JUDGMENT AND ORDER : K.H. NOBIN SINGH, J. 1. Heard Shri M. Hemchandra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Shri S. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondents and Shri A. Bimol, learned counsel for the private respondent No. 4. 2. By the instant writ petition, the impugned Government order dated 13-02-2015 transferring and posting the petitioner and the private respondent as given against their names therein, has been questioned and challenged by the petitioner. 3.1 According to the petitioner, she was initially appointed as Veterinary Officer (MVS Grade-IV) on the recommendation of a duly constituted DPC and since then, she had been working as the MVS Grade-IV to the satisfaction of her senior officers till she was promoted to MVS Grade-III vide Government order dated 18-02-2014 issued by the Commissioner (Vety. & A.H.), Government of Manipur against the lone post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal on the recommendation of a Selection Committee. 3.2 Very unexpectedly and unreasonably, the State Government issued an order dated 13-02-2015, impugned herein, transferring and posting the petitioner and the private respondent in the manner given as under:- Sl. No. Name of officers with position New place of posting 1. Dr. S. Shantikumar Singh, M.V.Sc. (Animal Production), Specialist (Cattle), DVO, Churachandpur (the present private respondent) As Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat in Vety. & A.H. Services, Manipur. 2. Dr. Kh. Shantibala Devi, Project Officer (ICDP), Dte. of Vety. & A.H. (the present petitioner) As Specialist (Cattle), District Vety. Office, Churachandpur. Being aggrieved by the said impugned order, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 19-02-2015 to the Principal Secretary (Vety. & A.H.), Government of Manipur through proper channel namely the Director (Vety. & A.H.), Government of Manipur praying for modification/cancellation of the said transfer order to meet the ends of justice but to no effect. Office, Churachandpur. Being aggrieved by the said impugned order, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 19-02-2015 to the Principal Secretary (Vety. & A.H.), Government of Manipur through proper channel namely the Director (Vety. & A.H.), Government of Manipur praying for modification/cancellation of the said transfer order to meet the ends of justice but to no effect. 3.3 The impugned order has been questioned by the petitioner on various grounds that the inter-transfer between the petitioner and the private respondent is not permissible in law; that the post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal is a lone post in the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Department and it being not transferrable, she cannot be transferred as the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur; that the impugned order is issued by the State Government without application of mind; that no considerable and cogent reasons are assigned in the impugned order; that the impugned order is issued by the State Government under the instruction/dictation of the Hon'ble Minister to accommodate his own men by resorting to favouritism, nepotism and bias which is highly illegal and arbitrary and that the impugned order is in total disregard and violation of the instructions laid down in various office memoranda dated 24-07-1982, 24-04-1981 and 31-07-1996 issued by the State Government. 4. 4. The instant writ petition has been contested by the State respondents by filing an affidavit-in-opposition wherein it is stated that the essential qualifications for appointment by promotion to the post of Project Officer and the Specialist (Cattle) remain the same; that as per Fundamental Rule 11, the whole time of a Government servant is at the disposal of a Government who post him as he may be employed in any manner required by the authority without claim for additional remuneration; that the concerned Hon'ble Minister is the competent authority to direct transfer of an employee of the State Government at his discretion to post either the petitioner or the private respondent to either of the two posts; that the executive instructions/office memoranda issued by the State Government are in the nature of executive instructions/guidelines and do not have statutory force and accordingly, do not confer upon the Government employees a legally enforceable rights; that the Hon'ble Court shall not ordinarily interfere with the transfer order; that the impugned order has already become effective when the private respondent took over the self-charge of the office of the Project Officer (ICDP) by signing TR-1 on 20-02-2015. 5. The instant writ petition has been contested by the private respondent No. 4 also by filing an affidavit-in-opposition denying the averments made in the writ petition. The private respondent has taken a similar stand as that of the State Respondents and in addition to what has been submitted by the State respondents, the private respondent has stated that the impugned order had not been issued unexpectedly and unreasonably as alleged and the same had been issued in his absence; that when the petitioner refused to comply with the transfer order, he assumed self-charge of the Office of the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and submitted a report thereof dated 20-02-2015 to the Director, Department of Vety. & A. H; that since he has assumed charge as the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal he is holding the same; that since both the posts are inter-transferable, there is no bar under the rules prohibiting inter-transfer between him and the petitioner; that the transfer of employees is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but is also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra; that it is the prerogative of the State Government to decide as to who should be posted where and when in the interest of general public; that the petitioner has no indefeasible right to continue to the post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal indefinitely or to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, she ought to continue in such place of posting as long as she desires; that in view of the provisions under the Rules of Business of the Government of Manipur, 1972, the concerned Minister happens to be in charge of the Department and that it is a settled law that the transfer order made in transgression of the administrative guidelines cannot be interfered with as they do not confer any legally enforceable right. 