JUDGMENT : N.V. Anjaria, J. The challenge in the present petition is directed against judgment and order dated 26th March, 1997 of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.TEN-BS-45/1992 which was preferred by the present petitioners. The Tribunal dismissed the Revision, consequentially confirmed order dated 18th February, 1991 of Mamlatdar & Agricultural Lands Tribunal (ALT), Chikhli in Tenancy Case No.32(1B) as well as the order dated 24th February, 1992 of Deputy Collector in Tenancy Appeal No.30 of 1991 arising therefrom. 1.1. The Mamlatdar in its aforesaid order dated 18th February, 1991 held that the respondents herein the heirs of the original tenant-were entitled to be handed over back the possession of the land in question as according to the Mamlatdar & ALT, they were wrongly dispossessed prior to 03rd March, 1973. In other words, tenancy rights were conferred on the respondent-heirs and it was directed to put them in possession of the land in question. The Tenancy Appeal before the Deputy Collector was dismissed, where after was the impugned order by the Revenue Tribunal. 2. The controversy pertains to the rights claimed by the petitioners, refuted and counterclaimed by the private respondents herein under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 in respect of land bearing Block No.119, Survey No.80/1- 2-3 admeasuring 61 Are and 71 Sq. Meters at Village Vanjana, Taluka Chikhli, District Valsad. The case has a chequered history. 3. Tracing the attendant facts from the record of the petition, the impugned order is the end-result of the third round of litigation in the same subject matter. The background litigation may be referred to and summarised with relevance as under. 3.1. As back as in the year 1960, respondent No.3 Mamlatdar & ALT, Chikhli, District Valsad initiated Inquiry Case No.837 under the Bombay Tenancy and Agri. Lands Act, 1948, and a public notice under Section 32G of the Act came to be issued. By order dated 29th February, 1960, the said competent authority closed the proceedings, recording a finding and holding that the applicant-tenant Bhaga Kara was not in possession on the tiller's day, that is on 01st April, 1957, resultantly no rights were claimable or conferrable on him as tenant under the Tenancy Act, 1948. By order dated 29th February, 1960, the said competent authority closed the proceedings, recording a finding and holding that the applicant-tenant Bhaga Kara was not in possession on the tiller's day, that is on 01st April, 1957, resultantly no rights were claimable or conferrable on him as tenant under the Tenancy Act, 1948. In the proceedings, the competent authority had examined the said Bhaga Kara who in the statement on 05th January, 1960 in terms stated that he was not in possession, nor was cultivating the land since last 10 years. It was further accepted by him that on 01st April, 1957 he was not in possession and the land was surrendered voluntarily. It was admitted that he never claimed nor cultivated the land since voluntarily surrendering thereof. 3.2. It appears that after gap of almost 18 years, on behalf of said Bhagabhai Karabhai filed another Tenancy Case No.3110 of 1977 before the Mamlatdar & ALT, invoking Section 32(1B). It further appears that in the said proceedings on 14th March, 1978 the parties remained present and the son of said Bhagabhai stated that his father has died, further stated that though they were not tenants, since they were used to go for labour work, their names appeared in the record. The previous proceedings of the year 1960 were also referred to and Entry No.2805 in that regard was produced. The competent authority concluded that applicants were not tenant in respect of the land in question. The said inquiry was also closed by passing order dated 14th March, 1978. The copies of the aforesaid orders and the statement by the tenant recorded for his admission and surrendering of possession are on record of the petition; 3.3. It appears that after the aforesaid closure of the second inquiry, the heirs of the deceased Bhagabhai once again sought to initiate proceedings under Section 32(1B) of the Act in form of Tenancy Case No.973 of 1983. By order dated 24th November, 1983 the proceedings were dropped by the competent authority holding that the applicants-opponents were not the tenants and they were never in possession so as to attract Section 32(1B). By order dated 24th November, 1983 the proceedings were dropped by the competent authority holding that the applicants-opponents were not the tenants and they were never in possession so as to attract Section 32(1B). It appears that Deputy Collector invoked for himself suo motu powers under Section 76A of the Act by means of Appeal No.1412 of 1984 and by passing order dated 20th December, 1988 in such exercise of powers, remanded the case to the Mamlatdar & ALT for deciding it afresh. The Mamlatdar & ALT acting upon remand passed order dated 18th February, 1991 to hold and direct that the petitioners were required to return the possession of the land to the respondents herein-tenants. The said order resulted to the impugned order of the Revenue Tribunal in the Revision. