (iii) Smt. Kamla vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1993 SC 374 . 6. At the outset it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr, reported in (2006)6 SCC, 39, the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgement of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the court below." 6.1 The very same principle is observed in the case of Habib (supra) as relied upon by learned advocate for the respondent. The Apex Court in para 10 of the said judgement has observed as under: "10. We are of the view that the High Court has correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence, including the evidence of PW 6, the Chief Medical Officer and rightly came to the conclusion that the trial court had committed an error in discarding their evidence. The Apex Court in para 10 of the said judgement has observed as under: "10. We are of the view that the High Court has correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence, including the evidence of PW 6, the Chief Medical Officer and rightly came to the conclusion that the trial court had committed an error in discarding their evidence. This Court in State of Punjab vs. Ajaib Singh and others (2005) 9 SCC 94 : ( AIR 2004 SC 2466 ) also recorded that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court is entitled to reappreciate the evidence on record if the court finds that the view of the trial court acquitting the accused was unreasonable or perverse. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to the innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. However, the paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented as noted in the judgement of this Court in V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala (2006) 10 SCC 617 : ( AIR 2006 SC 2667 )." 7. It is true that it is a settled position of law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to the innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. In the present case, going by the records of the case and the evidence of witnesses, we do not find that the view taken by the trial Court is just and proper. We have analysed the evidence in detail to find out as to whether the prosecution version is cogent and credible. In the present case, following evidence goes against the accused. (i) The first and foremost evidence is the dying declaration of the deceased. It is required to be noted that the victim in her dying declaration has categorically stated that the accused was harassing her mentally and physically. It is stated by her that the accused used to demand money from her and as she denied the same, she was set ablaze. It is required to be noted that the victim in her dying declaration has categorically stated that the accused was harassing her mentally and physically. It is stated by her that the accused used to demand money from her and as she denied the same, she was set ablaze. She has mentioned the role of the accused and how she was set on fire by the accused. Therefore, there seems to be no reason to disbelieve the version given in the dying declaration. (ii) The second being the medical evidence which categorically shows that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give her dying declaration. From the deposition of Dr. Vasanatkumari Mahera, PW-1, Exh.12, it is clear that the deceased had received 70 to 75% burn injuries and the cause of death, as mentioned in the postmortem report, is shock due to extensive burns. (iii) The evidence of P.W.4, Shri Ravjibhai Dhola, Executive Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration of the victim also supports the case of the prosecution. This witness has deposed that he verified from the doctor regarding the consciousness and fitness of the victim and after receiving suitable endorsement from the doctor that the victim was conscious and oriented to give her dying declaration, the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. It is also stated by this witness that thumb impression of the victim was also taken on the dying declaration as she was not in a position to put her signature. (iv) PW-5, Gunvantray Damodardas Pathak, father of the deceased, has also supported the case of the prosecution. He has deposed that when he went to the victim in the hospital, she narrated the incident and told him that the accused had beaten her and asked for money and since she refused to bring money she was set on fire by the accused. (v) The presence of the accused-convict at the scene of offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the motive is also established beyond reasonable doubt. This fact has emerged from the evidence of witnesses and the deceased herself that the accused came after drinking and took up a quarrel with her. Thereafter, he demanded money and upon refusal of the same, she was put on fire by the accused. This fact has emerged from the evidence of witnesses and the deceased herself that the accused came after drinking and took up a quarrel with her. Thereafter, he demanded money and upon refusal of the same, she was put on fire by the accused. 7.1 The aforesaid evidences are so clinching that the learned trial Court ought not to have acquitted the accused from the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC as the prosecution had proved the case against the respondent on the basis of dying declaration and evidence on record. 8. Mr. Barot, learned advocate for the respondent accused has sought reliance upon the case of State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), wherein the Apex Court has observed that where there are variations in two dying declarations which are not trivial in nature, the acquittal of respondent did not warrant any interference. 8.1 Learned advocate for the respondent has also relied upon the case of Smt. Kamla (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held that in the circumstances where the dying declarations are inconsistent, it is not possible to pick out one statement wherein the accused is implicated and base the conviction on the sole basis of such a dying declaration. 8.2 In our view, aforesaid decisions would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, as the dying declaration in this case is amply proved by cogent evidence and the principles enunciated for basing conviction on the basis of Section 32 of Evidence Act are reiterated herein before. In a catena of decisions of the Apex Court, dying declaration would permit us to take a different view in the matter. In the present case, all the facts and the evidence when weighed together will prove that it was the accused who had committed the murder of the victim. 