6. Admittedly, the transfer and posting is the domain and prerogative of the State Government and the courts shall not interfere with it except in cases where the transfer order has been issued in violation of the provisions of a rule or on the ground of malafide. In other words, the power of transfer and posting of the State Government is a discretionary power but is always subject to the exceptions curbed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. The issue relating to transfer and posting has been considered time and again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in various cases, settling the law thereof. In this regard, some of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which both the parties will have no disagreement, may be referred to herein. The issue relating to transfer and posting has been considered time and again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in various cases, settling the law thereof. In this regard, some of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which both the parties will have no disagreement, may be referred to herein. In the case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1974) 4 SCC 3 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter-alia held that a transfer is malafide when it is made not for professed purpose, such as normal course or in public or administrative interest or in the exigencies of service but for other purpose, that is to accommodate another person for undisclosed reasons. In the case of Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) v. State of Bihar reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: “ The courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of malafide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights.” In the case of M. Shankaranarayan, IAS v. State of Karnataka reported in (1993) 1 SCC 54 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the court may draw reasonable inference of malafide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of institution, surmise or conjecture. In the case of N.K Singh v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 98 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “6. But such inference must be based factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of institution, surmise or conjecture. In the case of N.K Singh v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 98 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “6. …the scope of judicial review in matters of transfer of a government servant to an equivalent post without any adverse consequence on the service or career prospects is very limited being confined only to the grounds of malafides and violation of any specific provision...” In the case of National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 574 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is well settled that no government servant or employer of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place, since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. In the case of Public Services Tribunal Bar Assn. v. State of U.P. reported in (2003) 4 SCC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “37. Transfer is an incident of service and is made in administrative exigencies. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the courts. This court consistently has been taking a view that orders of transfer should not be interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been made in a vindictive manner.” In the case of Sarvesh Kumar Awasthi v. UP Jai Nigam reported in (2003) 11 SCC 740, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “3. In our view, transfer of officers is required to be effected on the basis of set norms or guidelines. The power of transferring an officer cannot be wielded arbitrarily, malafide or an exercise against efficient and independent officer or at the instance of politicians whose work is not done by the officer concerned. For better administration, the officers concerned must have freedom from fear of being harassed by repeated transfers or transfers ordered at the instance of someone who has nothing to do with the business of administration.” In the case of State of UP v. Gobardhan Lal reported in (2004) 11 SCC 402 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “7 …. For better administration, the officers concerned must have freedom from fear of being harassed by repeated transfers or transfers ordered at the instance of someone who has nothing to do with the business of administration.” In the case of State of UP v. Gobardhan Lal reported in (2004) 11 SCC 402 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “7 …. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a malafide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made…” In the case of Tejshree Ghag v. Prakash Parashuram Patil reported in (2007) 6 SCC 220 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “ An order of transfer ordinarily should be in terms of the existing rules. Transfer may even incidental to the conditions of service, but thereby nobody can be deprived of his existing rights. Existence of a power and exercise thereof are two different concepts. An executive power in absence of any statutory rules cannot be exercised which would result in civil or penal consequences. Such exercise of power must, moreover, be bonafide. It cannot be done for unauthorised purpose. An executive order passed for unauthorised purpose would amount to malice in law. An order of transfer cannot prejudicially affect the status of an employee. If orders of transfer substantially affect the status of an employee, the same would be violative of the conditions of service and thus, illegal. Transfers must be made to an equivalent post. In the case of Prashar Bharati v. Amarjeet Singh reported in (2007) 9 SCC 539 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “ …“Transfer”, however, is limited to equivalent post in the same cadre and in the same department….” In the case of Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2009) 15 SCC 178 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “8. A government servant has no vested right to remain posted at a place of his choice nor can he insist that he must be posted at one place or the other. He is liable to be transferred in the administrative exigencies from one place to the other. