Research › Search › Judgment

Tripura High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 73 (TRI)

Jyoti Khasnabish v. Arindam Khasnabish

2016-03-16

U.B.SAHA

body2016
JUDGMENT : U.B. Saha, J. This appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 read with Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the appellant against the judgment dated 23.09.2010 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge (Court No. 3), West Tripura, Agartala in Title Suit (Probate) 1 of 2009. 2. Heard Mr. Sekhar Datta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. P.R. Barman, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 3. The facts of the case, needed for disposal, in a short compass, are as following: 4. The deceased Arun Khasnabish died on 6.4.2005 leaving behind the appellant and the respondents herein as his legal heirs. Mother of the respondents Smt. Ama Khasnabish died leaving behind the respondent No. 1 and 2 at the age of 4/5 years and 2 years respectively. After the death of Ama Khasnabish, Arun Khasnabish during his life time married the appellant on 14.8.1981 according to Hindu customs and rites. 5. After the death of Arun Khasnabish, the respondents left the house of Arun Khasnabish leaving behind the appellant in the month of May, 2005 and since then the appellant has been leaving in the house of her husband and she used to pay the electrical bills, telephone bills, municipal taxes and other Govt. revenues sometime from the family pension and sometime by taking loan from others. 6. Thereafter, the respondents filed an application under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Ac, 1925 for granting probate of last Will and Testament dated 2.3.2005 executed by testator Arun Khasnabish. The respondents stated in their application that the testator during his life time executed his last Will and testament on 2.3.2005 in presence of attesting witnesses and at the time of execution of the Will, the testator was in disposing state of mind and without being influenced and coerced by anybody, he executed the last Will and Testament voluntarily and by such execution, he bequeathed his all movable and immovable properties to his two sons and his wife i.e. the appellant herein. By the said Will and Testament, the appellant was provided the family pension and the share of the testator in monthly income schedule account No. 13333497 in Dhaleswar post office. No executor has been appointed in the said Will. The amounts of assets which are likely to come to the beneficiaries are about Rs. By the said Will and Testament, the appellant was provided the family pension and the share of the testator in monthly income schedule account No. 13333497 in Dhaleswar post office. No executor has been appointed in the said Will. The amounts of assets which are likely to come to the beneficiaries are about Rs. 2 lakhs. 7. The appellant opposite party submitted the written statement before the trial court stating, inter alia, that the testator married her on 14.8.1981 after expiry of his first wife, namely, Ama Khasnabish. She also stated that the signature in the Will was not the signature of her husband Arun Khasnabish and that the said signature was a forged one and signed by somebody else and the petitioners, respondents herein, are not entitled to get probate as prayed for. 8. Considering the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues for deciding the suit: 1. Whether the will was duly executed by the testator late Arun Khasnabish? 2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to get probate in respect of the Will and testament dated 2.3.2005? 9. The appellant produced the Identity Card of the Election Commission, Copy of the Ration Card, Survival certificate and pension payment order marked as Exhibit-A, B, C and D series and the respondents also submitted one original registered Deed of Sale No. 1-5106 dated 14.7.1080, prayer for extension of three months service by the testator, Arun Khasnabish after superannuation. 10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial court allowed application filed by the petitioner-respondents for granting probate by the impugned judgment dated 23.9.2010. 11. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with, the appellant preferred the instant appeal for setting aside the impugned judgment. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant being the legally married wife, she is entitled to get the share of land and building of her husband and to deprive of the same, the respondents have made the Will in question and the learned trial court failed to appreciate the submission of the opposite party appellant that the signature of the testator in the Will was not a genuine one. 13. 13. Learned counsel also submits that the appellant filed an application under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act to ascertain the genuineness of the signature of Arun Khasnabish with other documents having signature of Arun Khashnabish by a hand writing expert, but the trial court rejected the said prayer holding that the evidence on record is sufficient to decide whether the Will was actually executed by the testator or not as per the requirement of law and for the purpose, the opinion of the hand writing expert is not required to be called for. In support of the said contention, the opposite party also filed a prayer of the testator praying for three months extension of service dated 18.3.2002 addressed to the Director of Food & Civil Supply which contained the original signature of Arun Khasnabish. But without considering the same, the learned trial Court passed the impugned judgment. He further submits that as the Will in question being an unregistered one, no reliance can be placed upon the said Will, rather being the fictitious and forged Will, it is liable to be dismissed, which the trial court failed to do so and as such, the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eye of law and the same is liable to be set aside, the learned counsel further submits. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that the testator, the father of the respondents, executed his last Will and Testament in disposing state of mind in presence of the attesting witnesses and he made it voluntarily to make the provisions for his family members to avoid any complicacy after his death for the properties as described in his last Will and Testament and he distributed his all properties among the family members keeping arrangement to maintain the life of his wife as well as his sons. Therefore, the appellant has no right to affect the interest of the respondents accrued by the said Will. 15. He further submits that Section 59 and Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant; so far the proof of a document as a last will and testament is concerned. As per Section 59 of the Indian Succession Act, every person of sound mind, not being minor, may dispose of his property by Will. Section 63 provides in what manner execution of unprivileged Will is to be effected. 