JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. Award dated 8.12.2000 passed in I.D. Case No.79 of 1997 (C) passed by the Industrial Tribunal is under challenge whereby and where under following reference has been made by the appropriate government on 26.05.1995; “Whether the action of the management of Rampur Colliery, Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd., P.O.-Brajrajnagar, Dist-Jharsuguda in terminating the services of Sri Anirudha Mahanadia, At-Khindapada, P.O.-Lamtibahal, Dist-Jharsuguda vide management’s letter dated 13.07.1992 was justified ? if not, what relief the workman is entitled to ?” 2. Case of the petitioner-management is that the opposite party-workman was working as Badli Loader and was a habitual absentee from work for which his service could not be regularized and he was finally charge-sheeted on 13.11.1991 for his habitual unauthorized absence, receiving the charge-sheet, he did not submit reply, therefore enquiry committee was constituted, he was noticed to attend the enquiry but did not attend and therefore the enquiry was conducted ex-parte and the Enquiry Officer gave finding holding him guilty, ultimately he was terminated from service on 13.07.1992. According to the management, the enquiry was conducted in fair and proper manner following the principle of natural justice. 3. While on the other hand, case of the opposite party-workman is that he was working as Badli Loader under the management of Hemgir-Rampur Colliery of Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. w.e.f. 27.11.1978, due Identity Card was issued but after more than 13 years of service, he was removed from service vide order passed in this regard on 13.07.1992 verbally without assigning any reason against which he has made series of representations before the management but however to no effect, so he has preferred an appeal before the Asst. Labour Commissioner, Central Rourkela on 28.04.1993 and the Asst. Labour Commissioner has issued notice to the management and the management after receiving notice, conducted a departmental proceeding on the ground of allegations of unauthorized absence from duty. The charge-sheet was also antedated, no enquiry notice was served upon him, enquiry was conducted as ex-parte, copy of the finding of the enquiry proceeding was not given to him and as such without following the principle of natural justice, he has been terminated from service. 4. The charge-sheet was also antedated, no enquiry notice was served upon him, enquiry was conducted as ex-parte, copy of the finding of the enquiry proceeding was not given to him and as such without following the principle of natural justice, he has been terminated from service. 4. The dispute ultimately culminated into a reference vide reference dated 26.05.1995 referring the matter before the Industrial Tribunal to answer the reference with respect to the action of the Rampur Colliery, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. in terminating the service of the opposite party-workman vide management letter dated 13.07.1992. 5. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the award, it is evident that the Tribunal has formulated altogether three issues that are as follows:- i. Whether the domestic enquiry conducted against the 2nd party workman is fair and proper. ii. Whether the action of management in terminating the services of Sri Anirudha Mahanadia vide management’s letter dated 13.07.1992 was justified ? iii. If not, what relief the workman is entitled to ? All the issues have been taken together, so far as the fairness of domestic enquiry is concerned, the Tribunal has appreciated the evidence of W.W.1 who has categorically stated that after his termination, when he has appealed before the Asst. Labour Commissioner (C) vide Ext.1 and the A.L.C. (C) called both the parties for conciliation and in the conciliation meeting, the management for the first time disclosed that there was domestic enquiry against him and as per that enquiry he was dismissed from service. He further stated that he was never served with charge-sheet on any date. He was not served with any enquiry report or dismissal order. 6. The M.W.1 who being an office Superintendent of Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., the management-petitioner herein has stated that for habitual absence, the opposite party-workman was charge-sheeted on 13.11.1991 vide Ext.C, charge-sheet was served upon him personally through Office Peon vide Ext.D. The opposite party-workman did not reply to the charge-sheet and thereafter the management constituted enquiry committee vide Ext.E, but he was the management representative in that enquiry. The Enquiry Officer issued enquiry notice vide Ext.F, G, and H for different dates to the opposite party-workman and the attendance clerk served the enquiry notice upon him but he has not chosen to attend the enquiry and accordingly enquiry was conducted ex-parte. The Enquiry Officer issued enquiry notice vide Ext.F, G, and H for different dates to the opposite party-workman and the attendance clerk served the enquiry notice upon him but he has not chosen to attend the enquiry and accordingly enquiry was conducted ex-parte. The enquiry proceeding was produced by way of Ext.J and the enquiry report as Ext.K. The enquiry report disclosed that the charge leveled against opposite party-workman was established and thereafter the disciplinary authority terminated the service vide Ext.L. He proved the certificate of attendance Clerk namely Birsa Munda regarding serving of enquiry notice on the opposite party-workman. He proved Ext.M as the certificate of Peon Gunasagar Sahu regarding serving of the termination notice on opposite party-workman. 