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in terms of the appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contrary. No government can function if the government servant insists that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires.” In the case of Registrar General, High Court of Judicature of Madrasv. R. Perachi, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 137 , the Hon'ble supreme Court has observed that the transfer is an incident of service and one cannot make a grievance if a transfer is made on the administrative grounds and without attaching any stigma. From the above decisions which are illustrative and not exhaustive, the legal position settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court may be summarised that transfer is not only an incident but a condition of service. The employee holding a transferable post cannot claim vested right for his/her posting at a particular place. A Government servant has no vested right to remain posted at a place of his choice and that he is liable to be transferred to other place also. An order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with by the court unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a malafide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision or passed by an authority not competent to do so. The court can interfere with a transfer and posting which is not made in public interest or on administrative exigency. 7. The appointment, promotion and other service conditions of the Veterinary Officers of various grades are governed by the rules called the Manipur Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Service Rules, 1994 (herein after referred to as ‘Rules’). Rule 3 provides that there shall be constituted a service known as Manipur Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Services of persons appointed to the service under Rules 7, 8 and 11. Rule 3 provides that there shall be constituted a service known as Manipur Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Services of persons appointed to the service under Rules 7, 8 and 11. These services could not be constituted for a number of years on account of many litigations and only on 18-02-2012 they could be constituted for the first time with effect from 17-10-1994 after the Hon'ble High Court delivered its judgment and order. There are four grades in the MVS as specified in Rule 4 of the said Rules. The posts MVS Grade-III are relevant for the purpose of deciding the issues involved herein and the said posts of MVS Grade-III are categorised into 16 groups as shown in schedule-I thereof which is given as below: Sl. No. Grade & Designation Perm. Temp. No. of post Pay Scale 3. Grade - III 1. Deputy Director 6 - 6 3000-4500/- 2. Supdt. Vety. Hospital 1 - 1 3. Project Officer 2 4 6 4. Dy. Director (Statistics) 1 - 1 5. Dy. Director (Dairy) 1 - 1 6. Poultry Specialist 5 1 6 7. Cattle Specialist 4 2 6 8. Piggery Specialist 4 2 6 9. Fodder Specialist 1 - 1 10. Disease Specialist 1 - 1 11. Rinderpest Specialist 1 - 1 12. Specialist (Medicine) 1 - 1 13. Specialist (Surgery) 1 - 1 14. Specialist (Gynaecology) 1 - 1 15. Specialist (Bacteriology) - 1 1 16. Specialist (Parasitology)1 - 1 1 Total Grade - III 30 11 41 Rule 7 provides for the initial appointment at the time of commencement of the said Rules, 1994 and subject to what has been provided therein, Rule 9 lays down the procedure to be followed for appointment by promotion under Rules 11 thereof. Rule 20 provides a residua to the effect that in respect of other conditions of service for which no provision is made in these rules, a member of the service shall be governed by the rules and orders applicable to other officers of the Government in a corresponding grade or class, as the case may be. However, these Manipur Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Rules, 1994 are silent about the manner in which the power of transfer and posting is to be exercised by the State Government and the procedure to be followed in matters of transfer. However, these Manipur Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Rules, 1994 are silent about the manner in which the power of transfer and posting is to be exercised by the State Government and the procedure to be followed in matters of transfer. But the power of the State Government in respect of transfer and posting of veterinary officers of various grades is not the subject matter in issue and therefore, the same need not be gone into by this court. 8. The only question that has arisen for consideration in the present case is as to whether the issuance of the impugned order was malafide or bias which would render it to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The word “malafide” as given in Black's Law Dictionary means bad faith as opposed to the word “bonafide” which means in or with good faith; honestly, openly and sincerely; without deceit or fraud. Bias negates fairness and reasonableness by reason of which arbitrariness and malafide move creep in. In the case of State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna reported in (2001) 2 SCC 330 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “5. Whereas fairness is synonymous with reasonableness - bias stands included within the attributes and broader purview of the word “malice” which in common acceptation means and implies “spite” or “ill will”. One redeeming feature in the matter of attributing bias or malice and is now well settled that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the purposes of indication of ill will. There must be cogent evidence available on record to come to the conclusion as to whether in fact, there was existing a bias or a mala fide move which results in the miscarriage of justice (see in this context Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant). In almost all legal inquiries, “intention