JUDGMENT : K.M. Joseph, J. 1. Since Appeals arise out of writ petitions, which, in turn, relate to selection to the post of Pharmacist and as they generate common question, we dispose of the Appeals by the following common judgment. 2. Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) was the first writ petition filed in this case. It was filed on 25th June, 2012. Petitioners in the said writ petition were possessing the qualification of Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy. They sought the following reliefs: “(i) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the condition prescribed in sub-clause (b) of paragraph no. 1 of the advertisement dated 19.05.2012 issued by the respondent no. 2. (ii) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus declaring the procedure of selection on the posts of Veterinary Pharmacists adopted by the respondents, as arbitrary, illegal and against the Uttarakhand Veterinary Pharmacists Service Rules, 2010. (iii) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondent no. 2 to fill the post of Veterinary Pharmacist advertised vide advertisement dated 19.5.2012 strictly in accordance with the qualification prescribed under the Uttarakhand Veterinary Pharmacists Service Rules, 2010.” 3. The learned Single Judge passed an interim order permitting the selection to go on, but final result not to be published. Thereafter, the very same writ petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S). Therein, the writ petitioners sought the following reliefs: “(i) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the Rule 7(1)(b) contained in Part 4 of Uttarakhand Veterinary Pharmacists Service (Amendment) Rules, 2011 which were enforced vide notification dated 12.12.2011 (Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition). (ii) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus declaring the Rule 7(1)(b) contained in Part 4 of Uttarakhand Veterinary Pharmacists Service (Amendment) Rules, 2011 which were enforced vide notification dated 12.12.2011 as ultra-virus. (ii-a) Issue a writ order of direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the rule 14(5) of Uttarakhand Veterinary Pharmacists Services (Amendment) Rules, 2011 which were enforced vide notification dated 12.12.2011 (Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition). (ii-a) Issue a writ order of direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the rule 14(5) of Uttarakhand Veterinary Pharmacists Services (Amendment) Rules, 2011 which were enforced vide notification dated 12.12.2011 (Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition). (ii-b) Issue a writ order of direction in nature of mandamus declaring the rule 14(5) of Uttarakhand Veterinary Pharmacists Services (Amendment) Rules, 2011 is hit by Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India.” 4. As far as the third writ petition, which has given rise to this Bunch of Appeals, namely, Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S) is concerned, the writ petitioner was a Degree Holder in Allopathic Pharmacy. He sought the following reliefs: “(i) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to accept the application form of the petitioner for the post of veterinary Pharmacist in Veterinary Department as he possesses the higher qualification in the same stream.” 5. The State defended the Rule and also opposed the relief sought, otherwise by filing counter affidavit. The stand of the State in defense of the Rule, when it was challenged in Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S) was essentially that for the four posts of Veterinary Pharmacists, prior to 2010, the minimum educational qualification for the post of Veterinary Pharmacist was Intermediate (Biology) and the candidates selected for this post were provided two years training at the Departments training centre at Pashulok, Rishikesh by the Veterinary Officers of the Department. Thereafter, due to lack of proper and modern facilities at the said training centre, a high level committee was constituted comprising of the Additional Secretary, the official of the Department of the Animal Husbandry, Director of Health and Family Welfare and the Drug Controller of the State of Uttarakhand to study the legal and practical feasibility of Diploma Pharmacist for their appointment (as Veterinary Pharmacist) and after considering the recommendation made by the said Committee dated 21.5.2010, the Uttarakhand Pharmacist Service Rules, 2010 were framed, wherein the minimum educational qualification for the post of Veterinary Pharmacist was prescribed as Intermediate in Biology in Diploma (Veterinary Pharmacist). 6. 6. Thereafter, in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand in Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S), it was stated: “B. That it is submitted that later on, it came to the notice that initially at the start of the Diploma in Pharmacy Programme the minimum educational qualifications for the same was High School, consequently, keeping in view the same Rules were amended wherein the High School passed candidates who have passed the same before enforcement of Education Regulation, 1999 for Diploma (Veterinary Pharmacist) were also included in the qualification. C. That it is submitted that the Diploma in Pharmacist mentioned in the Service Rules, 2010 was creating certain problems inasmuch as those candidates who were passing Diploma in Ayurveda, Homeopathy had also applied for this aforesaid post and it became very difficult to reject their application. D. That it is submitted that since the degree in B.V. Sc. & A.H. is based on the Allopathic system of medicine, therefore, for the post of Veterinary Pharmacist, the knowledge of allopathic pharmacy is essential and not only this, but the following important aspects were also taken into consideration that is:- (i) There is no regulatory authority (Veterinary Pharmacy Council) even at the national level for registration of individuals having a Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy. (ii) Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy by any University/Technical Board/State Government has not been recognized in the State of Uttarakhand. (iii) Even in the erstwhile State of Uttar Pradesh no such Diploma Course is being awarded nor is it a condition for eligibility to the post of Veterinary Pharmacist. E. That since there is no regulatory authority i.e. Veterinary Pharmacy Council neither at the State Level nor at the National level for registration of individuals having a Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy and the degree of B.V. Sc. & A.H. is based on the Allopathic system of medicine, consequently, the Rules were amended in the year 2001 after considering the vital aspect of the matter.” And Rules were defended as being just and proper. 7. Therefore, in Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S), the statutory Rules, two in number, were put in issue by the petitioners therein, namely, Rule 7(1)(b) of the Uttarakhand Veterinary Pharmacists Service (Amendment) Rules, 2011 and Rule 14 (5) of the said Rules, which were also enforced from 12.12.2011. 7. Therefore, in Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S), the statutory Rules, two in number, were put in issue by the petitioners therein, namely, Rule 7(1)(b) of the Uttarakhand Veterinary Pharmacists Service (Amendment) Rules, 2011 and Rule 14 (5) of the said Rules, which were also enforced from 12.12.2011. Insofar as the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S) are concerned, noticing that they had obtained Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy, the learned Single Judge held as follows: “15. Earlier the petitioners had not impleaded the University from where they had obtained their Diploma. During the pendency of the writ petition, the University was impleaded as a respondent, and it has also filed its counter affidavit and is here represented by Mr. Ravi Babulkar, Advocate. In its counter affidavit it has been said that the University i.e. “Janardan Rai Nagar Rajasthan Vidyapeeth University” is a “Deemed University” under Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956. The “Diploma” given to the petitioners was under a distance mode, which is recognized by the Indira Gandhi National Open University i.e. IGNOU. Under a distance mode, it is not the case where the petitioners have simply done their Diploma Course by way of correspondence, but it is a two years “Diploma” in Veterinary Pharmacy where the petitioners had to appear in a Study Center at Delhi where they had to qualify a practical as well theoretical examination, after being evaluated by experts, and only after this evaluation is the diploma given to them. 16. As far as the validity of the diploma of the petitioners is concerned, since the “Diploma” which the petitioners have is from a recognized University, though, from the distance mode, its validity cannot be challenged particularly in view of the fact that there is no prohibition to a diploma obtained by “distance mode” under the Rules of 2011. Moreover, this Diploma cannot be ignored merely on the basis of the fact that there is no regulatory body to control or recognize such a “Diploma.” Therefore, although the amendment in the Rules of 2010 was done with the purpose to differentiate between the candidates having done their Diploma in “Ayurvedic Pharmacy” or in “Homeopathic Pharmacy” which has no apparent connection with the Animal Husbandry. However, to debar a person having valid Diploma in “Veterinary Pharmacy” is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. However, to debar a person having valid Diploma in “Veterinary Pharmacy” is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This Court finds that the petitioner having a “Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy” from the recognized University will be deemed to be qualified under the Rules and the Diploma in “Veterinary Pharmacy” shall be read to be a valid qualification under Rule 7 (i) (g) of the Rules.” 8. In regard to challenge to Rule 14(5), the view taken by the learned Single Judge is found reflected in Paragraphs-17 to 19 and we think it appropriate to extract the same: “17. The second grievance of the petitioners is regarding the preference to diploma holders of earlier years. On this, much emphasis has been raised by the respondents. Firstly, it has specifically come in the Amended Rules of 2011 that the Diploma holders of earlier years shall be considered first and only after this list is exhausted that the diploma holders of later years shall be considered. 