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr. K.K. Trivedi for the petitioners, learned advocate Mr. S.D. Vasavada for respondent Nos.1.1, 1.2 and 2, whereas learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Tirthraj Pandya for the respondent State authorities. 4.1. Assailing the impugned order of the Tribunal, learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that in the earlier rounds the opponents were held not in possession and not to be the tenants; that there was an admission about surrendering of possession and not being in possession since 1950. It was submitted that the proceedings lastly initiated and culminating into the impugned order were barred in law. It was submitted that no semblance of right survived for the respondents to claim their tenancy in respect of the land. 4.2. It was submitted that the Tribunal erred in appreciating the provision of Section 32(1B) which was inserted in the year 1973 in the statute book, and that no right could have been claimed to re-agitate tenancy by the heirs of the original tenant which issue was already concluded. 4.2. It was submitted that the Tribunal erred in appreciating the provision of Section 32(1B) which was inserted in the year 1973 in the statute book, and that no right could have been claimed to re-agitate tenancy by the heirs of the original tenant which issue was already concluded. Learned advocate by relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dhondiram Tatoba Kadam v. Ramchandra Balvantram Dubal [1995 (1) GLR 344 (SC)] as well as the decision of this Court in case of Jashbhai M. Patel v. Dhulabhai Lakhabhai [ 1997 (2) GLR 1196 ] submitted that once the tenant had voluntary surrendered the possession of the land before 01st April, 1957, he cannot be deemed to be in possession on the relevant date and cannot be said to be deemed purchaser on the ground that the formalities under Section 15 of the Act were not complied with. 4.3. On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Tirthraj Pandya supported the reasoning as well as the conclusion of the Tribunal in the impugned judgment and order. He vehemently submitted that finding of fact was recorded by two authorities and such concurrent finding was not required to be upset by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. He herein below the Tribunal found that proceedings under Section 32G was only for the purpose of determining the purchase price and the aspect of tenancy was not relevant in that. He submitted that tenancy aspect was examined under the impugned orders and the respondents were held entitled to be put back into possession, with a finding that the possession of the land was illegally taken back prior to the relevant date, which was just and proper. According to his submission, the proceedings before the authorities under Section 32(1B) were taken out and resulted into the impugned order of the Tribunal. Learned advocate for the private respondents reiterated the submissions on the same lines to urge that tenancy rights were established before the authorities and the concurrent view of the authorities may not be interfered with by the High Court. 5. Learned advocate for the private respondents reiterated the submissions on the same lines to urge that tenancy rights were established before the authorities and the concurrent view of the authorities may not be interfered with by the High Court. 5. As could be noticed from the above narrated facts, inquiry into the tenancy right of the Bhaga Kara-respondent-was closed as early as on 29th February, 1960, when upon admission of the said tenant Bhaga Kara in statement-cum-evidence that he was not in possession of the land on the tiller's day, that is on 01st April, 1957 and that the land was voluntarily handed over back since ten years and he was never in possession thereafter. It was the inquiry under Section 32G of the Act. Section 32G of the Act is about notices to be issued by the Tribunal and determination of price of land to be paid by tenants. It provides that as soon as may be after the tiller's day, the Tribunal shall publish a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling upon (a) all tenants who under Section 32 are deemed to have purchased the land; (b) all the landlords of such lands and all other persons interested therein to appear before it. It also contemplates issuance of individual notice to each of such tenant. Sub-section (2) provides that the Tribunal shall record statement of tenant whether he is or he is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. According to sub-section (3) where the tenant fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase, the Tribunal shall pass necessary order and communicate the same if the order is passed in default of appearance. If the tenant is willing to purchase and establishes his claim, the necessary procedure mentioned in the Section shall follow. 