7. The Tribunal after taking into consideration the rival submission of the parties, the deposition and the evidence produced before, it has come to conclusion that the management has not proved that charge-sheet was actually served upon opposite party-workman since the opposite party-workman denied of receiving notice. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion on the basis of the deposition of M.W.2, who claims about the serving of the same on opposite party-workman who received it putting signature on the Peon Book and that Peon Book is available in the office and as such according to the Tribunal, the Peon Book being the best piece of evidence to prove that enquiry notice was actually served upon opposite party-workman but Peon Book has not been proved. There is also no evidence that the enquiry finding was served upon opposite party-workman without serving the same, punishment has been awarded and thereafter the Tribunal has given a conscious finding that the management has not at all proved that the charge-sheet was served upon opposite party-workman, enquiry notice was served upon him, enquiry finding and dismissal order was also served upon him. Thereafter, domestic enquiry was conducted violating the principle of natural justice and accordingly answered the reference by holding the workman to be entitled to reinstate with full back wages. 8. Thereafter, domestic enquiry was conducted violating the principle of natural justice and accordingly answered the reference by holding the workman to be entitled to reinstate with full back wages. 8. The award has been challenged by the management on the ground that even assuming the ground of the opposite party-workman is that he has not been provided with charge-sheet or with copy of the enquiry report, the order of reinstatement should not have been passed by the Tribunal rather the Tribunal ought to have remitted the matter before the petitioner-management to take de novo enquiry but that have not been done. 9. In order to substantiate his argument, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vrs. B. Karunakar & Ors, (1993) 4 SCC 727 wherein at paragraph 31 their Lordships have been pleased to hold that merely on account of non-furnishing the second show cause notice before inflicting major punishment, the order of dismissal will not be said to be vitiated in the eye of law unless the delinquent employee has shown as to how he is prejudiced by non-supply of second show cause notice before inflicting major punishment, but after going through the finding given by the Presiding Officer in the award impugned in this writ petition, we found no where that the petitioner has taken the point as to how he is prejudiced by non-supply of copy of the second show cause notice and as such this ground is not available to the petitioner and on this ground the order of dismissal cannot be said to be vitiated in the eye of law. 10. 10. In order to appreciate the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner-management, we have gone into the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.D. ECIL (supra), wherein their Lordships has been pleased to hold that non-supply of copy of the proposed punishment by way of second show cause notice if not supplied the order of punishment or the entire departmental proceeding, rather the delinquent employee is to satisfy that due to non-supply of the proposed punishment in the shape of second show cause notice has prejudiced his case and only in case of prejudice having been caused to the delinquent employee, the punishment or the departmental proceeding can be said to be vitiated ? 11. In the light of this proposition, now it is to be discussed the facts of this case. The facts of this case is entirely different to that of the case which is the subject matter of the case of Managing Director, ECIL (supra). In that case, charge-sheet has been supplied to the delinquent employee and the delinquent employee has participated in the enquiry and after guilt having been proved by the Enquiry Officer, the same has been forwarded to the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority while inflicting punishment by accepting the finding of the Enquiry Officer since has not issued second show cause notice, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held prejudice has been caused to the delinquent employee is to be demonstrated for assailing the order of punishment due to non-supply of the second show cause notice. But the fact of this case is that the opposite party-workman was serving under the petitioner-management for last 13 years and all of a sudden he has been terminated from service verbally and when he has made an application before the Asst. Labour Commissioner only then he came to know that he has been dismissed from service by holding a domestic enquiry. 12. Labour Commissioner only then he came to know that he has been dismissed from service by holding a domestic enquiry. 12. The grievance of the opposite part-workman is that the charge-sheet has not been served to him, no notice of proceeding has ever been served, enquiry report has not been supplied and even the order of termination has served upon him, however this contention of the opposite party-workman has been disbelieved by the petitioner-management by relying upon the evidence that the charge-sheet, notice to appear in the domestic enquiry and the order of dismissal has been supplied but the opposite party-workman has refused to receive it, but the foremost important evidence to support this contention of the petitioner-management is the “Peon Book” has never been produced before the Tribunal and thereafter the Tribunal has not relied upon the oral deposition not being supported by any documentary evidence and has held that the domestic enquiry has not been conducted fairly. 