JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Arup Kumar Goswami, J. This appeal is directed against the judgement and order dated 07.10.2013, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara, convicting the accused-appellant under Section 304-B IPC and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. In terms of Section 357-A CrPC, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was also awarded, as compensation amount, to be paid by the District Legal Services Authority, Goalpara, to the minor daughter of the appellant, namely, Smt. Puja Rabha. 2. Heard Mr. A. Roshid, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. K.A. Majumdar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 3. An ejahar was lodged with the Agia Police Station, on 25.05.2011, at around 6-00 O'clock in the morning, by Anil Das, father of the deceased Lakhi Rabha, stating that Dhanoram Rabha, i.e., the appellant herein, had married his daughter about 5 years back and that after a few days of marriage, his daughter was asked by Dhanoram to bring money from her parents and, as his daughter could not bring money from her parents, his daughter was physically and mentally harassed by the accused-appellant. On 23.05.2011, at around 9-00 A.M., taking opportunity of absence of the family members, the accused-appellant entered into his house and took away the marriage certificate. On that day itself, at around 11-00 A.M., the accused-appellant detained his daughter inside the house, tied her hands and legs with a rope and gagged her mouth and, thereafter, he set her on fire by pouring kerosene oil. The incident was revealed before them by the couple's daughter, Puja Rabha. His daughter was rushed to the Goalpara Civil Hospital in an ambulance and, at around 3-00 A.M. on 25.05.2011, she died of her injuries. On the basis of the said ejahar, Agia Police Station Case No. 57/2011, under Section 302/304-B/380 IPC, was registered. 4. On registration of the case, police started investigation. The investigation revealed that the accused-appellant had harassed the deceased physically and mentally on demand of dowry and, failing to bear the torture, Lakhi Rabha burnt herself by pouring kerosene on her body. Accordingly, upon conclusion of the investigation, Charge-sheet (Ext.-6), under Section 304-B/302 IPC, was submitted. Along with the Charge-sheet, post-mortem report (Ext.-3) and two seizure lists, Ext.-2 and Ext.-3, respectively, were also forwarded. Accordingly, upon conclusion of the investigation, Charge-sheet (Ext.-6), under Section 304-B/302 IPC, was submitted. Along with the Charge-sheet, post-mortem report (Ext.-3) and two seizure lists, Ext.-2 and Ext.-3, respectively, were also forwarded. The case being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Goalpara, wherein Sessions Case No. 137/2012, under Section 304-B/302 IPC, was registered. Charges under Section 304-B IPC and 302 IPC were framed against the accused-appellant and the same having been read over and explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. During trial, prosecution examined 10 witnesses while the defence adduced no evidence. On conclusion of trial, statement of the accused-appellant was recorded under Section 313 CrPC, wherein the accused-appellant denied the incriminating materials brought into evidence by the prosecution. 6. PW1, PW2 and PW3 are brother, father and mother, respectively, of the deceased. PW4, PW7 and PW8 have houses nearby to that of the accused-appellant. PW5 is a co-villager, whose house is situated at a little distance away from the house of the accused-appellant. PW6 is a resident of a different village. PW6 is declared hostile. PW9 is the doctor, who conducted post-mortem examination and PW10 is the Investigating Officer. 7. Mr. Roshid, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. He has submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish the ingredients attracting Section 304-B IPC and that there was no evidence to the effect that prior to her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty by her husband in connection with demand of dowry. He has argued that even though a presumption can be drawn under Section 304-B IPC because death of the deceased had occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, the learned trial court has misconstrued the evidence on record by giving undue emphasis on occasional quarrels that had taken place between the accused and the deceased by concluding that the quarrels had their roots in the demand of dowry. He has submitted that in a case where demand of dowry by the husband and the relative is alleged to be the cause of death of a victim, the prosecution must be able to adduce cogent evidence to that effect, which is lacking in the instant case. He has submitted that in a case where demand of dowry by the husband and the relative is alleged to be the cause of death of a victim, the prosecution must be able to adduce cogent evidence to that effect, which is lacking in the instant case. Therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted, he contends. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has referred to the judgements in the cases of Baksish Ram and Another v. State of Punjab, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 131 , Modinsab Kasimsab Kanchagar v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 551 , Panchanand Mandal @ Pachan Mandal and Another v. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 800 . 8. Mr. K.A. Majumdar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, however, supports the impugned judgement and submits that the evidence brought on record by the prosecution warrants conviction of the accused-appellant under Section 304-B IPC. 9. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the evidence and the materials on record. 10. At the outset, it will be most appropriate to take note the evidence adduced by the prosecution. 