as distinguished from motive is the all-important factor” and in common parlance a malicious act stands equated with an intentional act without just cause or excuse. In the case of Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens the Court of Appeal has stated upon reliance on the decision of Lumley v. Gye as below: “For this purpose maliciously means no more than knowingly. In the case of Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens the Court of Appeal has stated upon reliance on the decision of Lumley v. Gye as below: “For this purpose maliciously means no more than knowingly. This was distinctly laid down in Lumley v. Gye where Crompton, J. said that it was clear law that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing, with notice, interrupts the relation of master and servant by harbouring and keeping the servant after he has quitted his master during his period of service, commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible in law. Malice in law means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse: Bromage v. Prosser. ‘Intentionally’ refers to the doing of the act; it does not mean that the defendant meant to be spiteful, though sometimes, as for instance to rebut a plea of privilege in defamation, malice in fact has to be proved.” 25. Bias admittedly negates fairness and reasonableness by reason of which arbitrariness and mala fide move creep in - issuance of the two notifications, assuming in hot haste, but no particulars of any mala fides move or action has been brought out on record on the part of Shri V.K. Khanna - while it is true that the notings prepared for Advocate General's opinion contain a definite remark about the mala fide move on the part of Shri V.K. Khanna yet there is singular absence of any particulars without which the case of mala fides cannot be sustained. The expression “mala fide” has a definite significance in the legal phraseology and the same cannot possibly emanate out of fanciful imagination or even apprehensions but there must be existing definite evidence of bias and actions which cannot be attributed to be otherwise bona fide — actions not otherwise bona fide, however, by themselves would not amount to be mala fide unless the same is in accompaniment with some other factors which would depict a bad motive or intent on the part of the doer of the act.” In the case of State of A.P v. Goverdhanlal Pitti reported in (2003) 4 SCC 739 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “12. The legal meaning of malice is “ill-will or spite towards a party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action”. This is sometimes described as “malice in fact”. The legal meaning of malice is “ill-will or spite towards a party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action”. This is sometimes described as “malice in fact”. “Legal malice” or “malice in law” means “something done without lawful excuse”. In other words, “it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the rights of others”. (See Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 3rd Edn., London Butterworths, 1989.) 13. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State. If at all it is malice in legal sense, it can be described as an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. Prof. Wade in his authoritative work on Administrative Law (8th Edn., at p. 414) based on English decisions and in the context of alleged illegal acquisition proceedings, explains that an action by the State can be described mala fide if it seeks to “acquire land” “for a purpose not authorised by the Act”. The State, if it wishes to acquire land, should exercise its power bona fide for the statutory purpose and for none other. 14. Legal malice, therefore, on the part of the State as attributed to it should be understood to mean that the action of the State is not taken bona fide for the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act and it has been taken only to frustrate the favourable decisions obtained by the owner of the property against the State in the eviction and writ proceedings.” As has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as shown above, legal malice should be understood to mean that the action of the State Government is not taken bonafide. Whether an action taken by the State Government in respect of transfer is malafide or not, in a given case, cannot be ascertained by reading the order itself. Malafide action is an action taken without lawful excuse. The State Government being an institution, is run and administered by many people. Whether an action taken by the State Government in respect of transfer is malafide or not, in a given case, cannot be ascertained by reading the order itself. Malafide action is an action taken without lawful excuse. The State Government being an institution, is run and administered by many people. In order to read the malafide intent of such people who are responsible for issuing the impugned order, one has to examine the surrounding circumstances, as there cannot be any direct evidence as to the state of mind of these people. Since the document namely the impugned order is prepared within the four walls of the State Government, it may be impossible for the petitioner to produce any direct evidence/material as regards malafide exercise of power except making prima facie allegations based on documents and circumstances as well. In the words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it may not always be possible to establish malice in fact in a straight-cut manner and therefore, the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn there from. 9. In order to substantiate his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has emphasised the following circumstances: (a) The post of Project officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal is not intra-transferable and therefore, the impugned order is bad in law; (b) The impugned order was issued by the State Government at the dictation of the Hon'ble Minister to accommodate his own man; (c) The various Office Memoranda, containing guidelines, issued by the State Government have been disregarded while issuing the impugned order. 