18. On this point, reliance has been placed on a judgment of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court. Before the Allahabad High Court. A number of writ petitions were filed before the Allahabad High Court challenging the selection being made for the post of Pharmacists in the Government Hospitals in State of U.P. under the U.P. Pharmacists Service Rules, 1980 where the Government had advertised the vacancies in which the selection was not to be made year-wise but purely on the basis of the merits irrespective of the year of diploma. The Pharmacists having diploma of earlier years had challenged the selection process on the ground of being violative of Rules of 1980 wherein the learned Single Judge had held that the selection if being made in accordance with the merits is not violative of Rules of 1980 as alleged. The Rules of 1980 only prescribe year-wise vacancies to be notified and there is no specific condition that first the earlier diploma holders should be adjusted only thereafter the later year’s diploma holders should be considered. This order was challenged in Special Appeal by such candidates who were having diploma from earlier years. The Rules of 1980 only prescribe year-wise vacancies to be notified and there is no specific condition that first the earlier diploma holders should be adjusted only thereafter the later year’s diploma holders should be considered. This order was challenged in Special Appeal by such candidates who were having diploma from earlier years. Their case before the Division Bench was that there has been an established practice in State of U.P. where in the Government Hospitals, diploma holders of earlier years were being considered first on the posts of pharmacist and when the list of the diploma holders of earlier years were exhausted, then only the diploma holders of later years were considered. Infact their case was that earlier when they were entitled to be selected and appointed on the basis of their merit alone on the vacancies advertised they were denied appointment by the State Government on the ground that irrespective of their merits being higher to some of the diploma holders, yet since they had obtained their diploma prior in time they would be considered first. Now when the petitioners are to be appointed on the same principle, they are being denied appointment and along with them the persons who have obtained diploma later in time are also being considered and all are being considered at par. This was an aspect which was not considered by the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that pre-existing practice must be upheld, an order which was upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court where the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench was held to the correct. The two judgments, referred above are (a) Sunil Kumr Rai and others vs. State of U.P. & others, 2009 (3) ESC 2053 (All) (LB) and (b) Prem Chandra and others vs. State of U.P. & others, Special Appeal No. 377 of 2008. It is the judgment which are being relied upon by the respondent-State authorities as well as the other private respondents. 19. It is the judgment which are being relied upon by the respondent-State authorities as well as the other private respondents. 19. This logic, however, cannot apply here in the present petitions for the simple reason that we do not have a case where appointments are being made for “Pharmacist” in Government Hospitals in accordance with the Rules of 1980, instead we have a selection and appointment for the post of “Veterinary Pharmacists” in the department of animal husbandry, for which the admitted position is that there were no Rules earlier and Rules have been framed only in the year 2010. Therefore, there is no question of there being an “accepted or long followed policy or practice” in the present case. Infact, it is not the case of the respondents, including the private respondents, that they were earlier given a promise by the State Government that the diploma holders of earlier years shall be considered first and now the State Government is going back on its promise. Such was the case only in the State of U.P. that too in another department. Therefore, the decision of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court as well as of the Hon’ble Apex Court is based on the entirely different facts and different Rules which will not be applicable in the present case.” 9. Equally relevant is Paragraph no. 21: “21. The respondents-State shall consider the Diploma in (Allopathy) Pharmacy as well as the Diploma in Veterinary (Pharmacy) as qualified for the post of Veterinary Pharmacist in Animal Husbandry Department, irrespective of years in which they have done such a Diploma provided they fulfil other conditions. It is made clear that since there is no regulatory body/Registering Body like a Veterinary Pharmacy Council in State of Uttarakhand, there is also no question of petitioners being registered with the Pharmacy Council of Uttarakhand. Having said this, registration with Pharmacy Council of Uttarakhand is not necessary at present for the petitioners.” 10. In regard to Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S), where there was no challenge to the Rule and only a mandamus was sought, as we have noticed, the learned Single Judge proceeded to take the view that the Degree course is of more importance than that of Diploma and it is in the same stream and the Degree obtained by the petitioner is also a valid qualification for the posts. Finally, the learned Single Judge directed as follows: “24. In view of the above observation, these writ petitions stands allowed. Respondents-State is hereby directed to consider the petitioners as eligible for the post of Veterinary Pharmacist in Animal Husbandry Department, thereafter, prepare a new select list. No order as to costs.” 11. Feeling aggrieved, the Appeals are maintained as follows: The State has filed Special Appeal No. 188 of 2015 against the judgment in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S). Special Appeal No. 189 of 2015 is filed by the State against the judgment in Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S); whereas Special Appeal Nos. 220 of 2015 & 623 of 2014 are filed by the State against the judgment in Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S). Special Appeal Nos. 568 of 2014, 624 of 2014 and 629 are filed by the persons possessing Degree of Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy against the judgment in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S); Special Appeal No. 628 of 2014 is filed against the judgment in Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S) and Special Appeal No. 630 of 2014 is also filed against the judgment in Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S). 12. We heard Sri Vinay Kumar, Sri Sanjay Bhatt, Sri Bhagwat Mahra, besides learned Chief Standing Counsel Sri Paresh Tripathi on behalf of the appellants. We also heard Sri Shakti Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) and Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S) and Shri Shailendra Nauriyal, learned counsel on behalf of the writ petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S). Besides, we also heard Sri Ravi Babulkar, who appears on behalf of Janardan Rai Nagar Vidhya Peeth, which is a deemed University, which purports to have awarded the Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy to the writ petitioners in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) and who are also the writ petitioners in Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S). 13. Learned counsel for the appellants, which includes learned Chief Standing Counsel, in the Appeals, which arise from Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S), would first assail the conduct of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) and Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S). 13. Learned counsel for the appellants, which includes learned Chief Standing Counsel, in the Appeals, which arise from Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S), would first assail the conduct of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) and Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S). What is submitted is that an applicant in writ proceeding, must always exhibit exacting standards of conduct to entitle him to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the petitioners in the two writ petitions, who are the same, first approached the Court in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S). It is in the said writ petition, they purported to mount to challenge the advertisement, which was issued in the year 2012 calling for applications from persons possessing Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy for the post of Veterinary Pharmacist. The Rules were not assailed. They obtained an interim order. It is pointed out to us that the very advertisement itself recites that the applications are being invited pursuant to the amended Rules of 2011. Still, they proceeded as if there is no amendment and did not challenge the validity of the Rule. It was when some of the appellants put in appearance and pointed out this fact that the second writ petition, i.e. Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 came to be filed, wherein different reliefs were sought, as we have already noticed, namely, challenging the two provisions of the Rules. The interim order obtained in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) continued throughout. Petitioners did not seek the leave of the Court and, as Mr. Bhagwat Mehra would point out, in the second writ petition, they sought the same interim relief, which they sought in the earlier writ petition. They have also not disclosed filing of Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) in Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S), leave alone the fact of obtaining interim order in the first writ petition. This conduct is condemned and it is argued that consequently, the learned Single Judge erred in exercising the discretionary jurisdiction in their favour. 14. Regarding the next submission, which, no doubt, relates to the validity of the Rules, Sri Bhagwat Mehra would submit that the petitioners did not apply. Sri Bhagwat Mehra would submit that the advertisement was issued on 19.5.2012; the last date was 25.06.2012. 