5.1. It is manifest from the provision of Section 32 that the benefit thereof is to be accorded to all the tenants who under Section 32 can be deemed to have purchased the land. Section 32 says that on a particular day known as tiller's day, that is 01st April, 1957, the tenant deemed to have purchased the land if (a) on the tiller's day such tenant is permanent thereof and cultivates the land personally or (b) cultivate the land leased personally. Section 32 says that on a particular day known as tiller's day, that is 01st April, 1957, the tenant deemed to have purchased the land if (a) on the tiller's day such tenant is permanent thereof and cultivates the land personally or (b) cultivate the land leased personally. Therefore, right to purchase upon getting the determination of the purchase price accrues provided the conditions of Section 32 of the Act are satisfied by a person claiming to be tenant. 5.2. Going back to the facts of the case, inquiry under Section 32G was closed upon the tenant on his own statement dated 05th January, 1960, admitting that he was not in possession since last 10 years and therefore necessarily was not in possession on 01st April, 1957 and there was a further acceptance by him about the factum of voluntary surrender of possession of the land in question to the owner. In other words, it was concluded that no right had accrued under Section 32 of the Act for applying the deeming provision of purchase of land on the tiller's day. 5.3. After the aforesaid stage where the proceedings concluded, after a yawning gap of 18 years, by invoking Section 32(1B) of the Act, fresh proceedings were initiated seeking the tenancy rights by the original tenant and his son. In that also, the son in his statement accepted about they being not in possession which led to closure of the said proceedings as well in the year 1978. The said proceedings purportedly under sub-section (1B) of Section 32 were barred in law and were not at all maintainable. 5.4. Section 32(1B) may be usefully reproduced herein below. 32. In that also, the son in his statement accepted about they being not in possession which led to closure of the said proceedings as well in the year 1978. The said proceedings purportedly under sub-section (1B) of Section 32 were barred in law and were not at all maintainable. 5.4. Section 32(1B) may be usefully reproduced herein below. 32. Tenants deemed to have purchased land on tillers' day:- (1) On the first day of April 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "the tillers' day") every tenant shall, 5[subject to the other provisions of] the next succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if- (a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates land personally; (b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally; and (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy under section 31; or (ii) notice has been given under section 31, but the landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar, on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land ; (iii) the landlord has not terminated his tenancy on any of the grounds specified in section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land: Provided that ….. … … Provided further that … … … (1A) (a) … … … (b) … … … (1B) Where a tenant who was in possession of land on the appointed day and who, on account of his being dispossessed of such land or any part thereof by the landlord at any time before the specified date otherwise than in the manner provided in section 29 or any other provision of this Act, is not in possession of such and or any part thereof and such land or part thereof is in the possession of the landlord or his successor-in-interest on the said date and such land or part thereof is not put to a non- agricultural use on or before the said date, then the Mamlatdar shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said section 29 or any other provision of this Act either suo motu or on an application of the tenant made within the prescribed period hold an inquiry and direct that such land or as the case may be, part thereof shall be taken from the possession of the landlord or, as the case may be, his successor in interest, and shall be restored, to the tenant; and thereafter, the provisions of this section and sections 32A to 32R (both inclusive) shall, so far as they may be applicable, apply thereto, subject to the modification that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased such land or part thereof on the date on which such land or, as the case may be, part thereof is restored to him: Provided that … … …" 5.5. In Amritlal K. Sharma v. Dahyabhai Jibhaibhai [ 2007 (2) GLR 1548 ], this Court explained the scope and applicability of Section 32(1B) which was amended by Gujarat Act No.5 of 1973, as under. "Section 32G was in the statute book right from the inception. In Amritlal K. Sharma v. Dahyabhai Jibhaibhai [ 2007 (2) GLR 1548 ], this Court explained the scope and applicability of Section 32(1B) which was amended by Gujarat Act No.5 of 1973, as under. "Section 32G was in the statute book right from the inception. Section 32G provides that Mamlatdar-cum-A.L.T., as soon as may be after the Tiller's day shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within his jurisdiction calling upon all tenants who under Section 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands and all landlord of such lands and all other persons interested in the land to appear on the date specified in the notice and after holding an inquiry in accordance with law, the Tribunal shall decide status of the person, and shall thereafter pass appropriate orders. Section 32G of the Act confers jurisdiction upon