11. PW1 works as a Handyman. He deposed that his elder sister was married to the accused-appellant about five years back and they had lived happily for about 5/6 months since their marriage and, thereafter, the accused-appellant started torturing and assaulting his sister demanding dowry about which his sister used to report to her parents. He stated that the accused had been given dowry within their means and as all that had been demanded could not be paid, the accused-appellant used to assault his sister. He further deposed that though for his service he stays in Jogighopa, he was at home on the day of the occurrence. Lakhinath Rabha, PW7, had come and informed them that his elder sister had been set on fire by the accused-appellant and, thereafter, he along with his father, immediately went to the house of the accused-appellant. At that time his mother was at Goalpara, who come on the following day on being informed about the occurrence. He also deposed that on reaching the house of the accused-appellant, he found his sister burnt and lying in the courtyard and she was unable to talk. At that time his mother was at Goalpara, who come on the following day on being informed about the occurrence. He also deposed that on reaching the house of the accused-appellant, he found his sister burnt and lying in the courtyard and she was unable to talk. An ambulance was called for and she was taken to Goalpara Civil Hospital, where she died and, after the post-mortem examination, when the dead body was handed over to them, the family of the accused-appellant cremated the body. He proved the inquest report as Ext.-1. In his cross-examination, he stated that no ejahar had earlier been lodged in connection with the accused-appellant demanding dowry. He admitted that he did not tell the police that Lakhinath Rabha, PW7, had informed them about the incident. He stated that he had heard that the child of the couple used to reside with the accused-appellant. He further stated that the deceased could talk a little. He had denied the suggestion that the accused-appellant had not been present there at the time of the occurrence and that it was a false case that the accused-appellant had set fire on the deceased. He also stated that a marriage proposal of her younger sister with one Bhrigu Singh was being considered, but the accused-appellant was against such proposal and was protesting, which had resulted into the deceased sister getting into a quarrel with the accused. He denied the suggestion that because of that, being angry, the deceased had committed suicide. 12. PW2, father of the deceased, is an illiterate person, who is working as a cook (Karigar) in a hotel. He deposed that he had solemnized the marriage of his daughter with the accused-appellant five years back and they had a child aged about five years. His further evidence is that from one year after the marriage, the accused-appellant started demanding dowry and when they could not give money, the accused-appellant used to assault her as told to him by his wife. He deposed that on the day of the occurrence, he was at his shop when his wife come to him and informed him that Lakhi was set on fire, whereupon he rushed to the house of the accused-appellant and saw her lying inside the room in burnt condition. He also deposed with regard to his lodging of the ejahar and putting his thumb impression on the inquest report. He also deposed with regard to his lodging of the ejahar and putting his thumb impression on the inquest report. He also stated that he had not lodged any ejahar earlier against the accused-appellant in connection with demand of dowry or assault upon his daughter. He denied the suggestion that the accused did not demand any dowry or that he did not kill her by setting fire on her. 13. PW3, mother of the deceased, deposed that the marriage of Lakhi was solemnized with the accused-appellant about five years back and since about a year after their marriage, the accused started demanding money and she also used to pay him money occasionally. She also deposed that her daughter used to tell them about the torture and harassment which she had been facing. It is also stated by PW3 that about a week before the incident, Lakhi had come and asked for Rs. 6,000/- from her husband. When she told Lakhi that she would not be able to give the amount her daughter told that the accused would kill her if the money was not paid, whereupon she pacified her daughter and sent her back. PW3 stated that on the day of the occurrence she was not at home as she had gone to Goalpara and, while she was at Goalpara, her son informed her over phone that his elder sister had caught fire but he did not tell her as to who had set her on fire. She also stated that when she met her daughter in the hospital, she saw burn injuries and that her daughter said, "I shall get well. Don't worry". In cross-examination, PW3 deposed that no ejahar had been lodged earlier in connection with demand of dowry or harassment meted out to her daughter. She denied the suggestion that Lakhi had never told them about the accused demanding dowry or doing physical torture on her and that the accused did not kill her daughter. 14. PW4 is a neighbour of the accused-appellant. He deposed that the incident had occurred after about 9-00 A.M. At that time he was at home and they were to go to work in the morning. The accused come to his house and stated that rice was not cooked till then. 14. PW4 is a neighbour of the accused-appellant. He deposed that the incident had occurred after about 9-00 A.M. At that time he was at home and they were to go to work in the morning. The accused come to his house and stated that rice was not cooked till then. At that very moment, he heard the family in the west of the accused person's house raising a hue and cry and, then, he and the accused went there in a run and, reaching there, he saw that the wife of the accused had caught fire and she was lying in the courtyard. Fire was still engulfing her person. They extinguished the fire and an ambulance was called for and she was rushed to the hospital. He also deposed that the relation between the husband and the wife was good. He deposed that the police had seized the jerrycan of oil, clothes belonging to Lakhi and a stove from the place vide Ext.