14. Regarding the next submission, which, no doubt, relates to the validity of the Rules, Sri Bhagwat Mehra would submit that the petitioners did not apply. Sri Bhagwat Mehra would submit that the advertisement was issued on 19.5.2012; the last date was 25.06.2012. They filed a writ petition on the last date before this Court. 15. Statutory Rule can be challenged on certain well established ground. They can be challenged if the Rule is ultra vires constitution, if they are ultra vires parent legislation or if it is arbitrary. No ground, as required in law, has been made out in this case. The Diploma, which is obtained by the writ petitioners in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) and Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S), are also sought to be put under a cloud. It is submitted that the posts involved the posts of Veterinary Pharmacists. Having regard to the history of the Rule, when the Rule makers have decided that a particular qualification is required, this Court may not sit in a judgment over the same as no ground in law is made out. 16. Mr. Bhagwat Mehra has referred us to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1631 . Therein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the employer is the best judge to decide the question of qualification. 17. Learned Chief Standing Counsel would emphasize the reasons for the amendment and the provisions providing for Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy alone. Earlier when the Rule provided for the qualification of Diploma in Pharmacy without specifying the Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy, the resultant position is emphasized, namely, on the basis of the said qualification, persons with Homeopathic Pharmacy and Ayurvedic Pharmacy started applying. This led to a situation, where in the treatment of the animals, the system of medicine, which was being followed, was the Allopathic system. Therefore, the Pharmacists were also required to possess Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy. The Rule makers, therefore, decided to make things clear and that is how the amendment came out in 2011 and the Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy was inserted as the sole qualification. As far as Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy is concerned, it is pointed out that there is no regulatory body. The Diploma of Veterinary Pharmacy is not recognized. The Rule makers, therefore, decided to make things clear and that is how the amendment came out in 2011 and the Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy was inserted as the sole qualification. As far as Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy is concerned, it is pointed out that there is no regulatory body. The Diploma of Veterinary Pharmacy is not recognized. Even in the erstwhile State of Uttar Pradesh, of which the State of Uttarakhand was once a part of, there is no recognized course in Veterinary Pharmacy. Furthermore, the argument runs that the requirement in the Rule, which is a part of Rule 7, is that the candidate must be registered with the Uttarakhand Pharmacy Council, is, admittedly, not fulfilled by the writ petitioners. Conspicuous by its absence even in the second Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S), where a portion of the Rule is challenged, is a challenge to the said provision. On this ground itself, the writ petitioners cannot be granted any relief, runs the argument. 18. Next it is argued with regard to Rule 14(5), which, in substance, provides that persons, who have obtained Diploma earlier, will be given preference in the matter of selection, is not a novel development, but it was already there in the Rule before the amendment. The only change, which is brought about in 2011, may not be material. In short, the argument is that even if the Court were to uphold the finding of the learned Single Judge that the requirement that the persons, who have obtained Diploma earlier, will be considered first and only thereafter, the persons having Diploma of subsequent years will be considered, cannot be sustained and the writ petitioners will be faced with a dilemma of being confronted with the earlier Rule, which also provides for the same effect. Furthermore, it is contended that when the petitioners are persons, who were not registered with the Uttarakhand Pharmacy Council, which is a mandatory requirement being an essential condition as provided in the proviso to Rule 7, which is not being challenged, petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of the said Rule. There is another line of arguments in support of the said Rule. There is another line of arguments in support of the said Rule. It is contended by the appellants that the persons, who had obtained Diploma of later years, were not being considered on account of the Rule, earlier and they were being relegated to the background on the strength of persons, who were having Diploma of earlier years. Now the situation has arisen, where their rights would be affected if that Rule is interfered with as done by the learned Single Judge. 19. As far as Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S) giving rise to the appeals, which we have mentioned, is concerned, there, the writ petitioner is a degree holder in Allopathic Pharmacy. He only sought a mandamus to consider him also without laying any challenge to the Rule. The learned Single Judge has proceeded to hold that being in the same stream and being degree course, he should also be considered. 20. Learned Chief Standing Counsel brought to our notice the judgment of this Court passed in Special Appeal No. 309 of 2015 decided on 26.08.2016, wherein in similar circumstances, this Court has discountenanced the view; the judgment passed in Special Appeal No. 309 of 2015 would cover the situation runs the argument. 21. Per contra, Sri Shakti Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) and Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S), would submit as follows: He would submit that the learned Single Judge has rightly interfered with the matter noticing that excluding the petitioners, who were having Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy would occasion a breach of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and it would give rise to a situation, where the equals are treated unequally. He would further submit that the Court may not take a hyper technical view in regard to the pleadings or lack of pleadings in the writ petition. He would submit that the Court, when exercising its powers under Article 226 of Constitution of India, is custodian of fundamental rights and therefore, any lack of pleadings or lacunae in the pleadings cannot be a ground to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which is, otherwise, soundly premised in law. He would submit that the Court may not be oblivious to the cardinal fact that the posts involved is the post of Veterinary Pharmacist. He would submit that the Court may not be oblivious to the cardinal fact that the posts involved is the post of Veterinary Pharmacist. The qualification, which the petitioners possess is Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy. It is a Diploma, which is awarded by a recognized University. This is a qualification, which is most appropriate for the post. When this is the position, to exclude the petitioners from being considered is a clear breach of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Appellate Court should not interfere. In regard to the flaw in the writ petitions, namely, that there is no challenge to proviso to the Rule 7, which mandates that a candidate must be registered with the Uttarakhand Pharmacy Council, is concerned, it is submitted that this is not the practice of the profession of Pharmacy. The writ petitioners are called upon to satisfy the requirement of registration with the Uttarakhand Pharmacy Council in connection with employment as Pharmacist. It is not as if they are called upon to possess this requirement as a condition for practising Pharmacy. Therefore, it is criticized by Sri Shakti Singh as unnecessary. In regard to the finding of the learned Single Judge about Rule 14(5), in fact, it is submitted that it is only to be supported for the reason that any other view would detract from meritocracy, as it is highly irrelevant that the matter may be decided with reference to the year of acquisition of the Diploma and what should determine the matter is the merits of the candidates inter se. 22. There is also case for the appellants that a situation has now arisen, as a result of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as to what is the procedure to be followed in the absence of Rule 14 (5), even allowing persons with Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy to be considered is not clear. Therefore, the consequential chaos that is introduced also is harnessed by the appellants to learned Chief Standing Counsel to contend that the judgment must be overturned. 23. We will first deal with the appeals arising from Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S). Therein, the writ petitioner, admittedly, did not possess Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy, instead he had Degree in Allopathic Pharmacy. We have already noticed the prayer. 23. We will first deal with the appeals arising from Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S). Therein, the writ petitioner, admittedly, did not possess Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy, instead he had Degree in Allopathic Pharmacy. We have already noticed the prayer. We are at a loss as to how a writ of mandamus, which presupposes the plea of a legal right in the writ petition to be considered, could have been ordered by the learned Single Judge. When the employer fixes a qualification as an essential qualification, unless there is a power of relaxation and the power is exercised, the said qualification is indispensable for being considered for public employment. This question is no longer in fact res integra. We would only advert to the following case law that the direction given by the learned Single Judge in this Writ Petition is clearly unsupported. They are: 1. State of Punjab and others vs. Anita and others reported in (2015) 2 SCC 170 . 2. Prakash Chand Meena and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2015) 8 SCC 484 . 