JUDGMENT : B.V. Nagarathna, J. 1. Though the appeal is listed for orders, with the consent of learned counsel on both sides, it is heard finally. 2. The first plaintiff in O.S.No.77/2003 has preferred this second appeal, assailing order dated 17.07.2013 passed in R.A.No.27/2013 by the Additional District Judge at Bidar. By the said order, the application filed by the first plaintiff-appellant herein (I.A.No.1) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter, referred to as the ' Act- , for brevity) has been rejected and consequently R.A.No.27/2013 has been dismissed. 3. Briefly stated, the relevant facts are that the appellant-plaintiff and respondent No. 2 herein as plaintiff No. 2 filed a suit seeking the relief of declaration and perpetual injunction in respect of the suit properties. In that suit, the first respondent-defendant sought a counter claim. By judgment and decree dated 30.08.2011, the trial court decreed the suit in part as well as the counter claim. The trial court decreed that, the plaintiffs as well as the defendant have half share each in the suit schedule land bearing Sy.No.122 and Sy.No.90. A direction was also issued to divide the suit schedule properties by metes and bounds. 4. Being aggrieved by that judgment and decree, the first plaintiff preferred R.A.No.27/2013. The said appeal was instituted on 22.02.2013. Consequently, there was a delay of one year, four months and ten days (501 days) in instituting the appeal. Under the circumstances, an application under Section 5 of the Act, was filed seeking condonation of delay. The first appellate court heard the application after recording evidence. The appellant herein let in his evidence as PW.1 and he got marked one document as Ex.P1. But the respondents herein did not let in any evidence. The first appellate court raised the following points for its consideration:- 1. Whether the appellant satisfy this court, the reasons for condoning the delay of one year four months and 10 days to file the instant appeal feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree in O.S.No.77/2013? 2. What order? It answered point No. 1 in the negative and rejected the application and consequently dismissed the appeal as being barred by limitation. Being aggrieved by that order, the first plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. 5. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent. 6. 2. What order? It answered point No. 1 in the negative and rejected the application and consequently dismissed the appeal as being barred by limitation. Being aggrieved by that order, the first plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. 5. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent. 6. Appellant's counsel contended that the first appellate court was not right in dismissing I.A.No.1 filed along with R.A.No.27/2013 and thereby dismissing the appeal. He contended that evidence was let in on I.A.No.1 and the appellant had stated in his evidence that, the delay in instituting the appeal was on account of his trial court advocate not informing him about the disposal of the suit. As a result, there was a delay in instituting the appeal. He contended that the first appellate court was not right in holding that the said reason assigned by the trial court was not corroborated by any affidavit produced by his trial court advocate and therefore, the said reason could not be believed. He submitted that the approach of the first appellate court was not right inasmuch as the fault of the advocate in not informing the appellant in time about the disposal of the suit, had led to delay in filing the appeal and that the appellant could not have been penalized for filing a belated appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that substantial questions of law would arise in this appeal and therefore the appeal may be admitted to consider the same and dispose of by answering the said questions in favour of the appellant. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supporting the order of the first appellate court submitted that the appellant has been remiss in filing a belated appeal. The first appellate court was right in not accepting the reason given by the appellant as a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. Learned counsel submitted that the exorbitant delay of 501 days in filing the appeal has not been explained properly so as to constitute sufficient cause which could lead to condonation of delay. He submitted that no substantial question of law would arise in the appeal and therefore, this appeal may be dismissed. 8. Learned counsel submitted that the exorbitant delay of 501 days in filing the appeal has not been explained properly so as to constitute sufficient cause which could lead to condonation of delay. He submitted that no substantial question of law would arise in the appeal and therefore, this appeal may be dismissed. 8. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submitted that she is the wife of the appellant herein and respondent before the first appellate court and that appropriate orders may be made in this appeal. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material on record, the following substantial question of law would arise in this appeal: "Whether the first appellate court was right in dismissing the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground that there was no sufficient cause to condone the delay of 501 days in filing R.A.No.27/2013 and thereby rejecting the said application, leading to dismissal of the appeal?" The appeal is admitted to consider the aforesaid substantial question of law. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it is noted that the first plaintiff is the husband of the second plaintiff and the defendant is the sister of the first plaintiff. The dispute is with regard to the suit schedule properties in respect of which the plaintiffs sought the relief- s of declaration and consequential permanent injunction. The trial court partly decreed the suit as well as the counter claim. