JUDGMENT : Sonia Gokani, J. 1. The factual matrix leading to filing of the present petition under section 226 of the Constitution of India, are as follows: "1.1 The petitioner was appointed as Seeds Supervisor on September 22, 1989 at Rajkot. He was promoted as Seeds Officer on May 29, 1997, where he continued to supervise godown, storage and handling of seeds, which included the despatch thereof, etc. He was also expected to prepare Challans or bills whenever the farmers/dealers used to approach him and so also to supply the seeds to the concerned purchaser. 1.2 In the year 1999, the respondent-Corporation found shortage of 829 kilograms of seeds and, therefore, a panchnama was prepared and a criminal complaint was lodged against the petitioner before Shihor Police Station and he was transferred to Amreli in the month of April, 1999 and immediately, suspended on April 26, 1999. 1.3 A show cause notice was issued as to why the Departmental Inquiry should not be initiated against him, to which he replied and eventually one Shri J.A. Pandya was appointed as an Inquiry Officer to conduct the departmental inquiry against the petitioner. On completion of the inquiry, he submitted his report in a sealed cover to the respondent-Corporation, wherein the petitioner was held guilty and he was eventually dismissed from service vide order dated June 30, 2000. 1.4 It is the say of the petitioner that the report of the Inquiry Officer was not given to him till he was dismissed and it was only in view of the application preferred by the petitioner under the Right to Information Act, 2005, that such report was provided to him on May 03, 2000. He preferred an appeal before the Board of Directors, who eventually took decision to quash the order of dismissal dated June 30, 2000 and directed the petitioner to be treated as a suspended employee and ordered him to be paid suspension allowance at the rate of 50% till the outcome of the criminal case pending before the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar. Such order was passed on December 18, 2000. 1.5 In a criminal case, the petitioner was convicted vide judgment and order dated October 18, 2003 in connection with the offence punishable under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the respondent-Corporation passed an order of dismissal dated October 28, 2003. Such order was passed on December 18, 2000. 1.5 In a criminal case, the petitioner was convicted vide judgment and order dated October 18, 2003 in connection with the offence punishable under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the respondent-Corporation passed an order of dismissal dated October 28, 2003. 1.6 A Criminal Appeal came to be preferred by the petitioner being Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2003 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Bhavnagar. The petitioner also availed the order of bail from the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar. After both parte hearing, he was acquitted on August 27, 2004 of all the charges, whereby the Appellate Forum quashed and set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. 1.7 The acquittal appeal was preferred before this Court being Criminal Appeal No. 312 of 2005 by the State, which also confirmed vide order dated December 14, 2009 the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The respondent-Corporation, therefore, sought for information of the Legal Department of the State Government as to whether this is a fit case for challenging such judgment before the Apex Court, however, the same was opined in negation. 1.8 The petitioner, therefore, made an application to the Corporation on December 18, 2009, seeking reinstatement on his original post with all consequential benefits and arrears, which was placed for consideration of the General Administration Department, which opined that no major penalty can be imposed upon him and he may be reinstated in service by imposing lighter punishment. 1.9 It is the grievance of the petitioner that the respondent-Corporation rejected application of the petitioner by order dated February 04, 2011 and confirmed the earlier order of dismissal dated October 18, 2003 by the respondent-Corporation. 1.10 He further made an application on February 16, 2011 for reconsideration of the decision of the Office of the Minister for Agricultural, Gujarat State. 1.10 He further made an application on February 16, 2011 for reconsideration of the decision of the Office of the Minister for Agricultural, Gujarat State. However, when no heed was paid, he has preferred present petition praying for the following substantial reliefs: "8(b) To quash and set aside the impugned order dated 4.2.2011 passed by the Respondent Corporation at Annexure-L by which it has confirmed the earlier order of dismissal dated 28.10.2003 at Annexure-E; (c) To direct the respondent Corporation to reinstate the petitioner forthwith on his original post and direct the respondent Corporation to pay to the petitioner all consequential benefits including arrears of payment as applicable from time to time w.e.f. 26.4.1999 i.e. from the date of his suspension till date of his reinstatement, together with interest @ 12% p.a.;" 2. An additional affidavit has been filed for and on behalf of the petitioner, wherein he has urged that both, the Board of Directors and Corporation, vide their order dated September 22, 2010 and January 18, 2011 had been approached which have rejected his request of reinstatement and, therefore, there is no question of approaching the Apex Court for redressal of grievance as the same would be a futile exercise. 3. The affidavit-in-reply was filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 questioning the very jurisdiction of this Court because of availability of the Appellate Forum. All the factual averments have been denied, except the fact that he has been acquitted by the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and thereafter, such order of acquittal came to be confirmed by this Court. No further challenge to such order of this Court is made by the Department or by the State. 