24. We would only refer to the following paragraphs of the latter judgment: 8. Having heard the parties, we have also perused the written submissions filed on behalf of some of them and have perused the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the impugned judgment of the Division Bench. In our considered view, the issue noticed at the outset must be decided on the basis of settled law noticed by the learned Single Bench that recruitment process must be completed as per terms and conditions in the advertisement and as per Rules existing when the recruitment process began. In the present case, the Division Bench has gone to great lengths in examining the issue whether BPEd and DPEd qualifications are equivalent or superior to CCPEd qualification but such exercise cannot help the cause of the respondents who had the option either to cancel the recruitment process if there existed good reasons for the same or to complete it as per terms of advertisement and as per Rules. They chose to continue with the recruitment process and hence they cannot be permitted to depart from the qualification laid down in the advertisement as well as in the Rules which were suitably amended only later in 2011. They chose to continue with the recruitment process and hence they cannot be permitted to depart from the qualification laid down in the advertisement as well as in the Rules which were suitably amended only later in 2011. In such a situation, factual justifications cannot change the legal position that the respondents acted against law and against the terms of the advertisement in treating such applicants successful for appointment to the post of PTI Gr. III who held other qualifications but not the qualification of CPEd. Such candidates had not even submitted separate OMR application form for appointment to the post of PTI Gr. III which was essential as per the terms of advertisement. 9. The candidates who were aware of the advertisement and did not have the qualification of CPEd also had two options, either to apply only for PTI Gr. II if they had the necessary qualification for that post or to challenge the advertisement that it omitted to mention equivalent or higher qualification along with qualification of CPEd for the post of PTI Gr. III. Having not challenged the advertisement and having applied for the other post, they could not have subsequently claimed or be granted eligibility on the basis of equivalence clarified or declared subsequently by the State Government. In the matter of eligibility qualification, the equivalent qualification must be recognized as such in the recruitment rules or government order existing on or before the initiation of recruitment process. In the present case, this process was initiated through advertisement inviting application which did not indicate that equivalent or higher qualification holders were eligible to apply nor were the equivalent qualifications reflected in the recruitment rules or government orders of the relevant time.” 25. We also take note of the our judgment, which we have rendered in Special Appeal No. 309 of 2015 and therefore, we take the view that the learned Single Judge is unjustified in directing the degree holder in Allopathic Pharmacy also to be considered. Accordingly, Special Appeal No. 189 of 2015 and Special Appeal No. 628 of 2014 are only liable to be allowed and the Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S) is dismissed. 26. As far as the issues, which arise from Writ Petition Nos. Accordingly, Special Appeal No. 189 of 2015 and Special Appeal No. 628 of 2014 are only liable to be allowed and the Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2013 (S/S) is dismissed. 26. As far as the issues, which arise from Writ Petition Nos. 815 of 2012 and Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012, are concerned, we would think that the following are the points which must be considered by us; firstly, whether the conduct of the petitioners would disentitle them from being given relief; secondly, what is the effect of the writ petitioners not challenging the entirety of Rule 7, which we have adverted to; thirdly, whether even otherwise the writ petitioners have made out a case for directing the Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy to be considered; fourth, whether the writ petitioners are entitled to challenge Rule 14(5) and fifth, whether the learned Single Judge was correct in allowing the challenge. 27. Regarding the first question, whether the conduct of the writ petitioners ill-behove an applicant under Article 226 of Constitution of India, it is true that the writ petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S). The prayers sought were to quash the clause in the advertisement. It is also true that the advertisement recites the factum of amendment to the Rule, so they must be treated as being aware that there is an amendment and the advertisement was being issued in terms of the amended Rules and still they did not consider it fit to challenge the Rules. The next aspect of the conduct of the writ petitioners is that the very same writ petitioners filed, upon being faced with an intervention application wherein, the actual position was brought to the notice of the Court without seeking any amendment of Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S), a fresh writ petition being Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S). Therein, they have sought the reliefs, which we have noticed, conspicuous by its absence in the pleadings any reference to Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S). Equally, they have also sought the same interim relief, which they had sought in the first writ petition. We notice that the interim order of the stay, which they had obtained in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) continued to hold good even when they sought the very same reliefs in the second writ petition. Equally, they have also sought the same interim relief, which they had sought in the first writ petition. We notice that the interim order of the stay, which they had obtained in Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) continued to hold good even when they sought the very same reliefs in the second writ petition. The learned Single Judge took note of the stand of the learned counsel that it was his fault as a counsel and it has been an oversight and he assures the Court that he shall be careful in future. The Court also took the view that moreover, this is too important a matter to be dismissed on the above objections of the learned Chief Standing Counsel. 28. We are conscious of the principle that applicant must hold himself up to exacting standards of disclosure of material facts and, also, of conduct, otherwise having regard to the discretionary and extraordinary nature of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in every aspect, which is material so that he does not disentitle himself from exercising of the jurisdiction, we would though, undoubtedly agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the conduct was not to be commended. We would also think that in view of the fact that there is a challenge to the Rule, we should desist from declining the relief to the writ petitioners on the said ground alone. But we will also at the time when we deal with other issues not be entirely oblivious to his conduct and, therefore, we would take a look at the merits of the petitioner’s case. 29. The notified translation of the existing Rules along with the Rule as was substituted by the amendment, reads as follows:- Column – 1 Column – 2 Existing Rule Rules as hereby substituted Part IV-Qualifications 7. Academic Qualifications (a) Must have passed the intermediate examination from the Board of Education and Examination, Uttarakhand with Biology or Board of Madhymik Shiksha Pariksha, Uttar Pradess or a qualification, declared by the Government as equivalent thereto; (b) Diploma in Pharmacy from any recognized institution. Part IV-Qualifications 7. Academic Qualifications (a) Must have passed the intermediate examination from the Board of Education and Examination, Uttarakhand with Biology or Board of Madhymik Shiksha Pariksha, Uttar Pradess or a qualification, declared by the Government as equivalent thereto; (b) Diploma in Pharmacy from any recognized institution. Part IV-Qualifications 7. Academic Qualifications (a) Must have passed the Intermediate examination from the Board of Education and Examination, Uttarakhand or Board of Madhymik Shiksha Pariksha, Uttar Pradesh or a qualification, declared by the Government as equivalent thereto; In addition to this High school passed candidates shall also be eligible before the enforcement of Education Regulations 1991 for the Diploma Course in Pharmacy of Pharmacy Council of India (As amended by Education (Amendment) Regulations 1994) (b) Diploma in pharmacy (allopathy) from any recognized institution. Essential requirements A candidate for direct recruitment to the service of the post of Veterinary Pharmacist must also full fill the following requirements:- (a) Must be registered with the Registrar of the Uttarakhand Pharmacy Council; (b) Candidates must be registered with any employment office of Uttarakhand. Column – 1 Column – 2 Existing Rule Rules as hereby substituted 8. Preferential Qualification (b) Obtained a N.S.S. Certificate 8. Preferential Qualification (b) Served in the Territorial Army for a minimum period of two years; Column – 1 Column – 2 Existing Rule Rules as hereby substituted Part V- Procedure for Recruitment 14. Procedure for Direct Recruitment (5) The Selection Committee shall prepare a list of candidates in order of merit, as disclosed by marks obtained by them passing year wise diploma examination. If two or more candidates obtain equal marks, the Selection Committee shall arrange their names in order of date of birth which is earlier on the basis of their general suitability for the post. The number of the names in the list shall be larger (but not larger by more than 25 percent) than the number of the vacancies. The list so prepared shall hold good for one year only. Part V- Procedure for Recruitment 14. Procedure for Direct Recruitment (5) The Selection Committee shall prepare a list of candidates in order of merit, as disclosed by marks obtained by them in the year of passing their diploma examination year wise. Once the merit list of the previous year is exhausted only then will the candidates be selected