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the plaintiff-appellant herein preferred R.A.No.27/2013. The said appeal was preferred after one year, four months and ten days which is beyond prescribed period of limitation, hence, I.A.No.1 had been filed under Section 5 of the Act. Evidence was let in by the appellant herein. But no evidence was let in on behalf of the respondents herein. The reason given by the appellant herein for the delay in filing the regular appeal is that his advocate did not inform him about the disposal of the suit by the trial court. Consequently, he had no notice about the disposal of the suit. Thereafter, when he came to know about the disposal of the suit, he took steps to get the certified copy of the judgment and decree of the trial court and then instituted the appeal before the first appellate court. 11. Consequently, he had no notice about the disposal of the suit. Thereafter, when he came to know about the disposal of the suit, he took steps to get the certified copy of the judgment and decree of the trial court and then instituted the appeal before the first appellate court. 11. It is the case of the appellant that, it is on account of negligence of his advocate in not informing him about disposal of the suit that the delay occurred. It is due to bona fide and unintentional reasons on the part of the appellant herein that the regular appeal was filed belatedly. Therefore, the appellant herein sought for condonation of delay of 501 days in filing the appeal. As against the said evidence, respondents did not let in any rebuttal evidence. The first appellate court has considered the evidence of the appellant herein and has held that the appellant ought to have sought an affidavit to be filed by his trial court advocate in the appeal so as to substantiate his reason for the delay in filing the appeal. According to the first appellate court, as appellants advocate did not file any affidavit in support of the appellant herein, it could not be believed that his advocate had failed to inform him about the disposal of the Suit. Therefore, according to the first appellate court, it was necessary for the appellant herein to corroborate his evidence by the evidence of his trial court advocate in the form of an affidavit and in the absence of such a corroboration the reason given by the appellant for the belated filing of the appeal could not be believed at all. 12. In my view, the first appellate court could not have dismissed the application merely because there was absence of corroboration of the case of the appellant herein by his advocate, who appeared in the trial court with regard to the delay in filing the regular appeal. Appellant categorically submitted that it was on account of negligence on the part of his trial court advocate to the effect that he has no intimation of the disposal of the suit by the trial court, which had resulted in delay in instituting the regular appeal. Appellant categorically submitted that it was on account of negligence on the part of his trial court advocate to the effect that he has no intimation of the disposal of the suit by the trial court, which had resulted in delay in instituting the regular appeal. When that was the reason averred by the appellant herein, the trial court ought to have considered as to whether that was a sufficient cause which could lead to condonation of delay. Although, the first appellate court has referred to various decisions with regard to condonation of delay, it has failed to believe the case of the appellant with regard to the delay in institution of the appeal, by holding that the appellant had to seek corroboration of the reason by an affidavit to be filed by his trial court advocate. Such an approach, in my view, is not proper as the first appellate court had to consider the question as to whether the appellant, not having knowledge about the disposal of the case from his trial court advocate, was a sufficient cause in the belated filing of the Regular Appeal. The trial court could not have disbelieved the evidence of the appellant merely because there was no corroboration of his plea and evidence from his trial court advocate on the issue of belated filing of the appeal. 13. In my view, the said cause or reason given by the appellant to the effect that the belated filing of the appeal was on account of the non intimation of the disposal of the suit by his trial court advocate is a sufficient cause that did not require any corroboration from the very advocate on whom negligence has been cast by the appellant herein. In the absence of any rebuttal evidence by the respondents, the first appellate court ought to have accepted the reason given by the appellant and held that there was sufficient cause to condone the delay, without insisting upon corroboration of appellant's evidence. 14. In the circumstances, the substantial question of law raised in the appeal is answered in favour of the appellant. The order dated 17.07.2013 passed on I.A. No.1 by the first appellate court in R.A.No.27/2013 is set aside. The appeal is restored on the file of the Additional District Judge, Bidar, by condoning the delay in filing the regular appeal. 15. In the circumstances, the substantial question of law raised in the appeal is answered in favour of the appellant. The order dated 17.07.2013 passed on I.A. No.1 by the first appellate court in R.A.No.27/2013 is set aside. The appeal is restored on the file of the Additional District Judge, Bidar, by condoning the delay in filing the regular appeal. 15. As the parties are represented by their representative counsel, they are directed to appear before the concerned court on 26.10.2016 without expecting any separate notice from the court. 16. The first appellate court to consider the appeal on merits and dispose of the same in accordance with law, in an expeditious manner, preferably, by the end of February 2017. It is needless to observe that the parties would co-operate with the concerned court for expeditious disposal of the appeal. 17. The appeal is disposed of with the aforesaid terms. 18. Parties to bear their respective costs.