9. Our aforesaid view gets support from the latest decision of the Apex Court cited by the learned APP in the case of Krishan vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 3 SCC 280 wherein the Apex Court has held that it is not an absolute principle of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction of an accused. Where the dying declaration is true and correct, the attendant circumstances show it to be reliable and it has been recorded in accordance with law, the deceased made the dying declaration of her own accord and upon due certification by the doctor with regard to the state of mind and body, then it may not be necessary for the court to look for corroboration. In such cases, the dying declaration alone can form the basis for the conviction of the accused. But where the dying declaration itself is attended by suspicious circumstances, has not been recorded in accordance with law and settled procedures and practices, then, it may be necessary for the court to look for corroboration of the same. 9.1 Similarly in the case of Panneerselvam (supra) the Apex Court has observed as under: "7. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence. 8. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross- examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence." 9.2 On the other hand, in the case of Ongole Ravikanth (supra), the Apex Court has held as under: "28. It is well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction. But at the same time due care and caution must be exercised in considering weight to be given to dying declaration inasmuch as there could be any number of circumstances which may affect the truth. 29. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the courts have always to be on guard to see that the dying declaration was not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is the duty of the courts to find that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. In order to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, the courts have to look for the medical opinion. [See: Smt. Paniben Vs. State of Gujarat (1992)2 SCC 474 , K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. Vs. The Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618 , Darshan Singh @ Bhasuri & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 411 , Kanchy Komuramma Vs. State of A.P. (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 118, Maniram Vs. State of M.P. (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 539, Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 & Nallapati Sivaiah Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur, A.P. AIR 2008 SC 19 ]." 9.3 In the case of Shudhakar (supra) the Apex Court has held that a "dying declaration" is the last statement made by a person at a stage when he/she is in serious apprehension of death and expects no chances of survival. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur, A.P. AIR 2008 SC 19 ]." 9.3 In the case of Shudhakar (supra) the Apex Court has held that a "dying declaration" is the last statement made by a person at a stage when he/she is in serious apprehension of death and expects no chances of survival. At such time, it is expected that a person will speak the truth and only the truth and that normally in such situations, courts attach intrinsic value of truthfulness to such statement. It is also held that once such statement has been made voluntarily, it is reliable and is not an attempt by deceased to cover up truth or falsely implicate a person, then courts can safely rely on such dying declaration and it can form the basis of conviction, more so where version given by other prosecution evidence, there is no reason for Courts to doubt truthfulness of such dying declaration. 9.4 In the case of M. Sarvanna (supra), the Apex Court has held in para 16 as under: "16. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002)6 SCC 710 , the Court while dealing with the argument that the dying declaration must be recorded by a magistrate and the certificate of fitness was an essential feature, made the following observations. The court answered both these questions as follows: "3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a Magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise." 9.5 In that view of the matter, it is clear that the dying declaration being voluntary and made in a fit state cannot be discarded. 10. In view of above, evidence of Dr. Hardev Mohanbhai, PW-3, and Executive Magistrate, PW-4 who had recorded the dying declaration could not have been disbelieved by the learned trial Court. We are unable to accept the submission made by learned advocate for the respondent that dying declaration could not be relied to convict the accused. There is no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration and complaint lodged by the victim. 11. In the present case, when the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration pursuant to the Vardhi received by him after taking opinion from the doctor, this Court finds no reason to disbelieve him more particularly when he has no axe to grind against the accused and being a public officer we find no reason as to why he will implicate a person falsely. 12. 12. In the case of Kushal Rao vs. The State of Bombay reported in 1958 AIR SC 22, the Apex Court has observed as under:- "On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions -and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human, memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the. circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it-; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties." 12.1 In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the dying declaration has been proved in accordance with law, is a truthful version of the events that occurred and the circumstances leading to the death of the victim narrated by the victim in a fit state of mind and without any force or coercion. There is no room for any doubt regarding the veracity of the dying declaration and the manner in which the victim was done to death by the accused. 13. Thus we are of the opinion that the trial court committed an error in acquitting the respondent-accused from the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The respondent-accused is required to be held guilty for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and therefore we are inclined to allow this appeal filed by the State. 14. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 4.5.1994 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 176 of 1993 is hereby modified and the accused is also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. For the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, the accused is ordered to undergo imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, further simple imprisonment of three months is imposed. The accused shall surrender before the jail authorities on or before 8th July 2016 to serve out the remaining period of sentence. The period of sentence already undergone by the accused be given set off to him. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent to the Court below forthwith.