JUDGMENT : The petitioner is a tenant under the opposite party. The opposite party filed a suit for eviction of the defendant, inter alia, on the ground of default in payment of rents. The petitioner beyond the time stipulated under Section 7 sub-section (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘said Act’) filed an application without a prayer for condonation of delay raising various disputes as were available to the applicant under Section 7(2) of the said Act. The Trial Court by order no. 26 dated 4th February, 2015 rejected the said application filed under Section 7(2) of the said Act. Being aggrieved by the said order, a revisional application was filed before this Court. The said revisional application was, however, dismissed by an order dated 5th May, 2015. The operative portion of the said order as are relevant for the present purpose reads: “The meaningful reading of the impugned order does not reveal that the Court made any observations on the explanation offered in the application under Section 7(2) of the said Act relating to the condonation of delay, but simply proceeded to observe that the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as filed by the defendant, was disposed of on the ground of its failure of appearance and the said petition does not contain any explanation as regard to show ground for condonation of delay in filing the petition under Section 7 of the said Act. From the recording of the facts in the preceding paragraphs and from the consistent stand of the parties, it is undisputed that separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in taking out an application under Section 7(2) of the said Act has not been filed by the petitioner. There is no prayer made in the said application about the condonation of delay and, therefore, the Court did not have any occasion to consider the same. Admittedly, the application under Section 7(2) of the said Act came to be filed beyond the statutory period and in absence of any prayer for condonation of delay, this Court does not find any fault in rejecting the said application on the ground of Limitation. Admittedly, the application under Section 7(2) of the said Act came to be filed beyond the statutory period and in absence of any prayer for condonation of delay, this Court does not find any fault in rejecting the said application on the ground of Limitation. This Court, therefore, declined to interfere with the impugned order.” Thereafter, the petitioner has filed an application for condonation of delay in depositing the monthly rents for the month of February 2004 to December 2011. In the said application it is alleged that due to wrong advice proper steps could not be taken and the newly appointed advocate had advised the petitioner to deposit all arrears of rent as claimed by the plaintiff in the suit together with interest and on the basis of such advice, the petitioner has filed the said application in which the impugned order was passed. Once an application under Section 7(2) of the said Act was rejected, all points available to the applicant under the said provision automatically perishes. There is no scope for any condonation of delay in depositing arrears of rent under Section 7(1) of the said Act. Mr. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, refers to a Division Bench judgment of our Court in Subrata Mukherjee vs. Bishakha Das, reported at (2012) 3 Calcutta High Court Notes 423 for the proposition that Section 7(1) and Section 7(2) of the said Act are directory and not mandatory. The learned senior counsel has referred to the observations made by the Hon’ble Division Bench in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the said report, which reads: “32. Accordingly, for this reason, we hold that section 5 of the Limitation Act will be applicable for the purpose of making deposit of admitted amount of arrears of rent, as mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 7 of the 1997 Act. 33. However, we think that the time limit fixed for payment of adjudged amount of rent, mentioned in subsection (2) of section 7 of the 1997 Act is of mandatory character. In the proviso, it has been made clear that having regard to the circumstances of the case, extension of time may be granted by the Civil Judge only once and period of such extension shall not exceed two months. In the proviso, it has been made clear that having regard to the circumstances of the case, extension of time may be granted by the Civil Judge only once and period of such extension shall not exceed two months. The aforesaid language with negative import of the legislature is very clear to make it mandatory, more so when subsection (3) provides for consequence. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that with the use of the word ‘shall’ coupled with negative import followed by consequence, the same is always mandatory.” Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/opposite party, submits that once the application under Section 7(2) of the said Act is dismissed, it is no more open for the petitioner to file another application for depositing the arrears rent. It is argued that the grounds sought to be raised in the subsequent application were available to the petitioner at the time when the first application was filed and the applicant having suffered a dismissal of the earlier application has filed the subsequent application with ulterior motive in order to render the earlier order ineffective and otios. The submission of Mr. Banerjee appears to be that the second application is clear abuse of the proposed law. Mr. Banerjee further argued that the observations made by the Hon’ble Division Bench in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the said report were beyond the scope of reference as the order of reference reads: “Whether provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable for condoning the delay in presentation of a time barred petition under section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.” Mr. Banerjee has also referred to the observation made by the learned Court below in dealing with the explanation offered for not being able to depositing the arrears rent. The consequence of not availing the provision of Section 7(1) or Section 7(2) of the said Act is mentioned in Section 7(3) of the said Act. Banerjee has also referred to the observation made by the learned Court below in dealing with the explanation offered for not being able to depositing the arrears rent. The consequence of not availing the provision of Section 7(1) or Section 7(2) of the said Act is mentioned in Section 7(3) of the said Act. The said section reads: “If the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) within the time specified therein or within such extended time as may be granted, [the Civil Judge] shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the [suit].” There cannot be any doubt that by reason of the order of dismissal in which the learned Trial Court has also observed that by reason of the dismissal of the petition under Section 7(2) of the said Act, the consequence of striking out of the defence should follow, has been approved in totality by the learned Single Judge of our Court in the civil revision preferred by the petitioner. Section 7 sub-section (3) does not contemplate any application may be filed for condonation of delay beyond a period of thirty days as contemplated under Section 7(1) of the said Act. If I accept the submission of Mr. Bhattacharya that it may be directory, then again the object and purpose of making the second application has to be looked into in order to find out whether this was to get rid of the adverse order with which the petitioner was visited in the eviction proceeding. Moreover, the explanations offered for not being able to deposit the arrears also appears to be unbelievable. The discretion exercised by the Trial Court, unless perverse, should not be interfered with in the revisional jurisdiction. Under such circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Sealdah in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay in depositing the arrears rent for the month of February 2004 to December 2011. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.