16. As per Section 59 of the Indian Succession Act, every person of sound mind, not being minor, may dispose of his property by Will. Section 63 provides in what manner execution of unprivileged Will is to be effected. 16. He also contends that though the appellant took the defence that the Will is a forged one, but she utterly failed to establish any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will. 17. In support of their case, the petitioner-respondents have adduced the evidence of four witnesses including the respondent No. 1 and the opposite party-appellant three witnesses including the appellant herself. The salient parts of those evidences may be discussed. 18. The petitioner respondent No. 1, Sri. Arindam Khasnabish, deposed that his father late Arun Khasnabish during his life time on 2.3.2005 executed his last Will and Testament in presence of attesting witnesses and at the time of execution of the Will, he was of sound disposing state of mind and without being influenced by any person, he executed the said Will bequeathing his property in favour of the petitioner-respondents and opposite party Smti. Jyoti Khasnabish, appellant herein. 19. P.W. 2, Advocate Bijan Saha deposed that he prepared the last Will as per dictation of the testator Arun Khasnabish. He handed over the Will and Testament to Arun Khasnabish who read the entire document and after being satisfied put as many as six signatures on his last Will and Testament and accordingly, he executed the said Will in his presence. He also put his signature in the fifth page of the Will. In cross, he stated that “it is not a fact that three-four months before the death of the Testator, he was sick and was not in proper mental condition to make the Will.” 20. P.W.3, Smti. Gouri Chanda, deposed that Arun Khasnabish put his signature in the Will in presence of the witnesses and thereafter Smti. Chanda also put her signature as one of the attesting witnesses in the said Will. 21. P.W. 4, Jyotirmoy Chakraborty, deposed that on 2.3.2005 at about 9.00 a.m., Arun khasnabish executed his last Will and Testament by putting his signature in his presence, one Advocate and a lady. Chanda also put her signature as one of the attesting witnesses in the said Will. 21. P.W. 4, Jyotirmoy Chakraborty, deposed that on 2.3.2005 at about 9.00 a.m., Arun khasnabish executed his last Will and Testament by putting his signature in his presence, one Advocate and a lady. Before putting his signature, the testator read the entire document and on being convinced that the Will was prepared according to his desire, he put his signature and thereafter, Shri Chakraborty also put his signature in the Will as one of the witnesses. 22. The opposite party appellant deposed herself as OPW No. 1. In her examination in chief, she stated that her marriage was solemnized on 14.8.1981 with Arun Khaasnobish at her father's residence at Teliamura in presence of their relatives and at the time of marriage, the petitioner respondent No. 1 was three years and petitioner respondent No. 2 was of two years. She also stated that after marriage, she was living with her husband in his house and after the death of her husband, she is living alone and the respondents left the said house. She has further stated that no will was executed by her husband in her house in presence of witnesses on 2.3.2005 and that is not the will of her husband and her husband before his death was seriously ill and as such, he was not in a position to execute any will in favour of the petitioner-respondents. 23. In cross, she stated that it is not a fact that she drove out the sons and daughters of her husband who were issues from his first wife and the Will already executed by her husband dated 2.3.2005 is genuine. 24. As the learned counsel for the respondents referred to Section 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act, it would be profitable to reproduce the same which read as under: “59. Person capable of making Wills.- Every persons of sound mind not being a minor may dispose of his property by Will. Explanation 1.- A married woman may dispose by Will of any property what she could alienate by her own act during her life. Explanation 2.-Persons who are deaf or dumb or blind are not thereby incapacitated for making a Will if they are able to know what they do by it. Explanation 1.- A married woman may dispose by Will of any property what she could alienate by her own act during her life. Explanation 2.-Persons who are deaf or dumb or blind are not thereby incapacitated for making a Will if they are able to know what they do by it. Explanation 3.- No person can make a Will while he, is in such a state of mind, whether arising from intoxication or from illness or from any other cause, that he does not know what he is doing.” 63. Execution of unprivileged Wills.- Every testator, not being a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare, (or an airman so employed or engaged,) or a mariner at sea, shall execute his Will according to the following rules: (a) The testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the Will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction. (b) The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will. (c) The Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.” 25. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on a number of judgments which are as follows: 1. Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh reported in AIR 1955 SC 346 . 2. H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma reported in AIR 1959 SC 443 . 3. Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb reported in AIR 1962 SC 567 . 4. Bhagat Ram v. Suresh, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 35 . 5. Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh reported in AIR 1955 SC 346 . 2. H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma reported in AIR 1959 SC 443 . 3. Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb reported in AIR 1962 SC 567 . 4. Bhagat Ram v. Suresh, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 35 . 