-2 seizure list with his signature as Ext-2(1). 15. PW5 is a co-villager of the accused-appellant. PW5 deposed that on the day of the occurrence, at around 9-00/9-30 A.M., while it was drizzling and he was going to work, he heard hue and cry from near the house of the accused person, whereupon he went there and saw that Lakhi had caught fire inside the house. He stated that he reached there when people were bringing her out. He made a phone call to 108 and called for an ambulance and, thereafter, Lakhi was taken to hospital in the ambulance. He stated that sometimes the accused and the deceased used to fight, but he did not know the reason as to why they used to fight. In cross-examination, he stated that quarrels between the husband and wife were normal and he had not witnessed any incident between Lakhi and Dhanoram. 16. PW6 stated that Sunil Das, who is his wife's elder brother and uncle of the deceased, had told him that Lakhi had caught fire and she was taken to hospital and, accordingly, he went to the hospital. He stated that the deceased never told him about any harassment done on her and, at this stage, the witness was declared hostile. 17. PW7, a daily wage earner, is a neighbour of the accused-appellant. He stated that the deceased never told him about any harassment done on her and, at this stage, the witness was declared hostile. 17. PW7, a daily wage earner, is a neighbour of the accused-appellant. He stated in his deposition that the accused used to quarrel with his wife every now and then, but he did not know the reason of such quarrel and, on the day of the occurrence, there was a quarrel and while coming back from work, at around 11-00 A.M., he found Lakhi's dead body lying in the courtyard. He stated that he did not know as to how she died as nobody had told him about that. He also stated that he put his thumb impression on a piece of paper given by the police. In his cross-examination, he stated that he never went the accused person's house when they had quarrel occasionally. 18. PW8 is also a neighbour of the accused-appellant. He deposed that the husband and wife used to quarrel occasionally, but he did not know the reason of such quarrel. He stated that, on the day of the occurrence, it was raining and that some quarrel had been going on for the last 2/3 days though he had not heard them quarrelling on the day of the occurrence. He stated that hearing hue and cry at the house of the accused, when he come out of his house, he heard Lakhi raising hue and cry and smoke coming out from inside the house. Then he called the neighbours and when the neighbours come, he left for his home. In his cross-examination, he stated that he had not witnessed as to how Lakhi caught fire and that at that time the accused was at his house. 19. PW9 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination (Ext.-3) on the dead body of the deceased. Accordingly to him, the death was due to fluid loss from the body (secondary shock) caused by burn injuries, which were ante-mortem in nature. 20. PW10 is the Investigating Officer. He described the steps taken by him during the course of investigation. He had also made a video on the dead body and prepared a video disk (Ext.-4). He also proved the G.D. Entry dated 25.05.2011 (Ext.-5). 20. PW10 is the Investigating Officer. He described the steps taken by him during the course of investigation. He had also made a video on the dead body and prepared a video disk (Ext.-4). He also proved the G.D. Entry dated 25.05.2011 (Ext.-5). He stated that he did not submit the Charge-sheet and the same was submitted by the Sub-Inspector of Police, whose signature he knew. He also deposed with regard to the preparation of sketch map of the place of occurrence (Ext.-7). In cross-examination, he stated that he took the accused to the hospital and at that time he was there with the deceased. 21. On the basis of the evidence on record, the learned trial court held that though the prosecution had alleged that the victim was kept confined inside the house with her hands and legs tied with ropes, her mouth was stuffed with a piece of cloth and kerosene oil was poured over her body by the accused and then she was set on fire, there is no such evidence and, on the contrary, the victim herself had set fire on her and had committed suicide. Thus, it was held that the allegation that the accused committed murder of the victim had no support from the evidence on record. On the basis of the evidence on record and, more particularly, that of PW1, PW2 and PW3, the learned trial court held that the victim was subjected to cruelty and maltreatment for demand of dowry and it continued till the time when the victim decided to put an end to her life by committing suicide on the fateful morning. While recording such finding, learned trial court held that the victim was physically abused just two days before the incident in question and that there was frequent bickering in between the parties, which is not a bickering of the type that generally happens in the life of a married couple but such bickering related to demand of dowry. 22. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to refer to the definition of "dowry death" under Section 304-B IPC, which reads as under: "304-B. Dowry death. 22. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to refer to the definition of "dowry death" under Section 304-B IPC, which reads as under: "304-B. Dowry death. - (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death." 23. A perusal of Section 304-B IPC clearly shows that if a married woman dies otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused the death. The condition precedents for an offence under this section are: (i) The death of the woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) Such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage; (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband soon before her death; and (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. 