10. As regards the circumstance (a), it has been submitted by Shri M. Hemchandra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal is not an intra-transferable post and since the petitioner has been appointed by promotion specifically against the said post, she cannot be transferred from it. On the other hand, Shri S. Nepoleon, learned Government Advocate and Shri A. Bimol, learned counsel appearing for the private respondent have submitted that one can be transferred from the post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal to the post of Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur because the qualifications for appointment as the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur remain the same. It is nowhere mentioned in the said rules as to whether the post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal or for that matter, the posts of MVS Grade-III are transferable or not. However, the said posts of MVS Grade-III are categorised into 16 groups as shown in schedule-I of the said rules. During the course of hearing, it has been fairly admitted by the learned Government Advocate that all the posts in the said 16 groups are not transferable and all that he submitted is that some posts out of 16 groups for which qualifications are equal, are transferable. Although the State Government is unable to produce any document to show which posts out of the said 16 groups are transferable, the learned Government Advocate as well as Shri A. Bimol, learned Counsel for the private respondent have produced copies of some Government orders showing that some officers of MVS Grade-III had been transferred in the past as the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal. It may be noted that the said transfer orders had been issued long before the initial constitution of the Manipur Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Services and moreover, it appears that since no one had challenged the said transfer orders, the validity and correctness thereof had not been gone into by a competent court. The issue whether the post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal is transferable or not is important and relevant one and in case it is not transferable, the question of transfer will not arise at all and if the transfer order is issued in such situation, it will be rendered arbitrary. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the posts of MVS Grade-III are categorised into 16 groups for which there must be some reason or rational behind it. There were 12 vacancies for the MVS Grade-III for the year 2012-2013 and the petitioner was appointed against the said lone post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal on the basis of the recommendation of a DPC which had considered only five officers of MVS Grade-IV. Similarly, five officers of MVS Grade-IV were considered by the same DPC for recommendation for appointment by promotion to one vacant post of Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur. Similarly, five officers of MVS Grade-IV were considered by the same DPC for recommendation for appointment by promotion to one vacant post of Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur. If the said two posts namely Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur are intra-transferable, there was no need for the DPC to consider the said two posts separately and all eligible officers of the MVS Grade-IV ought to have been considered simultaneously. It may be noted that in organised services like Manipur Civil Service, Manipur Police Service, Manipur Finance Service etc., employees are not appointed by promotion against the particular posts and they are appointed by promotion to the next higher grade on the recommendation of duly constituted DPC and after they having been appointed by promotion, they are transferred to various posts. In other words, the appointment by promotion is from one grade to a higher grade and not against a particular post. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the minutes of the meeting held on 22-01-2015 by the Principal Secretary (Vety & A.H.), Government of Manipur with his subordinate officials wherein various proposals have been made for amendment of the said rules and one of the proposals is that all posts of Cattle Specialist and Project Officers be made transferable. The existence thereof is not disputed by the State Government and the only contention of the learned Government Advocate is that it was only a proposal and not the decision of the State Government. It is obvious that it was not the decision of the State Government but it was a proposal to the State Government from which it is evident that the posts of the Project officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur are not transferable, otherwise there was no need of making such a proposal. The Principal Secretary (Vety & A.H.) is none other than the head of the Administrative Department namely Veterinary Department, Government of Manipur and the other officers present in the meeting include the Director (Vety & A.H.), the Registrar, Manipur State Veterinary Council, the General Secretary, Indian Veterinary Association, Manipur Branch and others who are also the high officials of the Directorate. They are the ones who are directly concerned with the implementation and the enforcement of the rules. They are the ones who are directly concerned with the implementation and the enforcement of the rules. However, in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Under Secretary (Vety & A.H.) on behalf of the State respondents, it is stated that the MVS Grade-III having the educational qualification of M.V.Sc in AP or APM can be posted either as the Project Officer (ICDP) or the Specialist (Cattle). It is unfortunate that the said statements have been made in the affidavit, as usual, without referring to any provision of law or any Government order or any decision of the State Government which is absolutely necessary for the reason that the State Government being an institution, its statements are to be made by its officers based on records only. Moreover, it is hard to understand as to how the Under Secretary (Vety & AH), being the junior most officer in the Administrative Department, came to know that the petitioner working as the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal can be transferred as the Specialist (Cattle), Churanchandpur, when the Principal Secretary (Vety & A.H) and the Director (Vety & A.H), Government of Manipur and anyone from the Veterinary fraternity did not know anything about it. In support of his averments made in the affidavit, not a single document has been placed on record by the deponent, the Under Secretary (Vety & AH). Thus, it is seen that the post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal is not an inter-transferable post. 11. As regards the circumstance (b), the allegation is that the impugned order was issued under the dictation of the Hon'ble Minister so as to accommodate his own man by resorting to favouritism, nepotism, bias to gain personal benefits and to substantiate her allegation, the petitioner has relied upon the letter U.O. dated 16-01-2015 addressed to the Principal Secretary (Vety & A.H.), Government of Manipur by the Hon'ble Minister whereby it has been directed that the private respondent be utilised as Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal whereas the petitioner be assigned to look after the work of Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur and they should draw their pay and allowances from their respective present place of postings and that this measure be taken to avoid criticism to protect public interest. On receipt of the said letter U.O. dated 16-01-2015, the Under Secretary (Vety & A.H.) addressed to the Director (Vety & A.H.) a letter dated 28-01-2015 requesting him to furnish his comments for further necessary action. It is not known as to what are the comments furnished by the Director (Vety & AH) but few days later from the date of receipt of the said letter, the impugned order was issued by the State Government. The learned Government Advocate has submitted that there is nothing wrong in writing such a letter U.O because the Hon'ble Minister is the competent authority to direct the transfer of its employee in terms of the rules of business. To support his contention, the learned Government Advocate has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the case State of Assam v. Dilip Kumar Das, reported in 2003 (1) GLT 530 wherein the Hon'ble High Court inter-alia held that the Minister, if has thought, that a particular employee is suitable to carry on a particular nature of job and in accordance therewith if he has directed the officer to hold the particular post and as a necessary corollary the person holding that post is required to be shifted to some other place, the act by which such a thing is done cannot be said to be an act done with malafide intent or to favour a particular individual. But the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case for the reason that while in the said case, the reason for transfer in public interest was found in the record, there is no such reason at all in the present case. It is no doubt true that the Hon'ble Minister is the competent authority in matters of transfer and posting but there has to be some reason for transfer in the record, although the same may not be required to be mentioned in the transfer order. As has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in many cases, the transfer is malafide if the same is not made in public interest or on administrative interest or in the exigencies of service. Mere writing such a letter by the Hon'ble Minister for transfer of an employee cannot, per se, be said to be a ground for a transfer order being challenged as malafide exercise of power. Mere writing such a letter by the Hon'ble Minister for transfer of an employee cannot, per se, be said to be a ground for a transfer order being challenged as malafide exercise of power. But blindly obliging the letter by the Administrative Department without application of mind, as has been done in the present case where the Administrative Department has not taken into account the fact that the post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal is not transferable and the petitioner has been appointed by promotion to it and the existence of Office Memoranda containing guidelines, would render the action being malafide. It is nowhere mentioned in the impugned order that the transfer order is made in public interest nor has it been stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State respondents before this court that the transfer is in public interest or on administrative exigency. The said affidavit is silent as to whether the petitioner's service as Specialist (Cattle) was required at Churachandpur in public interest or on administrative exigency although she had been specifically appointed by promotion as the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal or the public at Churachandpur desired that her service be utilised there. Since the State Government being an institution, it ought to act fairly and reasonably and there must be a bonafide and cogent reason behind any such action of the State Government and the absence of any cogent reason will ultimately and definitely tantamount to the order being malafide. 12. As regards the circumstance (c), it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the impugned order has been issued in total disregard and in violation of the instructions laid down in various office memoranda dated 24-07-1982, 24-04-1981 and 31-07-1996 issued by the State Government. The learned Government Advocate and Shri A. Bimol, learned counsel for the private respondent have submitted that instructions are in the nature of guidelines and do not have statutory force. To substantiate their contention, they relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. S.L. Abbas reported in (1993) 4 SCC 357 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “6. An order of transfer is an incident of Government service. To substantiate their contention, they relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. S.L. Abbas reported in (1993) 4 SCC 357 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “6. An order of transfer is an incident of Government service. Fundamental Rule 11 says that “the whole time of a Government servant is at the disposal of the Government which pays him and he may be employed in any manner required by proper authority”. Fundamental Rule 15 says that “the President may transfer a Government servant from one post to another”. That the respondent is liable to transfer anywhere in India is not in dispute. It is not the case of the respondent that the order of his transfer is vitiated by mala fides on the part of the authority making the order, — though the Tribunal does say so merely because certain guidelines issued by the Central Government are not followed, with which finding we shall deal later. The respondent attributed “mischief” to his immediate superior who had nothing to do with his transfer. All he says is that he should not be transferred because his wife is working at Shillong, his children are studying there and also because his health had suffered a setback some time ago. He relies upon certain executive instructions issued by the Government in that behalf. Those instructions are in the nature of guidelines. They do not have statutory force. 