4. It is the foremost contention on the part of the respondents that on the basis of the departmental proceedings which have culminated into inquiry report that the respondent-Corporation has taken decision of dismissal of the petitioner bearing in mind the gravity of the charges proved and not on the strength of the criminal case. It is also contended by the respondents that the Board of Directors had quashed the first order of June 30, 2000 on the ground that the amount of Rs. It is also contended by the respondents that the Board of Directors had quashed the first order of June 30, 2000 on the ground that the amount of Rs. 4 lakh had been paid back by the petitioner and after the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, the order of dismissal was passed on October 28, 2003 and thereafter, the judgment and order of conviction and sentence was set aside by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and confirmed by this Court. Therefore, with regard to the second charge which has been proved in the Departmental Inquiry, as no decision was taken, the respondent-Corporation chose to confirm the earlier order of dismissal. 5. In the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioner, he has emphasised that the Appellate Authority while quashing the inquiry report had already specified that the petitioner would be under suspension and he would be governed by the decision, that may be rendered by the competent Court in the criminal proceedings and the criminal case having attained finality, it then becomes binding upon the respondent-Corporation to follow the same. 6. Both the sides have been heard at length. They have submitted in support of their submissions the authorities of the Apex Court on the subject, which are as follows: "(1) In the case of State of U.P. v. Raj Kishore Yadav, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 673 , the Court has held that normally the High Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not interfere with findings of enquiry officer and punishment of dismissal, where the charges of serious nature against respondent were proved beyond reasonable doubt and on consideration of the entire material, the authorities concerned came to the conclusion that dismissal would meet the ends of justice. The High Court erred in interfering with the order of dismissal on the ground that acts complained of were sheer mistakes or errors on the part of respondent and for that no punishment could be attributed to respondent. There could be no dispute with regard to the proposition laid down. This would have no applicability in the present case. The High Court erred in interfering with the order of dismissal on the ground that acts complained of were sheer mistakes or errors on the part of respondent and for that no punishment could be attributed to respondent. There could be no dispute with regard to the proposition laid down. This would have no applicability in the present case. (2) In the case of State of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Gopal Shukla and another, (2015) SCC Online 791, the Apex Court was considering as to whether the legal forum should allow itself to imagine facts and conceive of perverted situations to brush aside the material brought son record and then for contrived reasons arrive at a conclusion that there was possibly no embezzlement or personal gain in the matter. In a matter before the Apex Court, the respondent was a conductor in the service of U.P. Road Transport Corporations and found carrying 25 passengers without ticket. The factum of personal gain was established. In such circumstances, the Apex Court held that the corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to progress, accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the conscience, jettisons the glory of the institutions, paralyses the economic health of a country, corrodes the sense of civility and mars the marrows of governance. The Court also held that the degree of corruption is immaterial. In the matter before the Apex Court, the delinquent employee had harboured the notion that when the cancerous growth has affected the system, he can further allow it to grow by covering it like an octopus, with its tentacles disallowing any kind of surgical operation or treatment so that the lesion continues. This act of corruption is found reprehensible by the Court, who held that such a situation does not even remotely commend any lenience. Not only this Court is bound by the above cited decision and the findings and the observations made therein, but it wholeheartedly agrees to the strong words expressed by the Apex Court, which also notice that such state of affair is impermissible as far as the case of the present petitioner is concerned. This Court has chosen not to go into the merits of the matter and has noticed that in the case of other employees, who were similarly situated, the authority has chosen to restrict the word 'punishment' to stoppage of one increment with future effect only. This Court has chosen not to go into the merits of the matter and has noticed that in the case of other employees, who were similarly situated, the authority has chosen to restrict the word 'punishment' to stoppage of one increment with future effect only. (3) In the case of State of West Bengal and others v. Sankar Ghosh, reported in 2013(14) SCALE 245, the Apex Court has held that the acquittal or discharge in a criminal proceeding shall not be a bar to award punishment in a departmental proceeding in respect of same cause of matter. There cannot be any dispute with regard to the principle that has been laid down, however, as already detailed hereinafter, the outcome of the departmental proceedings had been linked with the criminal proceedings consciously by the department itself and, therefore, to disregard the same taking shelter of this basic principle in the present case is impermissible. (4) In the case of K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited and others, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481, the Apex Court has held that where the petitioner makes a false statement or conceals material facts or misleads the Court, the Court may dismiss the petition at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The Court would be failing in its duty if it