24. 24. "Dowry", as used in Section 304-B IPC has been given the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and, therefore, it will also be appropriate to take note of the definition of "dowry" as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, which reads as under: "In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly - (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mohar in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies." 25. A perusal of this Section shows that this definition can be broken into five distinct parts, which are as follows: (1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security; (2) Such property or security can directly or indirectly be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not necessary; (3) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person, widening the reach of the Act; (4) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can be even after many years of solemnisation of a marriage. (5) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. 26. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant. It is to be noted that Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 1986 in order to tackle the menace of dowry death. (5) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. 26. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant. It is to be noted that Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 1986 in order to tackle the menace of dowry death. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads as under: "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death." 27. A perusal of Section 113-B goes to show that when there is a question as to whether a person committed the dowry death of a woman, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death if it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, demand of dowry. [emphasis supplied] 28. In Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N., reported in (2004) 9 SCC 157 , the Supreme Court laid down that the aforesaid presumption can be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304-B IPC.) (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before the death. 29. Section 304-B enjoins a statutory presumption of the guilt of the husband or relative of a husband on the proof of conditions and ingredients laid out therein and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, reinforces the presumption attached under Section 304-B IPC and they are supplementary to each other with the avowed objective of accomplishing the Legislative will of eradicating the social evil of dowry. 30. 30. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207 , the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the meaning of the expression "soon before" and it was stated as follows: "15. .... "Soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straight jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The expression "soon before" is not synonymous with the term "immediately before" and is opposite of the expression "soon after" as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be "soon before death" if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough." 31. In Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 477 , a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court had noted that there was divergent voices both on what would fall within "dowry" as defined and what is meant by the expression "soon before her death". In Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 477 , a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court had noted that there was divergent voices both on what would fall within "dowry" as defined and what is meant by the expression "soon before her death". The judgement in Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 721 wherein the definition was construed strictly and demand for money for defraying the expenses of manure made to a young wife who in turn made the same demand to her father was held to be outside a definition of "dowry" was noted as also the fact that while the said judgement was followed in Vipin Jaiswal v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 684 , the same was distinguished in Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 427 , Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 177 , Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 129 , Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 582. In Vipin Jaiswal (supra), the Apex Court had held that a demand of Rs. 50,000/- made by the husband after six months of marriage to purchase a computer to start his own business was not in connection with the marriage and was not really a dowry demand. In connection with the definition of "dowry", it was held in Rajinder Singh (supra) that judgement in Appasaheb (supra) and Vipin Jaiswal (supra) did not state the law correctly. It was held as follows: "20. Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgement in Appasaheb case followed by the judgement of Vipin Jaiswal do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise." 32. With regard to the expression "soon after", it is stated as follows: "24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B." One of the decisions endorsed as noted above is the decision rendered in Kans Raj (supra). The decision rendered in Dinesh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 322 wherein "soon before" was held to be synonymous with the term "immediately before" was held to be not a correct reflection of law. It was held that "soon before" is not synonymous with "immediately before". 