JUDGMENT : B.K. Nayak, J. - In this application, the petitioner prays for quashing the proceeding in I.C.C. Case No. 44 of 2012 pending on the file of the learned S.D.J.M., Titilagarh. 2. The opposite party as complainant has filed the aforesaid complaint case (I.C.C Case No. 44 of 2012) for alleged commission of offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by the present petitioner for dishonour of a cheque for Rs. 2,50,000/- issued by the petitioner. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the complaint filed by the opposite party was barred by limitation as provided under Clause (b) of Section 142 of the N.I. Act and that the learned S.D.J.M., Titilagarh has wrongly condoned the delay and taken cognizance of the offence. 4. It transpires from the cognizance order dated 06.07.2012 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Titilagarh as well as from the averments made in the complaint petition of the opposite party that after the cheque, which was dishonoured and returned by the Bank for insufficient fund on 14.02.2012, the opposite party issued a pleader notice by registered post with A.D. on 24.02 2012 to the petitioner demanding payment. The petitioner having not made payment the opposite party-complainant made a query to the postl authority, i.e., the Superintendent of Post Offices, Bolangir, who vide letter dated 27.04.2012 intimated that the notice was served on the petitioner on 27.2.2012. On receipt of such information, the Opposite party filed the complaint on 19.05.2012. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in terms of Clause (c) of the proviso under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the cause of action for the complaint arises for non-payment of the amount demanded by the notice within fifteen days after service of notice and that the complaint has to be filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action arises, as mandated by Clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act. It is his further submission that though the proviso to Clause (b) of Section 142 of the N.I. Act empowers the Court to condone the delay in filing the complaint beyond the period of limitation on being satisfied about sufficient cause, mere lack of knowledge of the complainant about the service of notice as required under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the N.I. Act would not be a sufficient ground to condone the delay, which has been done by the learned S.D.J.M. in the present case. He further submits that service of notice issued by registered post can be presumed as per Section 27 of the general Clauses Act, and that the complainant cannot keep waiting for making query to Postl Authority about service of the notice for any length of time and try to justify the delay on ground of lack of knowledge of service. 6. The learned counsel for the opposite party-complainant, on the other hand, submitted that in identical circumstances, the Calcutta High Court in C.R.R. No. 1355 of 2005 reported in 2006 (3) Crimes 726 Bhabani Shankar Agarwal v. State of West Bengal and Am. taking into consideration the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 290 of 2006 wherein the Apex Court had remitted the complaint to the Trial Court for trial, has held that the complaint cannot be said to be barred by limitation. The decision of the Calcutta High Court however does not indicate what principle was laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid Criminal Appeal No. 290 of 2006. Hence, the Calcutta High Court decision is of little use. 7. It appears from the records that after receipt of process, the petitioner appeared before the learned S.D.J.M. in the complaint case and filed a petition for recalling the order of cognizance on the ground that the complaint was barred by time and the learned S.D.J.M. by his order dated 26.12.2010 rejected the said petition on the ground that a Magistrate has no power to recall the order of cognizance and issuance of process and that none of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act mandates that the accused should have been given an opportunity of being heard before taking cognizance. 8. 8. True it is that the Magistrate is not mandate to give an opportunity of hearing to the accused on the question of limitation before taking cognizance and issuing process. If the circumstances so justify and the Magistrate finds that there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay, he may condone the delay and take cognizance. But to say that the accused would never have a right to question the legality and propriety of the order of the Magistrate condoning delay would tantamount to denial of an important right of the accused to point out the illegality in the order condoning delay. It would also amount to violation of principle of natural justice. True, it has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the Magistrate has no power to recall the order of cognizance, but definitely there cannot be a bar for reconsideration of the question of condonation of delay at the instance of the accused, who is entitled to show that there was no sufficient cause for condoning delay and that on finding that the delay was not liable to be condoned, the Magistrate should drop the complaint case on that ground. 9. The question whether the presumption of service of notice as per Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, where notice is issued by registered post, and whether the question of the knowledge or lack of knowledge of the complainant of service of notice to the accused would furnish sufficient ground for condonation of delay for taking cognizance, are relevant factors for consideration of the question of condonation of delay. 10. Evidently, in the instant case, the learned S.D.J.M., Titilagarh has not considered the necessary factors while condoning the delay. In such view of the matter, the CRLMC is disposed of with a direction that the Court below shall reconsider the question of condonation of delay and if satisfied that there was no sufficient ground for condonation of delay, it shall drop the complaint case. Final Result : Disposed Of