does not reject the petition on such ground. According to the respondent herein, the petitioner has not approached this Court by disclosing all the facts, however, there is nothing which this Court could notice which would require in the given set of facts, invoking these principles and, therefore, it does not require elaboration. According to the respondent herein, the petitioner has not approached this Court by disclosing all the facts, however, there is nothing which this Court could notice which would require in the given set of facts, invoking these principles and, therefore, it does not require elaboration. (5) In the case of Delhi Union of Journalist Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 819, the Apex Court has held that the earlier petition made to challenge the master plan and reallotment of land to dance school when was dismissed, the petitioner on concession made by the Development Authority making fresh representation to the Vice-Chairman sought for indulgence on the basis of notice of Minister and on rejection of the representation, he has filed a fresh petition claiming the same relief as was made in the earlier petition and therefore, the Court held that the concession made was uncalled for and order of Vice-Chairman did not entitle the petitioner to file a fresh petition. There is non-entertainment of petition on the ground of res judicata, which is found justified." 7. On due consideration of the pleadings and the material brought on record, the short question is as to whether the respondent-Corporation is within its right to decide the order of penalty in the case of the petitioner when the criminal charges have resulted into acquittal at the hands of the Sessions Court as well as this Court and when there is no further challenge made to the judgment and order of acquittal confirmed by this Court. And, corollary to this is as to whether the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the charges proved. 8. Admittedly, the petitioner had faced criminal proceedings before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhavnagar. He had been convicted by judgment and order dated October 18, 2003 for the offence punishable under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. This judgment and order of conviction and sentence was challenged by the petitioner before Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Bhavnagar, which had acquitted the petitioner of all the charges by quashing and setting aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. This judgment and order of acquittal was challenged by way of an appeal before this Court by the State. This judgment and order of acquittal was challenged by way of an appeal before this Court by the State. This Court vide order dated December 14, 2009 confirmed the judgment and order of acquittal while dealing with Criminal Appeal No. 312 of 2005. No further challenge has been made of the decision of this Court of confirming the said judgment of acquittal. Therefore, the criminal proceedings have been given a quietus by such decision of non-challenge. 9. Admittedly, the petitioner had been charged separately by way of departmental inquiry and in such departmental inquiry, two charges were levelled against the petitioner. The first charge was of shortage of 829.750 kg. of seeds while he was discharging his duty as a Seeds Officer at Shihor, the amount of which is quantified at Rs. 4 lakh. His integrity was questioned in the charge. The second charge was of dereliction in duty for his having sold the rejected seeds to the private parties, producers, etc. As noted above, both the charges are held to have been proved by the Inquiry Officer in his report. The disciplinary authority on the strength of such report had dismissed the petitioner from his service vide order dated June 30, 2000. 10. When challenged before the Appellate Forum, the Appellate Authority took into consideration his offer to deposit an amount of Rs. 4 lakh, which was the financial loss caused on account of the petitioner's act of misconduct. It then held that he along with the Senior Seeds Officer and the Branch Manager, are liable and a first information report was also lodged with Shihor Police Station and, therefore, the order of dismissal was quashed and he was suspended till the outcome of the criminal proceedings. It is also not in dispute that the Senior Seeds Officer and the Branch Manager, both, have been awarded punishment of stoppage of one increment with future effect, whereas in the case of the petitioner, the order of punishment is of dismissal. The respondent-Corporation has justified this belated action of dismissal after this Court confirmed the judgment and order of acquittal, essentially depending upon the fact that after the two charges proved in the departmental inquiry, the Appellate Forum has decided only in relation to one charge. He has since paid the amount for which the loss had been caused to the respondent-Corporation, the order was quashed. He has since paid the amount for which the loss had been caused to the respondent-Corporation, the order was quashed. It is the stand of the respondent that with the outcome of the criminal proceedings, the respondent-Corporation would have a right to decide in relation to the second charge. This, in the opinion of this Court, is wholly unsustainable stand. The Appellate Authority when was approached by the petitioner initially against the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority, taking into consideration the report of the Inquiry Officer as a base, the Appellate Forum ought to have addressed itself to the entire order and it could not have decided the matter in piecemeal. On December 13, 2000, when the petitioner volunteered to deposit the amount of Rs. 4 lakh, which according to the respondent-Corporation, was the loss caused because of shortfall of seeds to the tune of 829.750 kgs., such amount has been accepted from the petitioner and his case had been considered sympathetically as is quite apparent from the very order. At the same time, it does mention the fact that both the Senior Seeds Officers and the Branch Manager as well as the present petitioner, were since jointly found responsible and they were facing criminal trial in the wake of the first information report lodged before Shihor Police Station. Therefore, subject to his depositing an amount of Rs. 4 lakh towards the shortfall till the judgment and order was delivered by the competent Court, the order of suspension in the case of the petitioner was passed and on receipt of such judgment, further decision was to be taken. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation would be right in contending that when the respondent-Corporation has chosen to conduct departmental proceedings independently, the case of the petitioner would be governed on the strength of the report which may be submitted by the authority and it would not depend upon the outcome of the criminal proceedings. And, therefore, the acquittal may not, in that ordinary sense, have bearing on the fate of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner is concerned. However, when the appellate authority itself had provided while deciding the appeal that subject to the outcome of the criminal proceedings, further decision shall be taken, it is impermissible to take a contrary stand. While accepting the amount of Rs. However, when the appellate authority itself had provided while deciding the appeal that subject to the outcome of the criminal proceedings, further decision shall be taken, it is impermissible to take a contrary stand. While accepting the amount of Rs. 4 lakh when deposited by the petitioner for compensating the loss caused on account of the shortfall, it had chosen to link with the outcome of criminal proceedings. Therefore, it would be binding upon the respondent-Corporation and it cannot turn around and take a volte face. The appellate authority had chosen to consider the case of the petitioner sympathetically and, therefore, accepted the amount of Rs. 4 lakh and linked it with the criminal proceedings, which were pending. 12. It is a matter of record that the order of suspension had continued even after the petitioner volunteered to pay the amount of Rs. 4 lakh. At the cost of reiteration, it is to be held and observed that such acceptance of amount even if it does not take away the right of the respondent-Corporation to decide the punishment and it can differ the same till the outcome of the criminal proceedings. However, to say that the outcome of criminal proceedings has no bearing on the issue of punishment, having decided to wait for such outcome, is the stand, which does not require any sustenance. Had the appellate authority independent of such proceedings chosen to take its own decision in the departmental proceedings, it could have so done it. However, once the criminal proceedings resulted into acquittal, it is expected to regard the same. Moreover, when the opinion of the Legal Department for further challenge to the judgment and order of acquittal was in negation. Thus, both the counts that the second issue was not considered by the appellate authority at the relevant point of time and that the outcome of the criminal proceedings have no bearing on the issue, do not require sustenance. 13. If the department was aggrieved by the decision of the appellate forum of not considering the second charge when it provided for suspension and permitted to accept the amount of Rs. 4 lakh, the respondent-Corporation could have challenged the same before the competent forum. 13. If the department was aggrieved by the decision of the appellate forum of not considering the second charge when it provided for suspension and permitted to accept the amount of Rs. 4 lakh, the respondent-Corporation could have challenged the same before the competent forum. It has chosen to sit quietly for all these years and in the challenge made by the petitioner of the action of the respondent-Corporation, it is now coming with such a contention, in the opinion of this Court, which is absolutely unsustainable. This has to be also considered coupled with the fact that two of the officers who have been jointly found responsible, against whom a joint criminal complaint was preferred, have only been awarded the punishment of stoppage of one increment with future effect and in the case of the petitioner, he was awarded the punishment of dismissal on the very charge, which in the opinion of this Court, is surely amounting to disproportionate punishment to the charges proved against the petitioner. Instead of this Court deciding the punishment itself, in view of the charge in the case of petitioner, the present petition deserves to be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned order of dismissal and directing the petitioner to approach the appellate authority. Thus, the matter deserves to be relegated to the appellate forum which shall take into consideration the issue of disproportionality of punishment and decide the same. 14. For the reasons recorded in the judgment, the present petition is partly allowed. The impugned order dated February 04, 2011 passed by the respondent-Corporation, which confirmed the earlier order of dismissal dated October 28, 2003, is quashed and set aside. However, as the punishment awarded to the petitioner is held to be disproportionate, the issue of disproportionality is relegated to the Appellate Forum of the respondent-Corporation and such issue be decided within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the present order, particularly bearing in mind all the findings and observations made hereinabove in this judgment as well as the factum of acquittal of the petitioner from all the criminal charges, as also the punishment awarded to two of his colleagues who were charged with the very offences in the departmental proceedings. The petitioner is, however, ordered to be reinstated in service at his original post along with all the consequential benefits, including arrears of salary and allowances, as applicable from time to time with effect from April 26, 1999 i.e. from the date of his suspension, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, subject to outcome of the decision of the Appellate Forum on the issue of proportionality of punishment. The petition stands disposed of accordingly. There shall be, however, no order as to costs. Direct Service is permitted.