33. Thus, any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, at or before or at any time after the marriage, which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of the given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise. The expression "soon before" would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. "Soon before" is a relative term to be understood and considered under specific circumstance of each case. "Soon before", cannot be understood to mean that it must be immediately before the death, but the demand of dowry, cruelty, or harassment based upon such demand, and the date of death should not be too remote in time to suggest that the same had become stale. There has to be proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on the dowry demand and the consequential death. 34. Though PW2 stated that he had been informed by PW3 about Lakhi sustaining burn injury, from the own evidence of PW3 it appears that she was at Goalpara on the date of the occurrence, corroborated by the evidence of PW1. 34. Though PW2 stated that he had been informed by PW3 about Lakhi sustaining burn injury, from the own evidence of PW3 it appears that she was at Goalpara on the date of the occurrence, corroborated by the evidence of PW1. PW1 had stated that he was informed by PW7 but he had not made such statement before the police. This Court is of the considered opinion that it is not really material having regard to the prosecution case as to the source of information of PW1 or PW2. PW1, PW2 and PW3 were not eye-witnesses to the occurrence and the trial court had also recorded the finding that prosecution failed to establish the offence of murder. 35. PW1 deposed that dowry had been paid to the appellant at the time of marriage to the extent possible and after about 5/6 months of the marriage, the accused started committing torture and assault on his elder sister demanding dowry. The evidence of PW2 goes to show that after one year of the marriage, the accused started demanding money and whenever they could not make payment, the accused used to assault his daughter and this was informed to him by his wife. It may not be unusual for a daughter not to inform to her father directly about the turmoil that she was facing in her matrimonial house because of the demand of dowry. Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides that oral evidence must be direct if it refers to a fact which could be heard and it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it. In that sense, his evidence may be hearsay evidence. However, in the instant case, the evidence of PW2 is corroborated by PW3 when she stated that the accused had started demanding money after one year of marriage. She further stated that occasionally she used to pay money to the accused when the accused demanded money from his wife. When alive, the deceased also informed about the torture and harassment that she had been subjected to. PW3 deposed that only a week before the death of her daughter Lakhi, she had come to her and had asked for Rs. 6,000/-. Apparently, the accused had demanded money from Lakhi, which compelled her to go to her mother to inform her about the aforesaid demand and to collect the amount. PW3 deposed that only a week before the death of her daughter Lakhi, she had come to her and had asked for Rs. 6,000/-. Apparently, the accused had demanded money from Lakhi, which compelled her to go to her mother to inform her about the aforesaid demand and to collect the amount. Lakhi was informed by her mother that the amount could not be paid whereupon the daughter had expressed the apprehension that her husband would kill her if he did not get the money. Lakhi was, nevertheless, pacified by PW3 and was sent back to her matrimonial house. The evidence of PW3, on the above count, has remained unimpeached. Such evidence goes to show the anxiety and fear that the deceased had apprehending danger to her life from her own husband. The demand of money had taken an ominous form so much so that the wife feared for her life if the money could not be arranged and paid to him. 36. PW4 and PW5 stated that relationship between the appellant and the deceased was good. Outwardly, to an outsider, even though residing in a neighbourhood, the relationship between the husband and wife may appear to be normal. It is in this vein the evidence of PW4 and PW5 has to be considered. Their evidence cannot discredit the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 with regard to demand of money by the appellant, which was a family matter and, perhaps, was not sought to be publicized. But it has come out from the evidence on record that the accused used to pick up of quarrel with his wife every now and then. PW8 further stated that a quarrel had been going on for 2/3 days between the accused and his wife prior to the death of the deceased. It is to be remembered in this connection the apprehension of the deceased fearing for her life in the wake of not meeting the demand of money made by the accused. It is reasonable to hold that unable to bear cruelty at the hands of the accused husband, the deceased took her own life. 37. In Bakshish Ram (supra), the demand for purchasing a cooler one day prior to the date of occurrence had been met and, therefore, the Apex Court held that there could not have been any occasion for the accused persons to set the deceased on fire. 37. In Bakshish Ram (supra), the demand for purchasing a cooler one day prior to the date of occurrence had been met and, therefore, the Apex Court held that there could not have been any occasion for the accused persons to set the deceased on fire. In the instant case, the demand made was not satisfied. In Modinsab (supra), the demand made was for the payment of a society loan. In Panchanan Mandal (supra), there was no evidence of cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry before the death of the deceased. The factual matrix of the aforesaid cases is not attracted to the fact situation of the instant case. 38. In view of the discussions made, we are of the opinion that the learned trial court had rightly convicted the accused under Section 304-B IPC. Accordingly, we find no merit in this appeal and, resultantly, the appeal is dismissed. 39. Registry will send down the case records.