Their Workmen represented by Secretary Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Congress v. Employers in relation to the management of Khas Kusunda Colliery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited
2016-04-28
SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, VIRENDER SINGH
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. There are all 31 workmen, who were represented through the Union namely, Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Congress (hereinafter referred as workmen) raised a dispute which was referred for adjudication vide, Reference No.96/1993, in which an award dated 5th June, 1997 was passed in favour of workmen directing the respondent management of Khas Kusunda Colliery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, (hereinafter referred as B.C.C.L) to take them in regular service and to pay 25% of full back wages with effect from 01.11.1992. The said award was challenged by B.C.C.L through the medium of CWJC No. 274/1998(R), which petition was ultimately allowed vide impugned order dated 16th May, 2006 by learned Single Judge observing that the award dated 5th June, 1997 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference No. 96/1993 was perverse and that the workmen had raised the dispute after considerable delay. Aggrieved of the said order, workmen are before us through the medium of the instant Letters Patent Appeal, which is on board since the year 2006 and now taken up for its final consideration. 2. Heard learned counsel for both the sides, gone through the impugned judgment, award dated 5th June, 1997 and other relevant documents available on Writ Court records. 3. Learned counsel appearing for workmen appellants contended that in the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge while holding the aforesaid award as perverse has not assigned any reason. He submitted that even otherwise there appears to be no delay at the end of the workmen as the dispute was raised by them with the management in the year 1981 and they had worked till the end of 1976, thus if there was any delay on their part, it was of hardly 4 years and not from the year 1977 to 1991 which should not stare at them for the rejection of the award which they earned in their favour. 4. We do not find substance in the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the workmen. At the very outset, when a pertinent query was put to learned counsel for the workmen as to how many workmen out of 31 have reached the stage of superannuation, he is not in a position to take a categorical stand in this regard. Be that as it may, we for our satisfaction have calculated the period.
At the very outset, when a pertinent query was put to learned counsel for the workmen as to how many workmen out of 31 have reached the stage of superannuation, he is not in a position to take a categorical stand in this regard. Be that as it may, we for our satisfaction have calculated the period. It is the case pleaded by the workmen that they had joined management in the year 1970 and worked till the end of 1976. Assuming for the sake of argument that if all the workmen at the time of joining management were of 18 years, which is the minimum age for employment, by now their age turns out to be of about 64 years. This is the minimum age, which all of them must have attained by now, otherwise it is quite possible that many of them or some of them must have attained more than 18 years at the time of joining the establishment. This is one aspect of the matter, which can be taken against the workmen appellants while considering the direction for their reinstatement. Even otherwise on merits also, appellants workmen have no case. The impugned judgment of learned Single Judge has assigned reasons for setting aside the award dated 5th June, 1997 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad which we find in paras 9 and 10 of the impugned judgment, which read as under:- “9. I am satisfied that the finding of the tribunal that the workmen worked regularly during 1970-1976 on the job which was of permanent nature, is perverse. The onus was on the Union to prove the same which it failed to discharge. The Management produced the measurement books to show that Jamir Ansari was actually a contractor. The name of the workmen did not find place in the statutory Form-B register (Exts. M-2 and M-2/1). Further when the Management asserted that Ext.W1, the copy of the alleged letter dated 20.5.1977 was a fabricated document, the tribunal was absolutely wrong in drawing adverse inference for non-production of the original of the same by the Management. 10. Moreover, the claim was wholly stale. Admittedly the Union alleged that the workmen were stopped from working in the beginning of 1977. But the dispute was raised in November, 1991. There is no satisfactory material to justify such a long delay.
10. Moreover, the claim was wholly stale. Admittedly the Union alleged that the workmen were stopped from working in the beginning of 1977. But the dispute was raised in November, 1991. There is no satisfactory material to justify such a long delay. The tribunal justified the delay saying that there is no limitation under the Industrial Disputes Act and that the workmen were agitating their grievances.” 5. Not only that, huge delay and latches is also one of the grounds taken against the workmen by learned Single Judge and in this regard, learned Writ Court has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Bank v. Neelam reported in (2005) 5 SCC 91 , wherein their Lordships while dealing with the issue of delay and latches observed that “The aim and object of the Industrial Disputes Act may be to impart social justice to the workmen but the same by itself would not mean that irrespective of his conduct a workman would automatically be entitled to relief.” 6. Analysing the submissions of learned counsel for the workmen on any counts, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of learned Writ Court calling indulgence of this Court. Resultantly, the instant appeal deserves dismissal. Ordered accordingly. Appeal dismissed.