5. Kanthi Ram Bora v. Dom Bora (deceased)(defendant) and his heirs and legal representatives, AIR 1975 Gau 50 . 6. Benga Behera v. Braja Kishore Nanda, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 3741. 26. The pith and substance of those judgments has been taken note of: 27. In Girja Datt Singh (supra) the Apex Court considered whether the attestation of the signature of the deceased on the will, Exbt-A36 was in accordance with the requirements of Section 63, Indian Succession Act and considering the fact and circumstances of that case the Apex Court held that: “…..In order to prove the due attestation of the will Ex. A-36 Gangotri would have to prove that Uma Dutt Singh and Badri Singh saw the deceased sign the will and they themselves signed the same in the presence of the deceased. The evidence of Uma Dutt Singh and Badri Singh is not such as to carry conviction in the mind of the Court that they saw the deceased sign the will and each of them appended his signature to the will in the presence of the deceased. They have been demonstrated to be witnesses who had no regard for truth and were ready and willing to oblige Gur Charan Lal in transferring the venue of the execution and attestation of the documents Ex. A-23 and Ex. A-36 from Gonda to Tarabganj for reasons best known to themselves. If no reliance could thus be placed upon their oral testimony, where would be the assurance that they actually saw the deceased execute the will in their presence and each of them signed the will in the presence of the deceased. It may as well be that the signature of the deceased on the will was appended at one time, the deceased being there all alone by himself and the attestations were made by Uma Dutt Singh and Badri Singh at another time without having seen the deceased sign the will or when the deceased was not present when they appended their signatures thereto in token of attestation. We have no satisfactory evidence before us to enable us to come to the conclusion that the will was duly attested by Uma Dutt Singh and Badri Singh and we are therefore unable to hold that the will Ex. A-36 is proved to have been duly executed and attested….. The result therefore is that the will dated 17-3-1928 is not proved to have been duly executed and attested…” 28. So in that case no reliance could be placed upon the testimony of the attesting witness that they actually saw the deceased execute the will in their presence and each of them signed the will in presence of the deceased. Therefore, the will in the said case was not proved. 29. In H. Venkatachala Iyengar (supra), considering the facts and circumstances, the trial court held that the proof of the signature of the testatrix on the will raised a presumption that the will had been executed by her. On appeal the High Court came to the conclusion that it was not shown that the testatrix fully understood the contents of the will and put a signature on the instrument intending that the recitals and the depositions in the will should be her recitals and depositions and the ultimately the Apex Court held: “What is the true legal position in the matter of proof of wills? It is well-known that the proof of wills presents a recurring topic for decision in courts and there are a large number of judicial pronouncements on the subject. The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under s. 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such handwriting under ss. 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Under s. 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such handwriting under ss. 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a court of law. Similarly, ss. 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant. Section 59 provides that every person of sound mind, not being a minor, may dispose of his property by will and the three illustrations to this section indicate what is meant by the expression “a person of sound mind” in the context. Section 63 requires that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and that the signature or mark shall be so made that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the will? Did he understand the nature and effect of the dispositions in the will? Did he put his signature to the will knowing what it contained? Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by s. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by s. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the, prudent mind in such matters. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document-propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature, in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred, in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical courts in England when they exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word ‘conscience’ in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in actions on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for the appreciation of the evidence. It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties.” 30. And the considering the suspicious circumstances of the will, the Apex Court inclined to hold that the High Court was justified in reversing the findings of the trial court on the question of the due and valid execution of the will and thus dismissed the appeal. 31. And the considering the suspicious circumstances of the will, the Apex Court inclined to hold that the High Court was justified in reversing the findings of the trial court on the question of the due and valid execution of the will and thus dismissed the appeal. 