from the succeeding year. Procedure for Direct Recruitment (5) The Selection Committee shall prepare a list of candidates in order of merit, as disclosed by marks obtained by them in the year of passing their diploma examination year wise. Once the merit list of the previous year is exhausted only then will the candidates be selected from the succeeding year. The process will continue till all the vacancies are saturated. If two or more candidates obtain equal marks, the Selection Committee shall arrange their names in order of date of birth which is earlier on the basis of their general suitability for the post. The number of the names in the list shall be larger (but not larger by more than 25 percent) than the number of the vacancies. The list so prepared shall hold good for one year only. 30. The writ petitioners do not have Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy from any recognized institution. Therefore, they are, apparently, not qualified and therefore, the Writ Petition No. 815 of 2012 (S/S) can only be dismissed. The only proceeding, which remains to be considered is Writ Petition No. 965 of 2012 (S/S) as we have already noticed the stand of the State as regards the history of the law relating to the Post. The earlier Rule, as it stood, prior to the amendment, inter-alia, provided for the candidate possessing qualification of Diploma from any recognized institution. A high level committee went into the issue and it noticed the claims being raised by persons having Diploma in Homeopathic and Allopathic Pharmacy. The system of medicine, which was followed in treatment of animals, was Allopathic medicine. Therefore, it was considered appropriate that the matter be specified with articulation, amendment was made providing for qualification of Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy from any recognized institution. This is the provision, which is contained in Rule 7(1)(b). We, at once, notice that the petitioners have sought for the reliefs only against Rule 7(1)(b), namely, the requirement that a candidate must possess Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy from any recognized institution. This is obviously for the reason that the petitioners do not have that qualification. The qualification with which, the petitioners have approached this Court, is the qualification of Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy obtained from “Janardan Rai Nagar Rajasthan Vidyapeeth University.” It is said to be a recognized University. This is obviously for the reason that the petitioners do not have that qualification. The qualification with which, the petitioners have approached this Court, is the qualification of Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy obtained from “Janardan Rai Nagar Rajasthan Vidyapeeth University.” It is said to be a recognized University. The learned Single Judge has actually proceeded on the basis that since the Diploma is from a recognized University, though through the distance mode, its validity cannot be challenged, particularly as there is no prohibition to a Diploma obtained through distance mode under the Rules of 2011. It is further stated that the Diploma cannot be ignored merely on the basis that there is no regulatory body to control or recognize such a Diploma. To debar a person with Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Court also found that the petitioners must be deemed to be qualified under the Rules and the Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy shall be read to be a valid qualification under Rule 7(1)(b) of the Rules. 31. We have noticed the prayers in regard to Rule 7(1)(b). There is a prayer sought by way of a writ of certiorari. A writ of certiorari will not lie to quash a statute, be it plenary legislation or subordinate, but we need not be detained by the said aspect. The second relief, which the petitioners have sought, is declaration. In regard to challenge to a statutory Rule, it is a settled law that the statutory law can be successfully impugned only on limited grounds. They are: if the statutory Rule is foul of the Constitution in any manner; the Rule is ultra vires the parent legislation; if the subordinate legislation is arbitrary. 32. We notice that the learned Single Judge has entered a finding that clearly exclusion of the petitioners is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge, we notice, has not made an attempt to ascertain with reference to the historical background, the syllabus of the two courses, the reasons for excluding persons with Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy as to whether it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution of India, by now it is well settled, consists of two limbs. Article 14 of the Constitution of India strikes at arbitrary State action. Article 14 of the Constitution of India, by now it is well settled, consists of two limbs. Article 14 of the Constitution of India strikes at arbitrary State action. This new dimension was laid bare in the landmark judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India reported in 1978 AIR 597. Right from the very beginning, however, the Courts have recognized that Article 14 of the Constitution of India frowns upon treating equals unequally and un-equals equally. This is made the conventional aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which has been enforced by Courts for the most part. Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not, however, forbid classification. What Article 14 of the Constitution of India permits is reasonable classification. We would only like to refer to one judgment in this regard of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gauri Shankar and others vs. Union of India and others reported in (1994) 6 SCC 349 . Therein, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “7. The scope and content of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, familiarly known as the equality clause, have been laid down in innumerable decisions of this Court. It is unnecessary to refer to all of them. Briefly stated the gravamen of the article is equality of treatment. Article 14 forbids discrimination. As stated by Shah, J. in Western U.P Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. vs. State of UP : (SCC p. 821, para 7) "Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among equals; its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not however operate against rational classification. A person setting up a grievance of denial of equal treatment by law must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice and the differential treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law." It is implicit from the above, that equals should not be treated unlike and un-likes should not be treated alike. Likes should be treated alike. It is settled law that in giving effect to the said salutary principle, a mathematical precision is not envisaged and there should be no fanatical or 'doctrinaire' or wooden approach to the matter. A practical or realistic approach should be adopted. Likes should be treated alike. It is settled law that in giving effect to the said salutary principle, a mathematical precision is not envisaged and there should be no fanatical or 'doctrinaire' or wooden approach to the matter. A practical or realistic approach should be adopted. It is open to the State to classify persons or things or objects, for legitimate purposes. 8. The scope of Article 14 has been summarised in the oft-quoted decision, Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice S.R. Tendolkar. At (AIR p. 547), the Constitution Bench of this Court relied on the following passage from the judgment of the seven-Judge Constitution Bench in Budhan Choudhry vs. State of Bihar, (AIR p. 547) "It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration." The Court then laid down: "The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration." The Court then laid down: "The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases. The decisions of this Court further establish:- (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation." (Emphasis supplied) The above decision has been followed in innumerable subsequent cases. See Mohd. Hanif Quareshi vs. State of Bihar, Kerala Education Bill, 1957, Re and other cases.” 35. See Mohd. Hanif Quareshi vs. State of Bihar, Kerala Education Bill, 1957, Re and other cases.” 35. In cases such as this, when the petitioners approached the Court and attempted to persuade the Court that they are also entitled to the same treatment as is accorded to those, who are mentioned in the Rules, we would, in out humble view, hold that the appropriate doctrine would be the doctrine of under-inclusive classification. A reasonable classification would be the classification which includes all similarly situated persons and over-inclusive classification would be a classification which includes more persons than are entitled to be included in a particular class and thus, may result in un-equals being treated equally. We may, in this regard, refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of The State of Gujarat and another vs. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. Ahmedabad and another, reported in (1974) 4 SCC 656 . Therein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held has follows: “54. A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated, and none who are not. The question then is: what does the phrase ‘similarly situated’ mean? The answer to the question is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law. A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. The purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a public mischief or the achievement of some positive public good. 55. A classification is under-inclusive when all who are included in the class are tainted with the mischief, but there are others also tainted whom the, classification does not include. In other words, a classification is bad as under-inclusive when a State benefits or burdens persons in a manner that furthers a legitimate purpose but does not confer the same benefit or place the same burden on others who are similarly situated. A classification is over-inclusive when it includes not only those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated as well. In other words, this type of classification imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those attended with mischief at which the law aims. A classification is over-inclusive when it includes not only those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated as well. In other words, this type of classification imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those attended with mischief at which the law aims. Herod ordering the death of all male children born on a particular day because one of them would some day bring about his downfall employed such a classification. 