7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said guideline however does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right.” Similarly, in Syndicate Bank v. Ramachandran Pillai reported in (2011) 15 SCC 398, the Hon'ble supreme Court has inter-alia held that guidelines or executive instructions which are not statutory in character, are not laws and compliance therewith cannot be enforced through courts. Even if there has been any violation or breach of such non-statutory guidelines, it will not confer any right on any member of the public, to seek a direction in a court of law, for compliance with such guidelines. There is no doubt about the said observations being made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. But it may be noted that the petitioner has not claimed that she has enforceable right under the said Office Memoranda and her only case is that while issuing the impugned order, the instructions have been totally disregarded by the State Government. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chandra Mohan Nigam reported in (1977) 4 SCC 345 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “26. The learned Single Judge held the instructions of the Ministry of Home Affairs as statutory and as such binding, on a concession made in the counter-affidavit submitted before him by the Under Secretary of the Personnel Department (Cabinet Secretariat). According to the counter-affidavit these instructions were made by the Government by Rule 2 of the All-India Services (Conditions of Service - Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960. It is not necessary to go into this aspect in detail in this case as to whether the instructions can be elevated to the status of statutory rules or even constitutional directions as found by the learned Single Judge. It is sufficient for our purpose that these instructions do not violate any provision of the Act or of the rules. Rule 16(3), being a rigorous rule vis-a-vis a government servant not himself willing to retire under Rule 16(2), has to be invoked in a fair and reasonable manner. It is sufficient for our purpose that these instructions do not violate any provision of the Act or of the rules. Rule 16(3), being a rigorous rule vis-a-vis a government servant not himself willing to retire under Rule 16(2), has to be invoked in a fair and reasonable manner. Since Rule 16(3) itself does not contain any guidelines, directions or criteria, the instructions issued by the Government furnish an essential and salutary procedure for the purpose of securing uniformity in application of the rule. These instructions really fill up the yawning gaps in the provisions, and are embedded in the conditions of service. These are binding on the Government and cannot be violated to the prejudice of the Government servant (see also Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Union of India v. K.P. Joseph).” It appears that while rendering its decision in S.L. Abbas case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not referred to its earlier decision in Chandra Mohan Nigam's case. Be that as it may, the guidelines, applicable to all Departments in the State, have been issued by the State Government from time to time, by way of policy decision, for the reason that in almost all the Recruitment Rules made by the State Government, there is no provision incorporated therein as to how the power of transfer be exercised by the State Government. True may it be, these guidelines are not enforceable in law at the instance of an employee but are issued by the State Government to regulate the exercise of its power of transfer so as to bring transparency, just and equality in the administration and in other words, these are issued by the State Government to make or create a mechanism of self regulation. It may be noted that in Sarvesh Kumar Awasthi case(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has inter-alia held that the transfer of officers is required to be effected on the basis of set norms or guidelines. In the absence of any provision in the relevant Act enacted by the State Legislature or the rules made there under or rules under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, regulating the service conditions of the employee, about the manner of exercising power of transfer by the State Government, the guidelines issued by the State Government to fill such gap, ought to be honoured and followed by it. There is no point of issuing such guidelines, if the same need not be followed or complied with by the State Government. The disregard of such guidelines as in the present case has given rise to a malfide exercise of power of transfer by the State Government. The State Government's obligation of implementing its own guidelines in matters of transfer and the effect of non-implementation thereof, has been considered by the Hon'ble Guahati High Court in its few judgments and order which are also relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. In the case of Dayal Das v. State of Assam reported in 2002 (2) GLT 109 the Hon'ble High Court has inter-alia held that the guidelines for transfer of officers in the Office Memorandum dated 19th Sep 92 may not have statutory force, but are checks against arbitrary transfer and deviation from the said guidelines may result in an arbitrary transfer. Similarly, in the case of Prasanna Kumar Nath v. State of Assam, reported in 2005 (4) GLT 348, the Hon'ble High has observed that guidelines are always guidelines and not like statutory rules. However, the State Government itself framing the guidelines are bound to act within the parameters of the said guidelines with the justified exception here and there. This court also endorses the said views expressed by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court. 