31. In Rani Purnima Debi (supra) the Apex Court again considered the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of will and held : There is no doubt that ‘if a will has been registered, that is a circumstance which may, having regard to the circumstances, prove its genuineness. But the mere fact that a will is registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists, without submitting the evidence of registration to a close examination. If the evidence as to registration on a close examination reveals that the registration was made in such a manner that it was brought home to the testator that the document of which he was admitting execution was a will disposing of his property and thereafter he admitted its execution and signed it in token thereof, the registration will dispel the doubt as to the genuineness of the will. But if the evidence as to registration shows that it was done in a perfunctory manner, that the officer registering the will did not read it over to the testator or did not bring home to him that he was admitting the execution of a will or did not satisfy himself in some other way (as, for example, by seeing the testator reading the will) that the testator knew that it was a will the execution of which he was admitting, the fact that the will Was registered would not be of much value. It is not unknown that registration may take place without the executant really knowing what he was registering. Law reports are full of cases in which registered wills have not been acted upon (see’ for example, Vellasaway Sarvai v. L. Sivaraman Servai, (1) Surendra Nath Lahiri v. Jnanendra Nath Lahiri (2) and Girji Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh) (3). It is not unknown that registration may take place without the executant really knowing what he was registering. Law reports are full of cases in which registered wills have not been acted upon (see’ for example, Vellasaway Sarvai v. L. Sivaraman Servai, (1) Surendra Nath Lahiri v. Jnanendra Nath Lahiri (2) and Girji Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh) (3). Therefore, the mere fact of registration may not by itself be enough to dispel all suspicion that may attach to the execution and attestation of a will; though the fact that there has been registration would be an important circumstance in favour of the will being genuine if the evidence as to registration establishes that the testator admitted the execution of the will after knowing that it was a will the execution of which he was admitting….. The question therefore is whether in the circumstances of the present case the evidence as to registration discloses that the testator knew that he was admitting the execution of a will when he is said to have put down his signature at the bottom of the will in the presence of Arabali. We have scrutinized that evidence carefully and we must say that the evidence falls short of satisfying us in the circumstances of this case that the testator knew that the document the execution of which he was admitting before Arabali and at the bottom of which he signed was his will. Therefore we are left with the bald fact of registration which in our opinion is insufficient in the circumstances of this case to dispel the suspicious circumstances which we have enumerated above. We are therefore not satisfied about the due execution and attestation of this will by the testator and hold that the propounder has been unable to dispel the suspicious circumstances which surround the execution and attestation of this will. In the circumstances, no letters of administration in favour of the respondent can ‘be granted on the basis of it.” 32. So in that case also, the suspicious circumstances about the execution and attestation of the will by the testator could not be removed. 33. In the circumstances, no letters of administration in favour of the respondent can ‘be granted on the basis of it.” 32. So in that case also, the suspicious circumstances about the execution and attestation of the will by the testator could not be removed. 33. In Bhagat Ram (supra), the Apex Court considered the following questions were considered: (i) Whether the formalities attached with the execution of will need to be carried out in relation to a codicil also, and if so, whether a codicil is also required to be proved in the same manner as a will? (ii) Whether a Registrar of Deeds can also be an attesting witness? (iii) Whether registration of will or codicil dispenses with the need of proving the execution and attestation of the will in the manner required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872? 34. And observed thus: We hold that the same rules of execution are applicable to a codicil which apply to a will to which the codicil relates. So also, the evidence adduced in proof of execution of a codicil must satisfy the same requirements as apply to proof of execution of a will. A Registrar of Deeds before he be termed an attesting witness, shall have to be called in the witness box. The court must feel satisfied by his testimony that what he did satisfies the requirement of being an attesting witness. This is the view taken by the High Court of Punjab in the several decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants and also in the Division Bench Decisions of the High Court of Calcutta in Earnest Bento Souza v. Johan Francis Souza, AIR [1958] Calcutta 440, and of the Orissa High Court in Kotni R.N. Subudhi v. V.R.L. Murthy Raju, AIR [1961] Orissa 180. Registration of a document does not dispense with the need of proving the execution and attestation of a document which is required by law to be proved in the manner as provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Registration of a document does not dispense with the need of proving the execution and attestation of a document which is required by law to be proved in the manner as provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Under Section 58 of the registration Act the Registrar shall endorse the following particulars on every document admitted to registration: (1) The date, hour and place of presentation of the document for registration: (2) The signature and addition of every person admitting the execution of the document, and, if such execution has been admitted by the representative, assign or agent of any person, the signature and addition of such representative, assign or agent; (3) The signature and addition of every person examined in reference to such document under any or the provisions of this Act, and (4) any payment of money or delivery of goods made in the presence of the registering officer in reference to the execution of the document, and any admission of receipt of consideration, in whole or in part, made in his presence in reference to such execution. Such particulars as are referred to in Sections 52 and 58 of the Registration Act are required to be endorsed by Registrar alongwith his signature and date on document under Section 59 and then certified under Section 60. A presumption by reference to Section 114 [Illustration (e)] of the Evidence Act shall arise to the effect that the events contained in the endorsement of registration, were regularly and duly performed and are correctly recorded. None of the endorsements, require to be made by the Registrar of Deeds under the Registration Act, contemplates the factum of attestation within the meaning of Section 63(c) of the Succession Act or Section 68 of the Evidence Act being endorsed or certified by the Registrar of