62. In short, the problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think (See Tigner v. Teas).” 33. We may interestingly notice that the said doctrine came up for consideration in the case of Sowmithri Vishnu vs. Union of India and another, reported in 1985 (Supp) SCC 137. There the contention was that under Section 497 of Indian Penal Code, there is transparent discrimination between man and woman. In fact, it confers upon the husband the right to prosecute the adulterer but it does not confer any right upon the wife to prosecute the woman with whom the husband has committed adultery. The Court did not find it fit to sustain the arguments, even though shelter was sought to be taken under the doctrine of under-inclusive classification. The Court proceeded to, in fact, hold as follows: “9. The self-same answer holds good in the case of the third ground also. Law does not confer freedom upon husbands to be licentious by gallivanting with unmarried woman. It only makes a specific kind of extra-marital relationship an offence, the relationship between a man and a married woman, the man alone being the offender. An unfaithful husband risks or, perhaps, invites a civil action by the wife for separation. The legislature is entitled to deal with the evil where it is felt and seen most : A man seducing the wife of another. Mrs. Chidambaram says that women, both married and unmarried, have changed their life style over the years and there are cases where they have wrecked the peace and happiness of other matrimonial homes. We hope this is not too right but, an under-inclusive definition is not necessarily discriminatory. Mrs. Chidambaram says that women, both married and unmarried, have changed their life style over the years and there are cases where they have wrecked the peace and happiness of other matrimonial homes. We hope this is not too right but, an under-inclusive definition is not necessarily discriminatory. The alleged transformation in feminine attitudes, for good or bad may justly engage the attention of the law-makers when the reform of penal law is undertaken. They may enlarge the definition of adultery to keep pace with the moving times. But, until then, the law must remain as it is. The law, it is, does not offend either Article 14 or Article 15 of the Constitution. Incidentally, the demand of the petitioner that sexual relationship of a husband with an unmarried women should also be comprehended with in the definition of 'adultery' is a crusade by a woman against a woman. If the paramour of a married woman can be guilty of adultery, why can an unmarried girl who has sexual relations with a married man not be guilty of adultery ? That is the grievance of the petitioner.” Thus, an under-inclusive classification is not necessarily discriminatory. 34. It is also, no doubt, true that when a law is challenged, it is always open for the Court to read down the provision. We may, in this regard, notice the following paragraphs from the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal and others vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (2016) 3 SCC 183: “100. A passage from DTC v. Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (91) SCC 600 is also fruitful to extract: (SCC p. 728, para 255) “255.… the doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when two interpretations are possible—one rendering it constitutional and the other making in constitutional, the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from its violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. It is an extension of the principle that when two interpretations are possible—one rendering it constitutional and the other making in constitutional, the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from its violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible to gather the intentions of the legislature from the object of the statute, the context in which the provision occurs and the purpose for which it is made.” 101. In Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1 , the Court held that: (SCC p. 51, para 40) “40. Another significant canon of determination of constitutionality is that the courts would be reluctant to declare a law invalid or ultra vires on account of unconstitutionality. The courts would accept an interpretation, which would be in favour of constitutionality rather than the one which would render the law unconstitutional. Declaring the law unconstitutional is one of the last resorts taken by the courts. The courts would preferably put into service the principle of ‘reading down’ or ‘reading into’ the provision to make it effective, workable and ensure the attainment of the object of the Act.” 102. In Calcutta Gujarati Education Society v. Calcutta Municipal Corpn. (2003) 10 SCC 533 , it has been held that: (SCC p. 522, para 35) “35. The rule of ‘reading down’ a provision of law is now well recognized. It is a rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is resorted to smoothen the crudities or ignoring out the creases found in a statute to make it workable. In the garb of ‘reading down’, however, it is not open to read words and expressions not found in its and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. The rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. It is to be used keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfil its purpose.” 35. Therefore, when a law is challenged, it is certainly open for the Court to avoid the danger of the Statute perishing to read it down an sustain the Statute. It is to be used keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfil its purpose.” 35. Therefore, when a law is challenged, it is certainly open for the Court to avoid the danger of the Statute perishing to read it down an sustain the Statute. 36. The law relating to Pharmacy is contained in the Pharmacy Act of 1948, which is made by the Parliament. In the statement of Objects and Reasons, it is mentioned as follows: “STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS It is desirable that, as in most other countries, only persons who have attained a minimum standard of professional education should be permitted to practise the Profession of Pharmacy. It is accordingly proposed to establish a Central Council of Pharmacy, which will prescribe the minimum standards of education and approve courses of study and examinations for Pharmacists, and Provincial Pharmacy Councils, which will be responsible for the maintenance of provincial registers of qualified pharmacists. It is further proposed to empower Provincial Governments to prohibit the dispensing of medicine on the prescription of a medical practitioner otherwise than by, or under the direct and personal supervision of, a registered pharmacist.” 37. The law provides for Pharmacy Council of India. Incidentally, ‘medical practitioner’ is defined under Section 2 (f) as the person, who is inter-alia engaged in the practice of Veterinary medicine and who possesses the qualifications as approved by the State Government. Section 10 provides for Education Regulations, which reads as follows: “10. Education Regulations (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Central Council may, subject to the approval of the Central Government, make regulations, to be called the Education Regulations, prescribing the minimum standard of education required for qualification as a pharmacist. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the Education Regulations may prescribe:- (a) the nature and period of study and of practical training to be undertaken before admission to an examination; (b) the equipment and facilities to be provided for students undergoing approved courses of study; (c) the subjects of examination and the standards therein to be attained; (d) any other conditions of admission to examinations. (3) Copies of the draft of the Education Regulations and of all subsequent amendments thereof shall be furnished by the Central Council to all State Governments, and the Central Council shall before submitting the Education Regulations or any amendment thereof, as the case may be, to the Central Government for approval under sub-section (1) take into consideration the comments of any State Government received within three months from the furnishing of the copies as aforesaid. (4) The Education Regulations shall be published in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as the Central Council may direct. (5) The Executive Committee shall from time to time report to the Central Council on the efficacy of the Education Regulations and may recommend to the Central Council such amendments thereof as it may think fit.” 38. Section 11 provides for Application of Education Regulations to States. Section 12 being relevant, we extract the same: “12. Approval courses of study and examinations (1) Any authority in the State [***] which conducts a course of study for pharmacists may apply to the Central Council for approved of the course, and the Central Council, if satisfied, after such enquiry as it thinks fit to make, that the said course of study is in conformity with the Education Regulations, shall declare the said course of study to be an approved course of study for purpose of admission to an approved examination for pharmacists. (2) Any authority in a state [***] which holds an examination in pharmacy may apply to the Central Council for approval of the examination, and the Central Council, if satisfied, after such enquiry as it thinks fit to make, that the said examination is in conformity with the Education Regulations, shall declare the said examination to be an approved examination for the purpose of qualifying for registration as a pharmacist under this Act. (3) Every authority in the States [***] which conducts an approved course of study or holds an approved examination shall furnish such information as the Central Council may, from time to time, require as to the courses of study and training and examination to be undergone, as to the ages at which such courses of study and examination are required to be undergone and generally as to the requisites for such courses of study and examination.” 