13. Thus, in this case the opposite party-workman has been denied with an opportunity to defend himself regarding the charge of unauthorized absence before passing the order of major punishment of dismissal from service. If a delinquent employee or the workman has not even been supplied with the memorandum of charge-sheet, no notice of departmental proceeding, there is no question of establishing any prejudice by the workman, it is for the reason that questioning to establish prejudice will only come, if the workman or the delinquent employee will know about the proceeding against him and if any proceeding has been initiated without any information of the workman, it will be said that the disciplinary authority has acted in arbitrary manner and without following the principle of natural justice and this is not the intention of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Managing Director, ECIL (supra). In that case, the delinquent employee has been served with the charge and once delinquent employee has participated in the enquiry proceeding in that condition prejudice is to be shown by the delinquent employee in case of non-supply of the second show cause notice, but here in this case right from the beginning even the charge has not been supplied to the workman as has been referred by the Tribunal in the award. 14. 14. Hence, according to us, the judgment rendered in the case of Managing Director, ECIL (supra) is not at all applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case and further also for the reason that in that case the departmental proceeding was initiated against the service rule and not before the Tribunal in order to answer the reference and once the appropriate government has referred a reference before the Tribunal to answer it, the Tribunal is quite competent enough to see fairness of enquiry in order to prevent unfair labour practice and that is the intent of the Industrial Disputes Act being a social beneficial legislation. 15. After going through the finding given by the Tribunal which has been discussed in detail and also after taking into consideration that the vital piece of evidence i.e., the “Peon Book” since not been produced in order to substantiate the charge, the Tribunal has not accepted the plea of the petitioner-management and has come to the conclusion that the enquiry has not been conducted fairly rather in complete violation of principle of natural justice and accordingly award of reinstatement with full back wages has been passed. 16. It is settled that, if any document is lying with the management, it is its duty to produce before the tribunal or court of law and if it is not produced before the tribunal, it amounts to playing with the court and in a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vrs. Jagannath reported in AIR 1994 SC 853 , it has been held that suppression of vital documents by the authority which is relevant for litigation is fraud upon the court. 17. So far as question of back wages is concerned, we are of the considered view that the tribunal after taking into consideration the fact that the opposite party – workman has illegally been terminated from the service and as such awarded full back wages. 18. The matter of full back wages has been discussed in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vrs. 18. The matter of full back wages has been discussed in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vrs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and Others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 wherein their lordships have been pleased to hold that awarding back wages by the Tribunal cannot be said to be improper and accordingly it is held to be proper and as such in view of proposition laid down therein, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal has not committed any error rather the tribunal has given conscious finding considering the fact that denying to work will lead hardship not only to workman rather to his family members and has rightly passed the award of full back wages. 19. So far as the interference of the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of the India can judicially review the finding given by the Tribunal, if the finding is perverse but nothing has been brought on record to suggest that the finding given by the Tribunal is perverse. Hence, there is no reason to interfere with the finding given by the Tribunal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court by its Full Bench in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K. S. Radhakrishnan and others reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein at paragraph-7 their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” the proposition laid down in the case of Syed Yakoob is still holds good. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” the proposition laid down in the case of Syed Yakoob is still holds good. After going through the settled proposition of law which still hold good as has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s.Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 20. Thus, it is evident that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the fact finding on issuing writ of certiorari, if the order is without jurisdiction or the finding is perverse or there is any error apparent on the face of record. 21. After going through the award, we are of the considered view that no such exception is available to make interference with the finding given by the Tribunal. Accordingly we decline to interfere with the same. In view thereof, the writ petition is dismissed having no merit.