Deeds. The endorsements made at the time of registration are relevant to the matters of the registration only [See: Kunwar Surendra Bahadur Singh v. Thakur Behari Singh, A.I.R. (1939) Privy Council 117]. On account of registration of a document, including a will or codicil, a presumption as to correctness or regularity of attestation cannot be drawn. Where in the facts and circumstances of a given case the Registrar of Deeds satisfies the requirement of an attesting witness, he must be called in the witness box to depose to the attestation. On account of registration of a document, including a will or codicil, a presumption as to correctness or regularity of attestation cannot be drawn. Where in the facts and circumstances of a given case the Registrar of Deeds satisfies the requirement of an attesting witness, he must be called in the witness box to depose to the attestation. His evidence would be liable to be appreciated and evaluated like the testimony of any other attesting witness. 35. And ultimately came to the conclusion that: “So far as the Will dated 16.5.1973 is concerned. its execution is neither denied nor disputed. The factum of the Will dated 16.5.1973 having been duly executed and attested was an admitted fact. The disputed fact was the execution and attestation of the codicil dated 21.5.1973. The codicil is not proved. The codicil cannot have the effect of explaining altering or adding to the depositions made by the Will dated 16.5.1973.” 36. In that case, with the will there was a codicil. The will though declared having been duly executed and attested, the codicil was not proved. 37. In Kanthi Ram Bora (supra) the decision of H. Venkatachala Iyengar (supra) and Rani Purnima Debi (supra) was referred. And it was held that: “The execution and registration of the will appear to have been effected in suspicious circumstances. It was the applicant who was taking a leading part in the matter. The will. Exbt.1. shows that the testator at the time was an old man of 93 years. The applicant took him as well as his wife, Puhita, to the office of the Sub-Registrar. He did not take any other people of his village into confidence and taken anybody from his village to the office of the sub-Registrar either to attest the execution of the will or to identify the testator. He solely relied on three professional petition writers. There is no evidence to show that the testator was in his proper mental capacity to execute the will and to show that he really understood that he executed the will and that he admitted the execution of the will before the sub-registrar or that he knew that the document he was going to register was a will. These suspicious circumstances have been strengthen by the following other circumstances. The first probate case (Misc. Case No. 39/60) was dismissed on 25.11.1961 as stated above. These suspicious circumstances have been strengthen by the following other circumstances. The first probate case (Misc. Case No. 39/60) was dismissed on 25.11.1961 as stated above. Thereafter the applicant took no step to obtain the probate for merely 6 years. Meanwhile, the respondent had filed Title Suit No. 31/60 in respect of the suit land and got a decree which was affirmed by the High Court in 1961. Only after that the present probate was filed. In these circumstances, the learned District Judge was justified in holding that the applicant failed to prove that the will was duly and validly executed by the alleged testator. There is also no evidence to show that the will in question was the last will of the alleged testator.” 38. Thus in that case, the execution and registration of the will appeared to have been effected in suspicious circumstances. Applicant failed to prove that the will was duly and validly executed by the alleged testator. 39. In Benga Behera (supra), the property owned was an old lady living in a math. Beneficiary was the respondent No. 1 who was totally stranger to the said lady. The beneficiary and his father was in a position to dominate her mental process. The original will was missing. So copy of the will was produced. Attesting witness has signed the will before testatrix had put her thumb. Circumstances surrounding execution of will was suspicious. The Apex Court concluded that the execution has not duly been proved. 40. So the facts and circumstances of all those cases are different than the case in hand. Therefore, the decisions on those cases are not helpful to the case of the appellant. 41. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has cited the following decisions in support of his contention. Now it would be appropriate to examine those decisions. 42. In Smt. Sushila Devi v. Pandit Krishna Kumar Missir, AIR 1971 SC 2236 , the Apex Court held that: “The evidence of Rai Brij Raj Krishna has also considerable significance. Undoubtedly he is a very respectable person. By profession he is an advocate. As mentioned earlier, his family was the patron of the testator. The witness appears to have been a personal friend of the testator. According to the witness sometime prior to his death the testator discussed with him about making a will. Undoubtedly he is a very respectable person. By profession he is an advocate. As mentioned earlier, his family was the patron of the testator. The witness appears to have been a personal friend of the testator. According to the witness sometime prior to his death the testator discussed with him about making a will. He told him that he is desirous of bequeathing all his properties to Govindmani Tripathi as he considered him as his adopted son. The witness advised him that he should bequeath some property to his second daughter also. But then the testator told him that he had given her some money and he proposed to give her some more money. But he would not be giving her any immovable property. This evidence, which is clearly acceptable goes to prove that the bequest made by the testator cannot be considered as unnatural.” 43. So Will bequeathing most of the property to the son and the husband of the pre-deceased daughter of the testator instead of his only living daughter who was comparatively affluent held not invalid when genuineness of his signature and execution was proved by witnesses including scribe and attesting witnesses who were respectable persons and found not unreliable. 