39. Apparently in purporting exercising power under Section 10, Education Regulations have been made in 1991. Therein, we notice that regulation 2 provides for the qualification for the Pharmacist. It reads as follows: “2. Qualification for Pharmacist:- The minimum qualification required for registration as a pharmacist shall be a pass in Diploma in pharmacy (Part I & Part II and satisfactory completion of Diploma in Pharmacy (Part-III). OR Any other qualification approved by the Pharmacy Council of India as equivalent to the above. 40. Regulation 3 deals with the requirement to pass Part-I and Part-II and Regulation 4 reads as follows: “4. Diploma in Pharmacy Part-III shall consist of a certificate of having satisfactorily completed course of practical training as prescribed in Chapter-III of these regulations. 41. Thereafter, Chapter-II deals with the manner in which the courses are to be undergone. Regulation 6 provides that the duration of the course shall be for two academic years with each academic year spread over a period not less than 180 working days in addition to 500 hours practical training spread over a period of not less than 3 months. Regulation 7 provides that the course will include as given in Table-I and in Table-II and the number of hours devoted to each subject for its teaching in theory and practical is also mentioned specifically. We deem it appropriate to refer to Table-I dealing with Part-I and Table-II dealing with Part-II:- TABLE-I Diploma in Pharmacy (Part- I) Subject No. of hours of Theory No. of hours of Practical Pharmaceutics-I 75 100 Pharmaceutical Chemistry-I 75 75 Pharmacognosy 75 75 Biochemistry & Clinical Pathology 50 75 Human Anatomy & Physiology 75 50 Health Education & Community Pharmacy 50 -- 400 + 375 = 775 TABLE-II Diploma in Pharmacy (Part-II) Subject No. of hours of Theory No. of hours of Practical Pharmaceutics-II 75 100 Pharmaceutical Chemistry-II 100 75 Pharmacology & Toxicology 50 75 Pharmaceutical Jurisprudence 50 -- Drug Store and Business Management 75 -- Hospital and Clinical Pharmacy 75 50 450 + 275 = 725 42. Regulation 9 provides for the approval. We deem it appropriate to refer to Regulation 10: “10. Examinations:- There shall be an examination for Diploma in Pharmacy (Part-I) to examine students of the first year course and an examination for Diploma in Pharmacy (Part-II) to examine students of the second year course. Each examination may be held twice every year. Regulation 9 provides for the approval. We deem it appropriate to refer to Regulation 10: “10. Examinations:- There shall be an examination for Diploma in Pharmacy (Part-I) to examine students of the first year course and an examination for Diploma in Pharmacy (Part-II) to examine students of the second year course. Each examination may be held twice every year. The first examination in a year shall be the annual examination and the second examination shall be supplementary examination of the Diploma in Pharmacy (Part-I) or Diploma in Pharmacy (Part-II), as the case may be. The examinations shall be of written and practical (including oral) nature, carrying maximum marks for each part of a subject, as indicated in Table III and IV below:- TABLE-III DIPLOMA IN PHARMACY (PART-I) EXAMINATION Maximum marks for Theory Maximum marks for Practicals Subject Examination *Sessional Total Examination *Sessional Total Pharmaceutics-I 80 20 100 80 20 100 Pharmaceutical chemistry-I 80 20 100 80 20 100 Pharmacognosy 80 20 100 80 20 100 Bio- chemistry and Clinical pathology 80 20 100 80 20 100 Human Anatomy and Physiology 80 20 100 80 20 100 Health Education and Community Pharmacy 80 20 100 -- -- -- 600 + 500 = 1100 43. Regulation 12 provides for eligibility for appearing at the Diploma in Pharmacy Part-II examination. Chapter-III deals with the practical training. We deem it appropriate to refer to Regulations 20(1) and 20(5): “20. Period and other conditions for Practical Training:- (1) After having appeared in Part-II examination for the Diploma in Pharmacy, conducted by Board/University or other approved Examining Body or any other course accepted as being equivalent by the Pharmacy Council of India, a candidate shall be eligible to undergo practical training in one or more of the following institutions namely: (i) Hospitals/Dispensaries run by Central/State Gov./Municipal Corporation/Central Govt. Health Scheme and Employees State Insurance Scheme. (ii) A Pharmacy, Chemist and Druggist licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 made under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940) (iii) Drugs manufacturing Unit licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and rules made there under. (2)…. (3)…. (4).… (5) The practical training shall be not less than five hundred hours spread over a period of not less than three months, provided that not less than two hundred and fifty hours are devoted to actual dispensing of prescriptions. 44. (2)…. (3)…. (4).… (5) The practical training shall be not less than five hundred hours spread over a period of not less than three months, provided that not less than two hundred and fifty hours are devoted to actual dispensing of prescriptions. 44. Regulation 23 in Chapter-IV deals with the Certificate of Diploma in Pharmacy and it provides as follows: “23. Certificate of Diploma in Pharmacy : A certificate of Diploma in Pharmacy shall be granted by the Examining Authority to a successful candidates on producing certificate of having passed the Diploma in Pharmacy Part-I and Part-II and satisfactory completion of practical training for Diploma in Pharmacy (Part III).” 45. Finally, we refer to Regulation 24 in Chapter-IV: “24. Miscellaneous: No course of training in Pharmacy shall be considered for approval under regulation 18 unless it satisfies all the conditions prescribed under these regulations.” 46. The State has filed a Supplementary Affidavit. In this connection, we have to notice the submission of the learned Chief Standing Counsel Sri Paresh Tripathi that a perusal of the syllabus for Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy of the respondent University would show that it is the same as the Diploma in Veterinary and Livestock Development Assistant. We notice the subjects in the Education Regulation. In the syllabus for Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy, we notice that the following are the subjects to be learned over the period of fourth semesters. 1st Semester S. No. Course Code Course Title Credits 1. 36-1 Veterinary Physiology 4 2. 36-2 Animal Breeding 4 3. 36-3 Basic Science 4 4. 36-13 Practical 4 Total 16 2nd Semester S. No. Course Code Course Title Credits 1. 36-4 Veterinary Pharmacology 4 2. 36-5 Polultry Management & Prevention of Diseases 4 3. 36-6 General Veterinary Medicines 4 4. 36-14 Practical 4 Total 16 3rd Semester S. No. Course Code Course Title Credits 1. 36-7 Minor Veterinary Surgery 4 2. 36-8 General Veterinary Gyanecology 4 3. 36-9 Artificial Insemination 4 4. 36-15 Practical 4 Total 16 4th Semester S. No. Course Code Course Title Credits 1. 36-10 Livestock Management & Animal Husbandry 4 2. 36-11 Animal Nutrition 4 3. 36-12 Livestock Product Technology 4 4. 36-16 Practical 4 Total 16 47. 36-7 Minor Veterinary Surgery 4 2. 36-8 General Veterinary Gyanecology 4 3. 36-9 Artificial Insemination 4 4. 36-15 Practical 4 Total 16 4th Semester S. No. Course Code Course Title Credits 1. 36-10 Livestock Management & Animal Husbandry 4 2. 36-11 Animal Nutrition 4 3. 36-12 Livestock Product Technology 4 4. 36-16 Practical 4 Total 16 47. When we put this aspect to Sri Ravi Babulkar, learned counsel for the deemed University, he would submit that the Education Regulations, made under the Pharmacy Act, have been made in respect of Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy, which relates to the human body; whereas, Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy is specially oriented for administering medicine in relation to domestic animals and, therefore, the course in question has not been approved as such by the Pharmacy Council. It is only a course, which has been started on the basis of the decision taken by the Board of Studies of the University. Therefore, in such circumstances, the course need not be one, which is compliant with the requirements under the Education Regulations, made under the Pharmacy Act, which, as already noted, relates to medicinal preparation in relation to human beings. We have already noticed the arguments of the learned Chief Standing Counsel about the similarity between the subjects to be studied for both Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy and Diploma in Livestock Development Assistant. It is true that it is the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which in a manner of speaking forms the corner stone on our Constitution for more reasons than one particularly after the new dimension has been laid bare in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India reported in 1978 AIR 597 as reflecting the thirst of every man, at all points of time, for justice, and there cannot be a greater injustice when equals are treated differently. We would also think that if persons possessing the requisite qualifications are treated differently without any rationale, unless there is an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons belonging to substantially the same class, which difference has a nexus to the object, which is sought to be achieved by the law, the classification may certainly be unconstitutional. 48. In this regard, however, we must not ignore the facts, which were taken into account by the State. 48. In this regard, however, we must not ignore the facts, which were taken into account by the State. The State has apparently proceeded on the basis that there is no regulatory body in regard to the course of Veterinary Pharmacy. Even according to the learned counsel for the University, there is no regulatory body in regard to Veterinary Pharmacy. The State as an employer cannot be said to act in a completely arbitrary manner, when it takes note of the fact that in regard to the course of Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy, there is no body which regulates the said course. Furthermore, this is a case where the said course is not recognized by the State of Uttarakhand. We cannot brush aside the case that recognition by the State is a relevant aspect in determining the question, whether the person can be said to possess the requisite qualification, but we do not wish to rest our interference with the judgment of the learned Single Judge on this premise. We would think that we are on much safer ground in the facts of this case, when we turn to the state of pleadings and the reliefs, which have been sought and impact of the same on the destiny of the writ petitioners. 