the Mamlatdar-cum-A.L.T. to make an inquiry and record a finding that whether the person appearing before him is a tenant or not. If the authority finds that he was not a tenant, then, such Mamlatdar shall not pass any further orders, but in case he finds that such person is/was a tenant, then, the Tribunal shall fix the purchase price and would offer land to such tenant who on deposit of the price would become absolute owner of the property." (Para 6) "Section 32(1B) says that where a tenant who was in possession of the land on the appointed date, who, on account of his being dispossessed of such land or any part thereof by the landlord at any time before the specified date otherwise than in the manner provided in Section 29 or any other provision of the Act, is not in possession of such land or any part thereof etc., then, the Mamlatdar shall notwithstanding anything contained in the said Section 29 or other provisions of the Act, either suo motu or on an application by the tenant made within prescribed period, hold an inquiry and direct that the land be restored in favour of the tenant or if the tenant is in possession, then, he shall fix purchase price to be paid by the tenant to the landlord. Undisputely, the period for making an application under Section 32(1B) is one year from the date of enforcement of the Act. Undisputely, the period for making an application under Section 32(1B) is one year from the date of enforcement of the Act. The Act came in force in the year 1973, therefore, an application could be made within one year only. In the present case, application under Section 32(1B) came to be made on 20-12-1976, that is, almost after a period of three years. Such application was undisputedly time-barred. Even if it is taken to be within the limitation, then, the order passed under Section 32G of the Act where under status of the parties were already decided would always stare in the face of the present respondent and the authorities. Once, it is held by any competent authority that the alleged tenant was not a tenant for purposes of Section 32G, then, the Mamlatdar or any other revenue authority, contrary to the said order would not be entitled to hold that for purposes of Section 32(1B) such person would be deemed to be a tenant. Once, a finding recorded in the earlier proceedings attains finality, then, such order would always be res judicata between the parties or in any case, if principles underlying Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable, then too, such order would still be binding upon the parties, because, the law does not say that on conclusion of the first proceedings, on the same facts, next set of the proceedings can be commenced. If second proceedings are held to be maintainable, then, this would become endless, because, on conclusion of the second proceedings against interest of such applicant, he would go for third proceedings and so on." (Para 7) 5.6. The aforesaid Section 32(1B) was inserted in the statute book in the year 1973. It gave one year's time to the persons-the tenants who were dispossessed illegally, to apply and get back the possession of the land in respect of which he was a tenant in possession on the appointed day. The Section says that such application has to be made within the prescribed period. It gave one year's time to the persons-the tenants who were dispossessed illegally, to apply and get back the possession of the land in respect of which he was a tenant in possession on the appointed day. The Section says that such application has to be made within the prescribed period. Rule 15A of Gujarat Tenancy & Agricultural Rules, 1956 which provides the period within which application under sub-section (1B) of Section 32 shall be made, saying that an application under sub-section (1B) of Section 32 by a tenant specified in that subsection shall be made within a period of one year from the coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1972. 6. The first round of proceedings having been concluded and closed in the year 1960 that the respondent Bhaga Kara was not a tenant and no tenancy right was conferrable on him being not in possession on the tiller's day, the subsequent proceedings in the year 1977 which were sought to be re-started by filing Tenancy Case No.3110 of 1977 was clearly time barred. The application under Section 32(1B), as seen from the reading of Section 32(1B) read with Rule 15A of the Rules, was required to be filed within one year from the date of coming into force of the Gujarat Amendment Act, 1972. Therefore even if the tenant was to assert and could have asserted his tenancy rights, his application ought to have been within one year from the date of coming into force of the said Section in the year 1973. Proceedings initiated in 1977 were not permissible. Similarly, the third round of proceedings by the heirs of the deceased tenant Bhaga Kara which culminated into the impugned order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal were also an attempt one again invoke Section 32(1B), and the same were also manifestly barred by time as the period of one year from the date of coming into force of the provision had expired long back. In the said third round, there was a perpetuation of illegality by order dated 24th