44. Smt. Indu Bala bose v. Manindra Chandra Bose, AIR 1982 SC 133 wherein it was held: “Mr. S.S. Ray, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has not challenged the trial court's findings that the signatures of the testator and the signatures of the attesting witnesses on the will were genuine. In other words, the execution and the attestation of the will have not been challenged before us. The only submission of learned counsel is that the “suspicious circumstances” surrounding the execution of the will have not been satisfactorily explained by the propounders. 7. This Court has held that the mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by Section 63 of the Successions Act. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the will as genuine. Even where circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signatures of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the disposition made in the will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances, or there might be other indications in the will to show that the testator's mind was not free. In such a case the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate, even if the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations. (See AIR 1964 SC 529 , [1959] Suppl. 1 SCR 426 & [1962] 3 SCR 195). Needless to say that any and every circumstance is not a ‘suspicious’ circumstance. A circumstance would be ‘suspicious’ when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person… We do not find any suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the will. The circumstances pointed out by learned counsel are not only not suspicious but normal as pointed out above. The rule, as observed by the Privy Council, is that “where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable septicism, not as obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth. The rule, as observed by the Privy Council, is that “where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable septicism, not as obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth. (See 500 C.W.N. 895).” 45. In that case, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will have not been satisfactorily explained by the propounders. The Apex Court stated that every circumstance is not a suspicious circumstance. A circumstance would be suspicious when it is not normal or is not normally expected of a normal person and ultimately the Apex Court did not find any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. 46. In S. Sundaresa Pai v. Sumangala T. Pai (Mrs.), (2002) 1 SCC 630 , it was contended that the will in question was not registered in spite of the fact that the will executed by her husband was registered and the uneven distribution of the assets shows suspicious circumstances in respect of the execution of the will. Considering the facts and circumstances in that case, the Apex Court held “..The uneven distribution of assets amongst children, by itself, cannot be taken as a circumstance causing suspicion surrounding the execution of the will. One son was given bulk of immovable properties; another none; another half share in one immovable property; other half being given to the plaintiff and another daughter and husband were given nothing. It is also not in dispute that some properties were given in gift to the plaintiff by her mother during her life time. There was nothing unnatural. …This circumstance does not create doubt about the due execution of the will. There is nothing unnatural in the will made by the husband being registered and not that of his wife. Further, DW-2, an advocate of the family who was attesting witness of both the wills, explained in his testimony that because of the litigation in respect of the will of his wife, husband insisted that his will must be registered.” 47. There is nothing unnatural in the will made by the husband being registered and not that of his wife. Further, DW-2, an advocate of the family who was attesting witness of both the wills, explained in his testimony that because of the litigation in respect of the will of his wife, husband insisted that his will must be registered.” 47. So the Apex Court is of the view that even uneven distribution of assets amongst children by itself cannot be taken as a circumstance causing suspicious surrounding the execution of the will and that is the case at hand. 48. In Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage, (2002) 2 SCC 85 , the Apex court held that: “If after considering the matters before it, that is, the facts and circumstances as emanating from the material available on record of a given case, the court either believes that the will was duly executed by the testator or considers the existence of such fact so probable that any prudent person ought, under the circumstances of that particular case, to act upon the supposition that the will was duly executed by the testator, then the factum of execution of will shall be said to have been proved. …If there is nothing unnatural about the transaction and the evidence adduced satisfies the requirement of proving a will, the court would not return a finding of ‘not proved’ merely on account of certain assumed suspicion or supposition.” 49. In Pentakota Satyanarayana v. Pentakota Seetharatnam, (2005) 8 SCC 67, the respondents in that case contended that the propounders had taken a prominent part in the execution of the Will and that that was a suspicious circumstance and the exclusion of the natural heirs and grant of a lesser share to the legally wedded wife was a further suspicious circumstance. The Apex Court is of the view: “..The appellants being the profounder, the initial onus will be on them to prove execution of the Will. Thereafter, the onus would shift to the respondents. They have to establish their case of undue influence or coercion. Then the onus would shift to the appellants to remove the suspicious circumstances if any. ..It has also been held that the testator was hale and healthy and in a sound state of mind. The Will is a registered Will. Thereafter, the onus would shift to the respondents. They have to establish their case of undue influence or coercion. Then the onus would shift to the appellants to remove the suspicious circumstances if any. ..It has also been held that the testator was hale and healthy and in a sound state of mind. The Will is a registered Will. ..No evidence has been led in by the respondents to show the exercise of any fraud or undue influence at the time of execution of the Will. No evidence was adduced to show that the testator is not in sound state of mind and in fact, the finding is that he was of sound mind. In our opinion, the evidence adduced by the appellants/profounders are sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the Court of law that the Will was duly executed by the testator.” 