13. As discussed herein above and after having carefully appreciated the materials on record and having gone through the said decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is indubitably clear that transfer is not only an incident but a condition of service and an employee holding a transferable post cannot claim vested right for his/her posting at a particular place. But there are certain circumstances which are in the form of exceptions as laid down in a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the basis of which a transfer order can be interfered with by the Court. But there are certain circumstances which are in the form of exceptions as laid down in a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the basis of which a transfer order can be interfered with by the Court. Relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Airports Authority of India v. Rajeev Ratan Pandey, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 337 wherein it has been held by referring to its earlier decision that the burden of proving malafide is on a person levelling such allegations and the burden is heavy, admits of no legal ambiguity and mere assertion or bald statement is not enough to discharge the heavy burden that the law imposes upon the person levelling the allegation of malafide; it must be supported by requisite materials, Shri A. Bimol, learned counsel appearing for the private respondent has contended that the petitioner has failed to produce documents to prove that the impugned order is issued in malafide exercise of power. But his contention has no force and hence, cannot be countenanced at all. In the present case, the allegation is that the impugned order dated 13-02-2015 is one being issued in malafide exercise of power. It is an undeniable fact based on materials that the MVS Grade-III, consisting of 41 posts, have been categorised into 16 groups as per Schedule-I of the Manipur Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Rules, 1994 wherein there is no provision at all to the effect that the said posts of MVS Grade-III are transferable. Moreover, the State Government has failed to produce any document to show that the said posts of MVS Grade-III are transferable and the only stand taken by the State Government in their affidavit, without referring to any document or decision of the State Government, is that since the educational qualifications of both the posts of the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur are equal, they can be transferred against each other. During the course of hearing, the learned Government Advocate has fairly admitted that all posts in the said 16 groups are not transferable except between the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur and in support of his contention in respect of this exception also, the learned Government Advocate has failed to produce any document. During the course of hearing, the learned Government Advocate has fairly admitted that all posts in the said 16 groups are not transferable except between the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur and in support of his contention in respect of this exception also, the learned Government Advocate has failed to produce any document. But on the contrary, the petitioner has placed on record a document namely a copy of the minutes of a high level meeting held on 22-01-2015, hardly a month prior to the issuance of the impugned order, chaired by none other than the head of the Administrative Department namely Veterinary Department by which some proposals have been made to the State Government and one of which is that the posts of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur be made transferable. It is evident from these proposals that the State Government has not yet taken any decision to make the said posts of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur transferable. It may be noted that the petitioner was recommended by a DPC for appointment by promotion to the post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal and on the basis of the said recommendation, the petitioner was duly appointed by promotion to the said post of Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal vide order dated 18-02-2014 issued by the Commissioner (Veterinary & A.H.), Government of Manipur and accordingly, the petitioner was posted as the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal. Within a year from the date of her appointment as the Project Officer (ICDP), Porompat, Imphal the petitioner was transferred and posted as the Specialist (Cattle), Churachandpur vide impugned order dated 13-02-2015 issued by the Under Secretary (Vety & A.H.), Government of Manipur contrary to the guidelines contained in the said office memoranda and in particular, the O.M. dated 24-05-1991 by which the transfer is permissible only after three years of posting at a particular place except on compelling reasons. It is nowhere mentioned in the impugned order dated 13-02-2015 that the transfer of the petitioner was in public interest or on administrative exigency. The entire set of facts, when analysed in a proper perspective, has led to the conclusion that the impugned order is issued in malafide exercise of power and not in public interest. 14. It is nowhere mentioned in the impugned order dated 13-02-2015 that the transfer of the petitioner was in public interest or on administrative exigency. The entire set of facts, when analysed in a proper perspective, has led to the conclusion that the impugned order is issued in malafide exercise of power and not in public interest. 14. For the reasons stated herein above, the instant writ petition is allowed and consequently, the impugned order dated 13-02-2015 is quashed and set aside with no order as to costs.