November, 1983 which was for the third consecutive time that the Mamlatdar & ALT found that the opponents-respondents were not tenants and were not in possession so as to be entitled to apply under Section 32(1B). In the said third round, there was a perpetuation of illegality by order dated 24th November, 1983 which was for the third consecutive time that the Mamlatdar & ALT found that the opponents-respondents were not tenants and were not in possession so as to be entitled to apply under Section 32(1B). In addition that the said proceedings were time barred as stated above, after the aforementioned order dated 24th November, 1983, the Collector exercised the suo motu powers under Section 76A of the Act and remanded the case. It was thereupon that the authorities took summersault to come to a conclusion that the tenant was wrongly dispossessed and was entitled to be restored the possession under Section 32(1B). It turned out to be a case where errors of law were multiplied by the authorities. 6.1. Even as the aforesaid grounds are meritoriously good enough to set aside the impugned judgment and order, going further in the matter, it was unequivocally recorded by the competent authorities in the previous two rounds of litigation as well as in the third order of November, 1983 that the tenant Bhagabhai had not been in possession by virtue of his surrendering the possession voluntarily prior to the relevant date, no tenancy right was claimable by him or the heirs and the inquiry was closed. In the first proceedings in the year 1960 as well as in the subsequent proceedings sought to be commenced in repeat in the year 1977, in the statement-cum-evidence of tenant Bhagabhai, it was the admission that he was not in possession of the land and the possession was given back and surrendered voluntarily to the petitioners-owners. There was nothing on record to hold otherwise in the third round of litigation. Indeed as held hereinafter, the subsequent round of proceedings were barred in law. 6.2. A voluntary handing over of possession is not equated with what may amount to 'dispossession' in law. Proceedings under Section 32(1B) on such premise, when the tenant had earlier voluntarily surrendered the possession of the land would not lie to claim any merit. In Dhondiram Tatoba Kadam (supra) the Supreme Court held that in order to succeed under Section 32 (1B) as amended, the claimant must satisfy two conditions mentioned in the Section and held that voluntary surrender of possession by an erstwhile tenant is not a dispossession. 6.2.1. In Dhondiram Tatoba Kadam (supra) the Supreme Court held that in order to succeed under Section 32 (1B) as amended, the claimant must satisfy two conditions mentioned in the Section and held that voluntary surrender of possession by an erstwhile tenant is not a dispossession. 6.2.1. The Apex Court held thus : "The section entitles a tenant to restoration of possession provided he was in possession on the appointed date, i.e., June 15, 1955 and was dispossessed before April 1, 1957 and his landlord was in possession on July 31, 1969. The section is, thus, in two parts - one creating right and other entitling restoration of possession. Proceedings for restoration could take place either at the instance of the tenant or suo motu by the Tahsildar. But the order could be passed only if the primary requirements of tenant being in possession on the appointed date and his dispossession before April 1, 1957 were satisfied. The language of the latter part of the section directing the Tahsildar to take possession of the land from the landlord and restore it to the tenant who on restoration by operation of law becomes purchaser from the date of restoration are clear legislative indications to construe the section liberally in favour of the tenant. What happens if a tenant who satisfied the requirements as provided in the section is found to be in possession on July 31, 1969 " Could he be evicted in any proceeding even though he satisfied the requirement of being in possession on appointed date and was evicted before April 1, 1957 " Would such construction of the section be in consonance with the spirit of the Act " On the language the sub-section does not grant any protection to a tenant who was in possession on July 31, 1969. But reading the section in such a narrow manner would be defeating the legislative objective of enacting a beneficent legislation endeavouring to make the tillers of soil as purchaser and owner. This is clear from amendments made in Section 32 from time to time between 1957 to 1969. But reading the section in such a narrow manner would be defeating the legislative objective of enacting a beneficent legislation endeavouring to make the tillers of soil as purchaser and owner. This is clear from amendments made in Section 32 from time to time between 1957 to 1969. When Section 32 was renumbered and sub-section (1) was added in 1957, April 1, 1957 was declared as Tillers' date and it was provided that every tenant who was one of those mentioned in the sub-section and was cultivating the land personally was entitled to become purchaser of such land from his landlord free of all encumbrances subsisting on that date. In 1958 similar rights were granted by sub-section (1-A) added to