50. The Apex Court held that the appellants being the propounder, the initial onus will be on them to prove execution of the will. Considering the facts and circumstances of that case it was held that the testator was in sound stated mind and the evidence adduced by the appellants/propounders are sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court of law that the will was duly executed by the testator and so is the case at hand. 51. In Leela Rajagopal v. Kamala Menon Cocharan, AIR 2015 SC 107 , the Apex Court held that: “A Will may have certain features and may have been executed in certain circumstances which may appear to be somewhat unnatural. Such unusual features appearing in a Will or the unnatural circumstances surrounding its execution will definitely justify a close scrutiny before the same can be accepted. It is the overall assessment of the Court on the basis of such scrutiny; the cumulative effect of the unusual features and circumstances which would weigh with the Court in the determination required to be made by it. The judicial verdict, in the last resort, will be on the basis of a consideration of all the unusual features and suspicious circumstances put together and not on the impact of any single feature that may be found in a Will or a singular circumstance that may appear from the process leading to its execution or registration. The judicial verdict, in the last resort, will be on the basis of a consideration of all the unusual features and suspicious circumstances put together and not on the impact of any single feature that may be found in a Will or a singular circumstance that may appear from the process leading to its execution or registration. This, is the essence of the repeated pronouncements made by this Court on the subject including the decisions referred to and relied upon before us. In the present case, a close reading of the Will indicates its clear language, and its unambiguous purport and effect. The mind of the testator is clearly discernible and the reasons for exclusion of the sons is apparent from the Will itself. Insofar as the place of execution is concerned, the inconsistency appearing in the verification filed along with the application for probate by PW-3 and the oral evidence of the said witness tendered in Court is capable of being understood in the light of the fact that the verification is in a standard form (Form No. 55) prescribed 13 Page 14 by the Madras High Court on the Original Side, as already noticed. Besides, in the facts of the present case the participation of the first respondent in the execution and registration of the Will cannot be said to be a circumstance that would warrant an adverse conclusion. The conduct of the first respondent in summoning her friend (PW-3) to be an attesting witness and in taking the testator to the office of the Sub Registrar should, again, not warrant any adverse conclusion. It also cannot escape notice that the Will dated 11.1.1982 is identical with the contents of the earlier Will dated 28.12.1981. Insofar as the execution of the Will dated 28.12.1981 and its registration is concerned no active participation has been attributed to the first respondent. The change of the attesting witnesses and the non-examination of Seetha Padmanabhan who had attested the second Will dated 11.1.1982 has been sufficiently explained.” 52. So it was held that a will may have certain features and may have been executed in certain circumstances which may appear to be somewhat unnatural. The mind of the testator was clearly discernible and the reasons for exclusion of the sons was also found apparent from the will itself in that case. 53. So it was held that a will may have certain features and may have been executed in certain circumstances which may appear to be somewhat unnatural. The mind of the testator was clearly discernible and the reasons for exclusion of the sons was also found apparent from the will itself in that case. 53. So it is well settled that the conscience of the court must be satisfied that the will in question was not only executed and attested in the manner required under the Indian Succession Act, but it should also be found that the said will was the product of the free volition of the executants who had voluntarily executed the same after knowing and understanding the contents of the will. 54. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the appellant are: [i] That the signature in the will was not the signature of the husband of the appellant. So the will in question is not the genuine one. [ii] That the will being an unregistered one, no reliance can be pleased upon the said will and suspicious circumstances are surrounding the will. [iii] That the will made to deprive of the share of the appellant who is the legally married wife of the testator. [iv] That no will was executed by the husband of the appellant i.e. the testator in his house in presence of the witnesses on 02.03.2005 and her husband was seriously ill before his death and he was not in a position to execute any Will in front of the respondents. 55. So to prove that the signature of the testator in the Will is genuine, the initial onus lies with the propounder, the respondents herein. The respondents have submitted the registered deed of sale No. 1-5016 and the prayer of testator which he made for extension of his service for three months after superannuation having his signature. Out of them, the deed is certainly an old document which carried the signature of the testator and the said prayer was a subsequent document at the time of retirement of the testator which also bore the signature of the testator. Out of them, the deed is certainly an old document which carried the signature of the testator and the said prayer was a subsequent document at the time of retirement of the testator which also bore the signature of the testator. The learned trial court compared the signature in both the documents with the signature of the testator in the Will and found the similarity and then came to the conclusion that the signature in the Will and the signature in those two documents are of the same person i.e. testator of the Will. Then the onus to prove that the Will in question is not the genuine one or the signature in the Will was not the original signature of the testator shift to the opposite party i.e. the appellant herein. It is transparent from the record that she did not produce any document before the trial court having signature of the testator to prove that the signature of the testator did not tally with the signature in the Will barring allegation that it was not the signature of the testator in the Will. No evidence has also been led in by the appellant to show the exercise of any fraud or undue influence at the time of execution of the Will. Rather this Court is of the opinion that the evidence adduced by the respondents are sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the Court of law that the Will was duly executed by the testator, as the two documents viz sale deed and the prayer for extension of service are two documents belonged to the testator, they were not manufactured by the respondents. 