49. We have already extracted the Rules. The petitioners have specifically directed the challenge only to Rule 7(1)(b). Rule 7(1)(b) enacts only a portion of the requirement to be fulfilled by the candidate. The proviso, which is the part of the Rule unambiguously declares it to be an essential requirement that the candidate must be registered with the Uttarakhand Pharmacy Council. The learned counsel for the petitioners Sri Shakti Singh does not dispute that the prayer sought is only in respect of Rule 7(1)(b) and there is no relief sought as against the proviso. He does not also dispute the fact that the writ petitioners are not registered with the Uttarakhand Pharmacy Council. 50. Sri Ravi Babulkar would submit that the Diploma has been given to the petitioners validly after they had undergone the course, including the practical training. 51. The Statutory provision and in fact, even an order, even if it is void, must be challenged if it forms an obstacle in grant of relief to the petitioners. It is all the more so in the case of statutory provision. Statutory Rule is law. 51. The Statutory provision and in fact, even an order, even if it is void, must be challenged if it forms an obstacle in grant of relief to the petitioners. It is all the more so in the case of statutory provision. Statutory Rule is law. It is made in exercise of the powers delegated legislation and Parliament must be treated to have authorised the authority to make the law. The law, which is being made, cannot be ignored by a Court or by a litigant. The law if placed side by side with party’s cause of action and if they are at logger heads with each other, unless it is specifically challenged and got declared unconstitutional, it would be an insuperable obstacle in grant of relief to the party. Petitioners, not being registered in the Council and not still challenging the said provision, are clearly incompatible with the reliefs, which have been granted by the Court. We fail to see, how even proceeding on the basis that Rule 7(1)(b) is unconstitutional, which is, what the learned Single Judge has essentially purported to do by holding that there is discrimination, cannot assist the petitioners to ignore the essential requirement under the Rules, which remains unchallenged. It is not possible for the Court to ignore the mandatory Rules and to still grant relief, but this is what the learned Single Judge has done. A strong attempt was made by Sri Shakti Singh that the Court must not be technical in these matters and the lack of pleadings or even the absence of relief should also be ignored, when fundamental rights are found to be encroached upon. We are afraid that this argument is ill-founded. We are in agreement with the learned counsel, no doubt, to the point that in appropriate cases, in absence of pleadings, if the substance of the matter is conveyed to the respondents and they have got an opportunity to meet the case, the Court may not stand in the way of granting relief, but this is a case, where things are more serious as the petitioners have not called in question this provision and the petitioners have not sought any relief. It is not a case of a ground in support of the challenge being absent and it being permitted to be made up. It is not a case of a ground in support of the challenge being absent and it being permitted to be made up. Therefore, we would think that the absence of challenge to proviso to the Rule is fatal to the maintainability of the writ petition. In this regard, we may notice, however, what the learned Single Judge has done. The learned Single Judge has, in fact, in Paragraph-21, which we have extracted, taken the stand that since there is no regulatory body like the Veterinary Pharmacy Council, there is no question also of the petitioners being registered with the Pharmacy Council of Uttarakhand and having said this, it was further held that the registration with the Council is not necessary at present for the petitioners. We are at a loss, how the learned Single Judge could have made such an observation and finding without there being any challenge to the said provision. We would think that the said observation and finding are unjustified. Therefore, in this aspect, there can be no doubt that the petition is afflicted with the fatal blemish in the manner, we have noticed and on this ground alone, the writ petition must fail. 52. Shri Shakti Singh, learned counsel would further submit that the requirement that a candidate must be registered would only have been relevant, if it was insisted upon as a condition for exercising the right to practice the profession of Pharmacy and here, insisting upon such a requirement, cannot be sustained. We would have considered such argument provided, there was a challenge specifically raised against the provision. Since there was no such challenge, we need not be detained by the said argument. 53. It is in the light of this aspect that we must further consider the arguments in relation to the validity of Rule 14(5), which contemplates for grant of preference to Diploma Holders of earlier years vis-a-vis. Diploma Holders of later years. The learned Single Judge has discussed the matter and has found that unlike position obtaining in the State of Uttar Pradesh, where there is a historical reason, there is no historical perspective obtaining in the State of Uttarakhand, which justifies the said mode of determining the eligibility. Diploma Holders of later years. The learned Single Judge has discussed the matter and has found that unlike position obtaining in the State of Uttar Pradesh, where there is a historical reason, there is no historical perspective obtaining in the State of Uttarakhand, which justifies the said mode of determining the eligibility. No doubt, the learned counsel for the appellants would make an attempt to draw support from the observations made by this Court in the case of State of Uttarakhand and another vs. Keshavanand Jhaldiyal reported in 2014 (2) U.D. 485 , where the selection on the basis of year-wise obtaining of qualification was upheld. We would think that there is another aspect, which is pressed upon us by Shri Paresh Tripathi, leaned Chief Standing Counsel and that is this. The rule was amended in 2011. The Rule, which is put to challenge, was the amended Rule. Even proceeding on the basis that the amended Rule is found to be unconstitutional and is struck down, the un-amended Rule would revive. In the un-amended Rule, which also we have extracted, there is a mandate that selection will be made on the basis of the year, in which, the Diploma is obtained, namely, a preferential right is given to persons, who have obtained Diploma in earlier years. This part of the Rule has not undergone any change. Therefore, even if the Rule is struck down, the earlier Rule will revive. If the earlier Rule revives, this will clearly be an insuperable obstacle for the petitioners as they remain unchallenged. In this connection, the learned Chief Standing Counsel pointed out the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and another vs. Union of India (Recusal Matter) reported in (2016) 5 SCC 808 . Still further, he would submit that since the petitioners do not have the qualification, mentioned in Rule 7(1)(b) and as the proviso remains unchallenged and, therefore, in fact, the petitioners cannot maintain the challenge to the procedure, in which the qualified persons, namely, Diploma Holders in Allopathic Pharmacy are to be selected. We would think that there is merit in the argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel. The petitioners have approached this Court as the persons holding Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy. Rule 14(5) deals with the manner, in which persons with Diploma must be selected. We would think that there is merit in the argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel. The petitioners have approached this Court as the persons holding Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy. Rule 14(5) deals with the manner, in which persons with Diploma must be selected. What the Rule contemplated is person with Diploma, meaning Diploma in Allopathic Pharmacy are to be selected. This was the intention of the Rule maker. Even proceeding on the basis that Rule 7(1)(b) has to be struck down for the reason that it did not encompass within it the petitioners, who are also found to be qualified, the proviso not being challenged, it rendered the petitioners ineligible. When the petitioners are rendered ineligible in Rule 7(1), then they cannot put forward a claim to maintain a challenge to Rule 14(5) as their rights would stand terminated at the threshold by virtue of their failure to challenge the proviso rendering them ineligible. In such circumstances, we would think that we need not consider the merits of the challenge in regard to Rule 14(5). We have also noticed the argument that if the Rule is struck down, the earlier un-amended Rule will spring back into existence, which would be clearly in consistent with the cause of action of the petitioners. 54. In the light of this clear obstacle, we need not probe the effect of the conduct of the writ petitioners and we would rest our decision on this fatal blemish, namely, the absence of challenge to the proviso. 55. The upshot of the above discussion is that the direction, as given by the learned Single Judge, to consider the petitioners as eligible for Veterinary Pharmacy, is unsupportable and, therefore, the judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained both in the writ petitions and the judgment will stand set aside in all the other Appeals and the writ petitions will stand dismissed. Appeals are allowed as above, but we also only observe that nothing contained in this judgment will stand in the way of the State deciding to include the qualification of Diploma in Veterinary Pharmacy also or re-considering the existing Rule in regard to registration in the Uttarakhand Pharmacy Council. No order as to costs.