Section 32, to those tenants who had been evicted prior to the Tillers' date and were not in possession but had made an application for possession of the land under sub-Section (1) of Section 29. In 1969 yet another right was granted by Section 32(1- B) which has been extracted above. There can, thus, be no doubt that the legislature intended not only to grant rights to those tenants who were in possession but also to restore the land from which the tenant had been evicted prior to 1957 on satisfying the conditions mentioned in Section 32(1-A) and (1-B) and make such a person on restoration of possession, purchaser of the land. What happens if a tenant who is otherwise entitled to restoration of possession due to operation of the first part of the section is found to be in possession after July 31, 1969 either with permission of the landlord or in any other manner " Is such a tenant liable to eviction " The answer should be in the negative as it would result in conferring higher rights on a person who is not in possession than a person who is in possession. In our opinion, Section 32 (1-B) should be construed in a manner which must effectuate the legislative objective of making every tenant purchaser of the land if he satisfies the conditions laid down in Section 32(1-B) of the Act whether he was in possession or not." (Para 3) 6.2.2. It was further held : "The effect of surrender was that the appellant ceased to be tenant. It was further held : "The effect of surrender was that the appellant ceased to be tenant. Assuming that surrender was invalid and the appellant left the possession over land of his own accord, was he dispossessed as contemplated in Section 32(1-B) of the Act " Voluntary giving up of possession does not amount to diapossession unless the law provides for it. 'Dispossess' according to Black's Law Dictionary means : "To oust from land by legal process; to eject, to exclude from realty." The dispossession should have been, therefore, either by legal process or by physical act of exclusion. It would not include leaving possession voluntarily or by surrender. If the words would have been that if such a person was not in possession before April 1, 1957 then a tenant who surrendered or left the possession voluntarily could be included in it. But the legislature having used a stronger word it should, in absence of any indication to the contrary, be understood in its normal sense. A tenant surrendering the land either in accordance with the provisions of law or leaving possession voluntarily would not be covered in the expression 'dispossessed'. The appellant, on the finding of the High Court, therefore, was not dispossessed. Even if the surrender was not valid as found by the Tribunal then the appellant shall be deemed to have left possession voluntarily. In either case it was not dispossession. The appellant, therefore, did not satisfy the second requirement. Consequently he did not become purchaser of the land under Section 32(1-B) of the Act." (Para 4) 6.3. The reasoning supplied by the Revenue Tribunal in the impugned judgment is misconceived in law. While it stated that in the proceedings of Section 32G only aspect to be gone into was determination of price, it clearly overlooked the position of law emanating from reading of Section 32G read with Section 32 of the Act that Section 32G applies provided Section 32 is satisfied, in other words, unless the right of the tenant to be a deemed purchaser under Section 32 with a factum of his being possession on the tiller's day is established, then in such case, provision of Section 32G may operate in favour of the tenant. The Tribunal further dismally disregarded that the proceedings initiated in the year 1977 as well as the third round of proceedings in the year 1983 both were barred in law. No right had ever accrued in favour of the opponents to become tenants and claim tenancy in respect of the land under the Act. 6.4. Therefore, in holding that the opponents' case under Section 32(1B) was liable to be granted and that they were required to be put back into possession of land, the authorities below committed a patent error. A concurrent finding which amounts an error of law has to be categorized as a perverse finding. The stock contention that the findings were concurrent by the authorities readily does not hold good in such cases and cannot be accepted. The impugned judgment and orders require interference and deserves to be set aside. 7. Therefore both in terms of merit on law and the merit on facts, the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal and the orders of the authorities wherefrom the revision arose before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, cannot be sustained. They are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, judgment and order dated 26th March, 1997 of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dismissing the Revision Application No.45 of 1992 as well as order dated 24th February, 1992 of the Deputy Collector in Tenancy Appeal No.30 of 1991 as well as order dated 18th February, 1991 of the Mamlatdar & ALT, Chikhli in Tenancy Case No.32(1B) 11350 of 1990 are hereby set aside. Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute, with no order as to the costs. Petition allowed.