56. As regards the suspicious circumstances are concerned, this Court is of the view that every circumstance cannot be called a suspicious circumstance. A circumstance is considered suspicious when it is not in normal situation or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected from a normal person. In the instant case, the circumstances as referred to by the learned counsel are not only not suspicious but normal. Therefore, this Court is of the further opinion that the execution of the Will has been duly done and suspicious circumstances do not exist. 57. In Meenakshiammal (dead) through LRS v. Chandrasekaran, (2005) 1 SCC 280 , the Will in question was an unregistered Will. Therefore, this Court is of the further opinion that the execution of the Will has been duly done and suspicious circumstances do not exist. 57. In Meenakshiammal (dead) through LRS v. Chandrasekaran, (2005) 1 SCC 280 , the Will in question was an unregistered Will. The Apex Court held that “..the onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and proof of the signature of the testator, as required by law, is sufficient to discharge the onus.” 58. The Apex Court also held that “when the will is alleged to have been executed under undue influence, the onus of proving undue influence is upon the person making such allegation and mere presence of motive and opportunity are not enough” 59. In the said case the Apex Court further held “If there is nothing unnatural about the transaction and the evidence adduced satisfies the requirement of proving a will, the court would not return a finding of ‘not proved’ merely on account of certain assumed suspicion or supposition” 60. It is also alleged by the appellant that the Will in question was made to deprive of her share who is a legally married wife of the testator. If the testator of a Will bequest his property among his near and dear unevenly, it cannot be considered unnatural or the Will is invalid as because it is he, the testator, who knows the best how he will arrange distribution of his property in the Will amongst his own persons, even he may make uneven distribution of his property considering the status position of his own persons. He may give one son bulk of immovable property while other none or another half in one immovable property. On going through the Will, it would be evident that the testator has elaborately stated about distribution of his movable and immovable properties. So it is nothing unnatural and the circumstances do not create doubt about due execution of the Will, as the reasons for exclusion of the wife from some property are apparent from the Will itself. 61. On going through the Will, it would be evident that the testator has elaborately stated about distribution of his movable and immovable properties. So it is nothing unnatural and the circumstances do not create doubt about due execution of the Will, as the reasons for exclusion of the wife from some property are apparent from the Will itself. 61. The appellant has also made a contention that her husband i.e. the testator, before his death was seriously ill and he was not in a position to execute a Will in favour of the respondents and that the Will in question was also not executed in his house. 62. From the facts and circumstances as emanating from the materials available on record it would transpire that the testator was in a sound state of mind before execution of the Will. Though the appellant has mentioned that the testator was serious ill, no evidence particularly no medical evidence was adduced to show that the appellant was serious ill and that he lost his ability to execute any Will. Insofar as the place of execution is concerned, the two attesting witness one of which is an advocate, have clearly stated as to how the Will was prepared and where it was executed. So execution of the Will cannot be said to be a circumstance that would warrant an adverse conclusion. 63. A Will is nothing but reflection of the mind of the testator in disposal of his property. According to Section 59 of the Indian Succession Act, every person of sound mind, not being a minor, may dispose of his property by Will. So the testator being not minor has properly executed the Will. 64. In compliance of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, every testator shall execute his Will which shall be attested by two or more witnesses and that each of whom will see the testator sign the will. 65. In the instant case, the Will was signed by two attesting witnesses who put their signature in presence of the testator after the testator put his signature in the Will. Out of two witnesses, one witness PW-2 is an advocate who prepared the Will and handed other the same to the testator, the testator read the entire document and after being satisfied put his signature in the will. 66. Out of two witnesses, one witness PW-2 is an advocate who prepared the Will and handed other the same to the testator, the testator read the entire document and after being satisfied put his signature in the will. 66. P.W. 3 is the other attesting witness who stated in her deposition that the testator put his signature in the Will in presence of the witnesses and thereafter she also put her signature as one of the attesting witnesses in the Will. 67. Another witness is PW-4 who was also present at the time of execution of the Will and he put his signature in the Will as one of the witnesses. 68. Therefore, the provisions of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act have been complied with. The appellant has failed to prove that the Will was not duly and validly executed by the testator. 69. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, this Court is of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the trial court which calls for interference. The appeal devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 70. Send down the LCRs.